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The annual Public finances in EMU report was launched in 2000, one year after the Stability and 
Growth Pact took full effect. The objective, then as now, was to bring together in a single publication 
a review of key developments in the area of public finances in the Member States of the euro area and 
the EU as a whole. Over the years, thanks to the professionalism and dedication of the staff of the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, the report has established a prominent place 
in the debate on fiscal policy in the EU. Judging from the valuable feedback that we regularly receive 
the report has become an important reference for practitioners and academics involved in the analysis 
of fiscal policy making and surveillance in the EU.  
The content of this year's report is based on the well-known and successful formula of past years, 
essentially consisting of three major elements. The first element is a detailed description and analysis 
of recent budgetary developments and an assessment of the outlook over the coming years. This 
covers both the aggregate level, i.e. the euro area and the EU as a whole, and the individual Member 
States. The focal point of this year's analysis is the fiscal position achieved in 2007 against the wide 
margins of uncertainty attached to the short-term prospects. In spite of the still significant differences 
across countries, last year the headline deficit in the euro area and the EU as a whole reached its 
lowest level in decades. However, an array of adverse developments such as the US slowdown, the 
turmoil in financial markets, and record-high oil and commodity prices could jeopardise the fiscal 
adjustment achieved so far. If more progress had been made towards sustainable fiscal positions over 
the past years of high economic growth it would certainly have diminished potential risks to public 
finances in the medium term. 
The second element of the report is an examination of the EU’s fiscal surveillance framework. It 
contains a comprehensive account and analysis of how the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact 
are implemented in practice, including proposals for improvements. This year’s report calls attention 
to two issues: it discusses ways to improve (i) the assessment of the structural budget balance, which 
together with the revised Stability and Growth Pact has become the key instrument in the toolbox of 
EU fiscal surveillance, and (ii) the measurement and coverage of the quality of public finances.  
The quality of public finances is also the third element of the report. In the past, the scope of this issue 
was largely limited to examining the composition of expenditure with some attempts being made to 
assess the effectiveness of individual expenditure categories. In this year's report we try to establish a 
more comprehensive framework bringing together the different yet interlinked dimensions of the 
quality of public finances and to provide some initial empirical illustrations of this framework. This is 
an ambitious project and will be further developed in subsequent issues of the report.  
As in the past the ultimate success of our report will depend on the comments, reactions and input that 
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Recent budgetary development, prospects and risks 
On the back of favourable economic conditions and buoyant revenue 
developments, public finances continued to improve significantly in 2007. 
The general government deficit fell to 0.6% of GDP in the euro area and 
1.0% of GDP in the EU. Structural fiscal deficits are estimated to be at 
their lowest levels since the early 1970s. The budgetary improvements 
were broad based as 17 Member States recorded stronger fiscal positions 
in 2007 than in 2006. As a result, public debt dropped below the 60% of 
GDP threshold in the EU and is approaching this reference value in the 
euro area (Section I.1). 
At the same time, Member States subject to the dissuasive arm of the 
Stability and Growth Pact have made considerable advances toward 
correcting their excessive deficits. With the abrogations of excessive 
deficit procedures for the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal and Slovakia 
(June 2008), procedures remain active only concerning two non-euro-area 
members, Hungary and Poland, with the latter expected to come soon to a 
close. However, the fiscal outlook for the United Kingdom has 
deteriorated and the government expects the deficit to exceed the 3% of 
GDP reference value in 2008/2009, resulting in the Commission initiating 
a new excessive deficit procedure vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. 
Progress under the preventive arm of the Pact has been somewhat more 
uneven. On the one hand, most Member States have reached or are close 
to reaching their medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs). These 
budgetary improvements have helped to significantly lift the outlook for 
long-term debt sustainability (Section I.4). To cover their current level of 
debt and the future cost of ageing, on average Member States would need 
to undertake and maintain a fiscal effort of 2½% of GDP based on their 
2007 fiscal positions (down by ½ percentage point from last year). 
However, the overall risk classification of the EU Member States remains 
broadly unchanged with Portugal having been upgraded to 'medium risk' 
largely because of the expected positive effects of the 2006/2007 pension 
reform.  
On the other hand, in a number of countries little progress has been made 
toward medium-term budgetary objectives. In particular in France, 
disappointing macroeconomic performance is combined with a stalling 
structural budgetary consolidation and the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast projects a deficit of 2.9% of GDP in 2008 and 3% in 2009. 
In Romania, macroeconomic imbalances have been on the rise and, 
despite some recent budgetary measures, the Commission services' 2008 
spring forecast projected the headline deficit to be just below the 3% of 
GDP threshold in 2008 and at 3.7% of GDP in 2009. Against this 
backdrop, on 28 May 2008 and 11 June 2008 respectively the 
Commission addressed a policy advice to France and Romania. In 
particular, it recommended both Member States to implement rigorously 
the policy invitations of the Council issued on 12 February 2008 on the 
2007 update of their stability and convergence programmes. Further it 
encouraged France to pursue with determination the ongoing structural 
reform process and Romania to take urgent action to implement a binding 
Fiscal positions 
improved in 2007 … 
… leading to the 
abrogation of several 
excessive deficit 
procedures. 
Progress toward MTOs 
in many Member 
States could mitigate 
the sustainability 
challenge. 
But the stalling 
consolidation progress 
in France and 
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medium-term fiscal framework and to accelerate structural reforms 
(Section I.2). The Commission policy advice was used for the first time 
after this instrument had been introduced with the 2005 reform of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. In contrast to other instruments, such as the 
early policy warning, it can be issued directly by the Commission, i.e. 
without the involvement of the Council, and can be used in a wide range 
of circumstances not limited to a deviation from budgetary targets. 
Looking forward, EU Member States face stiff challenges in safeguarding 
their fiscal consolidation gains. They derive from policy short-comings in 
2007, and from the unusual uncertainties about the economic outlook 
(Section I.3). 
First, in most Member States, revenue windfalls as well as the better-than-
expected 2006 outcomes were at least partly used to cover expenditure 
slippages. This runs contrary to the policy advice in the Council opinions 
on the 2006 updated stability and convergence programmes (SCPs) and, 
for the euro-area countries, the commitments made in spring 2007, 
notably "to implement their 2007 budget as planned, avoiding 
expenditure overruns and using unexpected extra revenues for deficit and 
debt reduction" (1). While the jury is still out on the actual drivers of the 
tax buoyancy in 2006 and 2007, experience suggests that a significant 
part of it may be short-lived. Specifically, the favourable asset price cycle 
and the boom in corporate profits, which gave rise to extra revenues in the 
past two years, have come or are coming to a close.  
And second, there is a distinct risk that assumptions on medium-term 
growth prospects that underpin the current assessment of structural fiscal 
deficits and budgetary plans turn out to be on the high side. European 
Commission analysis indicates that many business cycle indicators, such 
as the rate of capacity utilisation in the manufacturing industry, suggest 
that the EU was operating in 2007 significantly above potential (i.e. in 
'good times') and may now have reached its peak. However, the output 
gap estimates used for determining Member States structural fiscal 
deficits, which are based on a production function approach, still 
indicated that the EU economy was operating at its potential level. A 
similar constellation occurred in spring 2000 when the output gap was 
estimated at -1¼% of GDP and later revised upwards to +2% of GDP, 
implying that the structural balance at the time was overestimated by 
about 1½% of GDP. While revisions of similar size are unlikely given 
methodological improvements in measuring output gaps, significant 
corrections may still occur. 
Member States' budgetary plans for 2008 and beyond need to be viewed 
against the backdrop of these risks. The updated SCPs foresee largely 
unchanged structural deficits for 2008 for the EU and the euro area (about 
1% and ¾% of GDP respectively) and small improvements for 2009-
2010. Budgetary outcomes could be worse if windfall revenues unwind. 
Moreover, as in the past many fiscal plans in the SCPs envisage 
expenditure cuts to be coupled with declines in the revenue share which 
                                                          
(1) "Eurogroup spring orientation debate on budgetary policies: Orientations for fiscal policies in euro area Member States", 20 
April 2007. 
Risks for the short-term 




2010 is insufficient. 




entails considerable risks when considering the track record of frequent 
expenditure overruns.  
In case downside risks to growth materialise, many Member States have 
considerable room to let automatic stabilisers play thanks to the recent 
structural improvements in their budgetary positions while others are in a 
more difficult situation because of their delayed consolidation efforts in 
the past. In the light of the daunting medium- and long-term challenges 
for fiscal policy, those Member States that have not yet achieved their 
medium-term budgetary objectives should therefore continue to adjust 
their structural balances and let automatic stabilisers only play around this 
adjustment path while also adhering to the 3% deficit limit.  
Improving budgetary surveillance 
Overall, the corrective arm of the Pact has been working well but the 
functioning of the preventive arm could be further improved as 
highlighted in the Commission communication accompanying the Public 
finances in EMU − 2007 report. (1) In particular, greater medium- and 
long-term orientation of fiscal policy needs to be supported by developing 
or strengthening indicators in three interlinked areas. 
A comprehensive set of information and indicators on quality of public 
finances (QPF) would allow fiscal surveillance to be broadened. Based on 
the conceptual framework for QPF and empirical links between QPF and 
growth set out in Section III, Section II.1.2 highlights a range of useful 
indicators as well as options on how to structure and combine the needed 
variables. This reflects ongoing work by the Commission services, in 
cooperation with Member States, on assembling relevant data from a 
range of internal and external sources.  
Given the complexity of QPF, it cannot be captured in a single number, 
such as the sustainability indicator, but a broader range is needed. Bearing 
in mind these and other caveats, the report gives an illustrative example 
for constructing composite indicators for five dimensions of QPF. The 
preliminary results reveal that differences in QPF are large among 
Member States with no country outperforming on all fronts. 
QPF indicators should be supplemented by country-specific information 
that could be based on Member States' SCPs. Currently however, most 
countries fall short of the Code of Conduct's requirements as regards the 
form and content on reporting on QPF (Section II.1.3). For example, only 
a few Member States report on the budgetary impact of qualitative 
measures and changes in the fiscal framework.  
The measurement of public sector productivity in national accounts is 
another useful approach for capturing QPF (Section II.1.4). The concept 
of productivity, like that of efficiency, requires information about outputs 
and inputs, but since no market prices exist for public sector output, 
output was in the past equated with input or costs. Today however, this 
method is only applied for collective public services (supplied 
                                                          
(1) See "Ensuring the effectiveness of the preventive arm of the SGP" (COM(2007) 316 final). 
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simultaneously to an entire community, e.g. defence and security). For 
individual public services (supplied to individual members or groups in a 
community, e.g. medical care and education), Eurostat invited Member 
States instead to define output measures by 2006. For instance, for 
education hours of teaching per pupil was adopted as a quantity (output) 
indicator for primary and secondary schools while for health the number 
of treatments is used as an output. Application of the output method, 
however, caused problems in some countries, for example in the United 
Kingdom, since without taking into account the quality of public services 
changes in productivity are not accurately captured. The influential 
'Atkinson Report', commissioned by the British government, proposed 
ways to address these short-comings by measuring efficiency through 
outcome measures. Based on these findings, Eurostat defined the outcome 
methods as the most appropriate, but in practice it turned out that some 
countries have difficulties even to eliminate the input method. 
Consequently, outcome methods have not been incorporated in the core 
accounts of the system of national accounting but only in some 'satellite 
accounts'. 
In addition to developing QPF indicators, the core indicator for fiscal 
surveillance, the structural fiscal balance, could be further improved 
through some technical changes. As detailed in the Public finances in 
EMU − 2007 report, the structural budget balance provides on average a 
reasonably accurate measure of the underlying budget balance, but the 
indicator sends misleading messages when the cycle is close to a turning 
point or when economic growth is significantly more tax rich than in 
'normal' years. Section II.2.1 suggests approaches to improve on both 
points.  
To better capture the first aspect, i.e. the real-time cyclical position, the 
proposed strategy would be to supplement the commonly agreed 
methodology for the calculation of potential output and the output gap 
with indicators that are less prone to revisions, such as survey-based 
indicators including proxies for the rate of capacity utilisation of 
production factors. The analysis compares the real-time output gap 
estimates using the current production function approach with two 
alternative econometric techniques: a purely statistical method making 
use of a broad set of indicators and an extended production function 
method integrating the rate of capacity utilisation. The results show that 
the two alternative methods and in particular the extended production 
function approach, improve notably the real-time output gap estimates, 
opening avenues for future improvement of the current methodology. 
The work aimed at dealing with the second measurement problem, short-
term fluctuations in the tax content of GDP, turns out to be more 
complex. On the one hand, the results clearly suggest some key factors 
behind the varying tax elasticities, such as changes in the composition of 
GDP. On the other hand, to appropriately use them to cleanse the budget 
balance of cyclical fluctuations one would need to know, for example, the 
equilibrium levels of consumption, the wage share in GDP, or asset 
prices. Even if a clear and unique answer to this question could be given, 
it would involve a complex theoretical apparatus, which would weigh 
considerably on the operational side of an indicator. Section II.2.1 
The structural deficit 
measure could be 
refined ... 
… by assessing 
alternative indicators 
for the cyclical 
position. 
But dealing with tax 
elasticity fluctuations is 
not straight-forward. 




provides some quantification of the impact of composition effects which 
can help to understand part of the evolution of taxes in recent years. 
To fully capture the Member States sustainability challenges, the 
reformed SGP provides for medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs) to 
be revised to also include implicit liabilities resulting from population 
ageing. On this basis, the Commission has, over the past two years, 
worked in consultation with the relevant Council committees on the 
criteria for updating the definition of the MTOs. Since last year's progress 
report that outlined alternative options, the Commission services have put 
forward a detailed proposal on defining the new MTOs that would ensure 
progress towards sustainability, convergence of outstanding government 
debt towards 'prudent levels' and a safety margin against breaching the 
3% of GDP fiscal deficit reference value of the Treaty; the key 
outstanding issues are set out in Section II.2.2. 
Analytical sections 
Improving the quality of public finances (QPF) has increasingly received 
greater attention by policy makers and provides a promising avenue to 
broaden and deepen fiscal and economic surveillance under the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) and the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs − a 
key aspect of the Commission's three-pillar agenda for the second decade 
of EMU. (1) The new focus is largely a response to preparing the 
European economies for a dual challenge: (i) their ageing populations, 
which jeopardise the sustainability of public finances unless the 
consolidation process is continued and accompanied by structural reforms 
that reduce the budgetary cost of ageing and (ii) increasing exposure to 
global competition, which puts pressure on EU governments to lower the, 
on average, relatively high tax, administrative and regulatory burden and 
to improve the provision of public services and goods, so as to deliver the 
much-requested better value for money. Better QPF can help tackle both 
challenges: either directly through fiscal consolidation and pension 
reforms (as called for under the SGP) or indirectly by contributing to 
sufficient long-term growth as expenditure and revenue systems are 
becoming more efficient and less distortionary (as called for under the 
Lisbon Strategy).  
The two analytical parts of the report provide a conceptual framework for 
QPF, review and assess the empirical links to economic growth and 
provide specific policy options in raising the efficiency of tax systems.  
The quality of public finance: a conceptual framework 
QPF can be viewed as a concept with many dimensions. In this analysis it 
encompasses all arrangements and operations of fiscal policy that support 
the macroeconomic goals of fiscal policy, in particular long-term 
economic growth. The impact on growth can run in principle through (i) 
the size of the government, (ii) the level and sustainability of fiscal 
positions, (iii) the composition and efficiency of expenditure and (iv) the 
                                                          
(1) See European Commission Communication "EMU@10: successes and challenges after 10 years of Economic and 
Monetary Union" (COM(2008) 238 final).  
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structure and efficiency of revenue systems. At the same time, (v) fiscal 
governance, i.e. the set-up of fiscal rules, institutions and procedures, can 
affect all of the above four dimensions. Moreover, there are many non-
budgetary ways in which public finances can impact on the functioning of 
markets and the overall business environment, which can therefore be 
viewed as a sixth, though indirect, dimension of QPF.  
Taking such a broad-based multi-dimensional approach to QPF has a 
number of advantages. It reflects the complex nature of the relationships 
between QPF and growth and attempts to avoid the 'omitted variables 
problem'. For example, focusing solely on the level of expenditure items 
that raise productivity would overlook the fact that such spending may be 
financed through a high and distortionary tax burden. Also, the multi-
dimensional concept of QPF provides fiscal policy makers with a wide 
range of mixes of policy options that can explicitly account for country 
specificities and other-than-growth objectives. Growth has been chosen as 
the framework's benchmark since growth can be viewed as a precondition 
for achieving other goals, such as social cohesion, and is the identified 
objective under both the SGP and the Lisbon Strategy.  
Despite the complexity of QPF, a number of empirical regularities have 
emerged on the links to growth. The key findings of the literature, which 
often focus on only one or two specific QPF aspects, and the empirical 
analysis in this report can be summarised as follows: 
First, sound overall public finances remain the linchpin of fiscal policy-
making conducive to economic growth. High-debt countries are, for 
example, found to have significantly lower medium-term growth and 
capital accumulation plays a less significant role for GDP growth in these 
countries due to crowding-out effects. 
Second, when public administrations become too large they tend to hinder 
economic growth in particular if they are associated with high tax burdens 
on labour and capital and inefficient use of public resources. Problems are 
compounded by large deficits and high levels of debt. On the other hand, 
when governments excel in these dimensions of QPF, large public sectors 
can go hand in hand with strong growth performances.  
Third, whether certain types of public expenditure (such as public 
investment or spending on education and health) are growth-enhancing 
largely depends on their ability to address market failures and provide 
public goods. Thus, it is rather the outcomes (such as a public 
infrastructure or educational attainment) and the institutional settings (e.g. 
labour market flexibilities) than the level of inputs that matter for growth. 
For example, our analysis finds that economies with less flexible labour 
markets tend to have a lower contribution of skilled labour to economic 
growth, implying that even in the case of higher public spending on 
education the impact on economic growth may be held back by rigid 
labour market institutions. 
Fourth, revenue structures that limit distortions and disincentives are 
typically associated with higher growth (see below). 
… through which it 
can support 
economic growth. 
This provides a wide 
range of policy 
options. 




And finally, achieving results on all of the above fronts of QPF can be 
facilitated by strong fiscal governance frameworks. They can contribute 
not only to improving budgetary performance and thereby strengthening 
fiscal sustainability but also to providing a more medium-term orientation 
with better focus on budgetary priorities and raising efficiency and 
effectiveness by better linking input and performance.  
The efficiency of tax systems 
The size of the tax burden and the structure of taxes have a clear impact 
on the allocation of labour and capital and, in turn, on economic growth. 
Abstracting from significant cross-country differences, the EU as a whole 
is characterised by a relatively high tax burden, reflecting governments' 
needs to finance high expenditure levels. In particular, high taxes on 
labour have been identified as a key reason for low employment levels 
and slow employment growth. At the same time, closer economic 
integration and the greater factor mobility across countries impose limits 
on governments when choosing the sustainable level of taxation and 
hence expenditure. 
The following elements can contribute to enhancing the efficiency of tax 
systems in Europe. Broad tax bases combined with low statutory tax rates 
help reduce distortions and increase tax revenues. As regards the labour 
market, a readjustment of the tax burden between different groups of 
workers and a better integration of tax and benefit systems would be 
conducive to raising employment levels. At the same time, a budget-
neutral easing of the tax burden on labour while raising the tax rate on a 
broader tax base, such as consumption, could help reduce the economic 
distortions of taxation. And finally, taking into account practical and 
administrative considerations, it can also pay off to simplify the often 
complex tax systems. 
One option to reduce the tax burden on labour that receives particular 
attention in the policy debate is the shift from labour income taxation or 
social security contribution to value added tax (VAT). In model 
simulations by the Commission services for the euro area, a 1% of GDP 
tax shift from labour taxation to consumption taxation is estimated to 
raise real GDP by about 0.1% in the first year and by about 0.2% in the 
long run. Employment is estimated to increase by about 0.14% in the first 
year and 0.25% in the long run. Such positive, but limited employment 
and growth effects depend on a number of factors, such as the adjustment 
of benefits and nominal rigidities in the economy. Compared to a 
situation in which an individual euro-area country unilaterally engages in 
the tax shift, a coordinated shift throughout the euro area results in larger 
positive effects for all countries. In principle, the employment and growth 
effects of the tax shift result from the broader tax base of the VAT. It falls 
on labour income, accumulated wealth and profit incomes rather than just 
labour income. This implies that the same tax revenue can be raised with 
lower tax rates and the negative effect on labour market outcomes is 
dampened. 
In sum, tax reforms should continue to be designed so as to foster growth 
and minimise distortions through simplifying the rules and broadening the 
While more efficient 
tax systems could 
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tax bases, including eliminating loopholes and inefficient tax 
expenditures. Reducing the high tax burden on labour by shifting to other 
tax bases, including consumption, can be an element in this strategy, but 
is an inadequate long-run instrument to address underlying structural 
problems. 
Part I 







The current state of public finances is typified by 
sharp contrasts of light and shade. While the 
fiscal position of the euro area and the EU 
attained in 2007 is the best in decades, the short-
term outlook is overshadowed by a number of 
downside risks which, if they materialise, could 
give rise to a setback on the way towards 
sustainable fiscal positions.  
Starting with the bright side, in 2007 a 
combination of favourable economic conditions 
and fiscal efforts kept public finances on the 
virtuous path initiated at the time of the Stability 
and Growth Pact reform, three to four years ago. 
Abstracting cross-country differences, which 
remain large, the general government deficit in 
both the euro area and the EU as a whole fell 
below one percent of GDP, to 0.6% and 0.9%, 
respectively. The last time comparable levels 
were recorded was in the early 1970s shortly 
before the first oil shock pushed the European 
economies into a protracted recession and put 
considerable strain on public finances. In most of 
the EU countries the notified outcome for 2007 is 
somewhat better than the official targets laid 
down in the 2006 vintage of the stability and 
convergence programmes (SCPs).  
The overall progress also reflects the fiscal 
corrections put in place by countries that were in 
excessive deficit. In January 2006, no less than 
twelve countries were subject to the procedure 
under the dissuasive arm of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). Two years on, the number is 
down to two, Hungary and Poland, with the 
procedure for the latter expected to come soon to 
a close. Since the last publication of this report, 
the Council abrogated the excessive deficit 
procedure for the United Kingdom (October 
2007), the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal and 
Slovakia (June 2008).  
But fiscal improvements did not continue in all 
Member States. Therefore, the Commission used 
two of its policy instruments for three Member 
States, where the fiscal and economic outlook 
has deteriorated. It issued a policy advice to 
France and Romania and initiated a new 
excessive deficit procedure vis-à-vis the United 
Kingdom. The Commission policy advice was 
used for the first time since it was introduced 
with the 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. In contrast to other instruments, such as the 
early policy warning, it can be issued directly by 
the Commission, i.e. without the involvement of 
the Council, and can be used in a wide range of 
circumstances not limited to a deviation from 
budgetary targets. 
To France, the Commission addressed a policy 
advice in light of disappointing macroeconomic 
performance that is combined with a stalling 
structural budgetary consolidation. The 
Commission services' spring 2008 forecast 
projects a deficit of 2.9% of GDP in 2008 and 
3% in 2009. In light of this, on 28 May 2008 the 
Commission, in its policy advice to France, 
recommended to implement rigorously the policy 
invitations of the Council issued on 12 February 
2008 on the 2007 update of the stability 
programme and pursue with determination the 
ongoing structural reform process.  
In Romania, the economy has shown signs of 
overheating and large and rising external 
imbalances have emerged. At the same time, 
despite some recent budgetary measures, the 
Commission services' 2008 spring forecast 
projected the headline deficit to be just below the 
3% of GDP threshold in 2008 and, under a no-
policy-change assumption, well above it in 2009, 
at 3.7% of GDP. Against this backdrop, on 11 
June 2008 the Commission addressed a policy 
advice to Romania recommending the authorities 
to implement rigorously the policy invitations of 
the Council issued on 12 February 2008 on the 
2007 update of the convergence programme and 
to take urgent action to implement a binding 
medium-term fiscal framework and to accelerate 
structural reforms. 
After the abrogation of its excessive deficit 
procedure in October 2007, the outlook for the 
UK's general government balances has 
deteriorated again. According to the EDP data 
notified by the UK authorities in March 2008 and 
also published in the United Kingdom's March 
2008 budget, the general government deficit in 
the United Kingdom is planned to reach 3.2% of 
GDP in 2008/09. At the same time, a rising trend 
for the general government gross debt was 
projected, even though it was forecast to remain 
below 60% of GDP. In the light of this, on 11 
June 2008 the Commission adopted a report 
under Article 104(3) of the Treaty on 
government finances in the UK, thereby 
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initiating a new excessive deficit procedure vis-
à-vis the UK on the basis of a planned deficit 
exceeding the reference value. 
Despite a weakening of fiscal performance in 
some individual Member States, a further facet 
of the overall improvements in budgetary 
positions in most others is its impact on the 
assessment of long-term sustainability of public 
finances. Assuming that current achievements 
are preserved, most Member States managed to 
narrow the budgetary gap to ensure sustainable 
public finances including the budgetary costs of 
ageing. 
In the face of the clear progress made in 2007, 
the aggregate figures mask several areas of 
concern especially in view of the ongoing 
slowdown of economic activity, the extent of 
which is subject to considerable uncertainty. To 
start with, the favourable budgetary outcomes 
largely benefited from revenue windfalls which 
in many cases were partly used to cover 
expenditure overruns. If the extra revenues had 
been fully used to reduce the deficit, in line with 
the policy advice in the Council opinions on the 
2006 updated SCPs and, for the euro area 
countries, the commitments made in spring 2007 
in Berlin, more significant progress towards 
sustainable fiscal positions would have been 
achieved. The expenditure overruns confirm a 
discomforting pattern observed over many years. 
Considering that a significant part of the extra 
revenues recorded in 2006 and 2007 is likely to 
vanish as economic activity decelerates and that 
the cyclical position may have been 
underestimated, the tendency to overspend is 
liable to seriously limit the room for manoeuvre 
in the coming years. The experience of the late 
1990s and early 2000s, which in many ways 
resembles the current juncture, was quite telling.  
According to the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast, which is based on the customary 
no-policy-change assumption, public finances 
will reflect the projected slowdown of economic 
activity. In particular, the process of deficit 
reduction observed since 2004 is expected to 
grind to a halt.  
Looking further ahead in time, assessment of the 
2007 vintage of SCPs reveals another source of 
concern, which in combination with the recurrent 
tendency to overspend compared to plans, bodes 
ill for the medium term. As in the past, the bulk 
of the fiscal adjustment planned over the next 
three to four years is back-loaded, i.e. projected 
to take place in the later years of the programme 
period, with little to no progress in underlying 
terms in 2008 and 2009. In an uncertain 
economic context as at present, this strategy is 
likely to revive a practice that had largely been 
shelved in recent years, namely transforming 
medium-term budgetary objectives into moving 
targets that get successively revised downward in 
the light of economic surprises instead of acting 
as an anchor for fiscal policy making. 
Overall, the particularly large degree of 
uncertainty attached to short-term economic 
prospects and recurrent departures from 
expenditure plans create major challenges for 
public finance developments in the coming 
years. While many Member States have 
considerable room to let automatic stabilisers 
play thanks to the recent structural improvements 
in their budgetary positions, others are in a more 
difficult situation because of their delayed 
consolidation efforts in the past. To avoid the 
déjà vu of the early 2000s, when a number of 
Member States entered the economic slowdown 
after having spent sizeable revenue windfalls, it 
will be crucial for those countries who have not 
yet reached their medium-term budgetary 
objectives to continue to adjust their structural 
balances and let automatic stabilisers only play 
around this adjustment path while also adhering 
to the 3% deficit limit. Relying on cautious 
macroeconomic projections and better 
implementation of expenditure plans should be 
key ingredients for such a strategy.  
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1.1. SHORT-TERM DEVELOPMENTS AND 
PROSPECTS FOR THE BUDGET BALANCE 
AND PUBLIC DEBT 
In 2007, the budgetary positions improved for 
the fourth year running, recording again a major 
progress in comparison to the previous year, with 
average budget deficits in the euro area and the 
EU reaching their lowest levels since 1973, 
before the first oil shock. The euro-area headline 
deficit reached 0.6% of GDP, down from 1.3% 
of GDP in 2006 (Table I.1.1). A slightly more 
moderate improvement took place in the EU as a 
whole, where the budget deficit declined by 0.5 
percentage points reaching 0.9% of GDP in 2007 
(Table I.1.2). In both the euro area and the EU 
the improvement in the headline deficit was 
matched by a broadly similar improvement of the 
structural budget balance, i.e. the budget balance 
net of cyclical factors and one-off and other 
temporary measures. Taken at face value this 
result would seem to suggest that the 
improvement in the headline deficit was fully 
structural or permanent. However, at the current 
juncture the estimates of the structural budget 
balance are still likely to be affected by the 
exceptional buoyancy of tax revenues (1). 
In 2007, the improvement in the (nominal) 
budget balance was particularly sizeable in 
Germany where the deficit fell by 1.6 percentage 
points and a balanced budget was achieved. Italy 
and Portugal both succeeded in bringing the 
deficit below the 3% of GDP reference value of 
the Treaty. In Cyprus (following data 
corrections) the deficit was replaced by a large 
surplus. Conversely, in Greece the development 
of the headline deficit stagnated, and the 3% 
threshold was only just undercut. As to France, 
here the deficit slightly deteriorated to 2.7%. The 
budgetary developments in countries with fiscal 
surpluses varied. The surplus in the Netherlands 
remained approximately constant, while in 
Ireland it declined very considerably. Spain and 
                                                          
(1) Tax revenues were much higher than projected in the 
SCPs in 2005-2007. See Section I.3 below. 
 
Finland managed to even further increase their 
surpluses. 
A positive impact was also felt outside the euro 
area in 2007, where relative to the previous year 
the budgetary position weakened in only few 
Member States. A very large improvement of 
almost four percentage points was recorded in 
Hungary. In Poland and Slovakia the deficit 
dropped well below the 3% threshold, while in 
the Czech Republic it remained there. However, 
in the United Kingdom the deficit deteriorated 
and came very close to the 3% of GDP reference 
value of the Treaty. As to the other Member 
States outside the euro area, they mostly reported 
surpluses which sometimes also increased.  
Looking ahead to 2008 and 2009, the public 
finance situation is expected to slightly 
deteriorate in light of slowing economic growth. 
The Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast 
projects euro area (EU) real GDP to expand by 
1.7 (2.0)% in 2008, compared to 2.6 (2.8)% in 
2007, and to slow further to 1.5 (1.8)% in 2009. 
Against this growth outlook, the aggregate 
deficit of the fifteen Member States which have 
adopted the single currency is expected to reach 
1.0% of GDP in 2008, 0.4 percentage points 
higher than the year before. Based on the no-
policy-change assumption a further small 
deterioration to 1.1% of GDP is projected in 
2009. Broadly the same profile is expected for 
the EU as a whole. The deficit is forecast to rise 
to 1.2% of GDP in 2008, from 0.9% in 2007, and 
to continue to rise to 1.3% of GDP in 2009.  
Outside the euro area, the development of 
budgetary positions is likely to be more diverse. 
The nominal deficit in Hungary is projected to 
continue to considerably improve over the 
forecast horizon, but to nevertheless remain 
above the 3% threshold by 2009. In the Czech 
Republic, and also in Poland and in Slovakia, the 
deficit is expected to stay well below the 3% of 
GDP reference value of the Treaty in both years. 
Conversely, the United Kingdom is forecast to 
breach the 3% threshold from 2008 onwards and 
Romania in 2009. For Estonia and Latvia a 
significant budgetary worsening is projected, 
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while the remaining Member States outside the 
euro area are often expected to maintain 
relatively comfortable surpluses.  
In structural terms, i.e. net of cyclical factors and 
one-off and other temporary measures, the 
projected deterioration in both the euro area and 
the EU in 2008 is broadly similar to that of the 
nominal deficit. In particular, the structural 
balance is estimated to deteriorate by 0.3% of 
GDP in the euro area and by 0.2% of GDP in the 
EU as a whole, with only marginal 
improvements projected for 2009.  
The group of euro-area countries that have 
already achieved their medium-term budgetary 
objective (MTO) is expected to remain almost 
unchanged over the projection horizon. Only 
Ireland and Slovenia are forecast to deviate from 
their MTOs, the latter only marginally so in 
2008. In most euro-area Member States which 
have not yet attained their MTOs, progress will 
likely be only marginal or could be even 
negative. Thus, they fall far short of the 0.5% of 
GDP benchmark structural fiscal adjustment 
required by the reformed Stability and Growth 
Pact. A significant improvement is only expected 
in Greece and Malta (which both are still 
relatively far away from their MTOs).  
Outside the euro area, overall a similar picture 
emerges. The countries which have already 
reached their MTOs are expected to remain 
there. With regard to the Member States, which 
have not yet attained it, a sizeable improvement 
is only expected in Hungary and the Czech 
Republic (which both are also still relatively far 
away from their MTOs). For Romania and 
Slovakia even significant deteriorations are 
forecast.  
Turning to government debt, in the euro area the 
debt-to-GDP ratio continues to be on the decline 
(Table I.1.3). In 2007 the ratio dropped by 2.1 
percentage points to 66.4%. A further decline to 
 
Table I.1.1:
Budget balances in EU Member States (% of GDP)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
BE 0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.4
DE -1.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 -1.4 -0.3 -0.8 -0.8 1.3 2.5 1.8 1.8
IE 3.0 0.3 -1.4 -1.7 2.9 0.2 -0.8 -0.9 4.0 1.2 0.2 0.2
EL -2.6 -2.8 -2.0 -2.0 -3.7 -3.3 -2.6 -2.3 0.4 0.8 1.4 1.6
ES 1.8 2.2 0.6 0.0 2.0 2.4 1.1 0.9 3.6 3.9 2.7 2.5
FR -2.4 -2.7 -2.9 -3.0 -2.7 -2.7 -2.8 -2.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
IT -3.4 -1.9 -2.3 -2.4 -2.8 -1.5 -1.9 -1.6 1.8 3.5 3.1 3.3
LU 1.3 2.9 2.4 2.3 1.4 2.8 2.7 2.9 1.6 3.0 2.9 3.1
NL 0.5 0.4 1.4 1.8 1.1 0.3 1.0 1.3 3.3 2.6 3.0 3.2
AT -1.5 -0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -1.4 -1.0 -1.2 -0.9 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.7
PT -3.9 -2.6 -2.2 -2.6 -3.2 -2.2 -1.9 -2.2 -0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6
SI -1.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6 -1.3 -0.7 -1.1 -0.7 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.4
FI 4.1 5.3 4.9 4.6 4.2 4.9 4.8 4.9 5.6 6.4 6.2 6.1
MT -2.5 -1.8 -1.6 -1.0 -2.9 -2.4 -1.7 -1.0 0.7 0.9 1.5 2.1
CY -1.2 3.3 1.7 1.8 -0.7 3.5 1.9 2.0 2.6 6.7 4.8 4.8
EA-15 -1.3 -0.6 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2 -0.7 -1.0 -0.9 1.6 2.3 1.9 2.0
BG 3.0 3.4 3.2 3.2 2.5 3.1 2.9 3.2 3.9 4.1 3.8 4.0
CZ -2.7 -1.6 -1.4 -1.1 -2.9 -2.3 -1.9 -1.5 -1.8 -1.2 -0.8 -0.4
DK 4.8 4.4 3.9 2.9 4.1 3.9 4.6 3.7 5.7 5.4 6.0 4.9
EE 3.4 2.8 0.4 -0.7 1.0 1.3 0.4 0.6 1.2 1.4 0.5 0.8
LV -0.2 0.0 -1.1 -2.1 -1.1 -1.4 -1.3 -1.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.6
LT -0.5 -1.2 -1.7 -1.5 -1.0 -1.4 -2.0 -1.3 -0.2 -0.6 -1.3 -0.6
HU -9.2 -5.5 -4.0 -3.6 -9.7 -4.7 -3.7 -3.3 -5.8 -0.6 0.5 0.8
PL -3.8 -2.0 -2.5 -2.6 -4.0 -2.5 -2.7 -2.3 -1.3 0.1 0.0 0.3
RO -2.2 -2.5 -2.9 -3.7 -2.7 -3.4 -3.7 -4.1 -1.9 -2.7 -2.9 -3.2
SK -3.6 -2.2 -2.0 -2.3 -3.1 -2.6 -2.8 -3.1 -1.7 -1.2 -1.5 -1.7
SE 2.3 3.5 2.7 2.3 1.5 2.8 2.4 2.5 3.2 4.6 4.1 4.2
UK -2.6 -2.9 -3.3 -3.3 -2.8 -3.0 -3.2 -2.8 -0.8 -0.8 -1.1 -0.7
EU-27 -1.4 -0.9 -1.2 -1.3 -1.5 -1.0 -1.2 -1.1 1.1 1.7 1.4 1.5
Note: The structural budget balance is calculated on the basis of the commonly agreed production function method (see European Commission (2004)).
Source: Commission services' spring 2008 forecast.
Structural balance Structural primary balanceBudget balance
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64.3% of GDP by 2009 is projected as primary 
surpluses coupled with a positive contribution 
from interest expenditure and economic growth 
are expected to more than offset the effect of 
debt-increasing stock-flow adjustment.  
In the EU as a whole, the debt ratio has dropped 
below the 60% of GDP reference value of the 
Treaty in 2007 but progress will likely halt over 
the near term. From its level of 58.7% in 2007, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to decline only 
slightly (to 58.3%) in 2008, before rising again to 
59.3% in 2009, not least because of a very 
significant increase in UK debt.  
Aggregate figures tend to mask diverging 
developments at the country level. In 2007, Italy 
continued to have a debt ratio above 100% of 
GDP, a condition which is expected to continue 
throughout until 2009. In Belgium the 
government debt remained on a steady 
downward path. It fell below 90% of GDP in 
2006 and is expected to be at just below 80% of 
GDP by 2009. Among the other countries with 
debt ratios above the 60% of GDP threshold, 
notably Germany, France, Portugal, Hungary and 
Malta, only Malta is forecast to reduce its debt 
ratio below the reference value of the Treaty by 
2009 without additional measures. In Portugal 
the debt ratio is projected on a very moderately 
upward path over the forecast period. 
1.2. GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND 
EXPENDITURE 
In 2007, the observed improvement in budgetary 
positions was chiefly the result of a lower 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio (see Table I.1.4). The 
decline in that ratio was due to slightly lower 
social transfers other than in kind and to other 
expenditures. As to the revenue side, a major 
positive contribution came from taxes on income 
and wealth which increased by 0.4% of GDP in 
the euro area and by 0.2% in the EU, thanks to a 
buoyant inflow of corporate income taxes.  
However, section I.3. sheds a different light on 
the composition of the improvements in the 
budget balance. It shows that compared to the 
plans presented in the 2006 updates of the 
stability and convergence programmes, 
significant nominal expenditure overruns were 
compensated by large windfall revenues. Much 
higher than expected nominal growth masks 
these developments in the expenditure-to-GDP 
ratios.  
According to the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast, it is insufficient progress on both 
the expenditure and revenue sides of the budget 
which prevents further adjustment in 2008-2009 
in the Member States that have not yet achieved 
their medium-term budgetary objective. For the 
euro area as a whole, a projected decline in the 
revenue ratio of 0.4 percentage points of GDP is 
forecast to be only very partly offset by a 
Table I.1.2:
Euro area - The General government budget balance (% of GDP)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total revenue (1) 44.6 44.9 45.7 45.6 45.2 45.2
Total expenditure (2) 47.5 47.4 47.3 46.3 46.2 46.2
Actual balance (3) = (1) - (2) -2.9 -2.5 -1.3 -0.6 -1.0 -1.1
Interest (4) 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.8
Primary balance (5) = (3) + (4) 0.2 0.4 1.6 2.3 1.9 1.8
One-offs (6) 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Cyclically adjusted  balance (7) -2.6 -2.0 -1.2 -0.7 -1.0 -0.8
Cyclically adj. prim. balance = (7) + (4)   0.5 0.9 1.7 2.3 1.9 2.0
Structural budget balance = (7) -(6) -2.8 -2.0 -1.1 -0.8 -0.7 0.3
Change in actual balance: 0.2 0.4 1.2 0.7 -0.4 -0.1
              - Cycle -0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
              - Interest 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1
              - Cycl.adj.prim.balance 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.6 -0.4 0.1
              - One-offs -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
              - Structural budget balance 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.1
Note: Differences between totals and sum of individual items are due to rounding. 
Source: Commission services' spring 2008 forecast.  
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reduction in the expenditure ratio of 0.1% of 
GDP.  
At the level of the Member States, the patterns 
are generally similar. In Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus, and, outside the euro 
area, in Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, 
and the UK, expenditure ratios are projected to 
increase in 2008-2009. Conversely, a large 
decline is only expected in Hungary. 
 The revenue ratios are set to increase in 2008-09 
in Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Cyprus, 
and, outside the euro area in Lithuania, Hungary, 
Romania and the UK, whereas important 
reductions are foreseen in  Slovenia, Denmark 
and Sweden.  
Given that so far in the euro area, as well as in 
the EU, a decline in expenditure on collective 
consumption, social benefits in kind and 
transfers other than in kind is not scheduled to 
happen, the scope for a budgetary neutral 
decrease in social contributions is actually 
limited. The projected budgetary adjustment in 
the euro area and the EU does not seem to weigh 
on growth enhancing spending items such as 
public investment, education and R&D. Gross 
fixed capital formation in the euro area is 
projected to remain broadly stable at around 
2½% of GDP, while in the EU as a whole a 
marginal increase is expected. The reduction in 
the share of interest expenditure that has 
contributed to a better allocation of available 
resources in past years will very slowly continue. 
1.3. THE FISCAL STANCE AND POLICY MIX IN 
THE EURO AREA 
An appropriate policy mix can be defined as a 
combination of monetary and fiscal policies that 
ensures price stability and keeps economic 
activity close to its potential level. In the euro 
Change in 
gross debt






BE 88.2 84.9 81.9 79.9 -5.0 -6.2 0.8 0.5
DE 67.6 65.0 63.1 61.6 -3.5 -4.5 1.0 0.0
IE 25.1 25.4 26.9 28.8 3.4 0.9 -0.1 2.6
EL 95.3 94.5 92.4 90.2 -4.3 -3.8 -4.6 4.2
ES 39.7 36.2 35.3 35.2 -0.9 -3.8 0.1 2.7
FR 63.6 64.2 64.4 65.1 0.9 0.4 1.0 -0.5
IT 106.5 104.0 103.2 102.6 -1.4 -5.2 3.5 0.3
LU 6.6 6.8 7.4 7.6 0.7 -5.1 0.0 5.9
NL 47.9 45.4 42.4 39.0 -6.3 -7.1 -0.3 1.1
AT 61.8 59.1 57.7 56.8 -2.4 -3.9 0.4 1.1
PT 64.7 63.6 64.1 64.3 0.7 -0.7 0.7 0.7
SI 27.2 24.1 23.4 22.5 -1.6 -1.0 -1.0 0.5
FI 39.2 35.4 31.9 29.1 -6.3 -12.2 -0.9 6.8
MT 64.2 62.6 60.6 58.8 -3.8 -3.7 0.6 -0.7
CY 64.8 59.8 47.3 43.2 -16.6 -9.1 -1.4 -6.0
EA-15 68.5 66.4 65.2 64.3 -2.1 -3.7 0.8 0.7
BG 22.7 18.2 14.1 10.8 -7.4 -8.2 -2.2 2.9
CZ 29.4 28.7 28.1 27.2 -1.5 0.3 -2.0 0.2
DK 30.4 26.0 21.7 18.4 -7.6 -9.4 0.7 1.1
EE 4.2 3.4 3.4 3.5 0.1 0.0 -0.7 0.4
LV 10.7 9.7 10.0 11.2 1.5 2.1 -1.4 0.9
LT 18.2 17.3 17.0 16.8 -0.4 1.8 -2.7 0.5
HU 65.6 66.0 66.5 65.7 -0.3 -0.7 -0.1 0.6
PL 47.6 45.2 44.5 44.1 -1.2 -0.2 -2.2 1.3
RO 12.4 13.0 13.6 14.9 2.0 5.0 -1.8 -1.2
SK 30.4 29.4 29.2 29.7 0.3 1.6 -2.2 0.9
SE 45.9 40.6 35.5 31.9 -8.6 -8.4 0.8 -1.0
UK 43.1 43.8 45.6 48.2 4.4 2.3 1.2 0.9
EU-27 61.3 58.7 58.3 59.3 0.6 -2.7 1.6 0.8
Note : Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding.
Source:  Commission services'  spring 2008 forecast.
Change in 2007-09 due to
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area, given that monetary policy is centralised 
and fiscal policies are decentralised, it is of a 
particular importance to assess both the 
aggregate fiscal stance at the euro-area level and 
the national fiscal stances. Namely, the aggregate 
fiscal stance affects the policy mix at the euro-
area level and is, therefore, one of the elements 
to be considered by the monetary policy 
authority.  
Graph I.1.1 displays the fiscal stance 
approximated by the change in the cyclically-
adjusted primary budget balance (∆ CAPB) in 
relation to the change in the cyclical conditions 
estimated by the level of the output gap (1).   
In this graph, fiscal behaviour in accordance with 
the SGP would be represented by movements 
along the horizontal axis. In other words, 
countries would achieve and maintain broadly 
balanced budgets over the economic cycle. 
However, as long as a Member State has not yet 
 
                                                          
(1) It should be noted, however, that changes in the output 
gap are also relevant for the judgement of the stance in 
relation to cyclical conditions, especially considering 
often important ex-post revisions to output gap levels. In 
line with the Council agreement, the output gap in this 
section is computed with the Production Function 
method. 






































Source:  Commission services' spring 2008 forecast.  
reached the medium-term budgetary objective in 
line with the provisions of the SGP, a restrictive 
fiscal stance – that is a positive change in the 
CAPB – would be needed.  
On the face of it, in 2007 the fiscal stance in the 
euro area would seem to have been counter-
cyclical as the budget balance net of cyclical 
factors and interest payments improved against a 
background of an output gap that is estimated to 
have turned positive. This conclusion is 
confirmed when cyclical conditions are 
Table I.1.4:
Euro area - Government revenue and expenditures (% of GDP)
2006 2007 2008 2009
Total revenue 45.7 45.6 45.2 45.2
Taxes on imports and production (indirect) 13.6 13.5 13.4 13.4
Current taxes on income and wealth 12.1 12.5 12.4 12.3
Social contributions 15.4 15.2 15.1 15.1
of which actual social contributions 14.3 14.1 14.1 14.0
Other revenue 4.6 4.3 4.3 4.3
Total expenditure 47.3 46.3 46.2 46.2
Collective consumption 8.0 7.9 7.9 7.9
Social benefits in kind 12.3 12.2 12.3 12.4
Social transfers other than in kind 16.2 15.9 15.9 15.9
Interest 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.8
Subsidies 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Gross fixed capital formation 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6
Other expenditures 4.2 3.5 3.4 3.3
Note : Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding.
Source : Commission services' spring 2008 forecast.  
European Commission 
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measured in terms of the change in the output 
gap (see Graph I.1.2)(1).  
Looking ahead, a slight fiscal loosening is 
expected in 2008 when cyclical conditions are 
expected to deteriorate. 
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In 2009, the no-policy-change assumption 
underlying the Commission services' forecast 
implies a neutral fiscal stance when actual output 
is estimated to remain below potential.  
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Source : Commission services' spring 2008 forecast.  
Graph I.1.3 illustrates the euro-area policy mix, 
by plotting the fiscal stance on the vertical axis 
and the monetary stance (approximated by the 
change in the short-term real interest rates) on 
                                                          
(1) Complementing the level with the change of the output 
gap when assessing the fiscal stance is key in view of the 
relatively large uncertainty attached to real time 
estimates of the output gap. This is also acknowledged in 
the Code of Conduct on the Specifications on the 
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. For 
details see http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/about 
/activities/sgp/codeofconduct_en.pdf  
the horizontal axis. Against the background of 
brisk economic growth and fiscal tightening the 
monetary stance remained broadly neutral in 
2007. In 2008, the only very gradual increases in 
interest rates (due to concerns related to rising 
food and energy prices) at the end of 2007 and at 
the beginning of this year plus those assumed in 
the Commission services' spring 2008 forecast 
are expected to give rise to a policy mix where 
both monetary and fiscal instruments enhance 
aggregate demand. This could be considered to 
constitute a counter-cyclical policy mix. The 
issue whether counter-cyclical fiscal policy is 
desirable will be taken up in more detail in box 
I.1.1 below. 
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Box I.1.1: Does discretionary fiscal stabilisation warrant a comeback in the EU?
Where does the renewed interest in the issue stem from? 
The rather unusual decision by the US Federal Reserve to cut its policy rate twice by a total of more than 
100 basis points in less than ten days at the end of January 2008, coupled with the proposal for a large 
fiscal stimulus tabled by the Bush administration, was a patent sign of the ailing state of the world's 
largest economy. In view of the potential spill over to other regions, the policy choices in the US fuelled 
a discussion on both sides of the Atlantic about whether monetary policy would be effective enough to 
soften the downturn and whether there was scope for discretionary fiscal stabilisation. The concerns 
about the stabilising power of monetary policy at the current juncture are linked to the tightened credit 
constraints resulting from the financial distress after the collapse of the US sub-prime residential 
mortgage market. Under such circumstances, the narrative goes, discretionary fiscal policy could have a 
bigger impact on aggregate demand. This argument stands out against the hitherto prevailing view that 
discretionary fiscal policy has generally not contributed to smoothing cyclical fluctuation of output. This 
box briefly examines the potential role of discretionary fiscal stabilisation in the euro area and the EU 
from three different angles. It first reviews available evidence about the short-term impact of 
discretionary fiscal policy on economic activity. It then takes a look at the actual conduct of fiscal policy 
including two concrete examples of discretionary fiscal stabilisation, and finally draws conclusions from 
available evidence.  
What is the effect of discretionary fiscal policy on economic activity? 
A broad consensus prevails among economists that owing to rigidities in labour, goods and services 
markets fiscal policy can have an impact on real output in the short term. While there is uncertainty 
about the exact size and timing of the effect, a wide range of studies, applying different methods, 
suggests that fiscal multipliers tend to be positive (e.g. Hemming et al., 2002 and Perotti, 2005). 
Table 1:
Government purchases shock (temporary 1% of GDP increase in first year)
2007 2008 2009 2010
Germany 0.58 0.14 -0.04 -0.10
Spain 0.71 0.16 -0.07 -0.13
The Netherlands 0.29 0.07 -0.01 -0.04
Ireland 0.20 0.05 -0.01 -0.03
VAT shock (temporary 1% of GDP decrease in first year)
Germany 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.08
Spain 0.23 0.15 0.10 0.08
The Netherlands 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08
Ireland 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
Discretionary fiscal policy and economic activity. Results from simulations with the QUEST-III model
(Domestic GDP as a % change from baseline level)
(Domestic GDP as a % change from baseline level)
Table 1 displays simulation results of the effects of two types of temporary fiscal expansions: a 1% of 
GDP increase in government purchases and a 1% of GDP decrease in VAT receipts. Both measures are 
reversed after one year (their effects can be shown to be even larger if they are permanent). 
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The simulations (1) were carried out for four different countries, representing four different types of 
economies: Germany is large and open; Spain is medium-sized with relatively low degree of openness; 
Ireland is small and open; while The Netherlands are medium-sized and open. The figures in the table 
confirm the two mainstays of received wisdom: (i) the impact of higher expenditure on aggregate 
demand is larger than an equivalent reduction of taxes; and (ii) the size of the effect declines with the 
degree of openness of the economy. In essence, empirical evidence supports the conclusion that fiscal 
policy makers do have the power to influence aggregate demand in the short term and, consequently, 
could utilise expenditure and tax policies to stabilise temporary fluctuations of output.  
Does discretionary fiscal policy actually smooth the cycle? 
Despite the potential to smooth the cycle via fiscal discretion, the actual performance is rarely in line 
with the normative perspective of fiscal stabilisation (see for instance Taylor, 2000). The gap between 
what could be done and actual outcomes can by explained by two groups of factors: (i) implementation 
lags and (ii) the political economy of fiscal policy. The implementation lags or inside lags refer to the 
delay between the recognition of the need for a fiscal stimulus, the time it takes to the government or 
Parliament to take a decision of what type of measure to implement, and the time to effectively put 
measures into practice. As regards the political economy of fiscal policy, a well established and still 
growing body of literature argues and shows that there are goals other than the stabilisation of output, 
notably electoral considerations, shaping the behaviour of fiscal policy makers and in turn the actual 
results of discretionary fiscal policy (see for instance Alesina and Perotti, 1994 and Drazen, 2000). 
One common approach to examine the behaviour of discretionary fiscal policy over the cycle is to link 
the fiscal policy stance, generally measured as the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance, to 
the cyclical conditions as measured by the output gap. An examination covering the period from the 
mid-1990s shows that fiscal policy has on average been pro-cyclical in the euro area and the EU (see 
European Commission 2006a). In particular, year-on-year changes in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB) were generally positive (denoting a budgetary tightening) in periods of negative output 
gap, whilst in years when output was above potential, fiscal policy was loosened. In a similar vein, an 
econometric analysis carried out by Fatas and Mihov (2003) find that the (ab)use of fiscal discretion 
goes along with a higher volatility of output and lower economic growth. 
The findings do not improve much when more detailed techniques are used to study the determinants of 
discretionary fiscal policy. Most studies estimating fiscal reaction functions, where the fiscal stance is 
modelled as a function of a number of economic and policy variables, including a measure of cyclical 
conditions, indicate that discretionary fiscal policy it at best a-cyclical and often pro-cyclical (see for 
instance Gali and Perotti, 2003 and OECD, 2003). Although the results differ to a certain degree 
depending on the data sample and the model specifications, a counter-cyclical response of discretionary 
fiscal policy seems to be the exception rather than the rule. This pattern seems to have weakened yet not 
disappeared with the introduction of the EU fiscal framework (see Gali and Perotti, 2003). 
Among the main reasons for the non-stabilising effects of discretionary fiscal policy are the difficulty of 
forecasting and measuring the economic cycle in real time. Golinelli and Momigliano (2006) suggest 
that the pro-or a-cyclical effect of discretionary fiscal policy is not necessarily intentional; rather it 
seems to result from the fact that real-time estimates of the output gap generally signal a position in the 
cycle which is significantly different from the assessment with hindsight. Other studies find evidence for 
                                                          
(1) The simulations were carried out with the Quest-III model developed by Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs.
Quest III is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium type of model. It assumes that a fraction of households are liquidity-
constrained and that prices and wages adjust with lags. Monetary policy is described by a Taylor rule according to which the
monetary authority changes the interest rates in response to divergences of real GDP from potential GDP and the divergence of
actual rates of inflation from the target rate of inflation. In order to ensure long-term sustainability of public finances following a
fiscal shock, debt is stabilized by means of a gradual adjustment in labour taxes. Model parameters are estimated on euro area data.  
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the role played by elections (see for instance Buti and van den Noord, 2004) or the political setup of a 
country (see for instance Lane, 2003). 
Are there successful cases of discretionary fiscal stabilisation and what can we learn from them? 
In spite of the generally negative findings of econometric studies, one may still raise the question 
whether there are any specific and significant cases of successful discretionary fiscal stabilisation in the 
recent history of the EU and, if yes, what lessons can be drawn from them. 
Two episodes are of particular interest, which are however very a-typical as deficits were also run in 
order to bail out financial institutions: Sweden and Finland in the early 1990s. At the time, the two 
countries went through a very steep recession, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
coupled with a domestic crisis of the banking sector, and against the backdrop of an overvalued 
exchange rate and tight monetary policy. Both economies recorded negative growth over the three 
consecutive years 1991-1993, amounting to a cumulated loss of output of 4.3% of GDP in Sweden, and 
10.8% in Finland.  
In both countries, the crisis triggered a significant fiscal expansion, largely focused on the expenditure 
side. Starting from surpluses, the headline balance of the general government accounts moved deeply 
into negative territory posting in 1991 a deficit of 11.4% of GDP in Sweden and of 7.8% of GDP in 
Finland. Over the whole episode (1991-1993) the CAPB deteriorated by 9.9% in Sweden, while in 
Finland it deteriorated by 'only' 3.4%. However, the latter fact could also be interpreted as a successful 
switching strategy, with tightening taking place once the economy had been 'kick-started' again. Indeed, 
by then the Finnish authorities already increased taxation considerably and only reversed that policy 
stance from the mid-1990s onwards. The Swedes took longer to reverse their fiscal policy stance.  
The economies soon returned to a relatively high growth path and the rate of unemployment declined. 
Fiscal policy remained tight in both countries after the counter-cyclical episode, with the result that 
within a few years they were both building up budgetary surpluses, Finland in particular some of the 
highest ones in the EU. So overall, and with the benefit of hindsight, both cases appear to have been a 
success. 
On the face of their apparent success, however, much of the fiscal expansions recorded ex post in 
Sweden and Finland in the beginning of the 1990s was simply the working of automatic stabilisers or 
occurred un-intentionally; i.e. was about not adjusting discretionary expenditure in the event of a sharp 
decline of revenues during the recession. In fact at the time already fiscal contractions were actually 
intended (see Jonung, 2008), but did not materialise due notably to a mis-estimation of potential growth. 
Interestingly, in both countries the counter-cyclical fiscal stance of policy was accompanied by far-
reaching measures to scale back public consumption, which in Finland started earlier than in Sweden. A 
major decline of the size of the public sector took place after the end of the recession period. Indeed, 
counter-cyclicality in the two Member States went hand-in-hand with fundamental structural and 
institutional reforms. 
What are the lessons to be learned for the current situation?  
Discretionary fiscal policy has the potential to smooth cyclical fluctuations. In practice, however, the 
potential effectiveness most of the time does not come to fruition. Available evidence shows that 
discretionary fiscal policy is at best a-cyclical largely because (i) policy makers do not have the 
necessarily information in real time to implement effective measures and (ii) stabilisation of output may 
not be the primary preoccupation of fiscal policy makers when implementing discretionary measures.  
One of the key lessons to be drawn from this is that the stabilisation function of fiscal policy should 
chiefly be taken care of by automatic stabilisers. According to existing work, automatic stabilisers are 
comparatively effective in the EU reducing the volatility of output by around 25% and more (see for  
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instance van den Noord, 2000 and Barrel and Pina, 2000). The size of automatic stabilisers in Europe 
also compares favourably with the US. In the group of countries adopting the single European currency 
the budgetary sensitivity, the parameter that measures the automatic reaction of the government budget 
to cyclical swings in output, averages 0.5, twice the size of what is estimated for the US. 
To the extent that it does not conflict with the requirements of the SGP, the recourse to significant 
discretionary fiscal stabilisation could be instrumental in the wake of sharp and protracted economic 
slowdowns after other policy instruments have not produced the desired effect. These conditions are 
clearly not met at the current juncture. The EU economy exhibits signs of a slowdown, but no recession, 
and is more resilient than the US. Automatic stabilisers and the common monetary policy should take 








The EU fiscal framework aims at ensuring 
budgetary discipline through two main 
requirements: the Treaty requirement to avoid 
excessive deficit positions, measured against 
reference values for deficits and debt of 3% and 
60% of GDP respectively, and the requirement 
for Member States to achieve and maintain their 
medium-term budgetary objective (MTO). 
Compliance with the MTO secures the 
sustainability of public finances and provides the 
necessary room for manoeuvre to allow the 
automatic stabilisers to play freely without 
breaching the 3% of GDP reference value of the 
Treaty. A brief description of the enforcement 
procedures of the rules-based framework of the 
Treaty and Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is 
provided in Box I.2.1.  
This section reviews the implementation of these 
mechanisms since spring 2007 focussing, in 
particular, on the excessive deficit procedure and 
on the Commission policy advice. The former 
mechanism refers to the dissuasive part of the 
Pact whereas the latter, which can be 
characterised as a policy guidance issued by the 
Commission to Member States, is related to the 
preventive part. 
2.2. THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT PROCEDURE 
Since spring 2007, the Commission and the 
Council took action on seven Member States 
subject to an excessive deficit procedure (EDP).  
Proceeding in a chronological order, in July 
2007, the Council endorsed the Commission 
communication on action taken for Hungary 
stating that the measures adopted by this country 
were considered consistent with the Council 
recommendation under Article 104(7). As a 
consequence, no further steps were needed under 
the excessive deficit procedure.  
Furthermore, in July 2007 the Council 
considered that the Czech Republic had not 
respected the recommendations formulated under 
Article 104(7) of the Treaty. As the Czech 
Republic is a Member State with a derogation, 
the Council issued another recommendation 
based on Article 104(7) in October 2007 (1). 
In September 2007, the Commission considered 
that the United Kingdom had corrected its 
excessive deficit. It recommended to the Council 
to decide to abrogate the excessive deficit 
procedure for the United Kingdom, which was 
adopted by the Council in October 2007. 
In December 2007, the Council adopted the 
Commission communication on action taken for 
Poland stating that the measures implemented by 
the authorities were consistent with the Council 
recommendation under Article 104(7). As a 
consequence, no further steps were needed under 
the excessive deficit procedure.  
Additionally, in May 2008, the Commission 
assessed that the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal 
and Slovakia had corrected their excessive 
deficits and recommended to the Council the 
abrogation of the respective excessive deficit 
procedures. In June 2008, the Council decided 
accordingly. 
In June 2008 the Commission considered that 
Poland had corrected its excessive deficit and 
recommended to the Council to abrogate the 
Polish excessive deficit procedure. The ECOFIN 
Council meets on 8 July 2008, after the cut-off 
date, of this report. If the Council decides to 
close the procedure for Poland, only Hungary 
will still be in excessive deficit. At the same 
time, however, it has to be noted that in June 
2008 the Commission adopted a report under 
Article 104(3) of the Treaty initiating the 
excessive deficit procedure for the United 
Kingdom (see Table II.2.1) (2), which may lead 
to a formal decision that the country is in 
excessive deficit. 
                                                          
(1) Recently acceded Member States went straight into Stage 
Three of EMU, with the status of 'Member State with a 
derogation' within the meaning of Article 122 EC. 
Currently, the Member States with a derogation are 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden. 
(2) For documents concerning EDP procedures, see the 








Box I.2.1: EU budgetary surveillance
This box describes the enforcement mechanisms of the EU budgetary surveillance framework. It outlines 
the excessive deficit procedure, the early warning mechanism and the Commission policy advice. 
The excessive deficit procedure 
Article 104 of the Treaty states that Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits. In 
particular Member States shall comply with budgetary discipline by respecting two criteria specified in 
the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedures annexed to the Treaty: a deficit ratio and a debt ratio not 
exceeding reference values of respectively 3% and 60% of GDP. Article 104 also sets out the procedure 
to be followed to identify and correct situations of excessive deficit, and voting modalities in the course 
of the procedure. The Regulation 1467/97 of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), as amended by 
Council Regulation 1056/05, clarifies the procedure. 
The first four steps of the procedure, corresponding to provisions of paragraph 3 to 6 of Article 104, 
concern the identification of situations of excessive deficit. The excessive deficit procedure is triggered 
if the deficit of a Member State exceeds 3% of GDP (1). In such a situation, the Commission adopts a 
report, in accordance with Article 104(3), reviewing in detail the economic and budgetary situation the 
Member State considered. As foreseen in Article 104(4) and Regulation 1467/97, the Economic and 
Financial Committee formulates an opinion on this report within two weeks. The Commission takes this 
opinion into account and, if it considers that an excessive deficit exists, addresses an opinion under 
Article 104(5) to the Council. On the basis of the Commission opinion, the Council decides on the 
existence of an excessive deficit under Article 104(6). 
The subsequent steps of the procedure are dedicated to the correction of excessive deficits. When it 
decides that an excessive deficit exists, the Council addresses a recommendation to the Member State 
concerned in accordance with Article 104(7). In this recommendation, the Council sets a deadline for the 
Member State to correct the excessive deficit and a fiscal effort to be achieved by the Member States 
concerned to this end (at least 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark). Regulation 1467(97) specifies that the 
deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit shall be set taking into account an overall assessment 
of the factors mentioned in the Article 104(3) of the Treaty. 
In case action by the Member State concerned leads to the correction of the excessive deficit, the 
Council shall decide, in accordance with Article 104(12), to abrogate its decisions under the excessive 
deficit procedure. In other words, the procedure is closed. In the event the Council considers that 
effective action has not been taken, it may decide, as stated in Article 104(8) of the Treaty, to make 
public its recommendation according to 104(7). In case effective action has been taken but events 
outside the control of the government with large adverse consequences on the budget prevent the 
correction of the excessive deficit within the time limits set by the Council, the possibility exists to 
revise the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit in a new 104(7) recommendation. 
The steps described above apply to all EU countries. The further steps of the procedure depend on 
whether the Member State is a euro-area Member State. The excessive deficit procedure applies in full 
to euro-area Member States. For these countries, Article 104(9) stipulates that, provided the Council 
adopts a decision under article 104(8), it may decide to give notice to the Member State concerned to 
                                                          
(1) Article 104(2) of the Treaty states that a deficit of more than 3% of GDP that is only exceptional and temporary may not be
considered excessive in case the deficit remains close to the reference value. A deficit above 3% of GDP may also not be
considered excessive if it has declined substantially and reached a level that comes close to the reference value. The same Article
provides an exception for countries having a debt ratio above 60%, if this ratio diminishes sufficiently and approaches the value of
60% of GDP at a satisfactory pace.  
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take the necessary measures to reduce the deficit. The recommendations under article 104(9) of the 
Treaty shall include a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and a fiscal effort to be 
achieved by the Member States concerned to this end (at least 0.5% of GDP as a benchmark). 
This step constitutes a move towards even closer surveillance, and is the ultimate step before the 
possible imposition of sanctions. If the Member State fails to comply with the recommendations, the 
Council may decide to impose sanctions no later than two months after notice has been given. In case of 
compliance with the recommendations formulated in the notice under article 104(9), the decisions taken 
under articles 104(6) to 104(9) are abrogated with a Council decision in accordance with article 104(12), 
and the procedure is closed. In case effective action has been taken but events outside the control of the 
government with large adverse consequences on the budget prevent the correction of the excessive 
deficit within the time limits set by the Council, the possibility exists to revise the deadline for the 
correction of the excessive deficit in a new 104(9) notice. 
As mentioned above, non-euro-area Member States are not exempt from the obligation to avoid 
excessive deficits, but the later steps of the EDP do not apply for them. When a Member States outside 
the euro area in a situation of an excessive deficit fails to respect the recommendations addressed under 
Article 104(7), it cannot be submitted to the last two steps of the excessive deficit procedure, namely 
notice foreseen in Article 104(9) and the imposition of sanctions foreseen in Article 104(11). Non-
compliance with a recommendation under 104(7) may lead to a renewed recommendation according to 
Article 104(7), following a decision according to Article 104(8).  
The early warning mechanism 
In its Article 99(4) the Treaty foresees the possibility for the Council to make recommendations to 
Member States in case their economic policies ‘are not consistent with the broad guidelines or risk 
jeopardising the proper functioning of EMU’. Based on this Article, Regulation 1466/97 as amended by 
Council Regulation 1055/05, which codifies the preventive arm of the SGP, provides the Council with 
the possibility to issue ‘early warnings’ to Member States in order to prevent the occurrence of an 
excessive deficit (1). The reference to the early warning comes in the section related to the adjustment 
path to the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO). 
The Commission policy advice 
The 20 March 2005 ECOFIN Council report, which underpins the revised SGP, introduced the 
possibility for the Commission to issue direct, i.e. without involvement of the Council, policy advice to a 
Member State. The so-called Code of Conduct (2) further specifies that the policy advice shall be given 
in accordance with Article 211, second indent, of the Treaty and that it shall be made public. The 
Commission policy advice can be used in a wide range of circumstances not limited to a deviation from 
budgetary targets. This includes cases in which a Member State's economic policies are not consistent 
with broad guidelines, delay progress towards sustainability or risk jeopardising the proper functioning 
of economic and monetary union. Such a broad application allows blending messages of structural 
reform needs, quality and long-term sustainability of public finances, addressing macroeconomic 
imbalances and budgetary consolidation. In general, the Commission policy advice differs from the early 
warning in at least three respects. Firstly, the policy advice reflects only the views of the Commission. 
Secondly, for a policy advice there is not necessarily a need to have identified a divergence from the 
                                                          
(1) Once the new Lisbon Treaty on European Union has entered into force, the Commission will also have the option to issue early
warnings directly, without having to involve the Council. 
(2) “Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and guidelines on the format and content of stability and
convergence programmes”, endorsed by the ECOFIN Council of 11 October 2005. 
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2.2.1. The surveillance mechanism in the 
euro-area Member States 
Italy 
On 23 May 2005, Eurostat released revised 
figures on Italian government data, showing a 
general government deficit of 3.1% of GDP in 
both 2003 and 2004. Over the same two years, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio was reported to have 
remained broadly stable at around 106-107% of 
GDP. On 24 May, the Italian nstitute of statistics 
released new public finances data for the period 
2000-2004. The deficit was reported at 3.2% of 
GDP in 2003 and 2004 and thus above 3% of 
GDP in both years. Although the deficit ratio 
remained close to the reference value the breach 
could not be considered temporary because the 
Commission projected, in its spring 2005 
forecast, the deficit to exceed 3% in 2005 and 
2006. Taking also into consideration the 
developments in the debt ratio, the Council 
decided on 28 July 2005, following a 
recommendation by the Commission, that Italy 
had an excessive deficit. At the same time, the 
Council addressed a recommendation under 
Article 104(7) specifying that the excessive 
deficit had to be corrected by 2007. In particular, 
Italy was recommended to implement with rigour 
the 2005 budget; reduce the structural deficit by 
a minimum 1.6 percentage points of GDP by 
2007 relative to its level in 2005, with at least 
half of this correction taking place in 2006; and 
ensure that the debt-to-GDP ratio diminishes and 
approaches the reference value at a satisfactory 
pace.  
On 22 February 2006, after the six-month 
deadline for the authorities to take action, the 
Commission adopted a communication 
concluding that the actions taken by Italy, if fully 
implemented and effective, would be consistent 
with the Council recommendation. The 
Commission communication highlighted, 
however, that implementation uncertainties 
persisted, requiring continuous monitoring. On 
14 March 2006, the Council agreed with this 
analysis, stressing the utmost importance of the 
execution of the 2006 budget and the likely need 
to identify and implement substantial additional 
corrective measures for 2007.  
Data provided by the Commission (Eurostat) 
following the reporting by Italy before April 
2008 showed that a significant budgetary 
adjustment took place in 2006 and in 2007, when 
the general government deficit reached 3.4% and 
1.9% of GDP, respectively. 
The structural deficit, i.e. the budget balance net 
of cyclical factors and one-off measures, 
improved by 1.7% of GDP in 2006 and by about 
1¼ percentage point in 2007. This exceeded by a 
comfortable margin the at least 1.6% of GDP 
between 2005 and 2007 required by the July 
2005 Council recommendation under Article 
104(7). According to the Commission services' 
spring 2008 forecast, the general government 
deficit is projected to increase to 2.3% of GDP in 
2008 and, under the usual no-policy change 
assumption, to 2.4% of GDP in 2009.  
The government debt ratio, which increased by 
2% of GDP in 2005 and by a further ½ 
percentage point in 2006, fell by 2½ percentage 
points in 2007, to a level of 104% of GDP. 
According to the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast, the debt ratio is projected to fall to 
103.2% of GDP by 2008 and, under the 
assumption of unchanged policies, around 
102½% by 2009.  
Overall, the Commission and the Council 
concluded that the excessive deficit situation in 
Italy had been corrected. Accordingly, on the 
basis of Article 104(12) of the Treaty, the 
Council decided on 3 June 2008 to abrogate its 
Box (continued) 
MTO or the adjustment path towards it and there is not necessarily a relation to the risk of an excessive 
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decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 
in Italy.  
Portugal  
The update of the stability programme submitted 
on 9 June 2005 by the Portuguese authorities 
planned a general government deficit in excess 
of the 3% of GDP reference value for the years 
from 2005 to 2007. After a reported deficit 
outturn of 2.9% of GDP in 2004, Portugal 
projected a significant slippage in the 
government deficit, reaching 6.2% of GDP in 
2005, 4.8% in 2006 and 3.9% in 2007, before 
falling below 3.0% of GDP in 2008. Over the 
same years, the debt-to-GDP ratio was projected 
to increase from 61.9% in 2004 to a peak of 
67.8% in 2007. On this basis and following a 
recommendation by the Commission, the 
Council decided on 20 September 2005 that 
Portugal had an excessive deficit.  
On the same date, the Council addressed a 
recommendation under Article 104(7) specifying 
that the excessive deficit had to be corrected by 
2008. Specifically, Portugal was recommended 
to limit the deterioration of the fiscal position in 
2005 and to ensure an adjustment of the 
structural deficit of 1.5% of GDP between 2005 
and 2006, followed by a further decrease of, at 
least, ¾ percentage points in each of the two 
subsequent years; to rapidly implement reforms 
to contain and reduce expenditure and to stand 
ready to adopt the additional measures which 
might be necessary to achieve the correction of 
the excessive deficit by 2008; to ensure that the 
government gross debt ratio was brought onto a 
downward path also by avoiding debt-increasing 
financial transactions, and by considering 
carefully the possible impact on debt of major 
public investment projects. 
The Commission communication of 21 June 
2006, adopted after the six-month deadline for 
the authorities to take action, considered that the 
action taken by Portugal in response to the 
Council recommendation represented adequate 
progress towards the correction of the excessive 
deficit. In particular, Portugal (i) achieved a 2005 
deficit outturn as planned; (ii) adopted a 
comprehensive package of corrective measures 
which, provided the full and effective 
implementation, was in line with the required 
structural adjustment in 2006; (iii) confirmed the 
deficit target for 2008 below 3% of GDP and a 
structural adjustment path in accordance with the 
Council recommendation; (iv) implemented or 
initiated expenditure-containing measures and 
kept fiscal targets in spite of a more cautious 
assessment of GDP growth prospects; (v) 
planned to bring government debt back on a 
declining path as from 2008; and (vi) took action 
to improve the quality of public finance statistics. 
On 11 July 2006, the Council agreed with this 
analysis. 
Data provided by the Commission (Eurostat) 
following the reporting by Portugal before 1 
April 2008 indicate that the general government 
deficit in 2007 was 2.6% of GDP, following 
government deficit outturns of 6.1% of GDP in 
2005 and 3.9% of GDP in 2006. In all, a 
government deficit below the 3% of GDP 
reference value was achieved one year before the 
deadline set by the Council in its 
recommendation under Article 104(7).  
These developments led to a significant 
reduction of the structural deficit (i.e., the 
cyclically-adjusted deficit net of one-off and 
other temporary measures) in 2006 and 2007. In 
the former year, a reduction of some 2% of GDP 
was achieved, followed by a further decline by 
about 1% of GDP in the latter. These results 
went well beyond the Council recommendation 
under Article 104(7) asking for a reduction of the 
structural balance by 1.5% of GDP in 2006 from 
2005 and, at least, ¾% of GDP in 2007. 
According to the Commission services’ spring 
2008 economic forecast the general government 
deficit is projected to decline to 2.2% of GDP in 
2008 and, under the assumption of unchanged 
policies, to increase to 2.6% of GDP in 2009. 
The structural balance is expected to improve by 
a ¼% of GDP in 2008. At unchanged policies, a 
worsening by ¼% of GDP is projected for 2009. 
The government gross debt ratio rose above the 
60% of GDP reference value in 2005. In 2006, 
the debt ratio went further up to 64.7% of GDP 
and fell back to 63.6% of GDP in 2007.  
According to the Commission services' spring 
2008 economic forecast, the government debt 
ratio is expected to rebound marginally to over 
64% of GDP in 2008 and, on the basis of the no-
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policy change assumption, to come at 64¼% of 
GDP in 2009. 
Overall, the Commission and the Council 
concluded that the excessive deficit situation in 
Portugal had been corrected. Accordingly, on the 
basis of Article 104(12) of the Treaty, the 
Council decided on 3 June 2008 to abrogate its 
decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 
in Portugal.  
2.2.2. The surveillance mechanism in the 
non-euro-area Member States 
The Czech Republic 
The Commission services' 2004 spring forecast 
revealed for the Czech Republic a deficit of 
12.9% of GDP for 2003 (5.9% of GDP excluding 
a major one-off operation related to imputed 
state guarantees). On 5 July 2004, the Council 
decided, on the basis of a Commission 
recommendation, that the Czech Republic had an 
excessive deficit and issued a recommendation 
under Article 104(7) of the Treaty for its 
correction by 2008. The Czech authorities were 
recommended to implement with vigour the 
measures envisaged in the May 2004 
convergence programme, in particular to cut the 
wage bill of central government and to reduce 
spending of individual ministries. Furthermore, 
they were invited to: (i) allocate higher-than-
budgeted revenues to deficit reduction; (ii) 
introduce fiscal targeting based on medium-term 
expenditure ceilings; (iii) design effective rules 
to reduce the risk of increasing indebtedness of 
regions and municipalities; (iv) undertake the 
reform of the pension and healthcare systems so 
as to improve the long-term sustainability of the 
public finances; (v) minimise the negative 
budgetary impact of the operations of the Czech 
Consolidation Agency. 
After the four-month deadline for the authorities 
to take action, the Commission concluded in its 
communication of 22 December 2004 that the 
measures envisaged to achieve the 2005 deficit 
target were consistent with the Article 104(7) 
Council recommendation and that no further 
steps were necessary under the excessive deficit 
procedure. On 18 January 2005, the Council 
agreed with this view. 
In 2006, the deficit fell just below the reference 
value of the Treaty, to 2.9% of GDP, in spite of 
some deficit-increasing one-off measures. 
However, the Commission services' spring 2007 
forecast projected the deficit to increase 
significantly in 2007, to almost 4% of GDP, on 
the back of higher social spending. Under the no-
policy-change assumption, the deficit was 
projected to decline to 3.6% of GDP in 2008. 
The structural position was estimated to have 
widened in both 2005 and 2006 and projected to 
widen even more in 2007.  
Following a recommendation by the Commission 
under Article 104(8), the Council decided on 10 
July 2007 that the Czech Republic had not 
adopted adequate measures in response to its 
July 2004 recommendation. 
In August 2007, the government approved a 
'stabilisation package', subsequently endorsed by 
the Parliament, which had an estimated fiscal 
impact of 0.3% of GDP, leading to an annual 
deficit target only slightly above the 3% of GDP 
threshold in 2008.  
Since the Czech Republic is a Member State with 
a derogation, the Council issued on 9 October 
2007, based on a recommendation by the 
Commission, a new recommendation under 
Article 104(7), confirming the 2008 deadline for 
the correction. The Czech authorities were 
invited to limit the 2007 deficit deterioration and 
to ensure an improvement in the structural 
balance of at least ¾% of GDP in 2008 compared 
to 2007.  
Based on data provided by the Commission 
(Eurostat), following the reporting by the Czech 
Republic before April 2008, the general 
government deficit stood at 1.6% of GDP in 
2007, significantly below the target of 4% of 
GDP set in the March 2007 update of the 
convergence programme.  
Compared to 2006, the headline deficit declined 
by 1.1% of GDP, of which about one half is due 
to measures taken and the other half is thanks to 
stronger growth. The improvement in 2007 
represented an overachievement of the Council’s 
recommendation under Article 104(7) issued in 
October 2007 which invited the Czech 
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authorities to “further contain the budgetary 
deterioration” expected at that time. 
According to the Commission services’ spring 
2008 forecast, the general government deficit is 
projected to decline further, reaching 1.4% of 
GDP in 2008 and, under a no-policy change 
assumption, 1.1% of GDP in 2009.  
The structural deficit (i.e., the cyclically-adjusted 
deficit net of one-off and other temporary 
measures) is expected to improve from 2¼% of 
GDP in 2007 to around 2% of GDP in 2008. The 
improvement is lower than recommended by the 
Council (at least ¾% of GDP) in light of the 
much better headline deficit in 2007, 
underpinned by a structural improvement in 2007 
of about ½% of GDP, which was not anticipated 
at the time of the Article 104(7) Council 
recommendation. 
Overall, the Commission and the Council 
concluded that the excessive deficit situation in 
the Czech Republic had been corrected. 
Accordingly, on the basis of Article 104(12) of 
the Treaty, the Council decided on 3 June 2008 
to abrogate its decision on the existence of an 
excessive deficit in the Czech Republic. 
Hungary 
The spring 2004 fiscal notification of Hungary 
reported a general government deficit in 2003 
above the reference value of 3% of GDP. On this 
basis and following a recommendation by the 
Commission, the Council decided on 5 July 2004 
that an excessive deficit existed in Hungary. On 
the same day, the Council issued a 
recommendation under Article 104(7) 
recommending that the excessive deficit situation 
had to be corrected by 2008. Hungary was 
invited to implement the measures envisaged in 
the May 2004 convergence programme and to 
stand ready to introduce more measures to 
achieve the deficit targets for 2004 and 2005. 
On 18 January 2005, following a 
recommendation by the Commission in 
accordance with Article 104(8), the Council 
considered that Hungary had not taken effective 
action in response to its recommendation. Since 
Hungary is a Member State with a derogation, 
the Council issued on 8 March 2005 another 
recommendation based on Article 104(7), taking 
into account the information of Hungary’s 
convergence programme update submitted in 
December 2004 (1). The Council confirmed the 
2008 deadline for the correction of the excessive 
deficit and recommended Hungary to take action 
in a medium-term framework according to the 
path of deficit reduction spelled out in its opinion 
on the updated convergence programme adopted 
on the same day.  
In the light of a substantial deterioration of the 
budgetary outlook in Hungary and based on a 
Commission recommendation, the Council 
decided on 8 November 2005, acting pursuant to 
Article 104(8), for the second time that Hungary 
did not comply with the new recommendations 
under Article 104(7).  
Accordingly, the Council, following a preceding 
recommendation by the Commission, addressed 
a new recommendation under Article 104(7) to 
Hungary on 10 October 2006 postponing the 
deadline for the correction of the excessive 
deficit by one year, to 2009. Hungary was invited 
to limit the deterioration of the fiscal position in 
2006, which was estimated as a deficit of 10% of 
GDP (including pension reform costs), ensure a 
frontloaded, sustained and substantial correction 
of the structural deficit and adopt and implement 
wide-ranging structural reforms aimed at 
containing public expenditure. Furthermore, 
Hungary was requested to improve expenditure 
control and to ensure that the gross debt ratio 
was brought onto a firm downward trajectory, 
preferably before 2009. The Council also 
welcomed the commitment of Hungary to report 
on a six-monthly basis to the Commission and 
the Council regarding the progress made in 
complying with the Council recommendation.  
On the basis of the December 2006 update of the 
convergence programme, of the first progress 
report submitted by the government in April 
2007 and of the Commission services' spring 
2007 forecast, the Commission adopted on 13 
                                                          
(1) Member States with a derogation are to avoid excessive 
deficits but in the event of inadequate action established 
under Article 104(8), further recommendations can be 
addressed only on the basis of Article 104(7) as Articles 
104(9) and Article 104(11) do not apply to them. 
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June 2007 a communication to the Council on 
the action taken by Hungary.  
Against the backdrop of revenue-enhancing as 
well as expenditure-containing measures, the 
general government deficit reached 9.2% of GDP 
in 2006, well above the reference value of 3% of 
GDP but almost 1 percentage point lower than 
expected in October 2006 at the time of the 
Council recommendation under Article 104(7). 
The spring 2007 Commission services' forecast 
projected a deficit of 6.8% of GDP for 2007, 
resulting from further measures on the revenue 
side as well as, to a lesser extent, from some 
expenditure retrenchment.  
For 2008, on a no-policy change basis, the spring 
2007 Commission services' forecast projected a 
further decline of the deficit to 4.9% of GDP. 
This figure was ½ percentage point above the 
target of 4.3% of GDP underlying the Article 
104(7) Council recommendation of November 
2005. According to the Commission, this 
inability in meeting the agreed targets called for: 
(i) further action on the enforcement of the 
expenditure cuts; (ii) a sudden implementation of 
a wide-ranging agenda of structural reforms 
including a reinforced system of budgetary rules.  
Based on this analysis, the Commission 
communication concluded that Hungary had 
until then acted in a manner consistent with the 
Council recommendation of October 2006 and 
that no further steps were needed under the 
excessive deficit procedure. On 10 July 2007 the 
Council examined the Commission 
communication and agreed with this view. 
Poland  
The Commission services' spring 2004 forecast 
revealed for Poland a deficit of 4.1% of GDP in 
2003. On 5 July 2004, the Council decided, 
based on a Commission recommendation, that 
Poland was in excessive deficit. At the same 
time, the Council addressed a recommendation 
under Article 104(7) specifying that the 
excessive deficit had to be corrected by 2007. In 
particular, Poland was recommended to 
implement with vigour the measures envisaged 
in the May 2004 convergence programme, 
specifically those contained in the so-called 
Hausner plan. This plan was proposed in 2003 
and aimed at reducing public expenditure on 
social protection, public administration and state 
aid. In addition, the Council invited the Polish 
authorities to allocate possible extra revenues to 
decrease the general government deficit. 
After the four-month deadline for the authorities 
to take action, the Commission concluded, in its 
Communication to the Council of 22 December 
2004, that no further steps were necessary under 
the excessive deficit procedure for Poland as the 
government had taken effective action regarding 
the measures envisaged to achieve the 2005 
deficit target. On 18 January 2005, the Council 
agreed with this view. 
On 28 November 2006, the Council decided on 
the basis of a Commission recommendation 
under Article 104(8) that Poland had not taken 
adequate action in response to the July 2004 
Council recommendation. Despite deficit 
outcomes for the years 2004-2006 lower than 
envisaged in the Council recommendation, the 
Commission services’ autumn 2006 forecast 
projected the 2007 deficit to exceed the target.  
Indeed, the draft budget for 2007 revised the 
deficit for the same year to 1.7% of GDP 
(excluding pension reform costs), 0.2 percentage 
points above the target of 1.5% of GDP foreseen 
in the recommendation. These figures were 
based on the classification of contributions to 
second-pillar funded pension schemes as 
government revenues, possible, by way of 
transitional arrangement, until end-March 2007. 
From April 2007, the inclusion of the pension 
reform cost led to a 2007 deficit target of 3.7 % 
of GDP. 
Since Poland is a Member State with a 
derogation, the Council adopted on 27 February 
2007 a new recommendation based on Article 
104(7), which confirmed the 2007 deadline for 
the correction of the excessive deficit. Poland 
was recommended to ensure an improvement of 
the structural balance by at least 0.5% of GDP 
between 2006 and 2007. 
On 20 November 2007, after the six-month 
deadline for the authorities to take action, the 
Commission adopted a communication to the 
Council on the action taken by Poland in 
response to the new Council recommendation. 
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Relying also on the autumn 2007 forecast, the 
Commission concluded that, on the basis of then 
available information, the consolidation 
measures approved by the Polish government 
were consistent with the Council 
recommendation as the deficit ratio in 2007 was 
expected to be below 3%. The structural 
improvement achieved by Poland in 2007 
amounted to around 1 percentage point, clearly 
exceeding the structural adjustment requested by 
the Council. However, as the general government 
deficit was expected to rebound above 3% of 
GDP in 2008, the correction was considered to 
be subject to risks.  
On 4 December 2007, the Council agreed with 
the assessment in the communication from the 
Commission and together with the Commission 
invited Poland to set out in a new convergence 
programme update a medium-term strategy 
consistent with a durable correction of the 
excessive deficit and further progress towards the 
medium-term budgetary objective. The new 
convergence programme was submitted by the 
Polish authorities at the end of March 2008.  
On the basis of data provided by the Commission 
(Eurostat) following the reporting by Poland 
before April 2008, the general government 
deficit stood at 2.0% of GDP in 2007, 
significantly below the 3% of GDP reference 
value.  
Compared to 2006, the headline deficit  
decreased by 1.8 percentage points mainly 
reflecting higher economic growth and 
expenditure restraint partly due to an incomplete 
execution of investment plans. The windfalls in 
revenues stemming from favourable economic 
conditions were offset by direct tax cuts and the 
underperformance in other revenue categories. 
Between 2006 and 2007, the structural balance, 
i.e. the cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off 
and other temporary measures, improved by 
about 1½ percentage point of GDP, well above 
the fiscal effort of at least 0.5 percentage point 
recommended by the Council in its 
recommendations under Article 104(7) of the 
Treaty. 
According to the Commission services’ spring 
2008 forecast, which also took into account the 
March 2008 update of the Polish convergence 
programme, the headline deficit is expected to 
increase to 2.5% of GDP in 2008 and, on a no-
policy change basis, to 2.6% in 2009. Similarly, 
the structural balance is projected to deteriorate 
by ¼ percentage points between 2007 and 2008 
whereas in 2009, under the no-policy-change 
assumption, it is expected to decrease by almost 
½ percentage points reaching 2.3% of GDP.  
Overall, the Commission concluded that the 
excessive deficit situation in Poland had been 
corrected. Accordingly, on 11 June 2008, it 
adopted a recommendation to the Council to 
decide, on the basis of Article 104(12), to 
abrogate the excessive deficit procedure for 
Poland. The Council meets on 8 July 2008, after 
the cut-off date of this report. 
Slovakia 
The Commission services' spring 2004 forecast 
revealed that the general government deficit in 
Slovakia was at 3.6% of GDP in 2003. It was 
projected to increase further in 2004 and, under 
the no-policy-change assumption, to continue to 
exceed 3% of GDP in 2005. On 5 July 2004, the 
Council decided, based on a recommendation 
from the Commission, that an excessive deficit 
existed in Slovakia. At the same time, the 
Council addressed a recommendation under 
Article 104(7) specifying that the excessive 
deficit had to be corrected by 2007. Slovakia was 
recommended to achieve the 2005 deficit target 
and to implement with vigour the measures 
envisaged in the May 2004 programme, in 
particular those related to the proposed further 
health care reforms and further public sector 
rationalisation. Furthermore, Slovakia was 
invited to accelerate the fiscal adjustment if the 
implemented structural reforms resulted in 
higher growth than expected in the programme, 
in particular by dedicating any higher-than-
budgeted revenues primarily to faster deficit 
reduction. 
The Commission communication of 22 
December 2004, adopted after the four-month 
deadline for the authorities to take action, stated 
that, based on then available information and the 
measures detailed in the 2005 budget, the 
measures decided by the Slovak government 
appeared to be consistent with the need to 
achieve the 2005 deficit target in response to the 
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Council recommendation under Article 104(7). 
The communication concluded that no further 
steps were necessary at that point under the 
excessive deficit procedure. On 18 January 2005, 
the Council agreed with this view. 
According to the data provided by the 
Commission (Eurostat) following the reporting 
by Slovakia before April 2008 the general 
government deficit remained below 3% of GDP 
in the years 2003-2005 due to a subsequent data 
revision. The headline deficit increased to 3.6% 
of GDP in 2006, before falling to 2.2% of GDP 
in 2007. 
The 2007 deficit outcome was below the official 
target of 2.9% of GDP set in the December 2006 
update of the convergence programme. 
Nevertheless, the structural deficit (i.e., the 
cyclically-adjusted deficit net of one-off and 
other temporary measures) deteriorated from 
some 1½% of GDP in 2003 to around 3% of 
GDP in 2006 before improving to around 2½% 
of GDP by 2007. However, the creation of the 
second funded pension pillar in 2005 contributed 
to the structural deterioration.  
According to the Commission services’ spring 
2008 forecast the headline deficit is expected to 
narrow further to 2.0% of GDP in 2008 before 
increasing to 2.3% of GDP in 2009 under the 
customary no-policy-change assumption against 
the background of markedly slowing but still 
robust GDP and decelerating employment 
growth. 
The structural deficit is expected to deteriorate 
from around 2½% to some 2¾% of GDP 
between 2007 and 2008. In 2009, the structural 
deficit is foreseen to deteriorate further to some 
3% of GDP.  
Overall, the Commission and the Council 
concluded that the excessive deficit situation in 
Slovakia had been corrected. Accordingly, on the 
basis of Article 104(12) of the Treaty, the 
Council decided on 3 June 2008 to abrogate its 
decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 
in Slovakia.  
United Kingdom 
According to the data notified by the United 
Kingdom (UK) in August 2005, the general 
government deficit amounted to 3.2% of GDP in 
the 2004/05 financial year (1). The Commission 
services' autumn 2005 forecast projected that on 
the basis of unchanged policies the general 
government deficit would rise further in the 
financial year 2005/06 to 3.4% of GDP, before 
declining to 3.2% in 2006/07 and 3.0% in 
2007/08. Output was projected to be 
strengthening from late 2005, approaching 
approximately the trend-level growth in 2006. 
Based on these projections, the excess over the 
reference value could not be considered 
exceptional or temporary within the meaning of 
the Treaty and the Pact although the deficit was 
close to the reference value.  
After the Commission services' autumn 2005 
forecast had been published, the UK announced 
policy decisions in the Pre-Budget Report 
presented to Parliament on 5 December. These 
measures represented an easing of fiscal policy 
by 0.1% of GDP in the financial year 2005/06 
and a tightening by 0.1% of GDP in 2006/07. 
Compared to an unchanged policy scenario, the 
Pre-Budget Report foresaw a tightening of 0.2% 
of GDP in 2007/08. Taking into consideration 
these measures, the Commission's assessment 
remained that the deficit in 2005/06 and 2006/07 
was expected to exceed 3% of GDP. On this 
basis and following a recommendation by the 
Commission, the Council decided on 24 January 
2006 that the UK had an excessive deficit. 
At the same time, the Council addressed a 
recommendation under Article 104(7) specifying 
that the UK had to correct the excessive deficit 
situation by the financial year 2006/07. The UK 
was recommended to ensure an improvement of 
the structural balance by at least 0.5 percentage 
points of GDP between the 2005/06 and 2006/07 
financial years. 
On 20 September 2006, after the six-month 
deadline for the authorities to take action, the 
Commission adopted a communication 
                                                          
(1) The EDP applies to the UK on a financial year basis. The 
UK financial year runs from April to March.  
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concluding that the UK was just on track to 
correct its excessive deficit by the financial year 
2006/2007. According to the Commission, fiscal 
consolidation was supported by better GDP 
growth than originally envisaged and the tax 
base was strengthened by the good performance 
of the financial sector and rising oil prices. 
Nevertheless, the Commission communication 
noted that the deficit correction remained 
vulnerable to negative surprises, given the lack 
of a safety margin against exceeding the 3% of 
GDP reference value and the likely shortfall of 
the structural improvement recommended under 
Article 104(7). On 10 October 2006, the Council 
agreed with this view.  
According to the Commission services' spring 
2007 forecast, the general government deficit 
was expected to decrease from 3.2% of GDP in 
2005/06 to 2.7% of GDP in 2006/07. The 
structural balance was estimated to improve by 
0.7% of GDP, in line with the minimum 0.5% of 
GDP adjustment recommended by the Council. 
Based on the Commission services' forecast, the 
headline deficit was projected to narrow to 2.6% 
of GDP in 2007/08 and, on a no-policy-change 
basis, to 2.4% in 2008/09. This indicated that the 
deficit had been brought below the reference 
value in a credible and sustainable manner, 
although the projected path of future 
consolidation was modest relative to the 
expansionary economic condition expected for 
2007/08 and 2008/09.  
Data on the actual outturn in 2006/07 notified by 
the UK in July 2007 and subsequently validated 
by Eurostat confirmed the reduction of the deficit 
below 3% of GDP and pointed to a structural 
improvement in line with the Council 
recommendation.  
Overall, the Commission and Council concluded 
that the excessive deficit situation in the UK had 
been corrected. Accordingly, on the basis of 
Article 104(12) of the Treaty, the Council 
decided on 9 October 2007 to abrogate its 
decision on the existence of an excessive deficit 
in the UK.  
However, according to the data notified by the 
UK authorities in March 2008, the general 
government deficit in 2008/09 was expected to 
reach 3.2% of GDP (3.3% according to the 
Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast) and 
further deficit-increasing measures were 
announced by the government in May 2008. The 
planned figure for the 2008/09 deficit provided 
prima facie evidence on the existence of an 
excessive deficit in the UK. In the absence of 
new discretionary deficit-reducing measures, the 
Commission services' spring 2008 forecast 
projected a general government deficit of 3.3% 
of GDP in 2009/10.  
The general government gross debt was 
projected to remain below the 60% of GDP 
threshold, although on a rising trend. 
In the light of this, on 11 June 2008 the 
Commission adopted a report under Article 
104(3) of the Treaty on the public finance 
situation in the United Kingdom, thereby 
initiating the excessive deficit procedure vis-à-
vis the UK. On the basis of an in-depth 
assessment covering recent and current 
budgetary developments, the short- and medium-
term economic prospects and the policy action 
taken by the government, the Commission 
concluded that the planned government deficit 
remains close to the reference value but that the 
excess over the reference value cannot be 
qualified as exceptional or temporary within the 
meaning of the Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact. This implies that the deficit 
criterion in the Treaty is not fulfilled. 
2.3. THE COMMISSION POLICY ADVICE 
In the period under review, the Commission used 
for the very first time a new legal instrument: the 
policy advice (see Box I.2.1). It addressed this 
new instrument to France and Romania. 
France  
French GDP growth has fallen below the euro 
area average since 2006, with evidence of 
structural problems and a related deterioration in 
competitiveness and bottlenecks in the labour 
market. This weak macroeconomic performance 
is combined with a stalling budgetary 
consolidation. The Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast projects a deficit of 2.9% of GDP 
in 2008 and 3% in 2009. Progress in structural 
adjustment appears to be very limited in the 
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period 2007-2009. In addition, despite steps 
taken to curb spending, notably in social 
security, France still has the highest expenditure-
to-GDP ratio in the euro area at around 52½% of 
GDP and the debt ratio, at around 64% of GDP, 
remains relatively high.  
In light of this, on 28 May 2008 the Commission 
addressed a policy advice to France 
recommending the authorities to implement 
rigorously the policy invitations of the Council 
issued on 12 February 2008 on the 2007 update 
of the stability programme (see Table I.3.3 in 
Part I.3). In addition, France was recommended 
to pursue with determination the ongoing 
structural reform process aimed at increasing its 
growth potential and competitiveness and to 
carry out the necessary consolidation of public 
finances in order to support the reform process.  
Romania  
Romania has experienced strong economic GDP 
growth averaging 6½% annually between 2003 
and 2007. Recently the economy is showing 
signs of overheating with high and growing net 
external borrowing (from 10.4% of GDP in 2006 
to 13.4% of GDP in 2007), rising labour 
shortages, strong wage growth affecting external 
competitiveness, rapid increases in household 
borrowing and increasing inflation.  
For Romania to maintain its fast convergence 
process towards the average income level in the 
EU, it will be crucial to address the growing 
macroeconomic imbalances and to implement 
wide-ranging structural reforms especially in the 
labour market, education, business environment. 
In addition, fiscal policy would have an 
important role to play by cooling down internal 
demand but this requires further improvements in 
the budgetary planning and execution and the 
implementation of a binding medium-term fiscal 
framework.  
Despite some recent budgetary measures, the 
Commission services' 2008 spring forecast 
projected the headline deficit to be just below the 
3% of GDP threshold in 2008 and, under a no-
policy-change assumption, well above it in 2009, 
at 3.7% of GDP. The structural deficit, i.e. the 
cyclically-adjusted deficit and net of one-off 
measures, is also expected to deteriorate going 
from 3⅓% of GDP in 2007 to 3¾% of GDP in 
2008 and some 4% of GDP in 2009.  
In light of this, on 11 June 2008 the Commission 
addressed a policy advice to Romania 
recommending the authorities to implement 
rigorously the policy invitations of the Council 
issued on 12 February 2008 on the 2007 update 
convergence programme (see Table I.3.3 in 
Part I.3). In addition, Romania was 
recommended to take urgent action to implement 
a binding medium-term fiscal framework with a 
view also to improving the quality of public 
finances and to accelerate structural reforms in 
particular to implement an integrated approach to 
increasing employment, activity rates and 
productivity levels.  
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Overview EDP-steps since spring 2007 – Euro-area Member States
Step in EDP procedure Article of the Treaty
IT PT
Commission adopts EDP-report = start of the procedure 104.3 7.6.2005 22.6.2005
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion 104.4 20.6.2005 4.7.2005
Commission adopts:
    - opinion on existence of excessive deficit 104.5
    - recommendation for Council decision on existence of excessive deficit 104.6
    - recommendation for Council recommendation to end this situation 104.7
Council adopts:
    - decision on existence of excessive deficit 104.6
    - recommendation to end this situation 104.7
                       - deadline for taking effective action 12.1.2006 19.3.2006
                       - deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2007 2008
Commission adopts communication on action taken 22.2.2006 21.6.2006
Council adopts conclusions thereon 14.3.2006 11.7.2006
Commission adopts recommendations for:
   - Council decision establishing no effective action 104.8
   - Council decision to give notice 104.9
Commission adopts communication on budgetary situation
Council adopts conclusions thereon
Council adopts:
   - decision establishing no effective action 104.8
   - decision to give notice 104.9
                        - deadline for first report to be submitted
                        - new deadline for correction of excessive deficit
Commission adopts NEW recommendation for:
   - Council decision to give notice 104.9
Council adopts:
   - decision to give notice 104.9
                       - deadline for first report to be submitted
                      - new deadline for correction of excessive deficit
Commission adopts communication on action taken
Council adopts conclusions thereon
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision abrogating existence of
excessive deficit 104.12 7.05.2008 7.05.2008
Council adopts decision abrogating existence of excessive deficit 104.12 3.06.2008 3.06.2008
Country
Table I.2.1:
Follow-up of the article 104.7 Council recommendation
Starting phase 
Follow-up of the Council notice
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CZ HU PL SK
Commission adopts EDP-report = start of the procedure 104.3 12.5.2004 12.5.2004 12.5.2004 12.5.2004 21.9.2005 11.6.2008
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion 104.4 24.5.2004 24.5.2004 24.5.2004 24.5.2004 30.9.2005
Commission adopts:
·         opinion on existence of excessive deficit 104.5
·         recommendation for Council decision on existence of exc. deficit 104.6
·         recommendation for Council recommendation to end this situation 104.7
Council adopts:
·         decision on existence of excessive deficit 104.6
·         recommendation to end this situation 104.7
·         deadline for taking effective action 5.11.2004 5.11.2004 5.11.2004 5.11.2004 24.7.2006
·         deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2008 2008 2007 2007 financial yr 
2006/07
Commission adopts communication on action taken 22.12.2004 22.12.2004 22.12.2004 20.9.2006
Council adopts conclusions thereon 18.1.2005 18.1.2005 18.1.2005 10.10.2006
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision establishing no
effective action 
104.8 30.5.2007 22.12.2004 14.11.2006
Council adopts decision establishing no effective action 104.8 10.7.2007 18.1.2005 28.11.2006
Commission adopts recommendation for new Council recommendation to end
excessive deficit situation
104.7 12.9.2007 16.2.2005 7.2.2007
Council adopts new recommendation to end excessive deficit situation 104.7 9.10.2007 8.3.2005 27.2.2007
·          deadline for taking effective action 9.2.2008 8.7.2005 27.8.2007
·          new deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2008 2008 2007
Commission adopts communication on action taken 13.7.2005 20.11.2007
Council adopts conclusions thereon - 4.12.2007
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision establishing
inadequate action
104.8 20.10.2005
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 104.8 8.11.2005
Commission adopts recommendation for new Council recommendation to end 
excessive deficit situation (Art. 104.7)
104.7 26.9.2006
Council adopts new recommendation to end excessive deficit situation (Art.
104.7)
104.7 10.10.2006
·          deadline for taking effective action 10.4.2007
·          progress report submitted 26.4.2007
·          new deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2009
Commission adopts communication on action taken 13.6.2007
Council adopts conclusions thereon 10.7.2007
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision abrogating existence
of excessive deficit 104.12 7.05.2008 11.6.2008 7.05.2008 12.9.2007
Council adopts decision abrogating existence of excessive deficit 104.12 3.06.2008 8.07.2008 3.06.2008 9.10.2007
Step in EDP procedure
Starting phase 
Follow-up of the 104.7 Council recommendation
Country
UK
(planned dates in italics)
24.6.200424.6.2004
24.1.20065.7.20045.7.2004
Abrogation of the EDP
Follow-up of the NEW article 104.7 Council recommendation
Table I.2.2:





3. OVERVIEW OF THE 2007/08 UPDATES OF THE STABILITY 




This Section provides an overview of the 
2007/2008 updates of stability and convergence 
programmes (SCPs). It first discusses the 2007 
implementation of the plans presented in the 
2006 updates, before turning to the budgetary 
plans for the period 2008-2010. At the end of this 
Section, table I.3.7. provides an overview of the 
key projections and budgetary plans in the SCP 
updates and table I.3.8. gives an overview of the 
summary assessments and policy invitations by 
country in the Council Opinions  
As regards 2007, in most countries the budget 
balance turned out better than envisaged in the 
2006 stability and convergence programme 
updates. However, this result masks pervasive 
expenditure overruns which were covered by 
sizable revenue windfalls. Progress towards 
sustainable fiscal position would have been 
larger in case Member States had stuck to the 
policy advice in the Council opinions, notably to 
implement expenditure plans and to use extra 
revenues to reduce the deficit and the debt. 
Assessing the budgetary plans for 2008 and 
beyond in the context of the implementation 
track-record highlights risks to the consolidation 
of recent achievements. Unless there is an 
improvement in implementation relative to plans 
or positive revenue surprises continue to support 
budgetary consolidation, little improvement in 
the structural budgetary position over the next 
two years can be expected.  
The experience of the past suggest that the 
current figures for structural balances may 
overestimate the strength of the underlying 
budgetary position, notably on account of recent 
favourable revenue surprises and a possible 
overestimation of potential output in the current 
juncture. This argues for additional prudence in 
setting the fiscal stance on an ex-ante basis and 
for a strict adherence to nominal expenditure 
plans. And if, following the years of buoyant tax 
revenues, revenue growth were to surprise on the 
downside, the relative lack of ambition in the ex-
ante adjustment would likely result ex post in a 
deterioration of structural balances and a moving 




SCP 2007 SCP 2007 MTO SCP 2006





BE 84.9 -0.3 0.5 3.7 3.5 4.3 2011
BG 19.8 2.9 1.5 4.6 4.1 4.1 2010
CZ 30.4 -4.1 -1 -2.8 -3.0 -1.3 2010
DK 25.6 3.5 0.75 to 1.75 3.8 4.9 3.4 2010
DE 64.9 -0.3 0 0.8 2.5 3.4 2011
EE 2.7 1.2 0 1.6 1.3 1.2 2011
IE 25.1 0.5 0 3.7 1.4 0.3 2010
EL 93.4 -2.8 0 1.2 1.1 3.3 2010
ES 36.2 2.2 0 3.4 3.8 3.3 2010
FR 64.2 -2.0 0 0.1 0.6 2.5 2012
IT 105 -2.2 0 0.9 2.7 5.0 2011
CY 60 1.8 0 1.8 5.0 2.8 2011
LV 9.4 -0.5 -1 -0.3 -0.1 2.0 2010
LT 17.6 -1.2 -1 -1.0 -0.4 1.7 2010
LU 6.9 0.7 -0.8 -1.1 0.9 1.9 2010
HU 65.4 -4.8 -0.5 -5.9 -0.8 1.0 2011
MT 62.9 -2.1 0 0.8 1.2 3.0 2010
NL 46.8 -0.4 -0.5 to -1.0 2.7 1.8 2.9 2010
AT 59.9 -0.7 0 2.1 2.0 2.5 2010
PL 44.9 -2.4 -1 -1.3 -0.2 1.2 2010
PT 64.4 -2.1 -0.5 -0.5 0.8 2.3 2011
RO 11.9 -3.4 -0.9 -1.9 -2.5 -1.9 2010
SI 25.6 -0.8 -1 0.3 0.5 1.0 2010
SK 30.6 -3.0 <1.0 -1.7 -1.5 0.1 2010
FI 35.3 4.2 2 4.5 5.7 4.0 2011
SE 39.7 2.4 1 3.5 4.0 4.6 2010
UK 43.9 -3.0 na -0.3 -0.8 0.6 2012
SCP 2007
Source: 2007 updates of stability and convergence programmes, Commission services' 
calculations.
Government balances in 2006 and 2007 (% of GDP)
Structural balance Structural primary balance
 
3.2. PLANS AND OUTCOMES IN 2007  
3.2.1. THE STATE OF PLAY – CLOSING IN ON 
THE MTOs  
On the back of benign economic circumstances 
and buoyant revenue developments, structural 
budget balances continued to improve in 2007. 
According to the stability and convergence 
programme updates, the euro-area average 
structural deficit reached 0.7% of GDP, the 
lowest level on record since the early 1970s, 
while the EU average structural balance 
improved from a deficit of 1.4% of GDP in 2006 
to 1.1% of GDP in 2007. Echoing developments 
in 2006, the improvement of the EU and euro-
area aggregates was almost entirely due to the 
significant improvements in Germany and 
countries in EDP. The Commission services' 
spring 2008 forecasts project an even lower 
structural deficit in 2007, reflecting in particular 
better-than-expected budgetary outcomes in 
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Italy, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, 
Portugal, Poland and Slovenia (see Part I.1). 
In 2007, 12 Member States strictly respected 
their MTO, of which 7 euro-area Member 
States (1).  
3.2.2. THE CONSOLIDATION ACHIEVEMENTS 
IN PERSPECTIVE – REVENUE WINDFALLS 
AND EXPENDITURE SLIPPAGE  
Only 5 out of 27 Member States (EL, IE, BE, FR 
and UK) realised a worse budget balance 
outcome in 2007 than planned in their 2006/07 
update. However, an assessment of the 
composition of the budgetary improvements tells 
another story.  
Council Opinions on the 2006/07 programme 
updates typically included policy invitations to 
make use of the benign economic outlook to 
consolidate fiscal positions. For the euro-area, 
the commitment to pursue sound policies was 
reiterated by the Eurogroup in April 2007. In 
particular, euro-area Finance Ministers agreed to 
“build on the better-than-expected 2006 
outcomes to pursue more ambitious targets than 
in the 2006/07 updates ” and to “ implement the 
2007 budgets as planned, avoiding expenditure 
overruns and using unexpected extra revenues 
for deficit and debt reduction ”. 
                                                          
(1) In addition to the 12 countries that have strictly achieved 
their MTO, the Council Opinion considered Germany to 
have 'broadly reached the MTO in 2007.   
Comparing the 2007 outcomes with the original 
plans for 2007 shows that few countries avoided 
expenditure overruns. Graph I.3.1 shows the 
effect on the budget balance of the differences 
between expenditure and revenue plans in the 
stability programme updates and the budgetary 
outcomes in 2007. Rather than comparing the 
planned and realised expenditure- and revenue-
to-GDP ratios, the nominal expenditure and 
revenue growth rates for 2007 as planned in the 
2006 stability and convergence programmes are 
compared to the outcomes. This allows assessing 
policy implementation on the expenditure side, 
as nominal expenditures are largely directly 
under the control of the government, while the 
expenditure ratio is strongly affected by inflation 
and growth surprises.    
In the majority of Member States, revenue 
windfalls as well as the better-than-expected 
2006 outcomes were at least partly used to cover 
expenditure slippages including additional 
discretionary spending. In this context it is also 
noteworthy that employment growth was 
stronger than projected in a number of Member 
States, leading to a reduction of unemployment 
benefits freeing expenditure for other purposes.  
In 2007, nominal expenditure overruns amounted 
to 0.3% of GDP in the euro-area Member States. 
Overruns were significantly larger in non-euro 
area Member States. 
Although positive revenue surprises occurred in 
many countries, they were particularly evident in 
countries experiencing overheating pressures 
with rapid credit growth, increasing current 



































Effect nominal revenue surprise on BB outcome
Effect nominal expenditure slippage on BB outcome
Base effect
Note : BB = budget balance; the figure in the square gives the difference between the planned BB in the 2006 programme update and the 2007 outcome; the 
countries are ranked from left to right on the basis of the size of the expenditure slippage.
Source:  2007 stability and convergence programme updates and Commission services' spring 2008 forecast.
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account deficits, booming housing markets, 
increasing price and wage inflation. In a context 
where fiscal policy could play a role in 
dampening demand pressures and building-up of 
imbalances, general government expenditure 
overruns were particularly large. In Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia, in particular, general 
government expenditures increased 20 percent or 
more in 2007 as large revenue windfalls were 
almost fully spent and expenditure overruns 
amounted to several percent of GDP. 
Fluctuations in tax-to-GDP elasticities have 
contributed to swings in revenues, implying 
changes in the structural balances (1).  Graph 
I.3.2 shows the apparent tax elasticity of the euro 
area and the EU as a whole. It is defined as the 
observed relative change of current taxes with 
respect to the observed change of nominal GDP. 
While it includes the effect of discretionary 
measures (tax cuts and increases), it provides a 
useful indication of the degree of volatility 
involved. The graph shows that – contrary to 
what could be expected on the basis of standard 
budgetary elasticities  (2) – the deviations of 
revenues from projected growth contributed 
significantly to the gap between budgetary plans 
and outcomes especially during the 2005-2007 
upturn. Analysis in the report on Public finances 
in EMU – 2007 indicates that asset price cycles, 
corporate profits and oil price developments 
were important drivers of the high tax elasticities 
in the 2005-2007 period. The situation in 2005-
2007 has similarities with the situation in 1999 
and 2000, when strong revenue inflows were 
used to reduce taxes or to increase expenditures 
on the assumption that they would be permanent. 
During the protracted slowdown that followed, 
revenue growth was particularly weak. Box I.3.1. 
                                                          
(1) In the commonly agreed method for the cyclical 
adjustment of the budget tax elasticities are taken to be 
constant over time. This approximation works reasonably 
well as long as the tax content of GDP growth does not 
change too much. In the event of large swings, the 
assumption of constant tax elasticities can provide a 
distorted picture of the underlying fiscal position; e.g. if 
tax elasticities increase above 'normal' levels the 
structural budget balance will be overestimated. 
(2) The standards elasticity of revenue to GDP growth is 
estimated to be around 1. This implies that revenues 
grow on average by 1% for each 1% of GDP growth. In 
percentage points of GDP, it implies that the revenue 
ratio does not change. 
illustrates how expenditure slippage has been a 
recurrent theme in the EU. 










































Note: Average estimate = estimate derived from commonly agreed method 
developed by the OECD









Box I.3.1: Expenditure slippage is a recurrent theme
Slippage from both nominal and real expenditure plans that are set out in the annual updates of the 
stability and convergence programmes is a recurrent phenomenon. Nominal expenditure overruns have 
been consistently occurring both in good and bad times, with positive or negative inflation surprises. 
There are marked and consistent differences in performance between Member States pointing to the 
importance of adequate expenditure control frameworks and budgetary institutions (1).   
Graph 1 shows that, on average, slippage from nominal expenditure plans amounted to ½ percent of 
GDP in the euro area Member States between 1999 and 2007 and were even larger in non-euro area 
Member States. Incidentally, this is equal to the benchmark for the required improvement of the 
structural balance for Member States that are not at their medium-term budgetary objective (MTO); i.e. 
the average expenditure overrun has completely wiped out the equivalent of the benchmark adjustment 
towards sustainable fiscal positions. The graph also highlights the marked differences between Member 
States. Austria, the UK and Germany performed rather well on expenditure control, while Malta, 
Slovenia, Sweden and Denmark had on average no expenditure slippage. Especially the latter three 
countries' performance is impressive, considering the significant revenue windfalls, which – in general – 
often puts pressure on governments for additional spending.    
 
Graph 1: Differences between nominal revenue and expenditure plans in the pogrammes at year t-1 and 



















Effect nominal revenue surprise on BB outcome
Effect nominal expenditure slippage on BB outcome
Note : BB = budget balance. The averages for recently acceded Member States and EU 15 Member States are not comparable as the 
period covered are respectively 2005-2007 and 1999-2007. This may give a biased view as these countries have not experienced yet a 
period with revenues and tax elasticities below expectations. 
Source: 1999-2007 stability and convergence programme updates and Commission services' spring 2008 forecast
 
The graph may also give an indication of the degree of prudence in the revenue projection in the 
programme updates. Despite the fact that exceptionally high tax-to-GDP elasticities in most Member 
States in recent years inflated the period averages, Portugal, the UK and Germany – on average – had 
lower tax income than foreseen in the programme updates over the period 1999-2007. This may point to  
                                                          
(1) See European Commission (2005), (2006a) and (2007a) for analysis of the effect of expenditure rules, budgetary
procedures and national institutions on budgetary outcomes.   
(Continued on the next page) 
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Graph 2:Expenditure and revenue in the euro area, comparing stability programme plans 







1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 avg 1999-
2007
Nom. exp. overruns Real exp. overruns
Nom. rev. surprise Real rev. surprise
Source:  1999-2007 stability and convergence programme updates and Commission services' spring 2008 forecast. 
 
a lack of prudence in forecasting revenues (and GDP growth). Also in Greece and Italy, revenues have 
not exceeded expectations on average despite the very sizable windfall revenues in recent years. In some 
cases, like Germany, the lower than expected revenues over the period may also be linked to the 
unforeseen protracted nature of the growth slowdown and the growth composition. In other Member 
States systematically higher than planned revenues may point to a budget process with intentionally 
cautious macroeconomic forecasts and cautious budgeting of tax revenues. This is for instance the case 
in the Netherlands. The budgetary framework allows part of the revenue windfalls – which likely occur 
due to the cautious forecasting – to result in additional spending and part to be used for debt reduction. 
In the charts, this is reflected as expenditure overruns with windfall revenues. It is however not of the 
same nature as spending of revenue windfalls in countries which do not have such intentionally cautious 
budgeting as it does not lead to bias towards slippage from budget balance plans. A disadvantage of 
cautious budget planning with such an expenditure rule, is its procyclical nature in good times.    
On average, a comparison of expenditure overruns with revenue overruns suggests a strong correlation 
in upturns, illustrating the tendency to spend revenue windfalls rather than letting automatic stabilisers 
play. But the correlation appears to break down in downturns, when revenue undershots are not matched 
by savings on expenditure. Graph 2 also illustrate that the picture is similar for real expenditure in the 
euro area and cannot be attributed to inflation surprises. The main difference is in the period 2002-2004 
when real expenditure growth plans were met as inflation surprised to the upside. 
There is no apparent structural improvement in the pattern of expenditure overruns since the 2005 
reform of the SGP. This raises some concerns about the durability of the fiscal consolidation 
achievements when the revenue buoyancy of the past years ends, in particular considering that (nominal) 
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3.3. PLANS FOR 2008 AND 2009 – SLOWING 
CONSOLIDATION 
3.3.1. Backloaded and insufficient 
consolidation in 2008-10  
In 2008, on the basis of the plans in the 
programme updates, the euro-area average 
structural balance is expected to deteriorate 
marginally to a deficit of 0.8% of GDP while the 
EU average deficit is expected to remain 
unchanged at 1.1% of GDP. Compared to the 
time the 2007/08 updates were drawn up 
economic prospects have further weakened. The 
situation is highly uncertain at this stage. Some 
countries are better positioned to cope with the 
deterioration in the international environment 
and financial turmoil than others. For many, 
however, there is a risk of worse budgetary 
outcomes resulting from the economic 
developments.  
Graph I.3.3 presents the budgetary developments 
in different groups of Member States. The 
Member States are grouped according to their 
budgetary situation in the year preceding the 
plan, according to the 2007/08 programme 
updates. It shows that:  
(i) Some deterioration in the structural balance is 
envisaged in 2008 in 'countries that are at the 
MTO'. This reflects developments in Cyprus, 
Ireland, Finland and to a lesser extent Spain and 
Estonia. In Spain and Finland the change is 
mainly related to tax cuts, while in Cyprus the 
deterioration is due to the assumed normalisation 
of exceptionally high tax revenue from a 
booming financial and real estate sector. In 2009, 
consolidation of a ¼% of GDP is planned.  
(ii) Member States that have a deficit below 3% 
of GDP but have not reached their MTO plan on 
average a small structural improvement in 2008. 
This reflects mainly fiscal loosening in Germany 
on account of a corporate tax reform and an 
almost unchanged structural position in France. 
In 2009 the countries in this group of Member 
States are planning to improve their structural 
balance by on average ½% of GDP, with marked 
differences between Member States. 
 
Graph I.3.3: Planned change in the structural balance - 
































Nominal deficit t-1 > 3% GDP Structural balance in t-1<MTO
Structural balance in t-1>=MTO
Source:  2007 stability and convergence programme updates.
Number of Member 
States in the group
 
 (iii) Countries with nominal deficits above the 
3% reference value all meet the required effort of 
0.5% of GDP in their plans. However, when 
comparing projections to the Commission 
services' forecast, additional measures may be 
required in Hungary to meet the budgetary 
objectives. When looking at Member States 
which were subject to the EDP (Graph I.3.4) in 
2007, a lack of ambition is apparent in 2008 in 
Italy, Poland and Slovakia, which estimate their 
2007 nominal deficits to have dropped clearly 
below 3% of GDP but do not take advantage of 
this to accelerate progress towards the MTO and 
increase the safety margin vis-à-vis the reference 
value. 
Graph I.3.4: Planned change in the structural balance of 




































Source: 2007 stability and convergence programme updates. 
 
3.3.2. Composition of planned adjustment - 
Expenditures and revenues 
As in previous updates, planned consolidation 
efforts over the programme period are typically 
expenditure based (Graph I.3.5). Planned 
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expenditure reductions are particularly large in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland and 
Slovakia, while increases in the expenditure-to-
GDP ratio are foreseen in Estonia, Lithuania and 
Denmark. At the same time, the average revenue 
share is projected to fall. Whereas the tax burden 
is projected to be reduced in most countries, 
Greece, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and the 
Netherlands expect a substantial increase in 
revenue ratio. In the past, while actual 
expenditures have been higher than planned, and 
partly substantially so, revenues have generally 
turned out closer to projections, also in the wake 
of revenue windfalls. Failure to improve 
implementation of the planned expenditure cuts 
would result in a worsening of the average 
budgetary balance, as compared to the planned 
budgetary consolidation.  
The share of interest expenditures to GDP is 
expected to decline further, especially in Cyprus 
due to the significant debt reduction. As to public 
investment, a sharp reduction is planned in 
Romania and Bulgaria, while it is projected to 
increase by about one percent of GDP in 
Germany. 
 
3.4. DEBT DEVELOPMENTS 
According to the figures presented in the updated 
stability and convergence programmes, in 2007, 
debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 66.7 % in the euro 
area and at 59.4 % in the EU as a whole, down 
from respectively 68.6% and 61.3% the year 
before. Eight Member States (MT, FR, PT, DE, 
HU, BE, EL, IT) have a debt ratio above the 60% 
reference value The official public finance 
projections in the updated programmes imply 
significant acceleration of the pace of debt 
reduction in both the EU as a whole and in the 
euro area over the period covered by the 
programmes, mainly due to higher primary 
surpluses and favourable economic growth 
prospects. Should the downside risks to the 
current economic outlook materialise, debt 
dynamics would clearly be affected. Note that in 
Section I.1 which discusses the Commission 
services' spring 2008 forecast, the debt reduction 
is foreseen to slowdown on the basis of the no-
policy-change scenario.  
Based on the programme updates, in 2010, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio would be 61.3 % of GDP in 
the euro area, while the EU aggregate is planned 
to be reduced further below the reference value 
of 60% of GDP, at 55.1% of GDP. Further 
reductions in the debt ratio are projected in the 
programmes, such that Germany, Portugal and 
Malta would fall below the reference value and 













































Gross fixed capital formation Primary current expenditure
Total change 
2007-2010 
Note: A positive value indicates a positive contribution to the change in budgetary position. A positive total variation of the 
budgetary position implies an improvement of the balance (value is presented on top (+) or below (-) of the columns). 
 Source: Commission services on the basis of the 2007 updates of the stability and convergence programmes. 
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the very-high debt countries would accomplish 
significant reductions.    
3.5. RISKS TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PLANS 
The experience of the past suggests that the 
current figures for structural balances may 
overestimate the strength of the underlying 
budgetary position, notably on account of 
temporary favourable revenue surprises and a 
possible underestimation of the output gap. 
Developments in asset prices and corporate 
profitability carry a particular risk for the 
revenue side of the budget.  
As to the output gap, Graph I.3.6. illustrates the 
risk that the output gap estimates may be revised 
upwards, deteriorating the structural balances. 
The graph plots output gap estimates using the 
autumn 2007 and the spring 2008 forecast 
against the rate of capacity utilisation in the 
manufacturing industry and the autumn 2007 
estimates integrating the rate of capacity 
utilisation for the euro-area countries. Looking 
back in time the rate of capacity utilisation has 
been a rather good predictor of cyclical 
conditions. The current evolution of this 
indicator and forecasts integrating the capacity 
utilisation in the production function currently 
used by the Commission services suggest that the 





























































Output gap (lhs; spring 2008 forecast)
Output gap (lhs; autumn 2007 forecast)
Capacity utilisation index (rhs)
Graph I.3.6: Capacity utilisation and output gap in 
the euro area
Note: Over the observation period (1991-2007), the index for capacity 
utilisation averages zero  
Source:  Commission services.  
While the Commission autumn 2008 forecast 
estimated the output gap for the euro area in 
2007 still being negative (based on the agreed 
common methodology), capacity utilisation in 
the manufacturing industry was far above its 
long-term average. The spring 2008 forecast 
modifies the autumn 2007 forecast and shows a 
positive output gap (+0.2). The estimates from 
the extended production function integrating the 
rate of capacity utilisation suggest however that 
the output gap could be much larger (+0.7).  
Current output gap estimates without integrating 
the rate of capacity utilisation may therefore 
underestimate the true figures. The 
methodological developments with regard to the 
calculation of the output gap are discussed in 
detail in Section II.2.   
This situation is similar to the situation in 2000, 
at the height of the previous upturn. At the time, 
output gap estimates where still negative as 
potential growth estimates were revised upwards 
in line with actual growth rates. In spring 2000, 
the euro area output gap for the year 2000 was 
estimated at -1.2% of GDP. Ex-post, as the 
slowdown materialised and potential growth rate 
estimates were gradually slashed, the output gap 
has been revised to +2% of GDP, implying that 
the structural balances at the time were 
overestimated by about 1½ % of GDP. While the 
real-time output gap estimates prepared in 2000 
are not strictly comparable to the current ones 
given differences in the methodology used (HP 
filter in 2000 vs. production function currently), 
past experience may repeat itself. 
From the viewpoint of fiscal policy the 
underestimation of the output gap can give rise to 
a distorted diagnosis and, in the present context, 
to an overestimation of the cyclically adjusted 
budget balance (and the structural balance). It 
cannot be excluded that the output gaps will be 
revised upward (and the structural balance be 
revised downward) again as growth decelerates, 
with implications for previous and future years. 
Especially in Member States that experience a 
pronounced growth deceleration (e.g. Ireland and 
Spain) potential output has already been the 
subject to sizeable revisions (½% of GDP or 
more) between the autumn 2007 forecast and the 
spring 2008 forecast. 
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There is a risk that weak tax revenues as well as 
revisions of the output gap will deteriorate the 
structural balance in 2008 and 2009 and lead to 
failure to comply with the 0.5% of GDP 
benchmark improvement of the structural 
balance even in Member States where the plans 
seem adequate and implementation would be 
rigorous.  
This risk comes on top of the usual risk of 
expenditure overruns. Should expenditure 
overruns occur (as they consistently have in the 
past), the budgetary stance would likely turn 
expansionary and there would be a move away 
from the MTOs or the path towards them in the 
period 2008-2010.  
In addition, nominal balances are likely to 
deteriorate further as the growth prospects have 
worsened since the submission of the programme 
updates. This argues for a strict adherence to 
nominal expenditure plans in 2008 and a full 
carry-over of better-than-expected outcomes of 
2007. It also calls for additional prudence in 
setting the fiscal stance on an ex-ante basis in 
2009 and 2010. Only in this way the 
consolidation gains of recent years would not be 
lost. In addition, such prudent fiscal policies 
would also support monetary policy in the 
current juncture, as inflation continues to exceed 
its target values.   
In this context, shifting surveillance and 
monitoring of the implementation of budgetary 
plans more to the adherence to aggregate 
expenditure plans would be useful. It would 
allow focusing on factors more directly under the 
control of the government and a fair judgement 
of budgetary consolidation efforts. Disappointing 
revenues due to lower tax-to-GDP elasticities, 
which are likely to occur in 2008, should not lead 
to a negative assessment (ex post) as long as the 
3% reference value is not breached and if 
disappointing revenues are not caused by unduly 
optimistic forecasts. As an aside, increased focus 
on monitoring of implementation of expenditure 
plans could in the future also contribute to 
increasing fiscal efforts in good times.  
Of course when monitoring expenditure plans, 
the degree of ambition, as well as the 
assumptions on the revenue side, needs to be 
taken into account. Countries which consistently 
and deliberately produce cautious forecasts with 
a bias towards underestimating growth and 
revenues can be granted some more leeway on 
the expenditure side. Member States which have 
a track record of expenditure slippage, and which 
do not have a bias towards underestimating 
revenues, could be more ambitious in setting 
their targets for 2009 and 2010 or present 
convincing measures to ensure improved 
expenditure control in order to avoid a move 
away from sustainable budgetary positions.  
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Budgetary developments in the Member States according to the 2007 stability and convergence programme updates
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
BE 2.8 2.7 1.9 2.0 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.5 88.2 84.9 81.5 78.1
DE 2.9 2.4 2.0 1.5 -1.6 0.0 -½ 0.0 -1.6 0.0 -½ 0.0 67.5 65.0 63.0 -61½
IE 5.7 4.8 3.0 3.5 2.9 0.5 -0.9 -1.1 2.9 0.5 -0.9 -1.1 25.1 25.1 25.9 27.6
EL 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.0 -2.5 -2.7 -1.6 -0.8 -2.5 -2.7 -1.6 -0.8 95.3 93.4 91.0 87.3
ES 3.9 3.8 3.1 3.0 1.8 1.8 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.8 1.2 1.2 39.7 36.2 34.0 32.0
FR (1) 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.5 n.a. -2.4 -2.3 -1.7 n.a. -2.4 -2.3 -1.7 n.a. 64.2 64.0 63.2
IT 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.6 -4.4 -2.4 -2.2 -1.5 -4.4 -2.4 -2.2 -1.5 106.8 105.0 103.5 101.5
CY 3.8 4.2 4.1 4.0 -1.2 1.5 0.5 0.5 -1.2 1.5 0.5 0.5 65.2 60.0 48.5 45.3
LU 6.1 6.0 4.5 5.0 0.7 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.8 1.0 6.6 6.9 7.1 7.2
MT 3.2 3.5 3.1 3.2 -2.5 -1.6 -1.2 -0.1 -2.5 -1.6 -1.2 -0.1 64.7 62.9 60.0 57.2
NL 3.0 2.8 2.5 1.8 0.6 -0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 -0.4 0.5 0.6 47.9 46.8 45.0 43.0
AT 3.3 3.4 2.4 2.5 -1.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 -1.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 61.7 59.9 58.4 57.0
PT 1.3 1.8 2.2 2.8 -3.9 -3.0 -2.4 -1.5 -3.9 -3.0 -2.4 -1.5 64.8 64.4 64.1 62.5
SI 5.7 5.8 4.6 4.1 -1.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.6 -1.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.6 27.1 25.6 24.7 23.8
FI 5.0 4.4 3.3 3.0 3.8 4.5 3.7 3.6 3.8 4.5 3.7 3.6 39.2 35.3 32.8 30.4
EA-15 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.2 -1.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.4 -1.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.4 68.6 66.7 65.0 63.3
BG 6.1 6.4 6.4 6.8 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 22.8 19.8 18.3 17.4
CZ 6.4 5.9 5.0 5.1 -2.9 -3.4 -2.9 -2.6 -3.1 -4.1 -3.4 -2.8 30.1 30.4 30.3 30.2
DK 3.5 2.0 1.3 1.1 4.6 3.8 3.0 2.0 2.7 3.5 3.4 2.5 30.1 25.6 21.6 19.2
EE 11.2 7.4 5.2 6.1 3.6 2.6 1.3 1.0 1.8 1.2 0.8 1.4 4.0 2.7 2.3 2.0
LV 11.9 10.5 7.5 7.0 -0.3 0.3 0.7 1.0 -0.9 -0.5 0.4 1.1 10.6 9.4 8.3 7.2
LT 7.7 9.8 5.3 4.5 -0.6 -0.9 -0.5 0.2 -1.0 -1.2 -0.9 0.3 18.2 17.6 17.2 15.0
HU 3.9 1.7 2.8 4.0 -9.2 -6.2 -4.0 -3.2 -8.9 -4.8 -3.5 -2.8 65.6 65.4 65.8 64.4
PL 6.2 6.5 5.5 5.0 -3.8 -2.0 -2.5 -2.0 -4.0 -2.4 -2.8 -1.9 47.6 44.9 44.2 43.3
RO 7.7 6.1 6.5 6.1 -1.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.2 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 12.4 11.9 13.6 14.2
SK 8.3 8.8 6.8 5.8 -3.7 -2.5 -2.3 -1.8 -3.1 -3.0 -3.1 -2.4 30.4 30.6 30.8 30.5
SE 4.2 3.2 3.2 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.8 3.1 1.7 2.4 2.1 2.8 47.0 39.7 34.8 29.8
UK (2) 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.8 -2.6 -3.0 -2.9 -2.4 -2.5 -3.0 -2.7 -2.3 43.4 43.9 44.8 45.1
EU-27 3.1 2.9 2.4 2.5 -1.6 -1.1 -1.1 -0.7 -1.4 -1.1 -1.1 -0.7 61.3 59.4 58.2 56.7
(1) Data from the low-growth scenario in the stability programme.
(2) Financial years ending in following March.
Source: 2007 updates of the stability and convergence programmes 
Notes: 
Real GDP growth Government balance Structural balance Government gross debt
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Overview of the Council Opinions on the SCPs - Summary assessments and policy invitations
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the programme aims at maintaining a sound budgetary position throughout the period,
planning the continuation of high general government surpluses. The budgetary targets seem plausible. The programme
proposes a significant upward revision of the MTO from a balanced structural position to a surplus of 1½% of GDP,
which will be comfortably met throughout the programme period. Safeguarding macroeconomic stability and sustaining
catching up in a context of rising external imbalances and high inflation requires the continuation of tight fiscal policies,
further improvements in the quality of public spending, including healthcare, and fiscal institutions and a public sector
wage policy that contributes to overall wage moderation in line with productivity gains.
BG POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment and also given the need to ensure sustainable convergence, Bulgaria is invited to:
(i) continue avoiding a pro-cyclical fiscal stance with a view to help contain existing external imbalances, notably by
saving any  budgetary over-performance and containing expenditure growth;
(ii) strengthen policies to contain inflationary pressures, including through prudent public sector wage policy contributing
to wage moderation;  
(iii) further strengthen the efficiency of public spending, in particular through full implementation of programme
budgeting, reinforced administrative capacity and reforms   in the areas of labour market, education and healthcare.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the programme is consistent with a correction of the excessive deficit in 2008, conditional
on continuing expenditure restraint and close monitoring of the impact of the fiscal impact of the tax measures in the
stabilisation package. Owing to the positive macroeconomic outlook and a likely better 2007 budgetary outturn than
expected in the programme, there could be ample opportunity to bring the 2008 deficit below the 3% of GDP reference
value by a larger margin, and to achieve stronger-than-targeted fiscal consolidation afterwards. The main risks are in the
reliance on reductions to public sector employment, and relate to the fact that further consolidation measures remain to be
spelled out after 2008. The Czech Republic remains at high risk with respect to the sustainability of public finances, while
a tentative start has been made on health care reform.
CZ POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment and also in the light of the recommendation under Article 104(7) of 10 October 2007, and
given the need to achieve sustainable convergence, the Czech Republic is invited to:
(i) exploit the better-than-expected 2007 budgetary outcome to bring the 2008 deficit below the 3% of GDP reference
value by a larger margin by continuing to exercise expenditure restraint;
(ii) exploit the high rate of growth in the economy by further strengthening the pace of adjustment so as to build a safety
margin against breaching the reference value as soon as possible, and speed up the  achievement of the MTO ;
(iii) in view of the projected increase in age-related expenditures, improve the long-term sustainability of public finances
through the necessary pension and health care reforms.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the programme aims at maintaining a sound budgetary position fully respecting the MTO
throughout the period, consistent with the objective of long fiscal sustainability. Foreseeing high, albeit rapidly declining,
surpluses over the programme period, the budgetary targets appear to be on the cautious side in view of the expected 2007
outcome and the most recent projections. 
The risk to long-term sustainability is assessed to be low. For the present, the most important policy challenge is to
address labour shortages and looming cost pressures through a mix of structural and macroeconomic policies. Further
measures need to be identified and implemented to stimulate labour supply. Meanwhile, the fiscal stance should be
considered carefully so as to avoid pro-cyclicality. Therefore, containing public consumption expenditure growth, as
foreseen in the programme, remains of high priority.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that, benefiting from continued strong growth, Germany has used unexpected revenues for
deficit-reduction and therefore broadly achieved its medium-term objective in 2007, much earlier than envisaged in the
previous programme, a result to be commended. In 2008, however, public finances could relapse into structural deficit.
The budgetary strategy foresees a gradual return to the medium-term objective thereafter, based on sustained expenditure
restraint. The risks attached to the budgetary projections are neutral; while the underlying macro-economic scenario after
2008 is prudent, the envisaged budgetary outcome requires continued commitment to maintain firm control over














In view of the above assessment and Germany is invited to:
(i) preserve the positive results achieved in 2007 by maintaining firm control over expenditures in line with programme
targets and by using unexpected extra revenues for debt reduction;
(ii) improve the long-term sustainability of public finances, by continuing to implement the growth and employment
promoting economic reforms enacted and by underpinning the achieved fiscal consolidation with a strengthening of
budgetary institutions, in particular through  the ongoing revision of federal fiscal relations.




The overall conclusion is that the programme aims at maintaining a sound budgetary position throughout the period with
continued, albeit somewhat declining, surpluses above the MTO. The budgetary targets seem plausible. Macroeconomic
imbalances that have accumulated in the economy during the years of high growth, notably wage growth exceeding that of
productivity, price pressures and high net borrowing vis-à-vis the rest of the world, are expected to moderate only
gradually and the deceleration path of the economy is clearly surrounded by downward risks. Setting budgetary strategy
that aims at over-achieving the MTO is a step forward in addressing these macroeconomic challenges. Nevertheless, fiscal
policy in 2007 appears to have been pro-cyclical and risks remaining so also in 2008 if Estonia continues to grow at high
rates. It would be desirable to maintain a broadly neutral fiscal stance in 2008, as it would support adjustment in the
current phase of the cycle when imbalances accumulated during the period of very high growth still persist. The long-term
sustainability of public finances is assessed to be at low risk.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment and also given the need to ensure sustainable convergence and a smooth participation in
ERM II, Estonia is invited to contribute to reducing risks to macroeconomic stability by:
(i) aiming for a neutral fiscal stance in 2008 and beyond so as to contribute to an orderly adjustment towards a balanced
convergence path;
(ii) complementing the recommended fiscal stance with ensuring appropriate public wage policy and further labour market
reforms  as well as sustaining rapid productivity growth so as to contain inflationary pressures.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that Ireland is facing several macroeconomic challenges in its transition to a period of lower
economic growth, mainly linked to a return to more sustainable activity in the housing sector. Slowing domestic demand
has been accompanied by losses in recent years in export market shares, pointing to price competitiveness challenges. The
fiscal position is expected to register a noticeable deterioration in 2007-2008, from a sound surplus in 2006. While Ireland
is expected to continue to register a surplus in 2007, the programme foresees that the structural position will turn into a
deficit in 2008 which will increase somewhat thereafter. The risks attached to the budgetary projections are broadly
neutral in 2008, but from 2009, in the absence of adequate expenditure containment, outcomes could be worse than
projected. While the MTO would be broadly reached in 2008, keeping to the MTO thereafter should be possible if the
margins foreseen in the programme as contingency provisions remain unused. 
IE
Furthermore, regarding the long-term sustainability of the public finances, while the public debt is low, Ireland is at
medium risk because of the projected impact of population ageing on pension expenditure. The challenge for the
authorities will be to deal with macroeconomic risks, while at the same time avoiding a deterioration of the fiscal situation 
POLICY INVITATIONS  
In view of the above assessment , Ireland is invited to:
(i) keep to the MTO in 2008 and thereafter, by maintaining firm control over expenditures;
(ii) in view of the significant projected increase in age-related expenditure, improve the long-term sustainability of public
finances by implementing further pension reforms.
The Council also notes that such actions would be consistent with the April 2007 Eurogroup orientations for fiscal
policies. 
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the programme envisages speeding up the reduction of the budget deficit, in a context of
strong growth, to achieve a nominal budget balance in 2010, although the MTO is not planned to be achieved in structural
terms within the programme period. This consolidation, which relies on a prompt implementation of the 2008 budget and
a significant increase in tax revenues throughout the programme horizon, is subject to risks as the underlying
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Moreover, there are uncertainties about sizeable projected stock-flow adjustments. Also, the reliance on results from the
fight against tax evasion is significant and only partly backed up with reforms in tax collection. In addition, the planned
cutbacks in some expenditure items (as a share of GDP) are not substantiated by specific measures and partly offset by
plans to increase social payments.
Ensuring a strong fiscal consolidation path would help address the imbalances of the Greek economy, notably persistent
inflation, competitiveness losses and a large external deficit. The level of debt which remains among the highest in the
euro area, coupled with the projected increase in age-related spending, will affect negatively the long term sustainability of
public finances, which remains at high risk.
EL POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, Greece is invited to:
(i) carry-out the envisaged adjustment towards the MTO, reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio accordingly, and use any budgetary
over-performance to speed up the consolidation process to reach the MTO within the programme period;
(ii) pursue the ongoing reforms of tax administration and continue improving the budgetary process by further increasing
its transparency, spelling out the medium-term budgetary framework and effectively implementing mechanisms to
monitor, control and improve the efficiency of primary expenditure;
(iii) in view of the level of debt and the projected increase in age-related expenditure, improve the long-term sustainability
of public finances by achieving the MTO, continuing the ongoing reforms in the healthcare system and reforming the
pension system; updated long-term projections for age-related expenditure should be produced as soon as possible.
The Council also notes that such policy actions would be consistent with the April 2007 Eurogroup orientations for fiscal 
Greece is also invited to improve compliance with the submission deadline for stability and convergence programmes
specified in the code of conduct
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
ES
The overall conclusion is that the medium-term budgetary position is sound with high general government surpluses above 
the MTO and a relatively low debt ratio. However, given favourable economic growth assumptions and the end of the
asset boom, the projected government revenue might turn out to be on the high side. In this context, a careful assessment
of the impact on the general government balance of permanent tax cuts and/or expenditure increases will be crucial to
maintain a strong budgetary position and to ensure the long-term sustainability of public finances, which is at medium
risk. Fostering productivity-enhancing expenditure items, such as R&D, infrastructure and education, is important to
underpin a smooth adjustment of the economy in the light of large external imbalances, the contraction of the housing
sector and the existing inflation differential with the euro area.
POLICY INVITATIONS  
In view of the above assessment, while maintaining a strong budgetary position, Spain is invited to further improve the
long-term sustainability of public finances with additional measures to contain the future impact of ageing on spending
programmes. Spain is also invited to improve compliance with the submission deadline for stability and convergence
programmes specified in the code of conduct
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the pace of budgetary consolidation and debt reduction has slowed down in 2007 and is
planned to be significantly less ambitious in the coming years than planned in the previous update of the stability
programme, especially as concerns 2008. The envisaged consolidation is back-loaded and the achievement of the MTO
through an expenditure-based adjustment is postponed from 2010 to 2012 under the more plausible of the two
macroeconomic scenarios presented by the French authorities. Moreover, even this adjustment path is subject to important
risks. While tax cuts adopted in summer 2007 are already impacting on public finances, the authorities have also adopted
measures to curb public expenditure in 2008, notably in social security, broadened the coverage of expenditure rules for
the state, and have embarked on structural reforms. Structural reforms will be crucial to increase potential growth, improve 
competitiveness and sustain the budgetary consolidation process. 
FR
However, measures underlying the ambitious planned reduction in the expenditure ratio over the programme period still
have to be further specified and implemented. The programme objectives are also subject to risks stemming from
macroeconomic assumptions, which are favourable and the assumptions on the impact of structural reforms on growth. In
view of the debt and deficit levels and the projected increase in age-related expenditure, France appears to be at medium
risk with regard to the sustainability of public finances.
POLICY INVITATIONS: 
In view of the above assessment, France is invited to:
(i) strengthen the pace of budgetary consolidation and debt reduction, including through a rigorous implementation of the
2008 budget, so as to ensure that the safety margin against breaching the 3% deficit threshold is attained more rapidly and
– cyclical conditions permitting- aim to reach the MTO by 2010 in order to decisively contribute to the improvement of
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(ii) effectively enforce existing expenditure rules and take further steps in order to guarantee the respect of the ambitious
multi-annual expenditure reduction targets of the general government by all sub-sectors thus leading to a reduction in the
expenditure to GDP ratio
(iii) continue and accelerate structural reforms, so as to increase potential growth and curb public expenditure.
The Council also notes that such actions would be consistent with the April 2007 Eurogroup orientations for fiscal
policies.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the programme is consistent with a correction of the excessive deficit in 2007, which should
be achieved by a good margin. The 2007 budgetary outturn is likely to outperform expectations due to the favourable
cyclical and budgetary developments. This result could have been even better in the absence of the additional expenditure
approved during the year. In 2008, the structural balance risks deteriorating substantially, unless the better than projected
2007 starting position is carried through. The planned adjustment towards the MTO is back-loaded to the outer years of
the programme. The programme provides no information on the composition of the fiscal consolidation strategy after
2008, which hinders its proper assessment. In particular, appropriate measures aimed at curbing expenditure developments
remain to be spelled out. In the light of these risks, the MTO may not be achieved by 2011 as planned in the programme
and the debt ratio may not be sufficiently diminishing towards the 60% of GDP reference value over the programme
period. 
IT
With regard to the sustainability of public finances, Italy is at medium risk but this assessment assumes the full
implementation of the pension reforms.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment, and also in the light of the recommendation under Article 104(7) of 28 July 2005, Italy is
invited to:
(i) building on the positive results of 2007, strengthen the budgetary target for 2008, so as to secure an ambitious
adjustment; and implement the planned fiscal consolidation thereafter with specified measures to ensure adequate
progress towards the MTO, so as to achieve it within the programme period and thus accelerate the pace of debt reduction;
(ii) in view of the very high level of government debt, fully implement the pension reforms, notably the planned periodical
actuarial adjustment, so as to avoid significant increases in age-related spending; and
(iii) spelling out the budgetary strategy within a medium time perspective in line with the SGP and its Code of Conduct,
continue the effort to improve the quality of public finance by focussing on their composition, increasing the transparency
of the budgetary process, and effectively implementing mechanisms to monitor and control expenditure.
The Council also notes that such actions would be consistent with the April 2007 Eurogroup orientations for fiscal
policies.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the budgetary strategy in the programme should be sufficient to maintain a sound budgetary
position and macroeconomic stability throughout the period. The programme puts forward a more ambitious MTO of a
balanced position in structural terms (compared to a deficit of 0.5% of GDP previously), which has already been over-
achieved in 2007. This is the result of an unexpected increase in total revenues by over 3 percentage points of GDP,
largely explained by composition effects associated to the strong profitability of the financial sector and the buoyant
investment in real estate, which are projected by the programme to return to historical trends in the coming years. The
budgetary targets, which are significantly better than in the previous programme, could be overachieved in 2008 and 2009
given the better 2007 base. Thereafter, they could be worse given the favourable growth assumptions.
CY
Although the planned reduction of the budgetary surplus compared to 2007 reflects to a large extent an expected
normalisation of tax revenues, there is a risk that the stance in 2008 may turn out to be procyclical. The level of debt is
projected to decline significantly, especially in 2008. 
Given the projected increase in age-related spending, the reform of the pension system and a timely implementation of
adopted reforms in health care, would have a positive effect on the long-term sustainability of public finances, which
appears to be at high risk.
POLICY INVITATIONS  
In view of the above assessment, Cyprus is invited to:
(i) avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policies by further improving the control of current expenditures, while using revenue
windfalls to further reduce debt;
(ii) contain public expenditure, notably by reforming the pension system and timely implementing the adopted reforms in








The overall conclusion is that the programme aims to reduce economic imbalances and excessive demand pressure by setting
slightly increasing but overall modest surplus target for 2008-2010, in excess of the MTO. However, the risks to the
achievement of the budgetary targets are high primarily due to large macroeconomic uncertainty and a track record of slippages
from expenditure plans. Moreover, a considerably tighter stance of fiscal policy is urgently needed to meet the programme's
aims in a context of an economy subject to risks to stability - stemming from inflationary pressures, deteriorating cost
competitiveness and sharply increasing net foreign liabilities. While medium-term expenditure ceilings have been introduced,
they remain to be tested. As regards the long-term sustainability of public finances Latvia is assessed to be at low risk.
LV POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment and given the need to ensure sustainable convergence and a smooth participation in ERM II,
Latvia is invited to contribute to reducing overheating pressures and risks to macroeconomic instability by:
(i) aiming for significantly more ambitious budgetary targets in 2008 and beyond than foreseen in the programme, notably by
fully saving any revenue over-performance and respecting the expenditure ceilings;
(ii) within the overall public sector expenditure limits set within the medium-term budget planning framework, carefully
prioritizing public expenditure and re-examining taxation instruments to avoid demand stimulus in sectors which do not
significantly strengthen the economy's medium- and long-term supply potential;
(iii) adopt further policies to contain inflationary pressures, including through a responsible public sector wage-setting, thus
contributing to the sharp reduction in whole-economy wage growth necessary to break the current cost-price dynamics and
rapidly  worsening cost competitiveness.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT: 
The overall conclusion is that the programme aims at tackling Lithuania's macroeconomic imbalances by tightening fiscal
policy. However, the budgetary targets seem modest in the light of the current high economic growth. The programme
envisages only a back-loaded adjustment effort so that the MTO is reached only in 2009. There are risks to the achievement of
the budgetary targets as the consolidation is insufficiently backed by announced measures while there is a need to strengthen
the medium-term framework. The revenue projections seem optimistic given the further planned direct tax cuts and a reliance
on improved tax collection and the cautious macroeconomic scenario counterbalances them only partially. A significantly
tighter fiscal policy than foreseen in the programme and further structural policy measures are needed to address mounting
inflationary pressures, maintain competitiveness and tackle remaining bottlenecks in the labour market, crucial also for
sustaining catching-up. As regards the long-term sustainability of public finances Lithuania remains at low risk.
LT POLICY INVITATIONS  
In view of the above assessment and also given the need to ensure sustainable convergence and a smooth participation in ERM
II, Lithuania is invited to contribute to reducing overheating pressures by:
(i) aiming for significantly better budgetary outturns in 2008 and thereafter than foreseen in the programme, notably by
restraining expenditure growth, saving windfall revenues and reinforcing the binding character of the medium-term expenditure
ceilings;
(ii) tackling inflationary pressures including by promoting wage setting in line with overall productivity gains and adopting
structural measures to remove labour market bottlenecks.
Lithuania is also invited to improve compliance with the submission deadline for stability and convergence programmes
specified in the code of conduct
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
LU
The overall conclusion is that public finances have gone back to surplus in a context of strong GDP and employment growth.
Recently released revised data indicate that the deterioration in public finances has been significantly more limited than
previously estimated. Consequently, Luxembourg has constantly achieved its MTO and the path for the general government
balance in the programme is at least 1% of GDP better in each year than in the previous update. While tax cuts will result in a
small decrease in the surplus in 2008, the programme aims at maintaining a surplus of 1% of GDP on average throughout the
period. The macroeconomic scenario and budgetary targets of the programme seem plausible and budgetary outcomes might
even be slightly better than planned. However, Luxembourg will have to support in the coming decades a particularly heavy
burden resulting from population ageing and no corrective measures have been taken to date. This explains that the country is
considered to be at medium risk as regards the long-term sustainability of its public finances, in spite of its currently sound
budgetary position.
POLICY INVITATIONS: 
In view of the above assessment and of the very strong increase in age-related expenditure forecast for the coming decades,
Luxembourg is invited to improve the long-term sustainability of its public finances by implementing structural reform








The overall conclusion is that the programme plans to continue the correction of high deficits of the past years through a
necessary frontloaded adjustment effort and envisages modest progress towards the MTO after the planned correction of the
excessive deficit in 2009. As a result of the consolidation measures and steps in structural reforms, Hungary is set to
considerably outperform its deficit target for 2007 of 6.8% of GDP and also to increase progress towards convergence. It also
improves somewhat the target for 2008 (to 4% of GDP) compared to the previous programme, and in view of the better-than-
expected outcome in 2007 it should be feasible, and indeed desirable, to overachieve it. However, the lower deficit targets are
combined with higher-than-previously-planned expenditures on the back of better-than-expected revenues, which cannot be
counted on after 2008. Moreover, from 2009 the achievement of the budgetary targets is subject to larger risks, linked mainly
to possible expenditure overruns in case the announced wide-ranging reform agenda is not fully carried out. 
HU
Thus, the durability of the planned adjustment hinges on the reinforcement of fiscal governance as well as on completing the
structural reforms which are key not only to attract foreign direct investment but also to improve the long-term sustainability of
public finances, for which Hungary remains at high risk. Such achievements are also crucial in accelerating economic catching-
up and ultimately moving towards lasting convergence.
POLICY INVITATIONS: 
In view of the above assessment and also the recommendation under Article 104(7) of 10 October 2006 and given the need to
ensure sustainable convergence, Hungary is invited to:
(i) rigorously implement the 2008 budget, take adequate action to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit by 2009 as
planned, where necessary through additional measures; and allocate the better-than-expected revenues to further deficit
reduction also given the insufficient margin in 2009 in view of the risks, thereby also contributing to accelerating the pace of
debt reduction towards the 60% of GDP threshold;
(ii) ensure expenditure moderation in a permanent manner by continuing to enhance fiscal rules and institutions and through
the adoption and swift implementation of the remaining streamlining measures as announced in the fields of public
administration, healthcare, and education system;
(iii) in view of the level of debt and the increase in age-related expenditure, improve the long-term sustainability of public
finances by making rapid progress towards the MTO, and continue to reform the pension system as announced after the steps
already taken in 2006-2007.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the stability programme envisages continued progress towards reaching the MTO, which is
planned to be achieved by 2010, brought about by expenditure restraint in a context of sustained economic growth. The
reduction of the general government gross debt is planned to proceed at a satisfactory pace and is expected to fall below the
60% of GDP reference value by 2009. However, there are risks to the achievement of the budgetary targets linked to a reliance
on volatile tax revenue items in 2008, the envisaged degree of spending restraint, the favourable macroeconomic outlook after
2008 and the lack of information of the underlying measures, in particular as regards the envisaged continued restraint in the
public wage bill. These may hinder the achievement of the MTO by the target year 2010. In addition, Malta's competitiveness
within the euro area may be at risk in the event of a departure from wage moderation in the public sector, which may spill over
to the private sector. In terms of the long-term sustainability of public finances, Malta is at medium risk.
MT POLICY INVITATIONS  
In view of the above assessment, Malta is invited to:
(i) pursue further fiscal consolidation as envisaged in the programme so as to reach the MTO by 2010 and ensure that the debt-
to-GDP ratio is reduced accordingly, by spelling out the measures supporting the planned consolidation, especially on the
expenditure side;
(ii) enhance the efficiency and flexibility of public spending, including by accelerating the design and implementation of a
comprehensive healthcare reform. 
NL SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the programme aims at achieving and maintaining a broadly stable surplus, thereby ensuring a
sound budgetary position throughout the period. While fiscal policy was pro-cyclical in good economic times in 2007, the
budgetary stance in the programme from 2008 onwards is in line with the Pact. The risks to the budgetary targets seem broadly
balanced in 2008. From 2009 onwards, if economic growth turns out better than the cautious economic scenario envisaged in
the programme, this should be reflected in a better budgetary outcome than planned. As regards the long-term sustainability of
public finances, the Netherlands appears to be at medium risk.
POLICY INVITATIONS:
In view of the above assessment and in the light of the projected increase in age-related expenditure and the recent deterioration
of the structural balance, the Netherlands is invited to improve the long-term sustainability of public finances by securing the
budgetary consolidation as planned in the programme.
Table I.3.8:
Part I 




The overall conclusion is that in a context of growth remaining close to its potential, the programme envisages slow progress
towards the MTO through a relatively back-loaded adjustment that is based on not-fully-specified expenditure restraint. There are
risks to the achievement of the budgetary targets after 2008 and the MTO might not be reached by the end of the programme
period. The update makes no provision for financing the tax cuts announced for 2010. Government debt is expected to have
decreased to just below 60% of GDP reference value in 2007 and to continue to decline moderately in future years. In terms of
long-term sustainability of public finances, Austria appears to be at low risk.
AT POLICY INVITATIONS: 
In view of the above assessment, Austria is invited to take advantage of the slightly lower-than-targeted deficit outcome in 2007
to strengthen the adjustment effort in 2008 as well as to underpin the adjustment planned for the two final years of the programme
with specific and sufficient measures, including financing of the envisaged tax reforms. In this way, the MTO should be achieved
earlier than foreseen in the programme, in particular by more rigorously implementing expenditure restraint and by using any
unexpected tax revenues for budgetary consolidation.
The Council also notes that such actions would be consistent with the April 2007 Eurogroup orientations for fiscal policies.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the programme is consistent with a correction of the excessive deficit no later than 2008. If the
better than expected budgetary execution is confirmed, the deficit outrun will be below 3% of GDP already in 2007 The
programme aims at further fiscal consolidation over the medium term, including the achievement of the MTO by 2010, and
foresees a declining path for the government debt ratio over the entire programme period. However, achieving these objectives is
subject to an effective implementation of the measures announced in the programme and may require additional efforts, notably
in the light of the risk of lower-than-projected economic growth.
Further progress with fiscal consolidation, as planned, could also help to address the external imbalances and improve the
prospect of the long-term sustainability of public finances, for which Portugal is considered to be at medium risk, after the
significant reform of the pension system. Finally, envisaged improvements in the quality and efficiency of public expenditure,
including the public administration and the budgetary framework, can have a favourable impact on potential GDP growth and
thereby help resume the catching-up process.
PT POLICY INVITATIONS  
In view of the above assessment, and also in the light of the recommendation under Article 104(7) of 20 September 2005 and,
Portugal is invited to:
(i) implement with determination the fiscal consolidation envisaged in the programme so as to secure the correction of the
excessive deficit;
(ii) carry out the planned adjustment towards the MTO, backing it up with reinforced measures if necessary; and, also in view of
the risks to the sustainability of public finances, ensure a rapid reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio, notably by continuing to
allocate any better-than-expected budgetary results to deficit reduction;
(iii) maintain expenditure moderation in a permanent way and enhance the quality of public expenditure, also by pursuing the
ongoing reform of public administration and further improving the budgetary framework as outlined in the programme.
The Council also notes that such actions would be consistent with the April 2007 Eurogroup orientations for fiscal policies.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
The overall conclusion is that the budgetary strategy outlined in the programme is not in line with a prudent fiscal policy,
necessary to contain the growing external deficit and inflationary pressures which put at risk macroeconomic and financial
stability and the convergence process. The programme does not envisage a reduction of the deficits, entailing a risk of an
excessive deficit. Progress towards the MTO is insufficient and fully back-loaded despite strong growth prospects. In view of the
risks to the budgetary targets and the significant adjustment that would be necessary after the programme period, the MTO is
unlikely to be achieved by 2011 as planned.
RO POLICY INVITATIONS  
In view of the above assessment and the need to ensure sustainable convergence, Romania is invited to:
(i) significantly strengthen the pace of adjustment towards the MTO by aiming for substantially more demanding budgetary
targets in 2008 and subsequent years in order to contain the risk of an excessive deficit, foster macroeconomic stability and rein
in widening external imbalances and address the risks to the long-term sustainability of public finances;
(ii) restrain the envisaged high increase in public spending, improve its expenditure composition so as to enhance the economy’s
growth potential and improve the planning and execution of expenditure within a binding medium-term framework;
(iii) pursue policies to contain inflationary pressures, complementing the recommended tighter fiscal stance, with appropriate
public wage policy and further structural reforms.  
European Commission 







The overall conclusion is that Slovenia met its MTO in 2007, two years ahead of previous plans, and that the programme aims at
respecting the MTO by a growing margin over the programme period. For 2007, the most recent available information points to a
better-than-planned budgetary outturn, possibly a slight surplus. However, for 2008, a slight deterioration of the structural
balance is envisaged despite the continuing strong growth prospects. The risks to the budgetary projections are broadly balanced
in 2008. In the outer years, budgetary outcomes might be slightly worse than targeted, mainly due to risks associated with the
envisaged reliance on expenditure restraint. The fiscal stance in 2008 may turn out to be pro-cyclical. A tighter fiscal stance than
presently envisaged for 2008 appears to be warranted also given the current strong inflationary pressures. 
SI
The high projected increase in public sector wage settlements is also a concern for the inflation outlook. In spite of the current
low debt level, Slovenia is assessed to be at high risk with regard to the long-term sustainability of public finances due to the
significant projected budgetary impact of ageing.
POLICY INVITATIONS  
In view of the above assessment, Slovenia is invited to:
(i) building on a likely better-than-expected outturn in 2007, aim for stronger budgetary positions in 2008 and beyond than
planned in the programme, thereby avoiding pro-cyclical policies, 
(ii) stand ready to adopt further measures to tame inflationary pressures, complementing the recommended fiscal stance with
appropriate wage, labour market  and competition policies;
(iii) in view of the projected increase in age related expenditure, improve the long-term sustainability of public finances, in
particular by further reforming the pension system.
The Council also notes that such actions would be consistent with the April 2007 Eurogroup orientations for fiscal policies.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT: 
The overall conclusion is that the programme is consistent with a correction of the excessive deficit by 2007. Thereafter, it
envisages back-loaded progress towards the MTO in a context of strong growth prospects; in 2008, the envisaged structural
improvement is not in line with the pact and should be more ambitious . Given risks to the budgetary targets from 2009, the
MTO may not be achieved by 2010 as planned in the programme therefore additional efforts may be required. Moreover, should
inflationary pressures emerge a tighter fiscal stance than foreseen in the programme would be required along with further
structural reforms to improve the labour market performance . As regards the long-term sustainability of public finances,
Slovakia appears to be at medium risk. With respect to medium-term challenges, the programme does not envisage any progress
in reallocating expenditure towards R&D and innovation while it states that education spending should increasingly rely on EU
funds.
SK POLICY INVITATIONS: 
In view of the above assessment and the recommendation under Article 104(7) of 5 July 2004 and also given the need to ensure
sustainable convergence and a smooth participation in ERM II, Slovakia is invited to:
(i) exploit the strong growth conditions to strengthen the pace of structural adjustment towards the MTO in 2008 and strictly
implement the envisaged structural consolidation thereafter backed up, if necessary, by additional measures as well as more
binding medium-term expenditure ceilings and
(ii) introduce further structural reforms to improve the labour market performance and stand ready to adopt a tighter fiscal stance,
in particular in order to contain possible inflationary pressures, especially after the disinflationary effect of past substantial
exchange rate appreciation fades out.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
FI
The overall conclusion is that the programme envisages continued high surpluses, albeit declining over the programme period.
While the risks attached to the budgetary targets are balanced overall, the programme's fiscal projections appear somewhat
cautious for 2008. The medium-term budgetary position is sound and should limit the risks to long-term sustainability.
Continuing with expenditure restraint will remain crucial to stem the risk of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy stance in 2008 and to
adjust to the lower growth path and the implied slower growth of tax revenue over the programme period.
SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:
SE
The overall conclusion is that the medium-term budgetary position is sound with high general government surpluses and Sweden
is at low risk with regard to the sustainability of public finances. With GDP growth in 2008 possibly turning out lower than
foreseen, the risk of pro-cyclical fiscal policy would be very limited. Moreover, the weakening of the structural budgetary
position in 2008 goes along with continued structural reforms aimed at encouraging labour force participation and thus
increasing growth potential and is not envisaged to spill over into subsequent years.
Table I.3.10:
Part I 







The overall conclusion is that the programme confirms a significant deterioration in the United Kingdom’s budgetary
position that, coupled with a probably weaker macroeconomic context than envisaged, carries a clear risk that general
government deficit will breach the 3% of GDP deficit reference value in the near term. While the programme envisages
some fiscal tightening from 2008/09 through a progressive increase in the tax revenue and a reduction in previously rapid
growth in current expenditure, there are risks to the achievement of this consolidation. These primarily stem from the
deterioration in macroeconomic prospects and risks to the achievements of spending targets The projected speed of
consolidation is itself unambitious. The debt ratio remains significantly below the 60 percent of GDP reference value,
increasing slightly before falling from 2010/11 onwards only. The long-term sustainability of UK public finances has
deteriorated when compared to the previous programme, mainly due to the deterioration of the budgetary position in 2007,
although the United Kingdom remains at medium risk.
POLICY INVITATIONS: 
In view of the above assessment, the United Kingdom is invited to:
(i) implement measures necessary for the deficit not to exceed the reference value of 3% of GDP; 
(ii) strengthen the pace of fiscal improvements overthe programme period, which would also address the increased risks
to the long-term sustainability of the public finances.
The United Kingdom is again invited to improve compliance with the data requirements of the code of conduct.
Table I.3.11:
Note:  The Belgian stability programme update and the Polish convergence programme update have not yet been 
discussed by the Council at the time of printing this report.  
4. THE LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES 
BASED ON THE 2007/08 UPDATES OF THE STABILITY 




The assessment of the long-term sustainability of 
public finances based on the 2007/08 updates of 
the stability and convergence programmes 
(SCPs) represents an update of the 
comprehensive appraisal laid out in the first 
Sustainability Report, published by the 
Commission in October 2006 and endorsed by 
the Council in November 2006 (1). The 
Sustainability Report provides a detailed 
description of the quantitative indicators and 
qualitative information used to assess long-term 
sustainability of public finances in the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework.  
This section summarises the main points of the 
updated assessment of the long-term 
sustainability of public finances. The 
presentation is in three stages. The first stage 
briefly discusses the data underlying the analysis, 
namely the long-term budgetary impact of 
ageing, updated by the inclusion of property 
income and taking into account the effects of 
recent pension reforms reviewed by the 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC). On this 
basis, and following established practice, the 
second stage presents the standard sustainability 
indicators for (i) a scenario based on current 
policies and (ii) for one based on the budgetary 
plans laid down in the 2007/08 vintage of the 
SCPs. The section concludes with a classification 
of countries into low/medium/high risk with 
regard to the sustainability of public finances (2).  
                                                          
(1) European Commission (2006b). ECOFIN Council, Press 
Release 14681/06, 7 November 2006. 
(2) A detailed assessment of the long-term sustainability of 
public finances carried out by the Commission services 
for each Member States as well as the relevant policy 




4.2. PROJECTIONS OF THE BUDGETARY 
IMPACT OF AGEING POPULATIONS 
4.2.1. The long-term budgetary cost of 
ageing 
The assessment of long-term sustainability of 
public finances carried out in the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework builds on long-term 
budgetary projections prepared jointly by the 
Commission and the EPC and released in 
February 2006 ("Ageing Report") (3). Compared 
with last year's appraisal exercise, two 
developments impact on the quantitative 
analysis. First, recently enacted pension reforms 
can lead to a revision of the long-term budgetary 
projections following a peer review and 
endorsement by the EPC. Second, property 
income received by general government has been 
incorporated in the calculations of the 
sustainability indicators. 
Table I.4.1 summarises the projected changes in 
age-related expenditure as a share of GDP over 
the long term, including the results of the three 
peer reviews that have taken place so far 
(Denmark, Hungary and Portugal, see Section 
I.4.2.2.). Member States used the common 
projection in the SCPs; however, in case Member 
States recurred to assumptions and/or methods 
that departed from the common projections or if 
pension reforms were mentioned, which were not 
subject to an EPC peer review, this was 
considered among the qualitative factors (see 
Section I.4.5.). 
Table I.4.1 shows that the peer-reviewed reforms 
are of considerable size for the countries 
concerned. Their effect on the EU and euro-area 
averages amounts to a cost reduction of about 
0.1% of GDP. The inclusion of property income 
into the projections results in less favourable 
long-term projections compared with previous 
assumptions (see Section I.4.2.3.). 
                                                          
(3) Economic Policy Committee and European Commission 
(2006). 
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4.2.2. EPC-reviewed pension reforms 
The long-term budgetary projections are carried 
out by the Member States, using a common 
method and assumptions agreed in the EPC. In 
order to ensure that the common method is 
respected, projection updates after a pension 
reform are subject to a peer review in the EPC. 
Denmark implemented a pension reform in June 
2006 (the Welfare Agreement). The main 
measures in the public pension system were an 
increase in the minimum voluntary early 
retirement age from 60 to 62 years between 2019 
and 2022 and in the statutory retirement age 
between 2024 and 2027. Furthermore, these age 
thresholds will be indexed to the mean life 
expectancy of 60-year olds. Against this 
background, new projections of age-related 
  
Table I.4.1:
2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050
BE 4.8 6.6 -0.1 -0.2
BG ( 2 ) -1.8 0.1 0.0 0.0
CZ 2.3 7.7 -0.2 -0.3
DK 1.5 1.2 -2.3 -3.3 -0.5 -1.0
DE 2.2 4.0 -0.1 -0.3
EE -1.6 -1.8 -0.1 -0.2
IE 3.4 7.8 -0.1 -0.1
EL ( 1 ) 0.4 1.4 -0.1 -0.2
ES 3.6 8.9 -0.1 -0.2
FR 2.0 3.2 -0.1 -0.2
IT 1.6 2.3 -0.1 -0.2
CY 4.0 11.7 -0.2 -0.3
LV 1.4 1.6 0.0 0.0
LT 1.0 2.1 -0.1 -0.1
LU 5.5 8.4 -0.1 -0.7
HU 2.3 6.9 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3
MT 0.9 -0.6 -0.1 -0.2
NL 4.0 5.2 -0.5 -0.9
AT 1.8 1.1 -0.2 -0.4
PL -2.6 -3.2 -0.6 -0.7
PT 1.3 4.9 -2.6 -4.8 -0.1 -0.2
RO ( 2 ) -0.3 -1.1 n.a. n.a.
SI 4.6 9.9 -0.1 -0.2
SK 1.1 3.7 -0.2 -0.3
FI 4.5 5.0 -0.5 -1.0
SE 2.2 2.4 -0.4 -0.6
UK 2.4 4.2 -0.1 -0.1
EU 2.2 4.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Euro area 2.5 4.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
(1) EL: No pension projections. CY, EL: no long-term care projections.
Projected changes in gross total age-related public expenditure and property income between 2010 and 2030/50 
(% of GDP)
Total age/related expenditure Cost reduction from pension reform Property income
Source: Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2006), Commission services.
Change from 2010 to: Change from 2010 to: Change from 2010 to:
(2) No EPC projections for BG and RO; the figures taken from convergence programmes. EU average excludes BG, EL 
and RO; euro area average excludes EL.
Notes :  Cost reduction from EPC peer-reviewed pension reforms in column 2. 
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expenditure were endorsed by the EPC in 
January 2008.   
The 2006 pension reform adopted in Hungary 
also aims at increasing the effective retirement 
age. The main budgetary impact will come from 
a shortened duration of early retirement schemes 
and a tightening of eligibility conditions. 
Furthermore, pension recipients, who are 
working, will have to set off some of their 
pension against the income from work. Finally, 
the contribution base that is used for determining 
individual pension payments will be reduced 
from 2008 until 2013. From 2013 on, taxation 
will be shifted from pension contributions to 
pension benefits (1). In addition, the disability 
pension system was reformed, but this was not 
quantified. On the basis of this reform, new 
projections of age-related gross expenditure were 
endorsed by the EPC in November 2007.  
The 2006 pension reform in Portugal brought 
forward the already implemented increase in the 
contribution period over which benefits are 
defined. The main budgetary impact over the 
long term will arise from indexing all pensions 
broadly to inflation. In addition, statutory 
pensions will decline when life expectancy at the 
time of retirement will be higher than that at the 
age of 65 in 2006. Finally, the discount to early 
retirement has been raised. Against this 
background, new projections of age-related 
expenditure were endorsed by the EPC in 
October 2008. 
4.2.3. Property income 
For the calculation of the sustainability 
indicators, in previous assessment rounds it was 
assumed that the non-age-related part of the 
budget be kept constant throughout the 
projection period, i.e. at the GDP ratio of the 
starting year. This was inconsistent with the 
assumption that the evolution of gross debt over 
time is entirely driven by the deficit, thus 
assuming no stock-flow-adjustments. Therefore, 
changes in property income are now explicitly 
included in the long-term projections. 
                                                          
(1) However, changes in direct taxes on pension are not 
taken into account in the calculation of the sustainability 
indicators, but in the "qualitative factors". 
Property income received consists mainly of 
interest, dividends and rents on land and on sub-
soil assets. First, consider interest-paying assets. 
With its face value fixed, the value of any bond 
expressed as a percentage of GDP will decline 
along the projected path for nominal GDP 
growth. For all bonds the government holds in 
the starting year of the long-term projection, the 
assumption of no stock-flow-adjustment implies 
that the accruing interest is fully used for debt 
reduction. Therefore, the stock of all interest-
paying assets will decline over time in proportion 
to GDP and, with interest calculated as a fixed 
proportion of the stock, also the revenue stream 
from it. Second, consider dividend income. The 
value of an asset will remain fixed in nominal 
terms over time if all returns are distributed to 
shareholders as dividends. As above, the 
assumption of no stock-flow-adjustment implies 
that the returns would be used by the government 
fully for debt reduction. If, however, returns are 
not distributed but reinvested in the asset, the 
asset will gain in value, implying that the returns 
would effectively not be used for debt reduction 
(but without a stock-flow adjustment). For the 
purpose of the projection, it is assumed that the 
valuation effects are such that the dividend-to-
GDP ratio remains constant over time. Finally, 
rents from sub-soil assets are of significant size 
only in Denmark and the Netherlands. Revenue 
from natural sources is assumed to linearly 
decrease as a percentage of GDP until 2050. 
4.3. SUSTAINABILITY GAPS 
This section presents the sustainability gaps, 
calculated on the basis of the information 
provided in the SCPs according to the commonly 
agreed methodology and the projected change in 
age-related expenditure in the period to 2050. 
4.3.1. Background 
The S2 indicator is defined as the change in the 
current level of the structural primary balance 
required to make sure that the discounted value 
of future structural primary balances (including 
the path of property income) covers the current 
level of debt. It is decomposed into two 
elements. The first is termed 'initial budgetary 
position' (IBP). The IBP would take the value 
zero if the structural primary balance in the 
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starting year – and maintained at this level over 
time – would be just sufficient to keep the debt-
to-GDP ratio at its level of the starting year over 
the long term. It is assumed that at current 
policies non-age-related revenues and primary 
expenditure are to remain unchanged.  Therefore, 
a positive value of the IBP indicates by how 
much the structural primary balance would have 
to rise from its current level and with immediate 
effect so as to keep the debt ratio unchanged. The 
second element of the S2 indicator is the 'long-
term cost of ageing' (LTC). LTC measures by 
how much the primary balance would have to 
further rise (fall) to finance the projected 
increase (reduction) in age-related expenditure. 
The S1 indicator is defined similarly, with the 
difference that it does not require the debt ratio 
to remain unchanged but to reach 60% of GDP 
by 2050 instead.  
Therefore, in comparison with S2, a third 
element, the 'debt requirement' (DR) enters the 
decomposition, which increases the gap vis-à-vis 
the current level of the structural primary balance 
if the initial level of debt is above 60% of GDP 
and decreases it otherwise. If the budgetary 
impact of ageing is increasing over time, the 
discounted budgetary cost of ageing (LTC) will 
be less for S1 than for S2, since S2 is defined 
over an infinite horizon and therefore gives 
relatively more weight than S1 to ageing costs 
arising in the later part of the 2010-2050 period. 
Countries may therefore decide to address 
population ageing by reducing its long-term 
budgetary impact (low LTC) and/or by 
'frontloading' this cost through a negative IBP. 
4.3.2. The current policy  scenario 
Table  reveals that in the EU and in the euro area, 
the sustainability gap is about 1% of GDP 
according to the S1 indicator and up to 2½% of 
GDP according to the S2 indicator. Compared 
with the previous round of SCP assessments, this 
is a remarkable improvement; the sustainability 
position has improved by about ½ to 1% of GDP, 
reflecting the improved structural fiscal positions 
in 2007.  
Table I.3.1 in Section I.3 provides an overview 
over the 2007 debt-to-GDP ratio and the 
structural (primary) budget balances based on the 
information provided in the 2006/07 and 2007/08 
vintages of the SCPs. In general, most countries 
improved their underlying fiscal position in 
2007. 
Section I.3.5 highlights two risks regarding the 
achieved structural consolidation. The first 
concerns the possible overestimation of current 
structural balances. A slowdown in real GDP 
growth for this and next year (compared with the 
projections made in the SCPs) might result in a 
downward revision of potential growth estimates 
also for the recent past. This would imply that 
the recent budgetary consolidation would have a 
cyclical component than currently estimated. 
The second risk relates to the crucial assumption 
underlying the sustainability gaps, namely that 
current policies are to be maintained ad 
infinitum, in order to reflect a no-policy-change 
scenario. Over the long term, changes in the 
structural primary balance are supposed to be the 
consequence of discretionary policy choices. 
However, in the short term, this may not be the 
case. Especially in 2006 and 2007, in many 
Member States tax revenues have exceeded what 
would have been normally expected on the basis 
of the agreed common method used to calculate 
the cyclical adjustment of the budget balance. 
Countries with such unexpected buoyant tax 
revenues that have carried out their expenditure 
larger plans, i.e. that did not change their 
expenditure policy, therefore experienced an 
improvement in their structural budget balance. 
It cannot be excluded that such unexpected 
positive tax developments could reverse if GDP 
growth slows down. In order to maintain the 
structural position reached after a positive 
revenue surprise, the government might in that 
case need discretionary action to consolidate. 
While respecting their medium-term budgetary 
objective (MTO), the structural primary balance 
deteriorated particularly steeply in Ireland and 
 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2008 
 
60 
the Netherlands (1). According to the SCPs, 
somewhat smaller deteriorations occurred in 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania 
and the UK (2). 
                                                          
(1) However, actual data released after the assessment of the 
Dutch programme indicate that the budgetary outcome in 
2007 was 0.8% of GDP better than projected in the 
programme. The structural balance deteriorated in 2007 
nonetheless. 
(2) Except for Romania, this was not confirmed by the 
Commission services' spring 2008 forecast. 
In spite of the improvements in the underlying 
budgetary positions in most countries, the long-
term budgetary impact of ageing remains the 
main factor behind the sustainability gaps. The 
EU aggregate however masks considerable 
variety across Member States.  
A majority of Member States presents 
sustainability gaps: 16 according to the S1 
indicator and 19 according to the S2 indicator 
(same numbers as in 2006). This implies that 
based on the current budgetary position and with 
no changes in policies, further fiscal adjustment 
 
Table I.4.2:
S1 S1 in 2006 S2 S2 in 2006
Total IBP (1) DR (1) LTC (1) Total Total IBP (1) LTC (1) Total
BE 1.6 -2.5 0.3 3.8 1.3 3.0 -2.4 5.4 2.7
BG ( 2 ) -6.0 -4.0 -0.8 -1.2 -6.5 -4.5 -3.9 -0.7 -5.2
CZ  5.6 3.5 -0.5 2.6 5.2  8.5 3.7 4.8 8.0
DK -3.7 -4.3 -0.9 1.4 -1.4 -2.6 -3.9 1.3 0.3
DE 0.5 -1.4 0.0 2.0 2.2 1.8 -1.3 3.1 3.3
EE -3.6 -1.2 -1.1 -1.3 -4.2 -2.6 -1.1 -1.4 -3.2
IE 1.3 -1.2 -0.9 3.5 -1.2 4.9 -1.1 6.0 2.4
EL ( 2 ) 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.2 1.4 0.5 0.9 1.3
ES -0.3 -3.3 -0.5 3.5 -0.2 2.7 -3.2 5.9 2.8
FR 2.2 0.3 0.0 1.9 2.3 3.0 0.4 2.6 3.2
IT 1.3 -0.9 0.7 1.5 3.4 1.1 -0.8 2.0 3.0
CY -0.9 -4.7 -0.6 4.4 2.3 4.1 -4.4 8.5 7.0
LV 0.2 0.2 -0.9 0.9 -0.1 1.5 0.3 1.2 1.2
LT 0.5 0.6 -0.8 0.7 1.0 2.0 0.7 1.3 2.4
LU 3.1 -0.5 -1.6 5.2 4.3 8.1 -0.2 8.3 9.3
HU 4.7 1.7 0.2 2.8 10.5 6.9 2.0 4.9 12.3
MT -0.2 -0.8 -0.1 0.6 0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1
NL 2.2 -0.8 -0.3 3.3 0.8 3.9 -0.5 4.4 2.4
AT  -0.1 -1.0 -0.1 1.0 -0.2  0.3 -0.8 1.1 -0.1
PL -1.7 1.1 -0.3 -2.5 -1.6 -1.3 1.5 -2.8 -1.4
PT 1.9 0.2 0.0 1.7 5.6 3.6 0.4 3.2 8.3
RO ( 2 ) 1.5 2.7 -0.8 -0.5 1.7 1.9 2.7 -0.8 1.9
SI 3.5 -0.2 -0.7 4.4 3.6 7.0 0.0 7.1 7.0
SK 2.6 2.0 -0.5 1.1 2.4 4.4 2.2 2.1 4.1
FI -3.1 -4.9 -1.5 3.3 -3.1 -0.5 -4.6 4.2 -0.7
SE -3.1 -3.5 -1.0 1.5 -3.1 -1.2 -3.2 2.0 -1.5
UK 3.3 1.5 -0.2 2.0 2.6 4.8 1.6 3.2 4.2
Euro area (2) 1.0 -1.2 0.0 2.3 1.9 2.3 -1.1 3.4 3.0
EU (2) 1.2 -0.7 -0.1 2.1 1.8 2.5 -0.6 3.1 3.0
Source: Commission services.
Results of the sustainability gap calculations in the '2007 scenario' (% of GDP)
Notes: 
(2) No commonly agreed pension projections were available for Greece and the rise in age-related expenditure is therefore underestimated. 
Pension expenditure was projected to rise between 2005 and 2050 by 10.2% in the 2002 update of the Greek stability programme. The 
aggregate results for the euro area exclude Greece and for the European Union additionally exclude Bulgaria and Romania, for which also 
no commonly agreed projections exist .
(1) IBP = the initial budgetary position, DR = the debt requirement in 2050 (if the current debt/GDP ratio is below 60% of GDP debt is 
allowed to rise and this component reduces the sustainability gap as measured by the S1 indicator, and vice versa.), LTC = the long-term 
changes in the primary balance.
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remains necessary so as to render public finances 
sustainable over the long term for most Member 
States. In more than half of the Member States, a 
sizeable adjustment, of more than 2% of GDP, 
would be required, with the gaps reaching about 
7% of GDP in the case of Hungary and Slovenia 
and even exceeding 8% of GDP for the Czech 
Republic and Luxemburg. 
According to data in the updated SCPs, 12 
Member States strictly respected their MTOs in 
2007 (1). Of these, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland and Sweden have a sustainability gap 
smaller than zero for both indicators, suggesting 
that based on the commonly agreed projections 
the current budgetary position, if maintained, 
would be more than sufficient to ensure 
sustainability as defined by the indicators (2). 
Thanks to reformed pension systems, the 
budgetary cost of ageing in these countries is 
below the EU average, except for Finland, where 
the budgetary impact of ageing is around the EU-
average but the degree of frontloading relatively 
high. Denmark, Finland and Sweden's budgetary 
positions in 2007 had considerably improved 
compared with 2006. 
Furthermore, among the countries at the MTO, 
Cyprus, Latvia and Spain would have a 
sustainability gap below or close to zero 
according to S1. Except for Cyprus, these 
countries have a low or even very low current 
debt ratio. According to S1, such low current 
debt would allow for some budgetary leeway 
(negative DR) to finance some of the cost of 
ageing permanently by additional debt. For 
Latvia, the cost of ageing is also far below the 
EU-average. By contrast, in Cyprus, Ireland and 
Spain, the cost of ageing is relatively high, 
implying that, while the projected rise in age-
related expenditure is relatively distant in time, a 
pension reform would be needed at some point. 
Cyprus is a special case. With debt at 60% of 
GDP in 2007, the high budgetary impact of 
ageing becomes more significant in the second 
half of the 2010-2050 period. However, Cyprus 
                                                          
(1) This is confirmed by the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast with the exception of Latvia, whose 
structural balance amounted to -1.4% of GDP in 2007 
(contrary to -0.5% according to the SCP). 
(2) For Bulgaria on the basis of national projections; 
commonly agreed long-term projections do not yet exist. 
considerably improved its budgetary position in 
2007 on the year before. The exceptionally 
strong structural primary balance achieved in 
2007, if maintained, would allow more than 
offsetting the impact of ageing for some time 
before the debt ratio returns to 60% of GDP. 
The remaining three countries strictly at the 
MTO, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and 
Slovenia, have sustainability gaps according to 
both definitions. If kept permanently, the 
budgetary position in the starting year (before 
population ageing will impact on the budget) is 
more than sufficient to stabilise the current debt 
ratio for these countries. However, the budgetary 
cost of ageing is among the highest in the EU in 
Luxemburg and Slovenia, and above the EU 
average in the Netherlands. 
On the back of the budgetary consolidation 
achieved in 2007, Germany has broadly reached 
its MTO. The primary surplus would be 
sufficient to stabilise the debt ratio, but still not 
enough to cover the long-term cost of ageing, 
which is around the EU average. 
Although being somewhat away from its MTO, 
the sustainability indicators for Austria are 
smaller than zero, since the initial budgetary 
position would be more than sufficient to cover 
initial debt and the cost of ageing below the EU 
average. Also not far from its MTO, Lithuania 
has a small sustainability gap, but a very low 
debt ratio, which would call for a slightly higher 
primary surplus than the current one for it to 
remain constant over time. However, the future 
cost of ageing is also far below the EU average. 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece, France, 
Italy, Hungary, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia 
are quite away from their MTOs. For Belgium 
and Italy, the structural primary balance in 2007 
would be, if maintained, more than sufficient to 
stabilise the debt ratio at its 2007 level, but not to 
offset the additional cost of ageing.  
For France and Portugal, and even more so for 
Slovakia, the initial budgetary position is not 
quite sufficient to stabilise the current debt ratio, 
while the budgetary impact of ageing is below or 
about the EU average. For Poland, the initial 
budgetary position is also not sufficient to 
stabilise the current debt ratio. However, the 
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pension reform implemented should gradually 
provide budgetary relief.  
The Czech Republic and Hungary are projected 
to experience ageing cost above average, while 
current policies would not stabilise the debt ratio. 
The same applies for Greece. Since commonly 
agreed pension and long-term projections do not 
exist, the above indicators are based on the 
commonly agreed other age-related budgetary 
items (health care, education, unemployment). 
National projections, as quoted in the recent 
updated stability programme and dating from 
2002, point to an increase of pension expenditure 
of more than 10 pp of GDP up to 2050. For 
illustration, the sustainability indicators can be 
recalculated taking the national projections at 
 
face value: a considerable sustainability gap 
would emerge (S2 at 8.7% of GDP). 
4.3.3. Achieving the plans in the 
programmes 
The sustainability gap according to S2 for the EU 
would be halved if Member States reached the 
budgetary targets planned in the 2007 updates of 
the stability and convergence programmes. The 
gap according to S1 would even be eliminated. 
The impact on the sustainability indicators of 
implementing the updated programmes' plans are 
given in Table . The planned consolidation in 
Cyprus, France, Italy and Lithuania would result 
in a reduction of the respective S2 sustainability 
gaps by 2% of GDP or more. 
Table I.4.3:
S1 S1 in 2006 S2 S2 in 2006
Total IBP (1) DR (1) LTC (1) Total Total IBP (1) LTC (1) Total
BE 0.4 -3.7 0.2 3.8 1.0 1.8 -3.6 5.4 2.4
BG ( 2 ) -6.0 -4.0 -0.8 -1.2 -4.6 -4.5 -3.9 -0.7 -3.5
CZ 3.8 1.8 -0.5 2.6 4.3 6.8 2.0 4.8 7.1
DK -2.1 -2.7 -0.8 1.4 -0.9 -1.1 -2.4 1.3 0.8
DE -0.4 -2.3 0.0 2.0 0.7 0.9 -2.2 3.1 1.8
EE -3.5 -1.1 -1.1 -1.3 -4.4 -2.5 -1.0 -1.4 -3.4
IE 2.5 -0.1 -0.9 3.5 0.0 6.1 0.1 6.0 3.6
EL ( 2 ) -1.1 -1.9 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.9 -1.7 0.9 0.1
ES 0.2 -2.8 -0.5 3.5 0.4 3.3 -2.7 5.9 3.3
FR 0.1 -1.7 -0.1 1.9 -0.5 1.1 -1.6 2.6 0.6
IT -1.2 -.3.3 0.6 1.5 -1.4 -1.3 -3.2 2.0 -1.5
CY 1.5 -2.5 -0.4 4.4 1.5 6.3 -2.1 8.5 6.2
LV -2.0 -1.9 -1.0 0.9 -1.1 -0.7 -1.9 1.2 0.2
LT -1.7 -1.5 -0.8 0.7 -1.4 -0.1 -1.4 1.3 0.1
LU 2.0 -1.5 -1.7 5.2 2.0 7.1 -1.2 8.3 7.1
HU 2.7 -0.2 0.0 2.8 3.0 5.0 0.1 4.9 5.2
MT -2.1 -2.6 -0.1 0.6 -1.6 -2.4 -2.3 -0.1 -2.0
NL 1.0 -1.9 -0.4 3.3 1.2 2.8 -1.7 4.4 2.7
AT -0.6 -1.5 -0.1 1.0  -1.3 -0.3 -1.3 1.1  -1.1
PL -3.2 -0.4 -0.3 -2.5 -2.8 -2.8 0.0 -2.8 -2.6
PT 0.2 -1.4 -0.1 1.7 2.5 2.0 -1.2 3.2 5.3
RO ( 2 ) 0.8 2.1 -0.8 -0.5 0.9 1.3 2.1 -0.8 1.3
SI 3.0 -0.7 -0.7 4.4 3.7 6.5 -0.5 7.1 7.2
SK 0.9 0.4 -0.5 1.1 1.5 2.7 0.6 2.1 3.2
FI -1.3 -3.2 -1.4 3.3 -2.6 1.3 -2.8 4.2 -0.2
SE -3.7 -4.1 -1.1 1.5 -3.0 -1.8 -3.8 2.0 -1.4
UK 1.7 0.0 -0.3 2.0 1.4 3.4 0.1 3.2 3.0
Euro area (2) -0.2 -2.3 -0.1 2.3 0.0 1.1 -2.2 3.4 1.2
EU (2) 0.0 -1.9 -0.2 2.1 0.1 1.4 -1.7 3.1 1.4
Results of the sustainability gap calculations in the 'programme scenario' (% of GDP)
Notes: 
(2) No commonly agreed pension projections were available for Greece and the rise in age-related expenditure is therefore underestimated. Pension expenditure 
was projected to rise between 2005 and 2050 by 10.2% in the 2002 update of the Greek stability programme. The aggregate results for the euro area exclude 
Greece and for the European Union additionally exclude Bulgaria and Romania, for which also no commonly agreed projections exist.
Source: Commission services.
(1) IBP = the initial budgetary position, DR = the debt requirement in 2050 (if the current debt/GDP ratio is below 60% of GDP debt is allowed to rise and this 
component reduces the sustainability gap as measured by the S1 indicator, and vice versa.), LTC = the long-term changes in the primary balance.
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However, compared with previous year's 
assessment, the sustainability gap according to 
the programme scenario remains unchanged, 
despite the more favourable structural position in 
2007. The recent updates of SCPs display a 
relative lack of ambition in the ex ante 
adjustment. Moreover, the achieved 
consolidation was helped by buoyant tax 
revenues. As discussed earlier, the observed 
narrowing of the sustainability gaps in the last 
two SCP assessments compared with the 
Sustainability Report may therefore not be 
permanent. 
4.3.4. Debt developments 
Given the improved structural budgetary position 
in 2007, the debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU has 
fallen below the 60 % reference value in 2007. In 
the ‘2007’ scenario it is projected to exceed 60% 
Table I.4.4:
Gross debt
2007 2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050
BE 84.9 76 60 145 75 31 80
BG ( 1 ) 19.8 17 -97 -269 17 -97 -269
CZ 30.4 34 116 386 30 76 282
DK 25.6 15 -64 -131 19 -26 -49
DE 64.9 59 43 89 60 22 38
EE 2.7 2 -43 -129 2 -41 -123
IE 25.1 26 33 139 29 58 198
EL ( 1 ) 93.4 87 90 136 83 33 -7
ES 36.2 29 -27 41 30 -14 75
FR 64.2 64 88 173 62 43 70
IT 105.0 101 86 133 99 28 -9
CY 60.0 39 -31 20 44 18 130
LV 9.4 10 18 69 6 -29 -52
LT 17.6 18 27 88 14 -20 -32
LU 6.9 8 47 197 7 26 155
HU 65.4 68 113 312 63 70 205
MT 62.9 57 57 49 53 17 -41
NL 46.8 44 63 173 41 34 112
AT 59.9 56 37 57 55 24 25
PL 44.9 44 10 -36 42 -20 -117
PT 64.4 63 70 168 60 33 74
RO ( 1 ) 11.9 15 72 139 15 58 105
SI 25.6 23 56 255 23 45 227
SK 30.6 31 66 212 30 32 116
FI 35.3 26 -45 -61 29 -2 36
SE 39.7 25 -43 -75 25 -57 -105
UK 43.9 47 92 223 45 59 147
Euro area (2) 65.9 62 52 116 61 25 52
EU (2) 59.3 56 54 125 55 27 61
(2) The aggregate results for the euro area exclude Greece and for the European Union additionally exclude Bulgaria and 
Romania.
Source:  Stability and convergence programmes, Commission services.
Projected debt developments in the EU Member States (% of GDP)
Notes: 
'2007' scenario Programme' scenario
(1) No commonly agreed pension projections were available for Greece and the rise in age-related expenditure is therefore 
underestimated. Pension expenditure was projected to rise between 2005 and 2050 by 10.2% in the 2002 update of the Greek 
stability programme. No commonly agreed long-term projections for Bulgaria and Romania exist.
 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2008 
 
64 
after 2030, rising to almost 130% by 2050. If the 
plans in the updated SCPs were achieved, the 
debt ratio would remain below 60% for almost 
the entire projection period (see Table ). 
4.4. THE REQUIRED PRIMARY BALANCE 
A further indicator to illustrate the budgetary 
consequences of ageing is the required primary 
balance (RPB), which is derived under the 
assumption that the intertemporal budget 
constraint of the government is respected over an 
infinite horizon (i.e. by eliminating the S2 
sustainability gap indicator). It is defined as the 
primary balance that is sufficient to stabilise debt 
and to finance the increase in age-related 
expenditure. It is a more stable indicator than the 
corresponding S2 gap indicator. The RPB as well 
as the structural primary balances are shown in 
Table I.4.5. 
The RPB varies widely across Member States, 
ranging from almost 10% of GDP to below zero, 
which mainly reflects the large dispersion of the 
projected changes in age-related expenditure. 
4.5. QUALITATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
In order to arrive at a comprehensive assessment 
of the long-term sustainability of public finances, 
additional factors are taken into account in order 
to better qualify the quantitative assessment. 
Adding qualitative factors may lead to a different 
overall assessment than the one that would result 
from the sustainability indicators only. 
The current level of the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
arguably the most important additional factor. 
While the sustainability indicators already 
include information on the current level of 
debt, (1) they do not incorporate all the specific 
risks faced by countries with a large initial level 
of debt. First, high-debt countries are more 
sensitive to short to medium-term shocks to 
                                                          
(1) The contribution of the debt to the S2 sustainability 
indicator for a country with a debt/GDP ratio of 100% 
and an interest/growth rate differential of 1.5% is in fact 
1.5% of GDP (debt times the interest/growth rate 
differential). 
economic growth and interest rates. Second, a 












BE 3.5 6.6 6.3
BG ( 2 ) 4.1 0.1 0.1
CZ -3.0 7.7 5.7
DK 4.9 1.2 1.7
DE 2.5 4.0 4.4
EE 1.3 -1.8 -0.7
IE 1.4 7.8 5.9
EL ( 1 ) 1.1 1.4 2.6
ES 3.8 8.9 6.6
FR 0.6 3.2 3.4
IT 2.7 2.3 3.8
CY 5.0 11.7 8.9
LV -0.1 1.6 1.8
LT -0.4 2.1 2.0
LU 0.9 8.4 8.5
HU -0.8 6.9 6.3
MT 1.2 -0.6 0.2
NL 1.8 5.2 5.2
AT 2.0 1.1 2.5
PL -0.2 -3.2 -0.2
PT 0.8 4.9 4.2
RO ( 2 ) -2.5 -1.1 -0.5
SI 0.5 9.9 7.3
SK -1.5 3.7 3.2
FI 5.7 5.0 4.8
SE 4.0 2.4 2.9
UK -0.8 4.2 3.9
Source:  Commission services.
Required primary balance (% of GDP)
Notes : The required primary balance is given as an average over the period 
covering the first five years after the last year covered by the programme.
(1) No pension projections were available for Greece and the rise in age-related 
expenditure is therefore underestimated. Pension expenditure was projected to 
rise between 2005 and 2050 by 10.2% in the 2002 update of the Greek stability 
programme.
(2) No commonly agreed long-term projections available.
 
than assumed in the projections and increase 
further the risks to sustainability. Third, when 
calculating the sustainability indicators, it is 
assumed that all countries can keep their current 
primary balance constant as a share of GDP. 
High-debt countries need to maintain large 
primary surpluses for a prolonged period of time 
in order to reduce the level of debt. This may 
prove difficult. This factor is used symmetrically 
as a risk-increasing factor for very high-debt 
countries, such as Belgium, Greece and Italy and 
a risk-decreasing factor for very low-debt 
countries or countries with large financial assets 
in reserves for the payment of future public 
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pension, such as Finland, Ireland, Luxemburg 
and Sweden (1). 
The sustainability indicator in the '2007 scenario' 
is based on the budgetary projection for 2007 in 
the SCPs, corrected by the effects of the business 
cycle and possible one-off and temporary 
measures so as to capture the underlying 
structural budgetary position, which is then 
assumed constant in a 'no-policy-change' 
scenario. The budgetary position may 
nonetheless change significantly in the short 
term, e.g. because some already enacted 
measures will gradually impact on the budget. 
The Commission services' forecasts are made 
under the assumption of unchanged policies and 
can indicate such short-term trends. If 
significant, such trends may nuance the 
assessment that could be inferred from the '2007 
scenario'. In the cases of Ireland and Spain, the 
decline in the structural budget balance until 
2009 as planned by the latest programme updates 
is also projected by the Commission services' 
autumn 2007 forecast (available at the time of 
the assessment), which would give additional 
plausibility to the less favourable sustainability 
projection in the 'programme scenario' (2). 
As the sustainability indicators are calculated on 
the basis of the projections of the Ageing Report 
(2006), unless a peer review in the EPC has 
taken place, pension reforms (or reform plans) 
are therefore considered as additional factors. 
The influence on the assessment of a pension 
reform depends on a number of factors: 
specifically whether the reform has been enacted 
or not, whether the reform is deficit-increasing or 
deficit-decreasing and whether the budgetary 
impact of the reform is available or not. Enacted 
reforms are taken into account in the risk 
assessment. However, a certain degree of caution 
is necessary as the information provided on the 
reform and its budgetary impact may not 
                                                          
(1) The assets considered in the analysis are financial assets 
on a consolidated basis (i.e. holdings of government debt 
are netted out). They exclude: (1) assets of mandatory 
funded schemes and occupational schemes, which are 
classified outside the general government sector; (2) non-
financial assets. 
(2) In the updated programme of Ireland, the budgetary 
projections for 2009 and 2010 explicitly incorporate 
unallocated contingency provisions of, respectively, 
0.4% and 0.8% of GDP. 
correspond to the methods agreed by the EPC. 
Implemented, deficit-decreasing reforms were 
taken into account for Germany and Hungary (in 
addition to the EPC-peer review). By contrast, 
deficit-increasing reform plans, as well as failure 
to implement a previously enacted reform, may 
be considered as an additional risk factor. 
Austria, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Poland and the 
United Kingdom have introduced reforms (or 
plan to do so) to their public pension systems 
aiming at ensuring adequate pensions in the 
future. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Italy, Lithuania and Spain have enacted 
or are considering reforms, where the progress of 
implementation or the information given in the 
SCPs was not sufficient to arrive at a qualitative 
assessment. 
Further aspects of the pension system that are not 
captured by the sustainability indicators are also 
taken into account. In particular, the calculation 
of the sustainability indicators is based on gross 
pension expenditure. For Denmark, Hungary and 
the Netherlands rising revenues from the taxation 
of public but also private pension schemes would 
reduce the sustainability gaps (3). In Hungary, 
however, the future tax treatment of pensions is 
not fully fixed yet, and further changes to the 
pension formula may become necessary. 
The reliability of projections may play a role, 
particularly when long-term 
assumptions/projections are considerably 
different from the common budgetary projections 
in the Ageing Report, suggesting that the 
indicators may be over- or underestimated. This 
applies to Bulgaria and Romania, for which in 
view of their recent accession long-term 
projections were not included in the Ageing 
Report. In fact, the lack of comparable and 
comprehensive long-term projections for these 
countries prevents the Commission from 
reaching an overall assessment for these 
countries. Nonetheless, a significant impact of 
ageing on government expenditure cannot be 
                                                          
(3) In Hungary, new pensions awarded from 2013 onwards 
will be subject to income tax, instead of being tax 
exempt. According to the Hungarian authorities, direct 
taxes paid by pensioners will amount to 3.6% of GDP in 
2050. This reduces the S2 sustainability indicator by 
2.8% of GDP, reaching 4.1% of GDP in the '2007' 
scenario'. 
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excluded given the current and projected 
demographic structure. Moreover, missing 
projections, in particular for Greece (pension and 
long-term care), result in a clear underestimation 
of the long-term budgetary impact of ageing. 
Greece was in fact invited by the Council to 
produce pension projections as soon as possible. 
Projections for long-term care are also missing 
for Cyprus. 
The SCPs may provide alternative projections to 
those of the Ageing Report (2006), even in 
absence of (pension) reforms, for example by 
updating demographic trends. The existence of 
alternative projections is mentioned in the 
additional factors. However, for the sake of 
comparability between countries and for the 
transparency of the assessment, the overall 
assessment is made on the basis of the 
methodology and assumptions of the Ageing 
Report. 
Furthermore, decreases in the benefit ratio larger 
than 20% over the next 50 years are included in 
the qualitative assessment (1).  This is based on 
the analysis of the Commission's Sustainability 
Report (2006). The general framework for 
assessing the 'sustainability' of the change in the 
benefit ratio is theoretically well understood: a 
decrease in the (public) benefit ratio may not 
raise pressure to increase public spending if 
current savings in private supplementary 
pensions are sufficient, if the financial incentives 
to work longer are large enough and if there is no 
obstacle to the work of older workers. Yet those 
factors are difficult to assess in a cross-country 
analysis. Therefore, the benefit ratio is taken to 
inform about possible additional risks. Examples 
where the benefit ratio entered the qualitative 
assessment are Austria, France, Germany, Italy, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden. 
The tax ratio could also play a role. Indeed, it 
may be more difficult for high tax-ratio countries 
to increase taxes further, limiting the possibilities 
to deal with the budgetary impact of an ageing 
population. This could be the case for high-tax 
countries such as Belgium, Sweden and 
Denmark, should the need arise. 
                                                          
(1) Ratio between the average pension and the GDP per 
worker. 
Measures with large intertemporal effects on the 
budget are mentioned in the sustainability 
assessment, whether or not they are treated as 
one-offs for the purposes of calculating the 
structural balance that is relevant for the SGP 
procedure. An example of this is the severance 
pay (TFR) in Italy. 
4.6. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGE IN THE 
MEMBER STATES 
Compared with the 2006 exercise, countries have 
retained their overall risk classification, except 
for the Netherlands (from low to medium risk) 
and Portugal (from high to medium risk). For 
Bulgaria and Romania, no overall risk 
assessments were made. Graph I.4.1 provides an 
overview (using the '2007 scenario'). The 
assessments in the Council Opinion’s confirmed 
the assessments made by the Commission (2). 
The reasons for the challenges to public finance 
sustainability are different across the Member 
States. 
The high-risk group of countries (the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Cyprus, Hungary, and 
Slovenia) is characterised by a very significant 
rise in age-related expenditure over the long-
term, underlining that measures aimed at curbing 
them will prove necessary. Moreover, the Czech 
Republic, Greece and Hungary have not reached 
their MTO and in some cases there is also a high 
level of debt, in particular in Greece. Budgetary 
consolidation is therefore necessary and urgent in 
order to reduce risks to public finance 
sustainability. 
The intermediate group of countries (Belgium, 
Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia and the UK) consists of countries with 
different characteristics. Ireland, Spain, 
Luxemburg and the Netherlands are at their 
MTO and Germany close to it. Ireland, Spain, 
Luxemburg and, to a lesser extent, the 
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Netherlands face a significant cost of ageing and 
need measures to curb these costs. Portugal's risk 
classification benefitted from the reduction in 
age-related costs from the EPC-reviewed pension 
reform. The Netherlands were downgraded to 
medium risk on the basis of the data provided in 
the stability programme, which projected a 
strong deterioration in the structural budget 
balance in 2007. However, statistical results for 
2007 indicate a significantly better budgetary 
outcome in 2007, which would be likely to result 
in the classification as low risk. Germany is a 
borderline case of low risk. After having 
implemented reforms it faces moderate costs of 
ageing (one reform not yet EPC-peer reviewed). 
Conversely, Spain and Ireland are planning a 
deterioration in their structural balance until the 
end of the programme period. However, Spain 
would still be at its MTO. Ireland may move 
away from the MTO after 2008, unless the 
margins foreseen in the programme as 
contingency provisions are not used. Malta and 
the UK have implemented pension reforms, 
which are not yet EPC-peer reviewed but tend to 
increase the future budgetary cost of ageing. 
In the remaining countries, the future rise in the 
budgetary costs of ageing is not exceeding the 
EU average. However, their initial budgetary 
position, at least in the 2007-scenario, falls 
significantly short of compensating this rise.  
The low-risk countries (Denmark, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Poland, Finland and 
Sweden) have in general gone furthest in coping 
with the budgetary impact of ageing, implying 
either a strong fiscal position (running large 
surpluses, reducing debt and/or accumulating 
assets) and/or comprehensive pension reforms, 
sometimes including a shift towards private 
pension schemes. This does not mean that in 
these countries there are no risks regarding the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. In 
fact, their situation (assessment) relies on the 
successful implementation of the far-reaching 
reforms, which have reduced significantly the 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Poland and Sweden) 
and maintaining the budgetary position. In 
contrast, the future budgetary costs of ageing are 
projected to increase above the EU average. 
However, Finland has the largest share of assets 
in pension fund reserves. It should be noted that, 
when considering the estimated impact of the 
reform package in Denmark, including effects 
from taxation, the long-term impact of ageing 
would be even smaller. 
Graph I.4.1: Overall risk classification and the sustainability gap
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Note:     * S2 for Greece underestimated. 











In retrospect, implementation of the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework has witnessed a 
succession of distinct phases with shifting 
emphasis reflecting the necessities of the 
moment. The smooth beginnings of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) in 1998-2000, gave 
rapidly way to a period where first the 
occurrence and then the correction of excessive 
deficits were the main concerns. More recently, 
the spotlight has moved again towards the 
preventive arm of the Pact; that is on Member 
States' progress, or lack of it, towards sustainable 
budgetary positions in the medium term.  
While the public finance situation still varies 
considerably across countries, demanding 
application of the full range of instruments 
envisaged by the Pact, the debate on the EU 
fiscal surveillance framework has been giving 
increasing prominence to issues of quality of 
public finances (QPF). This needs to be seen 
against the background of a number of key 
developments. Firstly, as Member States make 
progress towards achieving their medium-term 
objectives the scope for 'easy' adjustment 
narrows, choices about where to make cuts or 
which revenues to increase get tougher and 
further improvements become increasingly 
interlinked with issues of quality. Secondly, 
accommodation of the impending budgetary 
impact of ageing populations without 
jeopardising the long-term sustainability of 
public finances carries the risks of crowding out 
other expenditure items in the budget. More 
effective use of government resources becomes 
essential. Thirdly, there is also an increasing 
amount of pressure from various national 
constituencies on governments to deliver value 
for money, especially but not exclusively in 
Member States where the size of government has 
reached high levels. Lastly, the closer integration 
of markets and the accompanying increase in 
global competition creates the need for a fiscal 
policy geared towards enhancing the adaptability 
of economies to shocks.  
Reflecting this recent shift in attention, Part II of 
Public finances in EMU − 2008 discusses a 
number of operational issues related to QPF 
which have a direct or indirect bearing on the 
implementation of EU fiscal surveillance.  
As with fiscal policy in general, the assessment 
of QPF is to be based on a number of informative 
measurements and indicators. It is therefore 
imperative to first take a closer look at available 
data, instruments and tools. Our stock-taking 
exercise proceeds in two separate steps. We first 
plough through existing work and databases with 
a view to defining the available information for 
all key areas such as expenditure, taxation, fiscal 
governance and structural reforms which can be 
used to describe, analyse and assess QPF. The 
second step in our stock-taking exercise consists 
in exploring ways to organise and present the 
mass of information in a meaningful and concise 
way so as to draw solid conclusions about QPF 
across both countries and time.  
There are two important conclusions emerging 
from our review of data and indicators. First, in 
spite of the wide range of available information, 
one of the main obstacles is that sources vary 
considerably in terms of country and time 
coverage. This imposes constraints on the scope 
of the analysis and calls for further efforts to 
close existing gaps. The second, and probably 
more important, conclusion refers to the question 
of how to best organise the available 
information. The relevant literature is relatively 
young and no standard tools have emerged so 
far. For purely illustrative purposes we present a 
simple aggregate indicator of QPF which 
comprises a sufficiently broad number of 
dimensions and ensures an acceptable degree of 
comparability across countries. The country 
ranking implied by this tentative synthetic 
indicator is broadly in line with current 
preconceptions about QPF in the EU Member 
States. Further work, including notably 
sensitivity tests, is required to establish a robust 
set of indicators. 
QPF is not a completely new concept in the 
implementation of the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework. The March 2005 report of the 
Council underpinning the reform of the SGP 
implicitly and explicitly acknowledges the 
relevance of a number of dimensions of QPF, 
such as the composition of expenditure, national 
fiscal governance and structural reforms aimed at 
enhancing the sustainability of public finances.  
The provisions of the revised Pact, notably the 
Code of Conduct, requires Member States to 
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provide annually information related to the 
specific issue of QPF (1). In particular, Member 
States should provide information on measures 
aimed at improving the quality of public finances 
on both the revenue and expenditure side, on 
structural reforms and on fiscal governance.  
Complete and consistent reporting of this 
information is a pre-condition for giving more 
space to QPF in the assessment of medium-term 
budgetary plans and, more generally, for giving 
more prominence to QPF in implementation of 
the EU fiscal surveillance framework as a whole.  
In a bid to assess the scope and substance of the 
current reporting on QPF, we examined in detail 
the last vintage of stability and convergence 
programmes (2007/08). This examination reveals 
two main areas for improvement. Firstly, 
compliance with the reporting indications of the 
Code of Conduct relating to QPF is fairly low in 
terms of both structure and content. Secondly, 
the information provided does not lend itself to 
systematic and cross-country comparable 
analysis of QPF. Both points underline the need 
to put in place a more comprehensive and 
detailed reporting. 
A key dimension of quality of public finances is 
the efficiency of the government sector, which 
on an aggregate level should be gauged by its 
productivity. However, because most public 
services and goods are not traded at market 
prices, the measurement of output and, in turn, 
productivity is more complicated than for private 
sector activities. Part II presents an overview of 
measurement of government sector productivity 
in national accounts. The way national 
accountants first approached the issue was to 
approximate output by the total costs incurred in 
the production of public goods and services. 
However, this approach effectively results in 
attributing zero productivity growth to the public 
sector. Subsequently, attempts therefore have 
been made to identify appropriate output 
indicators for different areas of government 
activity, such as the number of treatments in 
                                                          
(1) "Specifications on the implementation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact and guidelines on the format and 
content of Stability and Convergence Programmes", 
endorsed by the ECOFIN Council of 11 October 2005.  
health care or the number of hours of teaching in 
education. More recently, the attention has 
shifted to ways to take into account outcomes 
and hence the quality dimension, in the 
measurement of the output of the government 
sector.  
The increasing prominence of QPF-issues in the 
EU fiscal surveillance framework does not 
detract from the importance of its more 
elementary references. One such reference is the 
structural budget balance, i.e. the budget balance 
net of cyclical, one-off and other temporary 
factors. The adjustment requirements of the 
revised SGP, in both its dissuasive and 
preventive arm, are expressed in terms of 
structural balances.  
Two main shortcomings of the structural budget 
balance − errors in measurement of the output 
gap in real time and year-to-year fluctuations in 
tax elasticities − were examined in last year's 
edition of the Public finances in EMU report. 
This year we present the results of our attempts 
to tackle the weaknesses of the indicator so as to 
improve its diagnostic accuracy.  
As regards the measurement of the output gap in 
real time the presented approach makes use of 
information from supplementary economic 
variables, where supplementary is to be 
understood compared to the commonly agreed 
method for estimating the output gap. The 
findings of our work indicate that an 
improvement on the current methodology can be 
achieved especially thanks to the information 
encapsulated in the rate of capacity utilisation of 
the manufacturing industry. Hence, inclusion of 
this variable in the current method for estimating 
output gaps in real time could be envisaged. 
The challenge inherent in year-to-year changes in 
tax elasticities is approached at two different 
levels. At the first level, we isolate the changes 
in the economic system that give rise to higher or 
lower than normal tax content of growth. This 
gives us the possibility to understand why in 
certain years and certain countries the tax content 
of GDP went up or down compared to its 
average. At the second and more difficult level, 
we seek to determine whether and what part of 
higher or lower than normal tax elasticities can 
be taken to be structural or temporary in nature. 
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Overall, the lessons from our recent work teach 
us to moderate our expectations. As for any other 
synthetic fiscal indicator, the structural budget 
balance does not provide a perfect picture of the 
underlying fiscal situation in each and every 
year. While the degree of inaccuracy can be 
trimmed somewhat by adding additional pieces 
of information, there is an ultimately 
ineliminable uncertainty inherent in the fact that 
key inputs in the assessment of structural 
balances are forecasts. 
In conclusion, the shortcomings of the structural 
budget balance have long been known to 
practitioners and academics. Unsurprisingly, 
questions about the shortcomings of this 
indicator have increased in line with its visibility 
in EU fiscal policy prescriptions. The main 
reason why in spite of these shortcomings the 
structural budget balance has survived and is still 
anchored in the minds of the majority of 
economists, is the convincing intuition behind it 
and its methodological simplicity which are key 
for a consistent application across countries in an 
economic policy framework such as the SGP. 
The other elementary reference of the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework that is covered in Part II 
is the so-called no-policy-change assumption in 
budgetary projections. No-policy-change 
projections are key because, coupled with the 
country-specific budgetary targets that are 
established at the same time, they determine the 
size of the required fiscal adjustment. An 
underestimation of expenditure trends (or an 
overestimation of revenue trends) will give rise 
to inadequate budget plans and, ultimately failure 
to meet targets. Past experience in EU fiscal 
surveillance has repeatedly brought to light such 
biased applications which hamper progress 
towards sustainable fiscal positions.  
While it is quite clear what is meant by no-
policy-change projections in conceptual terms, 
their implementation and assessment in practice 
are not straightforward, the main reasons being 
that (i) there is no commonly accepted 
operational definition of no-policy-change 
projections and (ii) linked to the first point, 
national budgets in the Member States feature 
many idiosyncrasies that are difficult to capture 
in a common framework. Nevertheless, there are 
a number of principles that are relevant to the 
budget of all Member States. The objectives of 
the presentation are twofold: to take stock of a 
number of common principles that have emerged 
from the implementation of the SGP over time 
and to provide a basis for discussion with the 
Member States with the ultimate aim of 
improving the consistency and transparency of 
budgetary projections. 
 
1. THE QUALITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES: DATA, 




As quality of public finances (QPF) is gaining 
greater importance in policy making, there is also 
a need to upgrade the practices of fiscal 
surveillance in this area. The motivation for 
fiscal policies to go beyond maintaining sound 
fiscal positions derives largely from the 
emerging challenges of ageing populations and 
globalisation. In response, as explained in 
Section III, the EU economic and fiscal 
frameworks (the Strategy for Growth and Jobs 
and the Stability and Growth Pact) foresee to 
better gear fiscal policy toward achieving long-
term sustainability and creating conditions in 
support of economic growth, including through 
strong fiscal governance.  
While surveillance procedures have already been 
established for assessing the sustainability 
objective, the practices for a broader analysis of 
QPF and its links to macroeconomic goals, 
especially economic growth are less developed. 
In the ensuing three sections, we therefore take 
stock of available data sources and outline the 
type of indicators that would be needed for such 
analysis and propose ways forward on how this 
could feed into a surveillance mechanism. We 
also review how countries currently report on 
QPF in their stability and convergence 
programmes (SCPs) and identify areas for 
improvement. Finally, we take a look at how 
output and productivity are measured in the 
government sector. This point is of considerable 
importance as the specificity of public goods and 
services - they are not traded at market prices – 
precludes the use of a standard approach and 
requires special methods of measurement.  
1.2. INDICATORS OF QUALITY OF PUBLIC 
FINANCES: WHERE WE ARE AND WHERE 
WE GO 
Developing a conceptual framework and 
indicators should be the corner stones for 
improving the assessment of QPF. Section III 
provides the needed conceptual background by 
defining QPF as a multi-dimensional concept 
comprising all fiscal policy arrangements and 
operations that support one of the main 
macroeconomic goals of government policies 
notably long-term economic growth. In particular 
these interrelated dimensions include: (i) the size 
of government, (ii) the level and sustainability of 
fiscal positions, (iii) the composition and 
efficiency of expenditure, (iv) the structure and 
efficiency of revenue systems, (v) fiscal 
governance arrangements that impact the former 
four dimensions and (vi) public finances 
decisions that impact the functioning of markets 
and the overall business environment. Economic 
theory and empirical studies allow drawing 
tentative conclusions on how these dimensions, 
individually or in combination with others, affect 
the channels to growth and the overall growth 
performance. These key findings are summarised 
in Section III, which also highlights that more 
research is needed in particular on the interplay 
of the various dimensions of QPF and growth 
and the transmission channels. Arriving at a 
comparison of where Member States stand today 
and what policy options they have at hand would 
then require a broad set of comparable indicators 
combined with country-specific knowledge. 
Below we describe the data and information 
requirements, outline the various caveats and 
weigh them against practical considerations and 
provide an illustrative example for the use of 
composite indicators. 
1.2.1. Choosing indicators: some issues 
Policy and performance indicators are needed for 
analysing QPF. Policy indicators are directly 
controlled by policy makers reflecting choices in 
each public finance dimension (e.g. the level of 
education and health spending or tax rates on 
labour and capital)  (1). Performance indicators 
link the policy choices with outcomes. Thus, 
they measure policy effectiveness (e.g. linking 
education spending with education attainment or 
the labour income tax rate with labour market 
participation).  
                                                          
(1) It should be noted however, that these policy decisions 
reflect many more policy objectives than merely 
economic growth, which is the benchmark against which 
QPF will be assessed here. 
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But defining appropriate performance indicators 
is problematic. Outcomes are often hard to 
measure and therefore need to be proxied by 
output indicators. For example, education 
attainment can be measured by the OECD PISA 
indicators (standardised test of competence of 
secondary-school students) but the score may not 
adequately reflect the employability of human 
capital. Or the number of roads financed by 
public spending can be used to reflect the public 
infrastructure outcome needed to encourage 
investment but they may not capture the extent to 
which relevant market failures are eliminated by 
public spending. Moreover, how policy choices 
impact outcomes depends on a number of other 
factors. Some of these other factors are also 
policy variables. For example the effectiveness 
of education spending may be linked to 
institutional choices such as the freedom of 
schools to decide on the use of funds; or the 
impact of lower labour income tax rates on 
labour participation rates may also depend on the 
availability of child care facilities that can affect 
women's decision to enter the labour market. 
Also, and some factors that shape outcomes are 
not under the control of fiscal policy, e.g. the 
effectiveness of health spending also depends on 
eating habits and life-style choices.  
Due to these difficulties, a wide range of 
indicators should be used and cross-checked with 
country-specific information. While a 
simplification is often needed to make measuring 
QPF practical, one should be cautious in 
interpreting the results. Using a range of 
complementary indicators would be useful and 
serve as a robustness test (e.g. when assessing 
the efficiency of certain spending categories 
different input-output ratios can be calculated 
and parametric and non-parametric techniques 
used to estimate efficiency scores; see 
Section III.3 for more details). Also, since 
country-specificities can never be fully captured 
in the data, the interpretation of results needs to 
be complemented by such additional information 
(e.g. the number of university graduates in 
Germany is rather low compared to the EU 
average as it reflects Germany's dual education 
system with some of those in vocational training 
receiving an education similar to a college 
education in other countries).  
Policy and performance indicators should also 
fulfil some minimum statistical standards (1). 
First, the economic rationale of the indicator 
should be straightforward and unambiguous so as 
to promote public understanding and debate on 
policy issues. Second, indicators should be 
available and comparable across most EU 
Member States. Third, indicators need to be 
statistically reliable (e.g. applying a sound and 
comparable methodology to all countries with 
few changes in methodologies). And fourth, 
indicators should be regularly updated without 
too great a time lag. A long time coverage (25 
years or more) would also be desirable but only 
needed for areas in which additional empirical 
analysis on the link between QPF and growth 
needs to be conducted. To assess the status quo, 
a shorter time span (several years to avoid 
cyclical effects) would be sufficient. 
For each dimension of QPF a number of existing 
policy and performance indicators can be 
identified. Tables II.1.1 and II.1.2 outline a broad 
structure for such indicators for each of the six 
QPF dimensions broken down further into 
various areas. Clearly, the level of detail should 
vary with the relevance of each area and the 
availability of data. Both aspects cannot be fully 
captured in this stylised presentation. Given the 
wide range of issues, the data would need to be 
drawn from a large set of sources including not 
only Eurostat and the Commission services, but 
also other international organisations, such as the 
OECD, IMF and the World Bank, and private 
organisations (e.g. the World Economic Forum, 
and the Heritage Foundation). 
1.2.2. How to use QPF indicators? 
Three key questions arise on how to use 
indicators for assessing QPF. First, against what 
benchmark should indicators be compared? 
Second,   should   all   QPF  areas   be  assessed  
                                                          
(1) The four statistical criteria mentioned below are very 
close to those chosen as part of the ongoing development 
of the Lisbon Assessment Framework which aims to 
assess progress under the Lisbon strategy (the details are 
described in a set of notes by the European Commission 
to the Economic Policy Committee-Working Group on 
Methodology to Assess Lisbon-related Structural 
Reforms; LIME group). For a broad overview on the 
work of the LIME group see European Commission 
(2007b).  
European Commission 




Examples of potential indicators for assessing the quality of public finances and to construct composite indicators (Part I)
Indicators and data sources Type of indicator
1. Size of government
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio (Commission services) Policy
…
2. Fiscal position and sustainability
Deviation of structural balance from MTO (Commission services) Policy, performance
Variability (standard deviation) of fiscal position (Commission services) Policy, performance
Debt-to-GDP ratio (Commission services) Performance
Sustainability indicator S2 (Commission services) Performance
…
3. Composition and efficiency of expenditure
3.1 Composition of public expenditure
Share of "productive" spending (e.g. education, R&D, public transportation) in total primary spending Policy
     (Commission services)
"Productive" spending (e.g. education, R&D, public transportation) (Commission services) Policy
Share of public consumption in total primary spending (Commission services) Policy
Share of public investment in total primary spending (Commission services) Policy
Public consumption-to-GDP ratio (Commission services) Policy
Public investment-to-GDP ratio (Commission services) Policy
…
3.2 Efficiency of public expenditure
3.2.1 Education spending 
Estimated input and output efficiency (e.g. Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2006a, Sutherland et al., 2006, Performance
     Verhoeven, 2007)
Indicators on the institutional and policy characteristics of educational systems Policy
     (Gonand et al., 2007, OECD WP 543) 
Output-input ratios using the following variables: Performance
PISA scores, reading, mathematics and science (OECD) Performance
School drop-out-rates Performance
Average years of secondary and higher education in schooling Performance
Share of tertiary-educated employment in total employment Performance
Higher education and training index (World Economic Forum) Performance
Public expenditure on primary and secondary education (OECD) Policy
Public expenditure on tertiary education Policy
Total public education expenditure, COFOG classification (Commission services) Policy
Cumulated education expenditure (OECD) Policy
Student-teacher ratio (OECD) Policy
…
3.2.2 Health spending 
Estimated input and output efficiency (from literature see e.g. Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2006b Performance
     and Verhoeven, 2007)
Output-input ratios using the following variables: Performance
Number of health personnel per 1000 inhabitants (OECD) Performance
Number of hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants (OECD) Performance
Life expectancy at birth, at 65 years (Eurostat) Performance
Healthy life years expectancy at birth, at 65 years (Eurostat) Performance
Potential years of life lost (OECD) Performance
Total public health expenditure, COFOG classification (Commission services) Policy
Total public health expenditure (ESSPROS) Policy
Composition of health expenditure (e.g. share of general government, social Policy
     securities, out-of-pockets etc.)
…
3.2.3 Public infrastructure spending 
…
3.2.4 R&D spending 
…
3.2.5 Other areas of public spending
…
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individually (thus, a large number of indicators 
be used) or can the information be bundled and if 
yes, how best to do so? And third, how can the 
indicators feed into an overall assessment on 
QPF, which also needs to account for 
interlinkages of areas and country-specific 
circumstances? 
Benchmarks help to position countries against 
their peers and facilitate to identify strengths and 
weaknesses in QPF. They are not meant to rank a 
country on its policy choices or performance, but 
they are systematic tool to detect policy 
successes and challenges. Different benchmarks 
may be useful for different countries. Of 
particular interest should be comparisons with 
the EU and EU-15, the highest and lowest 
Table II.1.2:
Indicators and data sources Type of indicator
4. Composition and efficiency of revenue systems
Direct taxation-to-GDP ratio (Commission services) Policy
Indirect taxation-to-GDP ratio (Commission services) Policy
Corporate income tax-to-GDP (Eurostat) Policy
Personal income tax-to-GDP (Eurostat) Policy
Share of direct taxation in total taxation, incl. social securities contributions Policy
     (Commission services)
Marginal tax wedge of an low income earner (OECD) Policy, performance
Marginal tax wedge of an average income earner (OECD) Policy, performance
Average tax wedge of an low income earner (OECD) Policy, performance
Average tax wedge of an average income earner (OECD) Policy, performance
Implicit average tax rate (incl. social security contributions) on employed labour (OECD) Policy, performance
Implicit marginal tax rate (incl. social security contributions) on employed labour (OECD) Policy, performance
Effective average tax rate on capital Policy, performance
Effective marginal tax rate on capital Policy, performance
Tax administration burden, hours per month to prepare tax statements (World Bank) Performance
Tax administration burden, number of payments (World Bank) Performance
…
5. Fiscal governance
Fiscal rules index, strength and coverage (European Commission) Policy, performance
Expenditure rules index, strength and coverage (European Commission) Policy, performance
Medium-term budgetary farmework index (European Commission) Policy, performance
Performance-based budgeting index (European Commission) Policy, performance
Budgetary procedures index (European Commission) Policy, performance
Government effectiveness (World Bank) Performance
…
6. Market efficiency and overall business environment
Index on active labour market policies (European Commission, LIME group) Policy, performance
Index on wage bargaining and wage-setting policies (European Commission, LIME group) Policy, performance
Job availability requirement index (Hasselpflug, 2005) Policy, performance
Unemployment trap (low wage-earner): Marginal effective tax rate Policy, performance
     for an unemployed person
Unemployment trap (average wage-earner): Marginal effective tax rate Policy, performance
     for an unemployed person
Inactivity trap (low wage-earner): Marginal effective tax rate when moving Policy, performance
     from social assistance to work 
Inactivity trap (average wage-earner): Marginal effective tax rate when moving Policy, performance
     from social assistance to work 
Index competition-friendly policy (European Commission, LIME group) Policy, performance
Index on business environment-regulatory barriers to entrepreneurship Policy, performance
     (European Commission, LIME group) 
Index on market integration - openness to trade and investment Policy, performance
     (European Commission, LIME group) 
Product market regulation index (OECD) Policy, performance
Service sector regulation index (OECD) Policy, performance
Doing business indicator (World Bank) Policy, performance
Business freedom index (The Heritage Foundation) Policy, performance
Business envionment quality index (World Economic Forum) Policy, performance
Economic freedom of the world index (The Faser Institute) Policy, performance
Corruption perception index (Transparency International) Policy, performance
…
Examples of potential indicators for assessing the quality of public finances and to construct composite indicators (Part II)
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quartile of countries and comparisons with non-
EU Member States. In Section III these type of 
benchmarks are used when reviewing the various 
QPF dimensions.  
While a large number of indicators may better 
reflect the complexity of the QPF, composite 
indicators would facilitate capturing and 
communicating the main issues. For a thorough 
analysis of the many areas through which public 
finances can support economic growth, a large 
set of indicators is needed as reflected in 
Tables II.1.1 and II.1.2 (1). However, working 
with thirty or more indicators for the specific 
issue of QPF would become impractical for 
deriving and presenting the core messages. For 
that purpose composite indicators, which 
summarise the key information are better-suited. 
For example, one composite indicator for each of 
the six QPF dimensions could ideally be 
constructed. Or, since at least the two dimensions 
'composition and efficiency of expenditure and 
revenue' are very complex a greater number 
could be chosen. Any choice involves a trade-off 
between economic rationale and practicality. 
Another option are statistical methods, such as 
for instance the principal components approach, 
which collapses the information contained in the 
wide range of potential variables into a limited 
number of factors. 
Constructing composite indicators is not without 
problems though. In addition to the obvious 
selection of the underlying variables, the 
weighting scheme is crucial. It should reflect the 
relevance of the individual components (while 
this can be to some extent based on economic 
theory it will also always include a subjective 
element). At the same time a composite indicator 
should be sufficiently robust when applying 
alternative weights and considering outliers. One 
option is to use random weights and show the 
                                                          
(1) This is in line with the approach of the assessment 
framework for the Strategy for Growth and Jobs which 
aims to assess progress on structural reforms for 
fostering growth and employment and has identified a 
narrow list of currently 135 policy and performance 
areas and a wider list of 279 indicators areas to capture 
the many transmission channels. 
indicators standard deviation to reflect the 
uncertainty range (2). 
An overall assessment of Member States QPF 
should not rest on an indicator-based approach 
alone. Given the difficulties to capture the 
complex links between QPF and growth in a few 
numbers, it will be key to cross-check the main 
messages that one can derive from indicators 
with more detailed country-specific information. 
A combination of both pillars would provide for 
a systematic transparent assessment based on a 
strong analytical framework, equal treatment 
across Member States while accounting for 
country-specificities. 
1.2.3. A stylised example 
As a purely illustrative example, which does not 
prejudge further work in this area, composite 
indicators have been constructed for the key five 
QPF dimensions, excluding the indirect 'market 
efficiency and business environment dimension'. 
Since the composite indicators are based on a 
small set of 11 underlying variables, they 
abstract from a number of issues. For example, 
expenditure efficiency is proxied simply by an 
indicator on education expenditure efficiency. 
The index for each dimension ranges from 0 to 2 
with equal weights for each sub-indicator. A 
higher index is associated with QPF providing 
stronger support for economic growth based on 
priors from economic theory and empirical 
findings (as discussed in Section III) (3). The 
benchmark is the unweighted average of the EU-
15 countries. Countries with an indicator that 
outperformed the EU-15 average by one standard 
deviation or more were assigned a 2; countries 
that underperformed the EU-15 average by one 
standard deviation or more were assigned a 0; all 
others were assigned a 1. Data represent in most 
cases the latest three-year average or the latest 
available year. The details on how the five 
 
                                                          
(2) This method has for example been used when 
constructing the Commission services' index on the 
quality of medium-term budgetary frameworks and fiscal 
rules presented in the 2007 issue of the Public finance in 
EMU report. See European Commission (2007a), 
pp. 131-167. 
(3) Since this index is not a metric measure, one should be 
cautious in interpreting differences (e.g. a value of "2" 
versus "1" does not imply a twice as good performance). 
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composite indicators were constructed are 
described in Table II.1.3. 
The composite indicators reveal that in the EU 
the mix of strengths and weaknesses in QPF 
varies strongly. In Graph II.1.1, Member States 
have been placed into three groups (top quartile, 
the two middle quartiles and lower quartile) 
based on their overall average QPF index across 
all five dimensions (1). 
                                                          
(1) In this example, the top quartile of countries include 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Slovenia and Spain, the middle two 
quartiles include Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak 
Republic, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and the 
lower quartile is comprised of Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Italy. 
The top quartile includes more than seven countries, 
since the 7th to 9th best have an identical index. 
Even though each group is a very mixed bag, 
countries in the top quartile are typically those 
with below-average-size governments, low debt 
levels and sustainable and sound public finances. 
The diversity in the top quartile of Member 
States across the other dimensions is greater with 
some countries allocating a rather high share of 
public spending to 'productive' items and using 
public spending relatively efficiently. Several 
others keep the tax wedge rather low and their 
tax administrations work very efficiently. All of 
these public finances characteristics put these 
countries in a promising position as regards 
support for economic growth. However, a 
number of them exhibit weaknesses in fiscal 
governance, which could put the sustainability of 
the current success into question. Thus, from this 
illustrative indicator-based analysis one could 
derive that for several countries in the top 
Table II.1.3:




0 if > 52.0%
1 if between 40.7% and 52.0%
2 if < 40.7%
Commission services
Fiscal position and 
sustainability
Deviation of structural balance from
MTO (2007)
0 if 0.5% lower than MTO
1 if between +/- 0.5% of MTO
2 if at or above MTO
Commission services
Debt-to-GDP ratio (average 2005-
2007)
0 if > 60.0%
1 if between 28.2% and 60.0%
2 if below 28.2%
Commission services
Sustainability indicator S2 (2007)
0 = high risk
1 = medium risk
2 = low risk
Commission services
Composition and efficiency of 
expenditure
Share of "productive" (education, 
R&D and public transportation) 
spending in total primary spending 
(2006)
0 if below 12.5%
1 if between 12.5% and 18.4%
2 if above 18.4%
Commission services, Eurostat (GERD) 
and OECD
Education spending efficiency
0 if in lowest quartile
1 if in middle two quartiles
2 if in upper quartile
Based on several education efficiency 
studies that correct scores for 
environmental factors (Afonso and St. 
Aubyn, 2006a, Sutherland et al. 2007 and 
Verhoeven et al., 2007; see Table III.3.4)
Structure and efficiency of 
revenue systems 
Marginal tax wedge of an average 
income earner (2006)
0 if above 61.7%
1 if between 43.7% and 61.7%
2 if below 43.7%
OECD
Share of direct taxation in total 
taxation (incl. social securities 
contributions)
0 if above 69.3%
1 if between 62.2% and 69.3%
2 if below 62.2%
Commission services
Tax administration burden (hours per 
month to prepare tax statements)
0 if above 23.6
1 if between 8.1 and 23.6
2 if below 8.1
World Bank
Fiscal governance Fiscal rules index
0 if below 0.06
1 if between 0.06 and 1.63
2 if above 1.63
Commission services
Medium-term budgetary framework 
index
0 if below 0.85
1 if between 0.85 and 1.67
2 if above 1.67
Commission services
A stylised example: elements of quality of public finance composite indicators
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quartile further strengthening of fiscal 
frameworks should be a policy priority (1). 
The lower quartile of countries are those with 
significant room for improvement in QPF to 
address future challenges. Again the variation 
across countries is large, but many of them 
exhibit a problematic combination of high debt 
and high sustainability risks, large tax burdens, 
especially on labour, inefficient tax 
administrations and rather low efficiency of 
public spending. Of particular concern is also the 
deterioration in this respect in some countries (2). 
In general, this country group is faced with the 
challenge to improve the QPF on a number of 
fronts. In cases where it may be difficult to 
garner political support for such a wide reform 
agenda, a promising avenue could again be to 
strengthen fiscal governance, including through 
expenditure rules and a more medium-term 
orientation of fiscal policy, even if the fiscal 
frameworks of this country group are close to the 
EU average (although there are large differences 
within the group). It should also be noted that 
advances in one policy area, such as pension 
reforms or higher spending efficiency, could 
bring rewards also in other areas, such as a better 
budgetary positions and lower tax burdens. 
                                                          
(1) Obviously, when looking at countries individually the 
assessment and recommendation would be more 
nuanced. 
(2) While this is not reflected Graph II.1.1 it follows from 
analysing the country specific data over time. 
1.2.4. Summing up 
Fiscal surveillance should be upgraded to 
systematically account for the quality of public 
finances (QPF). The multi-dimensional 
conceptual framework presented in Section III 
would provide an analytical and structured 
setting to address this challenge. It is based on 
findings from the literature on the key links 
between the various dimensions of QPF and 
growth, but it also highlights that more analytical 
work is needed to better understand the 
transmission channels and their interlinkages.  
Despite these gaps, one could advance by 
drawing on the conventional wisdom to identify 
a broad set of indicators with which Member 
States' strengths and weaknesses of QPF could 
be reviewed. While the indicator-based approach 
would help ensure a well-structured, transparent 
and equal review across Member States, it would 
need to be accompanied by country-specific 
information to overcome the indicator 
shortcomings. 
1.3. REPORTING ON QUALITY OF PUBLIC 
FINANCES IN STABILITY AND 
CONVERGENCE PROGRAMMES: 
TAKING STOCK AND LOOKING 
FORWARD 
The annual updates of the stability and 
convergence programmes (SCPs), where 
Member States lay down their medium-term 
Graph II.1.1: A stylised example: reviewing the QPF in EU Member States with simple composite indicators  



















































Notes: Composite indicators are based on variables described in Table II.1.2 with equal weights for each sub-indicator. A higher index is associated with a stronger support 
for economic growth. The benchmark is the unweighted average of the EU-15 countries. Countries with an indicator that outperforms the EU-15 average by one standard 
deviation or more were assigned a 2; countries that underperform the EU-15 average by one standard deviation or more were assigned a 0; all others were assigned a 1. 
Data gaps for a few countries (on fiscal governance and education spending efficiency) were filled with averages of comparable country groups. 
The countries have been grouped by quartiles based on the average overall index. 
Source: Commission service calculations.  
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fiscal plans, are a cornerstone of the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework. They form the basis of 
the assessment of national fiscal policies by EU 
peers in the Council. On top of presenting the 
projected path of a range of key economic and 
public finance variables, SCPs are also expected 
to include information on a number of elements 
which, in line with the conceptual framework 
discussed in Part III of this report, fall in the area 
of quality of public finances (QPF); e.g. 
information on tax reforms, value for money 
initiatives and changes in national fiscal 
governance. Traditionally and unsurprisingly, the 
main focus of SCPs has been on the key public 
finance variables related to the numerical 
thresholds of the Pact. The coverage of other 
aspects of public finances has been less detailed 
and varied greatly across countries. 
Based on the last two vintages of SCPs - 2006/07 
and 2007/08 - this section provides an overview 
of the current reporting on the QPF. The main 
aim of the exercise is to take stock of the type 
and amount of information provided by EU 
Member States and to assess whether there is 
scope for improving the reporting.  
1.3.1. The guidelines for reporting 
The revised Code of Conduct lays out detailed 
specifications about the format and content of the 
SCPs (1). As regards the QPF, the guidelines cut 
across a number of areas reflecting the large 
extension of the topic. In terms of the model 
structure of the programmes included in the 
Code of Conduct there are at least two chapters 
where QPF plays a prominent role: Chapter 5 
dealing with Quality of public finance and 
Chapter 7 on Institutional features of public 
finances. Chapter 5 should present the main 
budgetary measures with a breakdown into 
expenditures and revenues, while Chapter 7 is 
expected to report on changes in the national 
fiscal governance.  
The revised Code of Conduct also prescribes a 
broad range of quantitative information to be 
                                                          
(1) The revised Code of Conduct (Specifications on the 
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and 
Guidelines on the format and content of stability and 
convergence programmes) was endorsed by the ECOFIN 
Council on 11 October 2005. 
presented in standard tables. The tables most 
relevant for the QPF are General government 
budgetary prospects (Table 2) and General 
government expenditure by function (Table 3 – 
COFOG data). 
To substantiate the model structure and the 
standard tables, the Code of Conduct includes a 
broader set of indications on the content, some of 
which are again tightly linked to the QPF. From 
the relevant section of the Code of Conduct, the 
following points indicate what to cover in the 
programmes: 
• Budgetary and other economic policy 
measures being taken and, in case of the main 
budgetary measures, their quantitative effects 
on the general government balance. 
Budgetary targets should be backed by an 
indication of the broad measures necessary to 
achieve them. The further out the year of the 
programme, the less detailed the information 
is expected to be provided. 
• Measures aimed at improving the QPF on 
both the revenue and expenditure side (e.g. 
tax reform, value-for-money initiatives, 
measures to improve tax collection efficiency 
and expenditure control).  
• All budgetary measures having significant 
‘one-off’ effects. 
• Structural reforms (with special attention to 
pension reform), especially when they are 
envisaged to contribute to achieving the 
objectives of the programme. Comprehensive 
information on the budgetary and economic 
effects should be communicated, including a 
detailed quantitative cost-benefit analysis of 
the short-term costs – if any – and of the 
long-term benefits of the structural reforms 
from the budgetary point of view. 
• Information on the implementation of 
existing national budgetary rules as well as 
on other institutional features of public 
finances, in particular budgetary procedures 
and public finance statistical governance. 
The first four points would fit under the heading 
of Chapter 5 Quality of public finance, while the 
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last point should be covered in Chapter 7 
Institutional features of public finances of the 
SCPs.  
1.3.2. Findings  
Examining the 2007/08 vintage of the SCPs on 
how and what type of information is reported on 
QPF uncovers large differences across the EU 
Member States and a number of discrepancies 
vis-à-vis the indications of the Code of Conduct. 
In particular, few Member States follow the 
model structure laid out in the Code of Conduct 
and compliance with the guidelines on the 
content is rather low. The 'compliance scores' 
that have been calculated in that respect and 
which are summarised below and in Table II.1.4 
are based on the assessment of the 2007/08 
SCPs. Moreover, to highlight some of the key 
recent developments it has also been compared 
with the previous SCPs vintage. 
The structure of the reporting 
On average, EU Member States score close to 
60% on the model structure (1). The chapter on 
‘Quality of public finances’ (Chapter 5) is 
included in most programmes (23 of 26 
countries), while a version of ‘Institutional 
features of public finances’ (Chapter 7) appears 
only in around two thirds of the programmes. 
However, in both chapters the breakdown into 
the sections foreseen in the Code of Conduct is 
often overlooked (across all the SCPs of the 
Member States only 45% of the required sections 
are included).  
When it comes to the standard tables listed in 
Annex 2 of the Code of Conduct, all programmes 
include Table 2 General government budgetary 
prospects, even though a few countries have 
made some slight changes to the set up. On the 
other hand, Table 3 General government 
expenditure by function is presented only by 15 
Member States and six of these tables do not 
cover the required time period (2). Nevertheless, 
                                                          
(1) If a country includes all the requirements from the Code 
of Conduct, it would score 100%. Similarly, if none of 
the recommendations was followed the score would be 
0%. The score of all EU Member States is an unweighted 
average of all the country scores. 
(2) Note that provision of COFOG data is not compulsory. 
more countries included Table 3 General 
government expenditure by function in the 
2007/08 vintage than the year before. 
The cross-country variation in the reporting 
structure in the 2007/08 SCPs is huge; some 
Member States follow the proposed structure to 
the letter while others totally disregard it. Among 
the latter category are mostly 'old' Member 
States, which give preference to a format that is 
rooted in national standards. Recently Acceded 
Member States, which have been reporting for 
fewer years, tend to stick to the structure 
prescribed in the Code of Conduct to a much 
larger degree (a total score of 75% vs. 47% for 
the EU15).  
Another noteworthy result is that small countries 
tend to follow the structure laid out in the Code 
of Conduct more closely, scoring somewhat 
better than the five biggest Member States (64% 
vs. 43%) (3). 
The content of the reporting 
Assessing the actual content of the SCPs is 
difficult since countries follow very different 
approaches. Using the guidance of the Code of 
Conduct and the best practices (4) as the starting 
point, the average score of the Member States on 
the content side is only slightly above 30% 
(Table II.1.4).  
Recently acceded Member States score slightly 
better than 'old' Member States on the content 
side as well, although the difference is not large. 
The same applies to the five biggest Member 
States, which on the content outperform the 
smaller Member States somewhat. 
                                                          
(3) The five biggest countries both in terms of population 
and GDP are Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy 
and Spain. 
(4) As the Code of Conduct is not very specific on what 
should be included under the heading of QPF, the 
requirements from the Code of Conduct are 
supplemented with other important aspects of QPF that 
some of the Member States have included. 
Part II 
Evolving budgetary surveillance 
 
83 
Most programmes present to a certain degree a 
description of the policy measures that have been 
taken, with an overview, usually a table, of the 
overall projected expenditure and revenue 
changes for the first year and sometimes for the 
two following ones. As regards the quantitative 
effects on the general government balance of 
main budgetary measures, which are presented 
either as a percentage of GDP or in absolute 
terms, these are included in 22 of 26 
programmes. In general there is a stronger 
attention on the budgetary implications of the 
measures on the expenditure than on the revenue 
side, with some notable exceptions (1). 
                                                          
(1) Especially the Baltic States do distinguish themselves by 
covering the revenue side more extensively than other 
Member States.  
Nevertheless, the budgetary effects of the 
individual measures often refer only to the first 
year of the programme, without going deeply 
into the medium-term prospects. Only 11 of the 
22 programmes previously mentioned include an 
assessment of the projected budgetary effects up 
to 2010. 
Another aspect examined is the attention to the 
total direct budgetary effect. In fact, the sum of 
the direct budgetary effects of the individual 
measures should add up to the difference 
between the trend revenue and trend expenditure 
and the targeted ones. But only six of the 
programmes include all effects of the main 
measures, neatly presented in a table. Countries 
like Italy, Austria and United Kingdom would 
fulfil the role of best practices in this area.  
Table II.1.4:
Structure of the reporting No. of incidents % of incidents
  Chapter 5 (as stand-alone chapter) 23 of 26 88.5
  Information as required in Chapter 5 but presented in different format 50 of 78 64.1
  Chapter 7 (as stand-alone chapter) 18 of 26 69.2
  Information as required in Chapter 7 but presented in different format 20 of 78 25.6
  Table 2 included (with required time period) 52 of 52 100
  Table 3 included (with required time period) 24 of 52 46.2
  Total score for the structure 187 59.9
Content of the reporting No. of incidents % of incidents
  Quantitative effects of main budgetary measures
 - first year 22 of 26 84.6
 - medium term 11 of 26 42.3
 - all budgetary measures 6 of 26 23.1
  Measures aimed at improving QPF 12 of 26 46.2
 - tax reforms (budgetary effects) 8 of 26 30.8
  Analysis of one-off budgetary measures 4 of 26 15.4
  Structural reforms (in Chapter 5) 9 of 26 34.6
 - pension reforms 8 of 26 30.8
  Growth-enhancing budgetary measures 5 of 26 19.2
  Multi-annual budget for the gov. sector 5 of 26 19.2
  Fiscal rules 11 of 26 42.3
  Performance budgeting 7 of 26 26.9
  Tax collection efficiency 5 of 26 19.2
  Total score for the content 113 33.4
Source: EU Member States' stability and convergence programmes of 2007/08.
Notes:  This table summarises to what extent Member States fulfill the requirements to report on quality of public finances spelled out in 
the Code of Conduct. The table lists for each criterion how many countries provide the required information. In some instances, several 
criteria have been summarised. Therefore, the total is a multiple of the number of Member States in those cases. The total scores for the 
structure and content of reporting on quality of public finances are the unweighted sums of the criteria assessment. Belgium had not 
submitted its stability programme for 2007/08 at the time this report was written and is therefore not included. 
Included in the SCPs
Reporting on quality of public finances in the stability and convergence programmes
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Still, none of the SCPs include a detailed no-
policy-change scenario as discussed in Section 
II.2.4; it is only given implicitly in some SCPs as 
the difference between the budget measures and 
the target scenario.  
Concerning the measures aimed at improving the 
QPF, on both the revenue and expenditure sides, 
the SCPs usually provide some information. In 
particular, tax reforms, measures to improve tax 
collection and expenditure control are widely 
presented in many of the programmes. 
Nonetheless, the information provided deals 
mainly with the qualitative aspects of the 
reforms, without going into much detail on their 
costs and future benefits.   
For what concerns the one-off measures, only 
four programmes present a detailed analysis of 
their budgetary implications. Good benchmarks 
would be the programmes of Estonia and 
Denmark, which make the presentation of these 
measures clearer by using tables.  
Regarding the fourth point that should be 
covered in Chapter 5, notably major structural 
reforms, many of the countries that are 
implementing these types of reforms include a 
detailed presentation in their programmes. 
However, the budgetary implications and an 
analysis of the costs and the benefits of these 
reforms are not always included.  
Around one third of the programmes contain 
information on the progression of pension 
reforms. The SCPs usually present a general 
evaluation of the long-term benefits, but do not 
go into much detail on the short-term costs of 
introducing a new pension system. In some cases 
figures for the receipt of newly introduced 
second pillar pension schemes are also presented. 
Some countries are currently implementing tax 
reforms, usually towards flat rate systems for 
corporate sector or lower labour taxation to 
enhance employment. Most of them present the 
budgetary effects, also for the medium term. The 
programme of Lithuania devotes particular 
attention to the issue of how to find resources to 
finance the tax reform during the first years of 
implementation, which is an aspect highlighted 
in the Code of Conduct.  
In general, those countries that include Chapter 7 
Institutional features of public finances give a 
description of the institutional reforms to be 
implemented and the institutions to achieve 
certain policy goals, dealing in particular with 
the problem of the independence of statistical 
institutions.  
Eleven Member States present information on 
their fiscal rules, although not always within the 
context of Chapter 7. The Member States (EU25) 
have earlier filled out the questionnaires on fiscal 
rules and institutions sent out by the Commission 
services, so the information should be easily 
accessible by other means. 
A handful of countries mention the introduction 
of multi-annual budgets for the government 
sector. Around the same number of countries 
(20-25%) disclose their efforts on the areas of 
performance budgeting and tax collection 
efficiency.  
When Chapter 7 is included in the SCPs, it 
mostly consists of 1-3 pages. Both in the 2006/07 
and the 2007/08 vintage of the SCPs, the stability 
programme of Ireland has the most 
comprehensive chapter regarding institutional 
features (although the structure do not follow the 
recommendations of the Code of Conduct). 
One last aspect examined is the attention that 
programmes give to growth-enhancing budgetary 
measures. This issue is of particular importance 
in relation to the priorities of the Lisbon strategy 
and the link between SCPs and NRPs. In general, 
when this issue is taken into consideration, it is 
usually included in Chapter 5 of the programmes.  
The comparison shows that most Member States 
usually consider as priorities growth-enhancing 
policy measures. Generally, the focus in the 
programmes is on measures on the expenditure 
side (e.g. a frequent measure is moving 
expenditures towards more productive 
allocations through a reduction and a 
rationalisation of current expenditures). But a 
detailed analysis of the expected growth 
contribution from each measure is quite rare.  
As regards the budgetary implications of this 
type of measures, although most programmes do 
not provide detailed quantitative information, 
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they are usually included within the total 
projected expenditures under the heading 
‘growth-enhancing measures’. 
A good benchmark for the presentation of 
growth-enhancing measures would be the 
programmes of Malta or Slovenia. 
1.3.3. Main conclusions and suggestions 
The information provided under the heading 
‘Quality of public finances’ presents a high 
degree of heterogeneity inter alia because the 
concept has not been clearly and 
comprehensively defined yet. Usually there is a 
detailed description of the policy measures to be 
implemented during the first year of the 
programme period, but the expected budgetary 
effects are not presented for all individual 
measures and, in some cases, not even for the 
main ones. As regards the medium-term 
implications, most programmes tend to present 
only the global projections of revenues and 
expenditures for the medium term, without going 
into much detail on the budgetary effects of 
individual measures.  
The functional classification of expenditure 
(COFOG – Table 3) is fully included only in a 
one third of the programmes, while it would 
serve as a useful instrument for the overview of 
the allocation of resources over the programme’s 
horizon and of the policy priorities that have 
been targeted. The tables to be included in the 
SCPs might be relevant for several chapters; a 
good approach would be to include the tables in 
an appendix as well as in the text for more easy 
access. 
In order to have a user-friendly reporting on and 
effective assessment of QPF and the possibility 
to quickly compare the information provided by 
the Member States, the countries should stick 
more closely to the model structure as well as the 
elements of content indicated in the Code of 
Conduct. However, the Code of Conduct in its 
present form might not be a sufficient guidance 
for this purpose. Therefore, the conclusions from 
this assessment would be twofold: 
• The Code of Conduct could provide further 
details on the model structure of the 
programme, but, above all, be more specific 
on what should be included in Chapter 5 
Quality of public finances, particularly 
regarding the budgetary implications of 
structural reforms. It should also clarify what 
should be presented in Chapter 7 Institutional 
features of public finances. 
• A better compliance by the Member States 
with the provisions of the Code of Conduct 
would greatly facilitate and improve the 
comparability and the assessment of 
information. The recourse to best practice on 
the basis of the annual update could help 
establish a more systematic reporting across 
Member States. 
1.4. GAUGING PRODUCTIVITY IN THE 
GOVERNMENT SECTOR: CURRENT 
PRACTICE AND SCOPE FOR 
IMPROVEMENT 
In defining the original Lisbon Strategy, with its 
central objective of making the European Union 
the most competitive economy in the world by 
2010, the European Council of March 2000 made 
productivity the focal point of the economic 
policies of its Member States. The dual aims of 
competitiveness and productivity concerned the 
economy as a whole, that is, public services as 
well as the business sector. Measuring the 
productivity of public services, however, 
requires appropriate tools, and this is not without 
certain practical and theoretical difficulties. 
One important idiosyncrasy of the government 
sector compared to other areas of the economy is 
the absence of market mechanisms. Services and 
goods produced by different levels of 
government are generally not priced following 
the interplay of demand and supply. The 
allocation is regulated through mechanisms that 
make a valuation of its output more difficult or 
require different methods as compared to non-
government sectors. 
This section takes a closer look at how the output 
and productivity of the government sector is 
currently measured in the framework of the 
system of national accounts, i.e. the statistics for 
the measurement of aggregate economic activity. 
The objective is to explain the main principles 
underlying current figures, to identify the main 
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difficulties and to sketch out future 
developments.  
Clearly, better measurement is not an aim in 
itself. It is expected to be conducive to a better 
assessment of government activity and in turn 
form a better basis for economic policy 
decisions, especially when it comes to the 
allocation of government resources and the 
assessment of the quality of public finances. 
1.4.1. What would we like to measure? A 
brief refresher of business sector 
productivity 
In order to better understand the difficulties with 
the measurement of productivity in the 
government sector it is worthwhile to first review 
the standard concepts and methods applied in 
non-government sectors. 
Before embarking on an explanation of the 
difficulties involved in measuring the 
productivity of public services, it might be useful 
to consider how productivity is measured in the 
business sector. Productivity is a measure of the 
efficiency of production, and in general terms it 
is calculated as the ratio of the volume of 
production (or added value) to the volume of a 
factor of production (like labour or capital) used 
during the production process. It is also possible 
to calculate a multifactor productivity as the ratio 
of production volume to an index representing 
the combined volume of all production factors. 
For the sake of simplicity we shall be referring 
only to the productivity of labour, which is the 
factor most commonly used to measure 
productivity. 
If an economy produced only a single product, 
for example wheat, measuring productivity 
would be a relatively simple matter: all one 
would have to do would be to divide the quantity 
of wheat produced by the number of hours of 
labour needed to produce it. Unfortunately for 
the national accountant, however, a real economy 
encompasses thousands of different products; 
this means that production cannot be calculated 
directly on the basis of quantities, since 
aggregating quantities of dissimilar products is 
meaningless. National accountants resolve this 
initial difficulty by introducing the notion of 
volume. The idea is simple: in a market economy 
the problem of aggregation is resolved by 
assigning prices to the products to make them 
comparable, so that global production can be 
expressed by its monetary value. This value 
changes over time under the combined influence 
of variations in both the quantities produced and 
their prices. One simple method for preserving 
the advantage of monetary valuation while 
eliminating the effect of price variance, so as to 
retain only the effect of changes in quantities, is 
to calculate the value of production by freezing 
prices. National accountants thus expanded the 
notion of quantity by introducing that of 
production volume, which they define as 
production at constant prices. In practical terms, 
while it is not feasible – given the vast number of 
products involved – to measure all prices and 
quantities, as a strict application of the method 
would require, it is nonetheless generally 
possible to calculate the value of global 
production at current prices from the aggregate 
of company turnover. In practice, then, volume is 
commonly calculated by dividing the value of 
production at current prices by a price index, 
which is obtained by grouping products into 
categories as homogenous as possible and 
calculating price changes for each category on 
the basis of a limited sample of items. This 
method presupposes that prices within each 
group will move in a broadly similar fashion, so 
that there would be no advantage, in terms of 
additional accuracy, in monitoring each product 
separately. 
The same measurement difficulties exist with 
regard to labour, since it is not a uniform 
quantity but has qualifying factors, e.g. training 
and experience, that have to be taken into 
account. The methods used to calculate the 
volume of hours worked are similar to those 
described for calculating production volume. 
1.4.2. Why is it so difficult to measure 
productivity in the government sector? 
Public services differ from other products in that 
they are made available to the user either free of 
charge or at a price that bears no relation to the 
cost of production and is thus meaningless. This 
being the case, either it is simply not possible to 
attach a price to public services, or the price does 
not reflect the conditions of supply and demand. 
The method described above for calculating 
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production volume thus cannot be applied 
directly, since it presupposes the existence of 
meaningful prices.  
An alternative to the business sector method of 
calculating production volume by weighting 
quantity by price might be to use a different 
weighting factor. Here, however, another and 
even more fundamental difficulty arises: that of 
defining units of quantity for public services. 
How, for example, can one fix quantity indices 
for national defence services? The number of 
men under arms might be one possibility, but the 
importance of military equipment makes this 
fairly meaningless as an index.  
National accountants thus had to look for other 
solutions. The conventional method has been to 
define the production value of non-market 
services, which have no real price, by the sum of 
their costs. There is certain logic to this. Just as 
the price of a commercial product represents the 
amount that the consumer is willing to pay in 
order to acquire it, so the cost of public services, 
which are addressed to users rather than 
consumers in the true sense, represents the 
financial commitment that the public is prepared 
to make in order to secure them, for the citizens 
collectively (via their representatives) determine 
the budget allocated to these services. In other 
words, the citizens play the same role in the non-
market economy as consumers in the market 
economy. In these terms, when quantities can be 
defined, the notion of unit cost equates, in public 
services, to that of price in the business sector. 
This ought to mean that, as long as it is possible 
to measure quantities, it is possible to determine 
prices for public services and thus to apply the 
constant price method for calculating production 
volume.  
Since, however, it is not possible to assign 
quantities to all public services, national 
accountants had to seek some other way to 
calculate production volume. Applying the 
system used in the business sector, where 
production volume is calculated by dividing the 
value of production by a price index, price 
indices can be assigned to public services, where 
production is the sum of costs (intermediate 
consumption, compensation of employees, 
consumption of fixed capital, other taxes – less 
subsidies – on production). The initial idea was 
thus to calculate the production volume of non-
market services by dividing each element of 
production cost by a corresponding price index. 
This is known as the input method, and for years 
it has been the only system used by national 
accountants.  
The input method does, however, have one major 
drawback, in that it does not reflect changes in 
productivity, especially when productivity is 
measured on the basis of added value rather than 
production. In public services, added value 
consists almost entirely of payroll costs, which 
means that changes in added value more or less 
parallel changes in pay levels; this is true both 
for constant prices and for current prices. This 
means that while adoption of the input method 
made it possible to calculate production volume 
for public services, it was useless for measuring 
productivity. Furthermore, by assuming zero 
productivity gain for public services, it also tends 
to underestimate the productivity gains for the 
national economy as a whole. 
1.4.3. The introduction of 'output methods' 
The impossibility of measuring productivity 
using the input method generated increasing 
pressure for the adoption of new methods. Since 
the use of the input method was explained by the 
lack of quantity indices for public services, the 
initial focus was on looking for areas in which it 
would be possible to define units of quantity for 
these services. A distinction was thus made 
between two types of public services: collective 
services and individual services. Collective 
services, which include for example defence, 
police and justice services, are those supplied 
simultaneously to all members of the community 
or one of its sub-groups. Their primary 
characteristic is that the quantity available to the 
collectivity is not reduced by the amount 
supplied to an individual. Individual services, on 
the other hand, are those intended to satisfy the 
needs of members of individual households, and 
once acquired are no longer available to others. 
For collective services it was decided to 
continue, at least initially, to apply the input 
method, since defining quantity indices for these 
services would raise too many problems. One of 
the principal difficulties, cited in the UN’s 
Handbook of National Accounting (SEC 1993), 
lies in the preventive character of collective 
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national services (the aim of the police is to 
prevent crime, that of the army to prevent war), 
which makes it difficult to assign quantities to 
them.  
With regard to individual services, the UN’s 
System of National Accounting (SNA 1993) 
recommends defining quantity units for 
education and health services, noting that “there 
is no mystique about non-market health or 
education services which make changes in their 
volume more difficult to measure than volume 
changes for other types of output”. The European 
Union follows these recommendations and 
prohibits the use of the input method for non-
market health and education services. Eurostat’s 
2001 handbook on price and volume measures in 
national accounts specified the quantity indices 
to be used: in education services, for example, 
the number of pupil hours was adopted as a 
quantity index for primary and secondary 
education. Once quantity units had been defined 
for these services, it became possible to calculate 
their production volume by weighting, in each 
case, the quantities produced by their costs.  
1.4.4. The issue of quality 
Application of the output method did, however, 
cause problems in some countries. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, increases in national 
health spending were not accompanied by an 
increase in production volume as measured by 
the output method, which translated into a 
decline in the productivity of the public health 
service. The question was therefore raised as to 
whether this apparent deterioration was in fact 
real or whether it was the result of the 
inadequacy of the measuring instrument. In the 
field of hospital care, for example, the quantity 
index used by Eurostat is the number of 
treatments provided. If the unit cost of treatments 
increases, this is not necessarily because the 
public health service has become less efficient; it 
may simply be that a greater number of costly 
treatments were dispensed. If these costly 
treatments were also more effective, that is, of 
better quality, the increase in average treatment 
cost is not necessarily a sign of a decrease in the 
productivity of the health service. This is where 
the problem of quality comes in: it is not enough 
to define quantity indices for public services; the 
quality of these services must also be taken into 
account if changes in productivity are to be 
calculated accurately. The problem was, then, to 
find a way of measuring output that took quality 
into account; and the British Government 
commissioned Sir Tony Atkinson to resolve this 
problem.  
The notion of quality was in fact already present 
in national accounting. It was linked to the need 
to define the homogenous product categories 
required to utilise the concepts of price and 
volume. Quality as defined in the official UN 
(SNA 1993) and Eurostat (SEC 1995) handbooks 
is directly associated with the notion of 
homogeneity, a category of products being 
homogenous if constituted by units of the same 
quality. In these terms, taking account of quality 
in calculating volume means defining classes of 
products narrow enough that all the products in 
any given class can be considered as 
homogenous from the point of view of their 
physical characteristics, place of delivery, time 
of delivery, and conditions of sale. Quality in this 
sense implies no value judgement, no ranking; at 
most, using prices as weights in calculating 
volume amounts to considering an expensive 
product as of better quality than a cheap one. In 
the case of public services, this approach consists 
in grouping services in categories narrow enough 
to be considered homogenous and using basic 
costs as weights.  
This approach was rejected by Atkinson, largely 
because defining narrow categories means 
multiplying their number, which rapidly leads to 
practical difficulties in collecting quantity data 
and estimating unit costs.  
1.4.5. The notion of outcomes 
In essence, Atkinson returned to the basic aim of 
measuring productivity: measuring productivity 
means measuring the efficiency of production. In 
considering public services Atkinson reversed 
the proposition: since there is no satisfactory way 
of directly measuring their productivity, let us 
measure their efficiency and deduce their 
productivity from the result. The advantage of 
this approach was that use could be made of the 
numerous studies on the efficiency of the public 
services. To measure their efficiency, Atkinson 
proposed to use the notion of outcome. For 
example, the aim of the education services is to 
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improve the population’s level of education, and 
that of the health services to increase life 
expectancy and improve health. But levels of 
education and life expectancy depend on 
numerous factors, and not solely on the action of 
the public services. And so Atkinson defined 
outcome as the variation in the level of education 
or life expectancy that could be explained by the 
action of the public services alone. If it is 
possible to define representative quantitative 
indices for, e.g., the level of education of the 
population, it is also possible, using econometric 
methods, to measure the impact of the public 
services on these indices and hence to deduce an 
evolution in their production volume. Following 
the publication of the Atkinson Report, 
numerous efforts were made by individual 
European countries and by the OECD to 
implement its recommendations. Eurostat 
followed this lead and defined three types of 
price and volume measures, distinguishing 
between A methods, considered as the most 
appropriate, B methods, regarded as still 
acceptable; and C methods, which are not 
acceptable. In the case of non-commercial health 
and education services, the methods based on 
Atkinson’s recommendations were classed as A 
methods, simple output methods were classed as 
B methods, and input methods as C methods, that 
is, not acceptable. 
1.4.6. The implementing new methods in the 
EU Member States 
With a few exceptions, Eurostat gave the older 
Member States until the end of 2006 to eliminate 
non-acceptable methods (C methods), in 
particular input methods in the fields of health 
and education. To monitor and support the 
application of this regulation, Eurostat:  
• Asked the Member States to list the methods 
they used to measure prices and volumes. 
• Checked these lists and reported to the 
countries on the conformity of their methods 
with the new rules. 
• Sent the Member States a list of questions (in 
2006) to monitor the extent of compliance 
with the regulation.  
• Conducted information missions in 7 
countries (Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, 
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, United 
Kingdom) to determine the best methods. 
• Held a workshop on measuring quality in 
public services in November 2007, to try to 
harmonise the methods used across Europe. 
• Organised a workshop on measuring prices 
and volumes in public services in March 
2008 as a preliminary to drafting the new 
European accounting system handbook. 
By 2006 it had become obvious that the use of A 
methods was still the exception in the field of 
non-commercial health and education services 
and that some Member States were even having 
difficulties in eliminating their C methods (input 
methods), especially in the health sector. 
The information missions and the workshop on 
measuring quality in public services revealed that 
national accountants in many countries opposed 
the introduction of outcome-based methods for 
measuring production volume, for reasons both 
practical and theoretical. 
First of all, there can be no denying that outcome 
methods diverge substantially from the methods 
used in the field of commercial goods and 
services. Outcome methods suppose that that the 
public institutions have definite objectives and 
seek to measure the extent to which these 
objectives are reached. In the business sector, 
national accounting never tries to determine the 
objectives of the various economic agents, but 
simply measures prices and volumes that are 
objectively observable by the statisticians. The 
need to specify the objectives pursued by the 
public services is weakest point of the outcome 
method. What, for example, is the objective of 
the health service? To prolong life? To fight 
disease? It is clearly difficult, if not impossible, 
to define a single objective; and once one accepts 
multiple objectives the problem arises, for the 
national accountant, of how to weight them. 
Should, for example, one year of good health 
count for more than two years of ill health? Who 
can legitimately answer this question? The 
experience of the European countries involved 
has shown that it is practically impossible to 
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reach a consensus on the question of objectives. 
More than that, even when it was possible to 
agree on an objective it was still very difficult to 
define a numerical indicator to measure it. 
Finally, outcome methods place a burden of 
responsibility on national accountants, because 
their estimates can influence important decisions 
even though the data on which they are based are 
extremely flimsy.  
Nor are outcome methods the only ones that 
cause problems. Indeed, the chief accountants of 
several Member States have proposed a return to 
input methods. One problem with the simple 
output method, besides the fact that it does not 
always allow quality to be properly taken into 
account, is that of comparability on the European 
level, since its results depend largely on the level 
of aggregation of the sets of goods and services 
to which it is applied. This point was a particular 
focus of attention at the November 12-13 2007 
workshop on measuring quality in non-
commercial services, which found that output 
methods tend to converge with the input method 
when they are applied to increasingly narrow 
categories (see box).  
There are two obvious conclusions to be drawn 
from this finding. The first is that applying the 
output method at a detailed level, although this is 
in perfect compliance with European legislation, 
precludes any possibility of tracing meaningful 
changes in the productivity of public services. 
The second is that, a contrario, the only way to 
trace changes in productivity using an output 
method is to use it at a sufficiently aggregated 
level. But there are two problems with this, the 
first having to do with the choice of aggregation 
criteria. Defining aggregation criteria means 
defining homogenous classes, that is, classes 
within which all basic services are equivalent. 
Taking the education system as an example, if 
we divide education into three categories, 
primary, secondary and tertiary, then considering 
primary education as a homogenous category 
means considering all primary schools as 
equivalent, whatever their costs, which means 
that all those with higher unit costs, such as the 
special schools for handicapped children, must 
be judged less productive than the others. But the 
national accountant has no objective means of 
deciding whether the additional resources 
allocated to the education of handicapped 
children are legitimate or not and thus whether it 
is acceptable to work on the basis of such a broad 
aggregate as primary education. The second 
difficulty concerns outcomes. The output method 
applied at an aggregated level does not show an 
increase in productivity when the government 
decides to allocate additional resources to public 
services to improve their quality: on the contrary, 
it mechanically traces a downturn.  
1.4.7. Future developments 
These considerations were debated at the 
workshop on measuring prices and volumes 
organised by Eurostat on 13-14 March 2008 to 
decide which methods should be retained in the 
revised European accounting system handbook. 
The recommendation of the representatives of 
the Member States was to include, on an optional 
basis, output methods based on outcome in the 
satellite accounts.  
In the fields of health and education, output 
methods applied in sufficient detail are becoming 
the norm. In the health field, with its 
characteristically marked diversity and volatility, 
input methods are also accepted when output 
methods do not give satisfactory results. These 
decisions are entirely in line with the 
recommendations in the revised UN national 
accounting handbook, which stands as the 
reference for European accounting standards. Of 
course, insofar as the methods recommended 
converge with input methods with regard to 
outcome, they cannot trace meaningful changes 
in the productivity of the public services. But 
national accountants thought it was preferable to 
stick with tried and true methods based on sound 
estimates at the expense of concealing 
meaningful changes in productivity rather than 
adopt methods based on controversial 
conventions and shaky statistical foundations. In 
their view it is essential to avoid the risk of 
suggesting changes in productivity whose 
meaning is unclear, which could lead policy-
makers and decision-takers astray. 
The fact that outcome methods have been 
excluded from the heart of national accounting 
does not, however, mean that they have been 
entirely abandoned. On the contrary, the search 
for public service performance indicators can 
continue, since accepting their use in the satellite 
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accounts equates to removing the principal 
constraint on their development, namely their 
integration into a single composite index. The 
satellite accounts can accommodate non-
monetary data and thus multi-dimensional 
performance indicators, which means that it is 
possible to define indicators that are capable of 
reflecting the different objectives of the public 
health and education services and therefore of 
giving a truer picture of a particularly complex 
reality. 
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Box II.1.1: Convergence between output and input methods
Theoretically, in national accounting, a given product can have only one price. In the context of non-
commercial services, this implies that two services with different unit costs must be considered as 
different and classed in two different categories of the nomenclature used to calculate volume by the 
output method. Thus, all the services grouped in any single category must have the same unit cost. This 
can be taken a step farther, so that all non-commercial services in any given category should have the 
same unit input quantities, since otherwise diverging input prices would lead to different unit costs and 
thus to classification in different nomenclature categories.  
This means that, in strict compliance with national accounting rules, a non-commercial service is 
categorised by the quantity structure of its inputs, and if this structure changes over time one must 
consider that a new product has appeared. 
Assuming, for simplicity’s sake, that production is the sum of intermediate consumptions and salaries, 
the hypothesis of the stability over time of the quantities structure of inputs implies that the value of 





















011 ∑∑∑∑ +=+   
where the exponent 0 refers to the base period and the exponent 1 to the current period, ICp  is the 
intermediate consumption index for the current period and Sp  the salaries index. The input method 
divides intermediate consumptions and salaries by their respective price indices. 
This gives a volume equal to:   
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which is also the formula for calculating volume by the output method. In other words, when the output 
method is applied to the theoretically narrowest possible level of product nomenclature, it gives the same 
outcome as the input method. 
This outcome can be illustrated using an example from the education sector. Let us suppose that the 
teachers’ salaries are the only cost and that there are only two types of classes, classes of 20 pupils and 
classes of 25 pupils. The table below describes the situation at the base period, the quantity index being 
the number of pupils: 
Table 1:
Classes of 20 pupils Classes of 25 pupils Total
Number of classes 4 5 9
Number of pupils 80 125 205
Cost of one teacher 100 100 100
Total cost = production 400 500 900
Unit cost of one pupil 5 4 4.4
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Classes of 20 pupils Classes of 25 pupils Total
Number of classes 5 4 9
Number of pupils 100 100 200
Cost of one teacher 110 110 110
Production at current prices 550 440 990
Production at constant prices 500 400 900




2. MEASURING AND ASSESSING FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 
94 
2.1. FISCAL INDICATORS: IMPROVING THE 
ESTIMATION OF THE STRUCTURAL 
BUDGET BALANCE 
With the 2005 reform of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) the structural budget balance 
has taken centre stage in the EU fiscal 
surveillance. All key requirements of the revised 
Pact are now expressed net of cyclical factors 
and one-off and other temporary measures (1).  
Because of its increased prominence in the 
assessment of countries' fiscal positions, the 
structural budget balances is subject to a 
particularly intense scrutiny both in academic 
and policy circles. This increased attention has 
laid bare a number of limitations and 
methodological issues with tangible policy 
implications. Magnified by recent developments, 
two issues have received particular attention: (i) 
the uncertainty attached to the assessment of 
cyclical conditions in real time and (ii) 
significant short-term fluctuations in the tax 
content of economic growth. A detailed review 
of the recent experience with the use of the 
structural budget balance in the EU fiscal 
framework was included in the 2007 edition of 
the Public Finances in EMU report.  
Following up on this, the present section outlines 
ways to better cope with the two limitations of 
the structural budget balances mentioned above. 
The first subsection takes a closer look on how to 
reduce the degree of uncertainty attached to real-
time estimates of the output gap by making use 
of additional economic indicators which are less 
prone to revisions. The second subsection 
explores a method for tracking and explaining 
year-on-year changes in the yield of the tax 
system (2).  
                                                          
(1) This is the case for the Member States' medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO), the annual required 
budgetary adjustment for countries that have not reached 
their MTO yet as well as the fiscal adjustment required 
to correct an excessive deficit. A detailed review of the 
revised Pact and the role played therein by the structural 
budget balance can be found in European Commission 
(2006a). 
(2) The options sketched out in both subsections are 
currently being discussed and assessed in the competent 
The overall aim of this discussion is to 
eventually adapt the current method for the 
calculation of the structural budget balance, after 
consultation and agreement with the MS, so as to 
improve its effectiveness in the EU fiscal 
framework.  
2.1.1. Improving the assessment of the 
output gap in real time 
In the EU fiscal surveillance framework, the 
cyclical component of the budget is obtained by 
applying an aggregate budgetary sensitivity to 
estimates of the output gap (see Box II.2.1 for 
the details of the method). This approach is well 
established in the literature and puts into practice 
the understanding that output fluctuations affect 
the budget balance and may obscure the view on 
what is generally called the underlying budget 
balance, i.e. the budget balance that would 
prevail if output was at its potential level.  
The main downside of output gap estimates is 
their considerable degree of uncertainty. This 
uncertainty has direct implications regarding the 
assessment of the cyclically adjusted balance 
(CAB) in real time . In practice, measures of the 
output gap available in real time may differ 
significantly from those constructed with the 
same method on the basis of data published years 
later. Such revisions mainly reflect the 
uncertainty inherent to forecasts: in order to 
assess the current position in the cycle one 
inevitably has to make an assumption of where 
the economy is expected to be in the future. As 
forecasts are revised, they also affect the current 
assessment of the cyclical position.  
From the viewpoint of fiscal policy making and 
surveillance, the uncertainty surrounding output 
gap estimates is a serious issue (3). It can give 
rise to a distorted diagnosis and, in turn, to an 
inappropriate policy response. A relatively recent 
and particularly evident case in point, reviewed 
in more detail in the 2007 issue of this report, 
were the late 1990s, when available data and 
                                                                                
working group of the Economic Policy Committee, the 
Output Gap Working Group. 
(3) See Langedijk and Larch (2007) for an assessment of the 
sensitivity of the EU fiscal framework to variations in 
output gap estimates.    
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prevailing forecasts led to believe that the 
economies of most euro area countries were 
operating slightly below potential. With the 
benefit of hindsight, the output gap in the years 
1999-2000 turned out to be abundantly positive 
and the fiscal stance too lax. 
The way forward 
A way forward to address the uncertainty 
attached to real-time output gap estimates is to 
broaden the assessment of cyclical conditions 
with a battery of complementary real-time 
indicators that can reflect cyclical developments. 
This would be in line with the provisions of the 
Code of Conduct according to which "the 
identification of periods of economic 'good' times 
should be made after an overall economic 
assessment" (1). The number of potential 
candidates for complementary indicators is very 
large. In principle, all macroeconomic variables 
and survey indicators that are expected to reflect 
or mimic cyclical developments can be of use, 
for instance the rate of inflation, changes in the 
rate of unemployment, interest rates, real 
exchange rates, the current account balance or 
the rate of capacity utilisation. A first attempt to 
bring on board complementary indicators was 
made in the 2006/07 assessment round of the 
stability and convergence programmes. The 
approach was purely descriptive and judgemental 
in nature (2).  
With a view to making the assessment more 
systematic two different quantitative methods 
have been tried out. The first method applies a 
forecast approach recently developed by Stock 
and Watson (2002) and makes use of a battery of 
indicators to forecast the output gap using 
principal components analysis. This approach is 
purely agnostic from an economic viewpoint in 
                                                          
(1) The revised Code of Conduct (Specifications on the 
implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and 
Guidelines on the format and content of Stability and 
Convergence Programmes) was endorsed by the Council 
in September 2005. 
(2) Commission services' economic assessment of the 
2006/07 vintage include short paragraphs comparing 
output gap estimates with the indications emerging from 




the sense that it does not require any a priori as 
regards the link between the indicators selected 
and the cyclical conditions (3). It is organised in 
two steps: The principal components are first 
calculated using the battery of complementary 
indicators and selected using statistical criteria; 
these components are then used to forecast the 
output gap using an ordinary least square 
regression.  
The second approach to take into account 
complementary indicators is an extension of the 
current version of the commonly agreed 
production function method for calculating 
potential output and the output gap currently 
used in the EU fiscal surveillance framework, in 
order to incorporate the degree of utilization 
capacity of labour and capital. 
One of the major difficulties in the commonly 
agreed method is to correctly identify total factor 
productivity (TFP), which generally represents 
the largest part of GDP growth. Currently, this is 
achieved by resorting to the simplifying 
assumption that the existing stocks of capital and 
labour are always fully utilised across different 
phases of the cycle. The price paid for the 
simplification is straightforward. To the extent 
that the degree of capacity utilisation increases 
during upswings and decreases in downswings, 
TFP may be over- or underestimated, which in 
turn may affect the accuracy of the output gap 
estimate in real time. 
One way to overcome the problem is to relax the 
simplifying assumption about the constant 
degree of utilisation of capital and labour and to 
make use of available survey data on the rate of 
capacity utilisation and to embed it into the 
commonly agreed model, so as to track the 
 
                                                          
(3)  The technical details of how forecasts are made based 
on Stock and Watson (2002) approach are explained in 
Annex II. The properties of this forecasting procedure 
are based on the fact that the information potentially 
available in a large number of variables over long time 
spans provides valuable statistical information that can 
be exploited for forecasting purposes without imposing 
any a priori restriction on the links among these 
variables and the variable to be forecast. 
European Commission 




Box II.2.1: How the budget balance is adjusted for cyclical factors in the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework
In the framework of the EU budgetary surveillance the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB) is
derived by subtracting the temporary component of the budget balance from the overall nominal figure: 
tOGtbtCAB ⋅−= ε         (1) 
where tb  is the nominal budget balance-to-GDP ratio in year t, ε the budgetary sensitivity parameter
and tOG  the output gap in year t. The output gap is derived from a production function method endorsed
by the Council in July 2002. A detailed description of the method can be found in Denis et al. (2006). The
overall sensitivity parameter ε  is obtained by aggregating the elasticities of individual budgetary items
estimated on the basis of the methodology developed by the OECD and agreed by the Output Gap
Working Group of the Economic Policy Committee (OGWG) (1). The individual revenue elasticities,
iR,η , are aggregated to an overall revenue elasticity Rη using the share of each in the total current taxes











Rηη         (2) 
As for the expenditure elasticity, Gη , it can be expressed as 
G
GU
UGG ,ηη =          (3) 
where UG ,η  is the elasticity of unemployment-related expenditures, again estimated on the basis of the
agreed OECD methodology, and GGU /  is the share of unemployment related expenditure in total
current primary expenditure (3).  
The empirical estimates of the individual tax and expenditure elasticities for all EU Member States are
reported in Table 1 together with the overall tax and expenditure elasticities. The weights used to
aggregate the elasticities of the individual tax categories are shown in Table 3.  
As budgetary variables are generally expressed in percent of GDP, the revenue and expenditure
elasticities Rη  and Gη  (which measure the change in the level of a budgetary item with respect to the





GGRR ηεηε == , ,        (4) 
                                                          
(1) The OECD method for estimating budgetary elasticities is described in detail in Girouard, N. and C. André (2005).
(2) The weights are computed by the Commission services as an average over recent years. The period over which the
average is computed for the new and updated values of the budgetary elasticities is 1995-2004 (or 1995-2003 in
case 2004 was not available) 
(3) The share is computed by the Commission services using OECD data or data from national source for non-OECD
countries. The reference year is 2003 (2002 if not available).  
(Continued on the next page) 
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variations in the use of the existing capital stock 
during up- and downswings periods (1).  
Both methods − the principal components 
approach and the extended production function − 
have their pros and cons. The clear advantage of 
the extended production function method is that 
it stays within the commonly agreed method for 
calculating potential output and the output gap in 
the EU fiscal framework. The inclusion of the 
rate of capacity utilisation does not alter the 
overall philosophy of the agreed approach, 
which, due to its formal status, plays a pivotal 
role in the implementation of the SGP (2). The 
downside of the extended production function 
approach is equally clear. On top of the rate of 
capacity utilisation there may be other data 
available in real time (e.g. current account 
balance, asset price developments) that 
encapsulate useful information about the 
economy's position in the cycle. Such additional 
variables do not fit into the commonly agreed 
method, however. By contrast, they can be 
included in the principal components approach. 
Indeed, the agnostic feature of the principal 
components analysis does not set any limits to 
the type and number of variable to be used. But 
the potentially all-embracing nature of this latter 
approach comes at a price: the results of the 
principal components are rather opaque in the 
sense that it is difficult to pull out an economic 
story of which variables actually account for the 
predicted position in the cycle. This method also 
                                                          
(1) The technical details of the augmented production 
function approach are provided in Annex II. 
(2) In July 2002 the Council endorsed the production 
function approach as the reference method for the 
calculation of potential output and the output gap in the 
EU fiscal surveillance framework. 
relies on the availability of a large number of 
complementary indicators over long time spans 
which, for instance in the case of the recently 
acceded Member States, poses a problem. 
A numerical simulation 
In order to evaluate the relative merits of the two 
approaches in practice, a simulation for twelve 
EU countries was carried out covering the years 
2000-2006 (3). The objective of the simulation is 
to find out whether the two methods described 
above improve the assessment of the cycle in real 
time compared to the commonly agreed method 
currently applied in the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework. To this end the simulation replicates 
a typical assessment situation in the EU 
surveillance framework; i.e. only data available 
at the moment of the Commission services' 
assessment of the stability and convergence 
programmes are used (4). The latter is ensured by 
using successive vintages of the Commission 
services' autumn forecasts available at a given 
year t. The benchmark for the 'true' output gap is 
the one estimated with the production function 
approach on the basis of the latest available 
information (i.e. at the time the present report 
was written), the Commission services' 2008 
spring forecasts − henceforth ex-post output gap. 
The accuracy is assessed by means of graphs 
comparing the alternative real-time estimates and 
a basic statistical analysis. In view of the limited 
                                                          
(3) The twelve countries are BE, DE, DK, GR, ES, FI, FR, IE, 
IT, NL, PT, UK were selected on the basis of the data 
availability of the rate of capacity utilisation variable. 
The first year available is 2000 since this year also 
corresponds to the oldest vintage of real-time estimates 
based on the commonly agreed production function 
approach.  
(4) The simulation design is detailed in Annex II.  
Box (continued) 
where R/Y is the share of current taxes in GDP and G/Y is the share of primary current expenditure on 
GDP. (1) The difference GR εε −  yields the sensitivity parameter of the overall budget balance ε  
used in equation (1).  
 
                                                          
(1) Both weights are computed by the Commission services using 2003 as the reference year.  
 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2008 
 
98 
sample length the statistical quality of the 
accuracy analysis is likely to be relatively poor. 
Nevertheless, the comparison of alternative 
estimates provides useful insights, especially for 
years when the commonly agreed method proved 
to be wide off the mark, for instance in the year 
2000 and 2001. Table II.2.1 provides two 
measures of the accuracy of the real-time output 
gap forecasts, namely the Mean Error (ME) and 
Mean Absolute Error (MAE) for the three 
alternative methods: the commonly agreed 
production function approach, the commonly 
agreed production function approach 
incorporating the capacity utilisation and the 
method based on the principal components 
approach (1). 
Table II.2.1 shows that using methods other than 
the commonly agreed production function 
provides additional useful information, although 
it must be said that no method clearly 
outperforms. On average, the extended 
production function approach including the 
capacity utilisation gets the best scores, while the 
principal components tends to do a better job in 
certain cases although this depends on the 
statistical criteria used. Generally speaking, the 
use of complementary indicators tends to 
                                                          
(1) The ME measures the mean of the difference between 
the output gap estimates using the three different 
approaches and the ex-post estimates taken from the 
Commission services' spring 2008 forecasts for the 
period 2000-2006. The MAE takes the mean of the 
absolute values of the differences instead. 
improve the forecast of the output gap for a 
number of countries. When using the MAE 
criteria, the incorporation of the capacity 
utilisation improves the real-time estimates for 
Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Finland. For the latter two 
countries, however, the current production 
function is equally performant. In addition, the 
current production function approach yields the 
best results for Portugal, Ireland and the UK. The 
use of the principal components approach 
improves the real-time estimates for Belgium, 
Greece and Spain. The same proportions roughly 
applies when using the ME criteria instead, 
although the countries' grouping changes 
slightly.  
The values of the ME statistic show that in a 
majority of cases the production function 
approach incorporating the rate of capacity 
utilisation yields real-time output gap estimates 
which are larger than the real-time estimates 
based both on the commonly agreed method and 
the principal components approach over the 
period considered (2000-2006). For the EU fiscal 
surveillance, this would imply an additional 
margin of caution in order to take into account 
the uncertainty attached to the assessment of the 
cyclical component of the cyclically-adjusted 
balance.  
The relative merits of each method may vary 
depending on the country considered. As 
mentioned above, the real-time output gap 
estimates differed substantially from the ex-post 
Table II.2.1
Accuracy statistics of real time output gap estimates for 2000-2006. Benchmark: Commission services' spring 2008 forecast
MAE ME MAE ME MAE ME
Belgium 0.67 -0.67 0.85 0.85 0.55 -0.47
Germany 0.87 -0.47 0.69 0.21 1.01 -0.53
Denmark 0.86 -0.35 0.81 -0.73 0.83 -0.37
Greece 0.93 0.93 1.42 0.94 0.79 0.74
Spain 1.17 -1.00 1.49 -1.49 1.03 -0.86
Finland 0.46 0.19 0.46 0.19 0.88 0.59
France 0.86 -0.86 0.23 0.08 0.70 -0.70
Ireland 1.48 -0.95 4.17 -4.17 1.48 -0.74
Italy 1.43 -1.43 0.76 0.57 1.27 -1.27
Netherlands 0.71 -0.66 0.71 -0.15 0.79 -0.76
Portugal 1.52 -1.52 1.63 -1.60 1.71 -1.71
UK 0.76 -0.76 1.62 -1.62 0.84 -0.84
Source:  Commission services.
Commonly agreed production 
function approach
Commonly agreed production function 
approach incorporating the capacity 
utilisation
Complementary indicators, principal 
component
Notes: ME=Mean error; MAE = Mean absolute error. The benchmark output gap series is the one based on the Commission services' spring 2008 forecast. Figures in 
bold correspond to the best performing forecast.
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values observed in the early 2000s. A 
comparison of the three methods for countries 
where forecast errors during these years turned 
out to be particularly large can be particularly 
useful. Three countries, namely the Netherlands, 
Italy and Greece were selected on the basis of the 
average forecast errors for the years 2000 and 
2001. Results are reported in Graph II.2.1 to 
Graph II.2.3. 
Graph II.2.1: Assessment of cyclical conditions using 
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Extended production function approach, realtime
Source: Commission services
Graph II.2.1 shows that, in the case of the 
Netherlands, the extension of the production 
function approach to account for the capacity 
utilisation overall provides better predictions 
compared to the two other methods. This result is 
in line with the general comparison made in 
Table II.2.1.  
Graph II.2.2 shows that in the case of Italy the 
most accurate method is always the extended 
production function approach although the 
degree of this accuracy depends on the year 
considered. At the beginning of the period, when 
the real-time estimates derived from the 
production function approach appeared to differ 
greatly from the ex-post output gap, the extended 
production function approach using the capacity 
utilisation yielded clearly better predictions. 
However, from 2003 on, the predictions using 
the three alternative methods tend to depart from 
the ex-post figures. The extended production 
function approach also provides larger output 
gap prediction compared to the two other 
alternative prediction methods. The larger gap at 
the end of the sample period may simply be an 
indication that estimates for recent years 
obtained from the 'traditional' production 
function approach may underestimate the output 
gap. 
Graph II.2.2: Assessment of cyclical conditions 
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Source:  Commission services.
 
Graph II.2.3 concerning Greece provides an 
alternative case. Here the use of the principal 
components approach seems overall to provide a 
better fit for the output gap estimate although, as 
for the case previously considered, at the end of 
the period, the predictions obtained with the 
extended production function approach tend to 
diverge from the ex-post figures.   
Graph II.2.3: Assessment of cyclical conditions using 
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Source:  Commission services
Overall, while some caution should be applied 
when assessing output gap estimates in real time, 
past experience has overall proved their 
usefulness for assessing the underlying fiscal 
positions of EU Member States. The inherent 
uncertainty attached to real-time output gap 
estimates can be reduced by broadening the set 
of indicators used to assess cyclical conditions 
although the main analytical tool remains the 
production function approach. The evidence 
provided here shows that the extended 
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production function approach accounting for the 
rate of capacity utilisation provides interesting 
and potentially useful results. The consistency of 
these results will need to be checked as more 
data become available. 
Further caution is warranted as for the most 
recent years in our simulation, 2005 and 2006, 
the ex-post output gap estimates may not be a 
particularly good point of reference for assessing 
alternative estimates as they may still be subject 
to revisions once actual data become available. 
Finally, alternative methods such as the principal 
components approach making use of a broader 
battery of business cycle indicators provide 
useful alternative that, in some cases, can 
improve the assessment of the business cycle 
conditions and, by the same token, usefully 
complement the production function approach. 
Additional tests and the inclusion of more 
variables may also help further improve the use 
of complementary indicators for the assessment 
of cyclical conditions in real time. 
2.1.2. Tracking short-term tax elasticities 
The other weakness of the cyclical adjustment 
method used in the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework is the assumption of constant tax 
elasticities. As explained in Box II.2.1 the link 
between the cyclical component of GDP and the 
budget is taken to be invariant over time. This 
simplification can be justified by the forward-
looking nature of the EU fiscal surveillance 
exercise: the best predictor for tax elasticities in 
future years is the average of the past.  
Constant tax elasticities are an acceptable 
approximation as long as short-term variations in 
the tax content of economic growth remain 
small. In that case, the advantages in terms of 
methodological simplicity clearly outweigh the 
costs of additional precision. However, past 
experience has shown that in some years tax 
elasticities can depart quit substantially from 
their 'normal values' and produce unwelcome 
effects on the making and surveillance of fiscal 
policy. For instance, the economic boom at the 
end of the 1990s went along with considerable 
revenue windfalls, which lead fiscal policy 
markers to believe that there was room for tax 
cuts and/or expenditure increases. The 
implications of such an assessment became clear 
during the economic slowdown after the bursting 
of the ITC bubble in 2001 when tax elasticities 
bounced back from the high levels reached in the 
preceding boom. Tax cuts and expenditure 
increases turned out to be unsustainable and 
heavily weighed on the possibility to stabilise 
output through fiscal policy. A number of euro 
area countries, such as the Netherlands and 
France, were obliged to tighten their fiscal 
regimes during the slowdown.  
As mentioned in Section I.1, current 
developments carry a resemblance to those in the 
previous cycle. In 2006-07, tax elasticities again 
surged above 'normal levels' especially thanks to 
the buoyancy of corporate taxes. These 
additional revenues were at least in part used to 
finance higher expenditure or tax cuts.  
To improve the measurement of tax elasticities in 
the EU fiscal framework and in turn to enhance 
the appraisal of the structural budget balance, 
two separate questions need to be addressed. 
Firstly, what drives the year-to-year fluctuations 
of tax elasticities. Secondly, how big or 
important are changes in the tax content of 
growth for the assessment of the underlying 
budget balance?  
Identifying the sources of year-to-year 
variations in the elasticity of total current 
taxes 
The assessment of tax elasticities proceeds in 
two steps. The first is to estimate models that 
describe the behaviour of taxes as a function of a 
number of economic factors. The second step is 
to explain past and current behaviour of tax 
revenues on the basis of the estimated models.  
As regards the modelling, we build upon an 
approach established in the literature. Tax 
elasticities are derived from econometric 
regressions where annual tax data is linked to 
measures of economic activity and a series of 
other variables that are expected to affect the 
level of taxation (see for instance Wolswijk, 
2007).  
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Graph II.2.4: Sources of variations in tax elasticities:
Germany
Scale for slope-dummies
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Graph II.2.5: Sources of variations in tax elasticities:
France
Source: Commission services.  
The specificity of the model is that it explicitly 
allows for composition effects which lead to a 
higher or lower-than-normal tax-to-GDP ratio, 
including changes in asset prices (1). A detailed 
presentation of the approach followed is 
provided in Annex II. The attention is focused on 
the main results which are condensed in Graph 
II.2.4 to Graph II.2.7 (2).  
                                                          
(1) The asset price data used in our analysis was kindly 
made available by the Bank of International Settlements. 
A detailed description of the data can be found in Borio 
et al. (1994). 
 
(2) As indicated in Annex II, the analysis is limited to the 
EU-15 countries, excluding Luxembourg, given the 
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Graph II.2.6: Sources of variations in tax elasticities:
Italy
Source: Commission services.  
To stay within space limits the presentation is 
restricted to four particularly interesting cases: 
Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
The intention is not to single out specific 
countries; rather we want to discuss particularly 
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Scale for dummies Scale for elasticities
Graph II.2.7:  Sources of variations in tax elasticities:
United Kingdom
Source:  Commission services.  
Each of the four graphs has two parts. The upper 
part sets out the constant tax-to-GDP elasticity 
utilised in the EU fiscal surveillance framework 
(derived from the commonly agreed OECD 
methodology) against the time-varying elasticity 
obtained from our regression analysis. For 
comparison, it also shows the apparent elasticity 
obtained as the relative change of total taxes over 
the relative change of nominal GDP (3). The bars 
                                                          
(3) The difference between the tax elasticities derived from 
our model and the observed one can be quite big and can 
reflect at least three different elements: (i) the effect of 
discretionary fiscal policy; (i) other explanatory factors 
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shown in the lower part of the graph indicate the 
sources of the year-to-year variations of the 
simulated tax-to-GDP elasticity. 
The story encapsulated in the graphs is best 
understood by looking at specific episodes of 
large fluctuations. A recent episode deserving 
close attention regards the late 1990s when a 
number of EU countries benefited from 
significant revenue windfalls. Prominent cases in 
point are Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom. As can be seen from the respective 
figures, the simulated tax elasticity went 
significantly above the average estimate derived 
from the commonly agreed OECD method.  
• In Germany, the model attributes the 
temporary rise in the yield of the tax system 
mainly to a higher-than-normal consumption 
content of economic growth. For three 
consecutive years − 1999, 2000 and 2001 − 
private consumption grew at a rate of well 
above 3% per year, 1 percentage point more 
than nominal GDP. The respective windfalls 
were largely spent by cutting taxes in 2001, 
when the simulated elasticity had returned to 
'normal levels'. In 2002, private consumption 
weakened significantly vis-à-vis GDP and 
heightened the shortfall of government 
revenues during the downturn following the 
burst of the ITC bubble in 2001. 
• In France, the revenues windfall recorded at 
the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 
2000s is the combined effect of a number of 
factors. According to our model, a part is 
explained by a significant deterioration of the 
trade balance. This shift towards more 
imports has boosted revenues. The other 
driver of revenue windfall was an increase in 
the labour share in income. Equity prices also 
contributed to the higher-than-normal tax-to-
GDP elasticity but to a lesser extent. As in 
Germany, the revenue windfalls were used to 
cut taxes in 2000 and 2001 right at the peak 
                                                                                
not included in the tax model; (iii) the time-varying 
elements are modelled as dummies and hence capture 
only the average effect of the explanatory variables on 
total taxes. Among the three elements (i) is the generally 
the dominant one. In theory, the effects of discretionary 
fiscal policy should be netted out. This option is not 
available in practice because of the lack of data. 
of the ITC boom. Since France is one of the 
few countries that provide estimates of 
discretionary measures, we were in the 
position to calculate the elasticity net of such 
interventions. The corresponding result is 
given by the dashed line in Graph II.2.5. It 
shows that the decision to spend the extra 
revenues gave rise to a significant decline in 
the tax content of GDP when the cycle started 
to deteriorate. It shows the substantial role of 
discretionary measures in the evolution of the 
apparent aggregate elasticity. 
• Turning to the United Kingdom, the 
temporary rise in the yield of the tax system 
was the combined effect of a higher-than-
normal wage share and the strong increase in 
oil prices. Both factors pushed the elasticity 
of current taxes with respect to GDP well 
above normal levels around 2000. The 
elasticity dropped in the early 2000s as the 
difference between wage and GDP growth 
narrowed again, oil prices stabilised or 
declined from previous highs and 
consumption declined significantly in percent 
of GDP. 
• The second episode of interest relates to 
recent years (in particular 2005-2006), when 
tax-elasticities once more overshot 'normal' 
levels producing sizeable revenue windfalls, 
though the model fails to fully explain why 
this is the case (except in Italy where it is 
partly attributed to higher wage share).  
This type of econometric analysis is per se useful 
as it can provide an explanation of the variations 
in short-term tax elasticities. It notably 
underlines the role played by composition effects 
and by tax bases not traditionally considered in 
the analysis, such as assets prices. It however 
suffers from several drawbacks.  
The absence of tax series netted of discretionary 
measures, the size of which can be large, limits 
the reliability of the estimations (1). Moreover, 
an econometric approach on relatively short time 
                                                          
(1) For example, econometric analysis would fail to identify 
the causes of 'natural' variations in tax elasticity in a 
country where tax windfalls/shortfalls are systematically 
compensated by discretionary tax cuts/hikes. 
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series (a few decades of yearly data) is unable to 
identify in a robust way all the drivers that can 
affect taxes. More crucially, while the approach 
can provide an explanation for the change in the 
aggregate tax elasticity, it cannot say anything 
about the temporary or structural nature of tax 
windfalls/shortfalls. For example, rises in assets 
prices, shifts in the wage share or the 
deterioration of the trade balance may explain 
the buoyancy of tax revenues but, in absence of a 
model of the equilibrium level of asset prices, the 
wage share or the trade balance, it cannot be 
determined whether the increase in the revenue 
share is purely temporary or permanent.  
Gauging the size of composition effects 
In order to gauge more precisely the importance 
of composition effects on tax revenue as well as 
to estimate whether those effects are of a 
temporary nature or not, it is necessary to 
analyse the behaviour of individual tax bases. A 
more disaggregated approach takes into account 
the fact that individual tax bases, such as 
household consumption, wages and profits 
follow a different pattern compared to overall 
GDP. If all tax bases were fully synchronised 
with the aggregate level of economic activity, 
composition effects would not play any role. 
Two methods are used to assess the size of the 
composition effects. 
Method 1: To this end, we apply first a variant 
of the disaggregated approach developed and 
used by the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB), on the revenue side of the general 
government (1). Tax revenues are broken down 
into four categories (indirect taxes, personal 
income taxes, corporate income taxes and social 
security contributions) and linked to their 
corresponding tax bases or approximations of 
them (household consumption, gross operating 
surplus and wages). The temporary component 
of tax revenues is calculated on the basis of the 
standard elasticity of each tax category vis-à-vis 
its tax base and the deviation of the tax base 
relative to its trend (2). In absence of a theory of 
                                                          
(1) For a detailed description of the method see Bouthevillan 
et al. (2001). 
(2) To limit the differences with the traditional approach, we 
use the same decomposition of taxes, the same tax bases 
and the same elasticity of taxes vis-à-vis the tax base 
the structural level of the wage share and the 
consumption share in GDP consistent with the 
production function, the trend for each tax base 
is extracted by means of the Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter (see Box II.2.2 for more details).  
This approach allows calculating directly an 
alternative cyclically-adjusted balance in levels 
by subtracting the temporary component from 
the actual yield of each tax category. The 
difference between the traditional CAB and this 
alternative calculation provides a proxy of the 
impact of composition effects. Yet, the 
equilibrium level of the tax bases is determined 
statistically and independently from the 
equilibrium level of GDP measured in the 
production function (3).  
Method 2: To circumvent the issue of the link 
between the appropriate equilibrium level of 
GDP and of tax bases, we also calculate the 
change in tax revenues that would result if the 
tax intensity (i.e., the ratio of the tax revenues to 
the tax bases) of each tax base presented the 
same values as in the previous year and if the 
only change related to the composition of GDP.  
This provides directly a measure of the 
composition effect of the change in the CAB, 
which does not require a measure of the 
equilibrium level of the tax bases. Since there is 
no estimated structural level of the tax bases, this 
approach cannot discriminate between a 
structural and a temporary decrease in the wage 
share or in the consumption-to-GDP ratio. 
Therefore, the second method can provide an 
estimation of the composition effect on the fiscal 
stance (y-o-y difference in the CAB) but not on 
the cyclically-adjusted balance in level.  
Graphs II.2.8 to II.2.12 show the size of the 
composition effects on the fiscal stance, 
according to the two methods, for five EU 
countries: DE, FR, IT, UK and the NL over the 
period 1996-2007. A positive (negative) 
difference indicates that composition effects tend 
to improve (deteriorate) tax revenue and the 
                                                                                
used in the commonly agreed methodology to calculate 
the CAB. The only difference relates to the different tax 
bases which are no longer synchronized with GDP. 
(3) Note this would also be the case if the equilibrium level 
of GDP was determined by a HP filter.  
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budget balance. Despite the difference in the two 
approaches, the estimated composition effects 
points have the same sign in 80% of the cases. 
Both simulations show that composition effects 
may be significant: on average ¼ pp of GDP 
every year in absolute terms over the considered 
sample (1). Moreover, composition effects also 
tend to be of the same sign over several years in 
a row; the cumulative impact over a few years 
may therefore be even more significant. 
In most countries, composition effects 
contributed strongly and positively at the turn of 
the century (1999-2001). This was in particular 
due to the increase in the wage share, as 
productivity usually slows down after a peak in 
activity and wages do not follow immediately 
change in productivity (wage rigidity). 
Conversely, composition effects tended to be 
rather negative over the period 2002-2006, 
reflecting a decline in the wage share and a 
corresponding rise of the gross operating surplus. 
The qualitative results are somewhat different in 
Italy than in the other four countries, reflecting a 
different pattern in the wage share, which tended 
to peak in 2005 and 2006. 
Graph II.2.8: Impact of composition effects on the change in the 
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(1) The estimation of the composition effects relies crucially 
on the tax intensity of the different tax bases (i.e. ratio of 
taxes to the tax base). The definition of the tax base 
therefore plays an important role. For example personal 
income tax is assumed, in the commonly agreed 
methodology, to be fully paid on wages, which probably 
underestimate the tax base and therefore overestimate the 
average tax rate paid on wages. Therefore the two 
methods may over-estimate the budgetary impact of 
shifts in the wage share. The same assumption was 
retained here, however, in order to limit the source of 
differences with the commonly agreed methodology.  
Graph II.2.9: Impact of composition effects on the change in the 
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The practical lesson to be learned from this 
exercise is quite evident. In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, taking into account composition 
effects would have shown significantly lower 
improvements in the structural budget balances 
and in turn given rise to more cautious policy 
conclusions than the traditional CAB. 
 
Graph II.2.10: Impact of composition effects on the change in the 
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Graph II.2.11: Impact of composition effects on the change in the 
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Box II.2.2: Gauging the size of composition effects
The commonly agreed methodology for the calculation of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance 
assumes that the fluctuations of the different tax bases (wages, gross operating surplus and consumption) 
around their structural level follow the same cycle as output. The amplitude of the fluctuations is 
different across tax bases as it depends on the variation of the tax base vis-à-vis GDP (e.g. wages are 
more stable than the gross operating surplus) but the fluctuations of the tax bases are assumed to be fully 


















ηη  (1)  
Where the asterisk denotes the structural level of taxes, OG stands for the output gap and η is an 
elasticity. 
Table 1:
Commonly agreed assumptions to calculate CABs
Tax Tax base Elasticity of taxes vis-à-vis the tax base (A) Elasticity of the tax base vis-à-vis the output gap (B)
1 Indirect taxes Consumption 1 1
2 Corporate income taxes Gross operating surplus 1
3 Personal income taxes Wages Tax code
4 Social security contributions Wages Tax code
Source:  OECD 2005
Estimated econometrically
 
In practice, however, the different tax bases are not fully synchronised. Composition effects will have a 
budgetary impact as soon as the tax intensities of the various tax bases in GDP are different. In order to 
gauge the effect of the composition of tax bases, two alternative simulations are made. 
Method 1: The elasticity of the tax vis-à-vis the tax base (A) is the same as in the commonly agreed 
methodology but the traditional cycle derived from the output gap and the elasticity of the tax base vis-à-


















 (2)  
This enables to calculate an alternative CAB; the difference of this alternative CAB and the usual CAB 
approximates the impact of changes in the composition of GDP. Importantly, the three different tax 
bases are deflated by the same price (GDP deflator), so as to take into account different price dynamics 
across GDP components. For example, in case of a deterioration of the terms of trade, consumption 
prices will increase more than GDP prices, leading to an increase in indirect taxes as a share of GDP, if 
the share of consumption in GDP remains unaffected by the shock.  
Method 2: The change in the tax-to-GDP ratio under the assumption that the ratio of every tax to its tax 












iTaxbase .  
The first simulation calculates directly a CAB in levels as there is an estimation of the structural level of 
each tax base. Yet, in absence of a theory of the structural level of the wage share and the consumption 
share in GDP that is consistent with the production function approach, the first simulation uses a HP 
filter to estimate the structural level of the tax base. The second simulation avoids the issue of 
determining the structural level of the tax bases but it cannot discriminate between a structural and a 
temporary decrease in the wage share or in the consumption-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, the second 
simulation can only provide an estimation of the composition effect on the change in the CABs but not 
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Graph II.2.12: Impact of composition effects on the change in the 
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Conclusions 
Composition effects turn out be of non-negligible 
size in the EU. Tracking composition effects may 
therefore help understanding the evolution of 
overall taxes on a yearly basis.  
Yet, in the budgetary surveillance process, the 
cyclically-adjusted balance is used not only in 
terms of change, e.g. in relation to the 0.5% of 
GDP benchmark for the annual progress towards 
the MTO, but also directly in terms of level to 
assess the structural budgetary position vis-à-vis 
the MTO or to project the budget balance over 
the long term in the sustainability analysis. To 
account for composition effects in budgetary 
surveillance, an estimate of the structural level of 
each of the relevant tax bases would be needed, 
consistent with the estimate of the structural 
level of output.  
The approach to estimating structural revenues 
presented above is purely statistical and therefore 
does not (cannot) incorporate the relevant 
information contained in the production function, 
such as the trends in productivity gains, the 
evolution of the NAWRU or of the labour 
supply. Complementing the production function 
with a structural wage share or the structural 
GDP share of consumption is beyond the scope 
of the present exercise. For instance, several 
factors play a priori a role in determining the 
wage share such as the evolution of energy 
prices, the competition level in products markets, 
the interest rate or the capital intensity of the 
different sectors of the economy (1). It implies 
not only identifying the drivers of the wage share 
and but also modifying accordingly the 
production function used to estimate potential 
GDP given that the Cobb-Douglas function 
explicitly assumes a constant wage share. 
Substantial changes would be needed to go 
towards a more disaggregated approach; yet, it is 
not clear that the identification of structural 
breaks in the wage share or the consumption 
share to GDP would be any easier or less 
controversial than identifying structural breaks in 
the yield of the tax systems, notably in real 
times.  
2.2. MEDIUM-TERM BUDGETARY OBJECTIVES 
AND IMPLICIT LIABILITIES: A NEW 
SYNTHESIS 
2.2.1. Background 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), enacted in 
1997, enjoined Member States to respect the 
medium-term budgetary objective of positions 
close to balance or in surplus. The reform of the 
SGP in 2005 foresaw that this uniform objective 
should become country-specific, so as to account 
for the diversity of economic and budgetary 
positions and developments as well as the 
diversity of risks to the sustainability of public 
finances. In the revised SGP, (2) Member States 
are required to achieve medium-term budgetary 
objectives (MTOs) that pursue a triple aim: (i) 
provide a safety margin with respect to the 3%-
of-GDP deficit limit of the Treaty; (ii) ensure 
rapid progress towards sustainability; and (iii) 
given the above, allow room for budgetary 
manoeuvre. The MTOs are defined in structural 
                                                          
(1) An increase in energy prices increases the wage share if 
producers do not fully compensate increase in production 
costs. This is expected to be the case at least over the 
short term. An increase in the competition in products 
markets decrease the mark-up and therefore increase the 
wage share. An increase in interest rate increases the cost 
of capital and therefore reduces the wage share.   
(2) Council Regulation (EC) N°1466/97 of 7 July 1997, as 
amended by Council Regulation (EC) N°1055/05 of 27 
June 2005. 
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terms, i.e. net of cyclical and one-off and other 
temporary factors (1). 
As regards the second aim of the MTOs, the 
country-specific structural budget balance that 
ensure rapid progress towards the long-run 
sustainability of public finances should be based 
on a comprehensive assessment of liabilities, 
both explicit (current debt level) and implicit 
(expenditure increases arising from population 
ageing). Since such an assessment requires the 
clarification of a number of conceptual and 
methodological issues, the Council concluded 
that until criteria and modalities for taking into 
account implicit liabilities are appropriately 
established and agreed by the Council, the 
country-specific MTOs be set on the basis of the 
current government debt ratio and potential 
growth, while preserving a sufficient safety 
margin against the risk of breaching the 3% of 
GDP reference value. Moreover, the Council 
Regulation 1466/97 as amended by Council 
Regulation 1055/05, which codifies the 
preventive arm of the reformed SGP, stipulates 
that the country-specific MTOs of euro area and 
ERM II Member States shall be within a defined 
range between -1% of GDP and balance or 
surplus, in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-
off and temporary measures.  
According to the ECOFIN Council Conclusions 
of 9 October 2007, the criteria and modalities for 
taking into account the resulting implicit 
government liabilities in the definition of MTOs 
should be established and agreed in the course of 
2008, so that Member States can present MTOs 
in accordance with the new arrangements in the 
2009 updates of their SCPs (2). 
2.2.2. Ongoing work 
The incorporation of implicit government 
liabilities into the definition of MTOs will 
benefit from the updated long-term projections of 
the budgetary cost of ageing. These projections 
are carried out by the Commission and the 
Member States in the Economic Policy 
                                                          
(1) See Council of the European Union, Presidency 




Committee (EPC) according to a common 
methodology and will be available in the course 
of 2009, in time for the periodic revision of the 
MTOs as stipulated by the SGP.  
Following the Progress Report submitted by the 
Commission in 2007, which sketched out broad 
options on how to incorporate implicit liabilities 
into the MTOs, an operational definition of 
MTOs based on work by the Commission's 
services is currently discussed by the Ageing 
Working Group of the Economic Policy 
Committee and by the Economic and Financial 
Committee. The key outstanding issues are 
summarized below.    
Degree of front-loading and national 
ownership 
There are only three ways to preserve 
sustainability of public finances in the face of 
budgetary costs from demographic ageing. The 
first is to reduce the implicit liabilities, i.e. 
reforming the public social security system so as 
to reduce the claims of future benefit recipients. 
The second is to reduce public spending in areas 
other than social security to fund the increasing 
social security cost. The third is to increase tax 
rates. The choice of the mix and timing of those 
policies depends eventually on intergenerational 
equity considerations.  
In this context, current fiscal policies can 
contribute to pre-finance the budgetary impact of 
ageing population by reaching over the medium 
term higher primary surpluses than required to 
stabilize the debt ratio. This strategy enables, in a 
first phase, to reduce debt or to accumulate 
financial assets in a public fund. In a second 
phase, when the budgetary impact of ageing 
starts to materialize, additional age-related 
expenditure can be financed not only by these 
savings but also by the reduction in interest 
payments or the returns on the financial assets 
accumulated in the first phase. Full front-loading 
would pre-fund all future ageing costs over an 
infinite horizon. A degree of front-loading lower 
than 100% is an implicit promise to bridge the 
remaining gap towards a fully sustainable fiscal 
position at a later point in time through (further) 
structural reform of age-related spending 
programmes, an increase in the tax burden or a 
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decrease in the scope of goods and services 
publicly provided. 
There is general agreement that the required 
balance, i.e. the budget balance that fully 
frontloads the cost of ageing, provides the correct 
starting point for incorporating implicit 
liabilities. Yet views diverge on how much 
freedom should be allowed in determining the 
degree of front-loading of the cost of ageing. It 
can be argued that Member States should retain 
the right to decide on the degree of pre-funding 
of the cost of ageing, since the design of social 
policy would be in their responsibility. It is clear 
that by choosing their MTO, Member States 
would equivalently choose their degree of front-
loading and, therefore, make public what remains 
to be done through future budgetary adjustment 
or pension reforms after the end of the 
programme.  
However, leaving governments completely free 
to determine the degree of front-loading could 
come into conflict with the aim of the MTO of 
ensuring sustainability. The conflict may arise in 
particular in the case of a country where the 
current budgetary position appears sound, but 
falls short of providing sufficient margin against 
the projected increase in age-related expenditure. 
According to this view, a minimum degree of 
front-loading is necessary to satisfy the objective 
of ensuring progress towards sustainability. 
Moreover, allowing full freedom in the choice of 
the degree of front-loading would weaken the 
link between MTOs and implicit liabilities, 
providing little reward for countries actually 
implementing a pension reform or incentives for 
countries to maintain already enacted pension 
reforms.  
High-debt countries: the relative importance 
of implicit and explicit liabilities 
The incorporation of implicit liabilities in the 
MTO should not cause losing sight of the role of 
outstanding debt in defining a prudent budgetary 
strategy. Full pre-funding of the cost of ageing 
can be consistent with stabilisation at or a slow 
reduction from very high levels of explicit debt. 
For example, a high-debt country, with no cost of 
ageing to front-load, could target a deficit that 
stabilizes debt at its current level, i.e. a 
significant deficit. Such a strategy is fully 
consistent with the intertemporal budget 
constraint under the assumption of no 
uncertainty. Yet, in case of a prolonged period of 
low growth or high interest rates, a high-debt 
country may be forced to adjust its policies more 
rapidly and more dramatically than a low-debt 
country: taking into account a more uncertain 
world, such a budgetary strategy can be hardly 
considered as a sustainable (or even safe) 
budgetary strategy. Moreover, maintaining high 
debt levels is not consistent with the limit set by 
the Pact. There should therefore be specific 
safeguards that ensure that MTOs lead to a 
steady reduction of the debt ratio for high-debt 
countries.  
The strictness of the debt-reduction requirement 
has to be defined. This depends essentially on the 
relative weights given to two objectives of the 
MTO: debt reduction (explicit liabilities) and 
pre-financing future rises in social security 
spending (implicit liabilities).  Either stricter 
MTOs could be set for high-debt countries until 
debt is effectively reduced below the reference 
value (1)  or an additional fiscal adjustment for 
high-debt countries could be added on top of the 
requirement to pre-fund part of the ageing costs. 
The first option gives clear priority to debt 
reduction with the argument that implicit debt, 
being based on long-term projections, may carry 
some margin of error; moreover explicit debt is 
more likely to have detrimental cross-borders 
spill-overs than implicit debt, which can always 
be dealt with through social security reforms. 
However, a strict dominance of explicit debt may 
lead to identical MTOs for high-debt countries 
with different cost of ageing, thus reducing the 
incentives to make ambitious pension reforms or 
to resist pressures to reverse already 
implemented reforms. The second option would 
give less priority to debt reduction and more 
weight to implicit liabilities. This way, pension 
reforms (or reversal thereof) are reflected in the 
medium term objective for all countries. 
Low-debt countries 
Low-debt countries do not pose an immediate 
threat in an economic and monetary union. Yet, 
                                                          
(1) In practice, this means that the MTO is subject to a 
minimum that depends exclusively on the level of debt. 
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requiring to pre-fund, even partially, the cost of 
ageing may result in an unnecessarily tight 
constraint on fiscal policies. Countries with a 
very low debt ratio may wish to raise it, for 
example by increasing public investment. In 
particular, while a policy of delaying budgetary 
adjustment to deal with demographic ageing may 
be suboptimal for the country concerned, it can 
be argued that there is no risk of detrimental 
cross-border spill-overs as long as the debt 
remains relatively low. This argument finds 
support in the Treaty, which sets a reference 
value of 60% of GDP for the identification of 
"gross errors" when it comes to the stock of debt, 
and in the SGP itself, where one of the aims of 
the MTO to ensure the convergence of 
outstanding government debt towards "prudent 
levels". There is a consensus that specific 
consideration should be given to low debt 
countries, e.g. by allowing a budgetary room of 
manoeuvre consistent with their low debt level. 
Yet, the right balance between this budgetary 
room of manoeuvre and the need to pre-finance 
the cost of ageing, still has to be found. 
Conclusions 
MTOs are guiding the conduct of fiscal policy of 
EU Member States over the medium-term and 
play a central role in the reformed Pact. The 
MTOs have to be credible and attainable to 
appropriately guide the conduct of fiscal policy 
over the period covered by the programme (3 or 
4 years) while fulfilling the –ambitious- 
objective to ensure progress towards sustainable 
public finances.  
The determination of MTOs should also be 
flexible enough to accommodate for the diversity 
of strategies that countries can follow in view of 
financing the budgetary cost of ageing but should 
provide at the same time a sufficient degree of 
coordination of budgetary policy. The choice of 
the MTOs should finally be transparent and 
easily communicated to the public to ensure 
national ownership. At the same time, the 
framework should be rich and complex enough 
to take into account the large diversity of 
budgetary situations in the EU. Progress on those 
issues has been made but no final agreement has 
been reached and the exact modalities have yet to 
be agreed. 
2.3. NO-POLICY-CHANGE SCENARIOS OF 
FISCAL POLICY: BRINGING TOGETHER 
KEY PRINCIPLES 
Stripped down to their essentials, budgetary 
targets are expected to incorporate two crucial 
elements: (i) a scenario of how public finances 
are expected to develop under the current set of 
rules and policies; and (ii) a set of discretionary 
measures which, if necessary, would close the 
gap between the target and the no-policy-change 
path. 
This basic concept is straightforward, but its 
implementation and assessment in practice is less 
so. In particular, there is no commonly accepted 
understanding of how to build a no-policy-
change scenario. On the one hand, this has to do 
with the complexity and idiosyncrasy of national 
budgets, underpinned by a multitude of rules and 
policies the mechanics of which may give rise to 
peculiar dynamics even in the absence of policy 
decisions. On the other hand, little work has been 
done so far to achieve such a common 
understanding. Existing studies generally cover 
fiscal forecasting as a whole, where the no-
policy-change assumption is dealt with only 
marginally. Good examples are Don (2001) and 
Carnot et al. (2005) (1). 
The importance of a better understanding of no-
policy-change scenarios for the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework is evident. An 
underestimation of expenditure trends (or an 
overestimation of revenue trends) may generate a 
favourable fiscal outlook and, in turn, give rise to 
the conclusion that a smaller than actually 
required fiscal adjustment is necessary to achieve 
or safeguard the medium-term budgetary 
objective (MTO). Past experience in the EU 
                                                          
(1) Formally, the most coherent way of making the no-
policy-change assumption operational would be to rely 
on (i) a large scale macro-econometric model with a 
detailed fiscal block or (ii) a more narrative but 
equivalent set of instruction. Such a model or 
instructions would explicitly define the link between 
public finances variables and their macro-econometric 
drivers, taking into account feedback mechanisms. The 
clear downside of macro-models confirmed by practical 
experience is that they do not allow for the many 
idiosyncrasies (both across countries and across time) 
that projections need to allow for. This is why in 
practice, macro-models are mostly used for simulations 
rather than for country-specific projections. 
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fiscal surveillance has repeatedly brought to light 
such biased applications which hamper progress 
towards sustainable fiscal positions.  
A further complication is given by the 
asymmetry of information between the Member 
States and any third party, including the 
Commission services, producing forecasts and 
assessing fiscal developments. In spite of the 
comprehensive reporting of fiscal data and 
regular exchange of information, the 
Commission services, which carry out the 
technical assessment of the budgetary projections 
laid out in the annual updates of the stability and 
convergence programmes, do not know or do not 
have full access to the detailed mechanics 
driving government revenues and expenditure. 
Against this backdrop, the Commission 
Communication accompanying the 2007 issue of 
the Public finance in EMU report encouraged 
Member States to better spell out the difference 
between fiscal trends at unchanged policies and 
the budgetary targets (1). This encouragement is 
echoed in the Council Conclusions of 9 October 
2007 according to which "[…] Stability and 
Convergence Programmes should specify how 
medium-term budgetary objectives will be met, 
including the extent to which further measures 
are required to fill the gap between the medium-
term targets and fiscal trends under existing and 
already implemented policies." 
While the prudent and informed appreciation of 
the expert will always remain a fundamental 
ingredient of any forecast that links fiscal 
variables with macroeconomic projections, it is 
worthwhile discussing existing practice at least 
                                                          
(1) Proposal 5 of the Commission Communication 
(2007)316 final accompanying the Public finances in 
EMU – 2007 report reads: "To enhance the reliability 
and credibility of their medium-term budgetary targets, 
Member States could make clearer in their stability and 
convergence programmes (SCPs) whether the medium-
term budgetary targets are attainable under unchanged 
policies, or whether they will require the implementation 
of additional policy measures. In the latter case, it would 
be important that the SCPs specify the gap between the 
main budgetary targets (government balance, 
government expenditure) and developments in 
government finances under unchanged policies, and 
provide the most detailed description of the measures 
envisaged to bridge the gap between budgetary trends 
and objectives." 
for two reasons: (i) to improve upon the current 
approach and (ii) to possibly agree on a set of 
commonly shared guidelines. 
Keeping this in mind, the following 
considerations should not be taken as a set of 
rules that are strictly applied in the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework and which should also be 
followed by the Member States. The objective is 
more modest and twofold. Firstly, to try to 
synthesise the basic elements underpinning an 
approach that has emerged since the inception of 
the SGP in the preparation of the Commission 
services' forecasts (2). Such basic elements 
guarantee a certain degree of coherence and 
transparency of public finance projections and 
eventually, allow for a better assessment of fiscal 
policy in the EU. Secondly, the principles and 
guidelines laid out should provide a basis for 
discussion with the Member States with the 
ultimate goal of improving the consistency and 
transparency of budgetary projections  
2.3.1. A definition of the no-policy-change 
assumption 
Twice a year − in spring and in autumn − the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs (DG ECFIN) releases fully-fledged 
macro-economic forecasts for all 27 Member 
States, including projections for key fiscal 
variables. These forecasts are generally used as 
reference in the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework when assessing the Member States' 
                                                          
(2) The role of public finance forecasts has been 
acknowledged and enhanced by the revised SGP. The 
March 2005 Council Report underpinning the reform 
explicitly recognises "the important contribution that 
Commission forecasts can provide for the coordination 
of economic and fiscal policies". In turn, the provisions 
of the revised Pact make references to the role of 
forecasts in the framework of the excessive deficit 
procedure in relation to (i), whether a deficit in excess of 
the reference value should be considered temporary in 
the sense of the Treaty and (ii) whether "unexpected 
adverse economic events with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances" could take place. 
While the Pact provisions relating to stability and 
convergence programmes do not contain specific 
references to the role of forecasts other than the 
projections provided by Member States, the Code of 
Conduct specifies that "significant divergences between 
the national and the Commission services’ forecasts 
should be explained", thereby recognising the role of the 
forecast as a benchmark against which the programmes 
are assessed. 
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fiscal developments against the provisions of the 
SGP. 
In line with the practice followed by most 
macroeconomic forecasters, DG ECFIN's 
forecast publication typically draws attention on 
a number of important methodological aspects of 
its projections. As regards public finances, the 
following text, taken from the Commission 
services' spring 2008 forecasts, is relevant: "For 
2008, budgets adopted or presented to 
parliaments and all other measures known in 
sufficient detail are taken into consideration. For 
2009, the “no-policy change” assumption used 
in the forecasts implies the extrapolation of 
revenue and expenditure trends and the inclusion 
of measures that are known in sufficient detail 
[at the time of the completion of the forecast]". 
Although very succinct, this clarification 
underscores an important point, namely that the 
no-policy-change assumption is not the same as a 
projection 'under current legislation'. An 
illustrative example is the regular, most often 
annual, inflation-adjustment of the tax and social 
welfare systems, which in some Member States 
happens automatically (i.e. without government 
intervention) and in others requires a government 
decision or legislation. For the latter group of 
countries, the no-policy-change projections for 
the year(s) not covered by the budget should 
include a degree of indexation that reflects the 
government’s past behaviour in order to avoid a 
bias (upward for revenues given fiscal drag and 
downward for expenditure) and to enhance cross-
country consistency with the countries with 
automatic indexation. Another case in point, 
highlighting the difference between 'no-policy-
change' and 'under current legislation', are public 
wages. Like in the private sector, the dynamics 
of wages and salaries paid by the government are 
mostly fixed by bi- or multiannual agreements. 
When such wage agreements expire shortly 
before budgetary projections are made or shortly 
after, Member States following the 'current 
legislation principle' typically present 
expenditure projections where government 
wages remain unchanged at the levels 
determined by the previous agreement. By 
contrast, a no-policy-change projection would 
allow for increases reflecting past trends or other 
reference mechanisms. 
These examples also reveal another important 
feature of the no-policy-change assumption. Its 
implementation involves different concepts and 
different underlying models for different items of 
the budget. While on the revenue side it is fair 
and appropriate to assume that most items are 
linked to specific tax or revenue bases, such as 
personal income or private consumption, very 
few stable or automatic relationships are likely to 
govern the expenditure side of the budget. A 
meaningful approach to the no-policy-change 
assumption needs to take account of these 
elemental disparities. This is reflected in the 
discussion below, which is conducted separately 
for revenues and expenditures. 
A further point, which may seem evident and 
implicitly already included in the previous 
points, is the importance of internal coherence of 
the forecast as a whole. The no-policy change 
assumption for fiscal policy needs to be linked to 
projections of the relevant macroeconomic 
projections and the assumed path of the 
exogenous variables. 
Before entering the specifics of the projections, 
one should note that the no-policy-change 
assumption, in particular for the year(s) not 
covered by the budget presented to or adopted by 
parliament, does not necessarily, or even 
normally, imply a zero-change in the structural 
balance (i.e. the cyclically-adjusted balance net 
of one-off and other temporary measures). This 
would only be the case if structural revenues and 
expenditure, including measures that are already 
known, can be expected to increase at the same 
rate vis-à-vis GDP. However, such a 
constellation cannot be taken to be the rule (see 
for instance Larch and Salto, 2005). 
2.3.2. The no-policy-change assumption for 
revenues 
On the revenue side of the budget the no-policy-
change assumption generally includes two 
elements: (i) a stable relationship between tax 
revenue and the corresponding tax base and (ii) 
the carry-over effects of discretionary measures 
taken in past years.  
The carry-over effects are generally assessed on 
the basis of the country economists' detailed 
knowledge of national fiscal policy. In most 
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cases, the assessment will start from the official 
estimates provided in the budget or other 
legislative acts affecting governments revenues 
and will be complemented by information made 
available by independent institutions and/or the 
judgment of the country economist. 
The assumption of a stable relationship between 
tax revenues and tax base is underpinned by 
national tax codes. They define in a legally 
binding way how much of a given tax base 
generated within a given year has to be paid to 
the Ministry of Finance. There is a relatively 
large and consolidated body of empirical 
literature examining these relationships, which 
are typically captured by an elasticity parameter. 
This elasticity parameter measures the relative 
change of a specific revenue item with respect to 
a relative change of the corresponding tax base. 
For a varying degree of disaggregation, such 
elasticities are typically estimated by the fiscal 
authorities of Member States, the Commission, 
the OECD and the ECB (1). Clearly, these 
estimates are not perfect mirrors of the 
complexity of national tax codes, but generally 
provide a sufficiently accurate approximation for 
projecting tax revenues. 
Table II.2.2 summarises how the link between 
tax revenues and their macroeconomic drivers is 
typically modelled in the Commission services' 
bi-annual forecast exercise. As the availability of 
data differs from country to country, the 
breakdown of total revenues used in the table 
mainly serves illustrative purposes. In some 
cases the available breakdown can be more 
detailed than in others. 
2.3.3. The no-policy change assumption for 
expenditures 
Unlike revenues, the largest part of public 
expenditure is not anchored to well-defined bases 
or macroeconomic variables. Except for 
unemployment benefits, which are linked to 
labour market developments, there are few 
general rules to determine the course of 
                                                          
(1) See for instance Girouard and André (2005) and 
Bouthevillan et al. (2001). The elasticities used in the EU 
fiscal surveillance framework were published in 
European Commission (2006a). 
government outlays under the no-policy-change 
assumption.  
In empirical terms, the past several decades have 
seen a gradual and consistent increase in 
government spending alongside the long-term 
upward movement in economic activity: this 
upward trend visibly flattened in the 1980s and 
even reverted to some extent in the 1990s. There 
is a significant body of literature that examines 
the link between expenditure and economic 
growth over time. Some work aims at describing 
long-term tendencies in history (Tanzi and 
Schuknecht, 1995). Other studies provide a 
formal test of the so-called 'Wagner law', 
according to which the income elasticity of 
government expenditure is taken to exceed unity. 
The empirical evidence for Wagner's law is 
mixed (2). 
Although it is difficult to identify general rules 
linking government expenditures to aggregate 
economic activity or components thereof, 
government outlays are of course underpinned by 
legislation, which, while generally involving a 
certain degree of discretion, lays out a possibly 
complex set of rules mapping outlays with 
specific events. For instance child benefits paid 
are linked to the number of people in a certain 
age group; subsidies or grants will be correlated 
with the volume of a specific activity of private 
households or firms. Evidently, the detailed 
knowledge and understanding of such rules is 
concentrated in the competent departments of the 
Ministries of Finance and used for the official 
budgetary projections (3). Barring a complete 
                                                          
(2) The Wagner law has been tested in different ways (see 
also Section III.3.1.1).  
(3) Some Member States do publish no-policy-change 
projections or projections under current legislation, 
which can be a useful reference, although adjustments 
are likely to be needed depending on how and when 
these trend projections are made. Adjustments may in 
particular be required (i) if national 'trend' projections 
embody a rate of increase of certain expenditure items 
that looks implausibly low in the light of historical 
experience or (ii) if expenditure trends are based on 
projections of exogenous variables for instance interest 
rates or population growth, which are not in line with the 
consensus view. More generally, it has to be born in 
mind that projections of Member States are also used 
strategically. A number of recent papers assess the 
accuracy of official economic and budgetary forecasts in 
the EU concluding their information content is limited 
(see, for example, Strauch et al., 2004, Jonung and 
Part II 
Evolving budgetary surveillance 
 
113 
duplication of work or a plain replica of the 
official projections, an external forecaster is not 
in the position to collect and process the amount 
of information available to national authorities. 
He or she will typically have to be more selective 
and rely on more stylised methods. The most 
common solutions or shortcuts are: 
• Keeping the ratio to GDP constant compared 
to the previous year or compared to the 
average of the past five years or so. 
• Applying the same nominal growth rate as in 
the previous year or the average growth rate 
of an appropriate reference period. 
• Focus on expenditure growth in real terms 
and combined it with an assumption on the 
deflator. 
• Extrapolating an observed trend of increasing 
or decreasing (nominal or real) growth rates 
or of the ratio to GDP. 
Which of these methods is the most appropriate 
will depend on the variable under consideration 
and on the features of the economy. For some 
expenditure categories, a more sophisticated 
forecast can often be made, which typically also 
links to other parts of the macroeconomic 
forecast or to the external assumptions, thereby 
enhancing the consistency of the forecast as a 
whole. 
Regardless of the method eventually chosen to 
implement the no-policy-change assumption for 
government expenditure, consideration has to be 
given on how to reconcile them with domestic 
expenditure rules. The institutional arrangements 
of many Member States include an expenditure 
norm (in nominal or real terms) or expenditure 
envelopes for total or individual items of general 
government expenditure. Whether the no-policy-
change forecast can actually embody respect of 
these norms and ceilings essentially depends on 
their credibility, which in turn is to be judged on 
the basis of (i) the past track record of the 
framework and (ii) the design of the enforcement 
mechanisms. 
                                                                                
Larch, 2006, and Pina and Venes, 2007, von Hagen, 
2008, for the European countries). 
2.3.4. More specific issues 
In addition to the basic elements of the no-
policy-change assumption related to revenue and 
expenditure projections, there are a number of 
somewhat more specific points that deserve 
attention too. 
A first issue is how to deal with carried-over 
savings on expenditure and the possibility of 
drawing down on them. The most appropriate 
way of taking this into account will depend on 
historical experience and institutional features 
(e.g. is whether such draw downs require prior 
approval by the ministry of finance, parliament, 
etc.; if so, by the ministry of finance, by 
parliament etc.).  
Historical experience will also indicate whether 
the forecast should include, for selected 
expenditure items, notably public investment, an 
electoral cycle. In particular, in case the past 
highlights a recurring pattern of expenditure 
increases ahead of elections it would be in line 
with the no-policy-change concept to take it into 
account this feature in the projection.  
In the recent past, public finances in the EU 
Member States have increasingly been 
characterised by the recourse to so-called one-
offs, i.e. “measures having a transitory 
budgetary effect that does not lead to a sustained 
change in the inter-temporal budgetary 
position” (1). Because of their transitory nature 
they need to be specifically identified when 
preparing no-policy-change forecasts in order to 
present a 'clean' trend. 
A final element that has attracted attention more 
recently and which plays a role for a no-policy- 
change projections are contingency reserves. 
Such reserves are to be found in a number of EU 
Member States and constitute allocations for 
expenditure the occurrence of which depends on 
some events that cannot be foreseen with 
certainty. As for carried over-savings, historical 
 
                                                          
(1) This definition is taken from the Code of Conduct, i.e. 
“Specifications on the implementation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact and guidelines on the format and 
content of stability and convergence programmes”, 
endorsed by the ECOFIN Council of 11 October 2005. 
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experience is also key in deciding how much of 
the contingency reserve can be expected to 
translate in actual government expenditure. 
2.3.5. Conclusions 
A clear understanding of the no-policy-change 
assumption is a condition for an effective 
implementation of fiscal surveillance in the EU. 
Reflecting the more general difficulty in making 
the no-policy-change assumption operational, 
current practice in the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework has not been 'codified'. Nevertheless, 
over the past years a number of guidelines have 
emerged which serve as a reference for the bi-
annual Commission services' forecasts. These 
guidelines are applied with judgement taking into 
account the idiosyncrasies of Member States. On 
the side of the Member States, stability and 
convergence programmes generally provide little 
insight into how budgetary aggregates are 
expected to develop in the absence of policy 
changes. However, such scenarios are key to 
assess the degree of ambition and, hence, 
attainability of budgetary targets. Following up 
on the Council conclusion of October 2007, the 
assessment of fiscal plans in the context of the 
EU surveillance framework would benefit from 
more systematic information about both the 
expected impact of discretionary measures and 
how revenues and expenditure are expected to 
develop without such measures. Such 
information could also help compare alternative 
approaches and establish best practice. 
A more specific conclusion that draws on 
practice in some Member States relates to the 
assessment of policy measures. When presenting 
policy proposals to national parliaments most 
governments are required to produce an 
accompanying technical 'fiche' which explains 
the detailed mechanics of the proposed 
intervention. The scope and feasibility of such a 
process linked to the stability and convergence 









Implementation of the no-policy-change assumption: government revenues
ESA95 code




Proxied tax base Notes
D.2 30.0
Taxes on products D.21 25.0
Value added tax D.211 15.0
Household final consumption; household investment(when residential investment is 
subject to VAT); intermediate consumption by government and social transfers in kind 
related to expenditure on products supplied to households via market produces.
0.1% of GDP  of VAT goes to the EU budget. This does not appear as 
government revenues, as they are booked as if enterprises paid directly to the 
EU. However, taxes paid to the EU appear in the tax burden.
Other (mainly excises) D.212+D.214 10.0 Household final consumption.
0.2% of GDP other indirect taxes goes to the EU budget. This does not 
appear as government revenues, as they are booked as if enterprises paid 
directly to the EU. However, taxes paid to the Eu appear in the tax burden.
Other taxes on production D.29 5.0
Taxes on production are more heterogeneous across countries than taxes on products, 
hence the proxied tax base may vary (i.e. nominal GDP or gross value added, 
compensation of employees tec.).
D.5 28.0
Taxes on income D.51 26.0
Household income tax mainly D.51a+D.51c1
Wages and salaries received by households, non-wage income (property income 
received) and some social benefits other than in kind.
Household income taxes also include taxes on holding gains, which are not 
necessariliy (or very imperfectly reflected in the proxied tax base. In most 
countries, this tax is paid and recorded in the year the taxable income is 
earned, but some positive or negative adjustement in the subsequent years 
are possible.
Corporate income tax mainly D.51b+D.51c2
Gross operating surplus of the corporate sector. Depending on the country, this tax is 
likely to be paid and recorded with a lag in relation to the generation of taxable profit. 
Due to the leeway foreseen by national tax codes such lags are not likely to be constant 
over time. When feasible, it is useful to split taxes paid by non-financial corporations 
(S.11) from those paid by financial corporations (S.13).
Coproate taxes also include taxes on holding gains, which are not 
necessarily (or very imperfectly) reflected in the suggested proxied tax base.
Other current income taxes Residual.
Other  current taxes D.59 1.8 If available, stock of finacial and non-fincial wealth. E.g. taxes on wealth and real estate ownership
Social contributions of which D.61 31.7
Actual social contributions D.611 29.4
Wages and salaries paid; depending on the specificity of each country it may be 
appropriate to excluded wages and salaries paid by the government or by some 
government units.
Imputed social contributions D.612 2.3
This is an imputed transaction and there  is no income subject to this contribution. 
However,  wages and salaries paid by the government sector are probably the best proxy 
for the tax base.
Imputed social contributions also appear on the expenditure side under 
compensations of employees.
Other current revenue of which 7.6
Sales P.11+P.12+P.131 3.9 No readily available proxy. Keeping a stable ratio to GDP is probably the best strategy in most cases.
Property income received D.4 2.0
Property income depends on government financial assets and land and their 
remuneration. It does not include realised or unrealised capital gains. It also does not 
include rentals received from government owned real estate, which is recorded as sales.
Other D.7+D.39 1.7 Other current transfers and subsidies on production paid to government units.
Capital transfers received of which D.9 1.6
Capital taxes D.91 0.6 No readily available proxy. Keeping a stable ratio to GDP is probably the best strategy in most cases.
E.g. inheritance taxe. Taxes on capital gains are recorded under current 
taxeson income and wealth and not under capital taxes.
D.92+D.99 1.0 No readily available proxy. Keeping a stable ratio to GDP is probably the best strategy in most cases.
Some structural funds from the EU budget, financing government-owned 
projects are booked here.
Source:  Commission services
Item
Indirect taxes (taxes on production and 
imports) of which
Direct taxes (current taxes on income and 
wealth) of which
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AII.1. ASSESSING ALTERNATIVE REAL-TIME 
OUTPUT GAP ESTIMATES 
This annex presents the details of the simulation 
underlying the results presented in Section 
II.2.2.1. In a bid to replicate a typical assessment 
situation in the framework of the EU fiscal 
surveillance framework, the simulation 
exclusively draws on information available at the 
time the Commission services evaluate the 
annual updates of the stability and convergence 
programmes. This is ensured by using successive 
vintages of the Commission services' autumn 
forecasts, which are the benchmark in the 
assessment of Member States' fiscal projections.  
AII.1.1. Simulation design 
The simulation covers the period 2000-2006. 
This choice is dictated by the availability of data. 
Real-time output gap estimates calculated with 
the commonly agreed production function 
methodology are not available before the year 
2000.  
The simulation is articulated in two distinct 
steps: 
• Estimating alternative output gaps in real 
time: For each year t of the 2000-2006 period, 
real-time output gap estimates are produced 
with two different methods on the basis of 
successive vintages of the Commission 
services' autumn forecasts. The first method 
is based on the principal component-based 
approach developed by Stock and Watson 
(2002). It is purely statistical in nature, yet 
gives the possibility to extract information 
about cyclical developments from a very 
large set of economic indicators. The second 
method is a modification of the commonly 
agreed production function approach that 
relaxes the assumption of a constant degree 
of capacity utilisation. Both methods as 
described in detail in separate sections below.  
• Evaluating alternative real-time output gap 
estimates: The real-time output gap estimates 
obtained in the first step are set out against 
the real-time output gap estimates that were 
actually used in the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework, i.e. those based on the commonly 
agreed production function method with and 
without incorporating the rate of capacity 
utilisation (1). The benchmark for assessing 
the accuracy of the real-time estimates is the 
ex-post output gap, i.e. the estimate derived 
on the basis of the latest available 
information, i.e., at the time the present report 
was written, the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast.  
AII.1.2. Forecasting using principal 
components  
The forecasting based on principal components is 
implemented following the methodology 
described in Stock and Watson (2002) and is 
built upon two steps. In the first step, principal 
components are estimated from the multiple 
indicators which are expected to contain 
information on cyclical conditions. In the second 
step, cyclical conditions, as measured by the ex-
post output gap, are regressed on the principal 
components. The regression equation can then be 
used to produce forecasts of the cyclical 
conditions using the information contained in the 
range of real-time indicators and condensed into 
the principal components.  
Formally, the approach can be represented as: 
ttt eFX +Λ=     (1) 
tttFt Fy εωββ ω ++= ''    (2)  
where X is the vector of predictors, F are the 
common factors and y the variable to be 
predicted and e is a N×1 vector of idiosyncratic 
disturbances, ω is a m×1 vector of observed 
variables including, in the present case, lags of 
yt. The variable yt stands for the ex-post output 
gap estimates derived from the commonly agreed 
production function approach; i.e. based the 
Commission services' spring 2008 forecast. It is 
assumed that (Xt, yt) admits a factor model 
representation with common latent factors Ft. 
The forecast horizon is t, which is also the period 
during which yt is observed. While longer time 
                                                          
(1) For a detailed description of the commonly agreed 
method (see Denis et al., 2006). 
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horizons (i.e., beyond t) could be considered as 
well using the same approach, only the forecast 
of year t is performed here given that the 
objective of the present exercise is to assess the 
forecasting performance of the principal 
component approach for real-time forecast. 
Under general conditions on the errors, Stock 
and Watson (2002) show that the estimator 
derived using the principal component approach 
is consistent and asymptotically efficient as both 
N, the number of factors and T, the time 
horizons, tend to infinity. The selection of factors 
derived from (1) and used the estimation of (2) is 
made using the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC). 
An important improvement of this approach 
compared to existing methods implementing 
factor analysis to forecasting purposes such as, 
for instance, Ding and Hwang (1999), is that the 
Stock and Watson (2002) approach is suited in 
the case where the error terms et in (1) are both 
serially and (weakly) cross-sectionally correlated 
which is likely to be the case when considering 
macroeconomic variables. For the simulation 
carried out here, the following variables were 
used in order to calculate the principal 
components used in the second stage of the 
forecast: (1)Total unemployment in percentage of 
labour force; Employment (in persons); Private 
final consumption expenditure, Consumer price 
index; Gross fixed capital formation; Gross fixed 
capital formation in construction, Gross fixed 
capital formation in equipment; Change in 
inventories and net acquisition of valuables, 
Domestic demand excluding change in 
inventories; Final demand; Gross domestic 
product; nominal compensation per employee; 
Net capital stock at constant prices, Export of 
goods and services, Import of goods and 
services, Gross saving, Net saving, Net lending 
with the rest of the world, Assessment of current 
production capacity*, Economic sentiment 
indicator*, Industrial confidence indicator*, 
Judgement about present economic situation in 
overall economy*; Judgement about present 
                                                          
(1) All variables were transformed into annual growth rates 
and taken from Ameco (Annual macro economic 
database, DG ECFIN), variables with an * were taken in 
level and from the Webfame database (Business and 
Consumer Surveys, DG ECFIN). 
economic situation: private consumption*; New 
orders in recent months*. 
AII.1.3. Augmented production function 
approach 
The following Cobb-Douglas production 
function is at the core of the commonly agreed 
method for the calculation of potential output 
and the output gap in the framework of the EU 





−= 1)()(    (3) 
where the level of output Y is obtained as a 
combination of the two factor inputs − K the 
capital stock and L labour − and a residual – total 
factor productivity TFP. The latter captures both 
pure efficiency improvements or trend TFP 
(TFPT) and variations in the degree of capital 
and labour utilisation. Taking this into account 
the production function can be rewritten as: 
aKUKaLULTFPTY −⋅⋅= 1)()(   (4) 
Where UK and UL denote the rate of capital and 
labour utilisation respectively. Combining both 
equations and taking logarithms we have: 
ukultfpttfp ⋅−+⋅+= )1( αα    (5) 
where lower case letters indicate logarithms. The 
two rates of capacity utilisation uk and ul cannot 
be observed directly and hence need to be 
approximated by survey measures of capacity 
utilisation, which we denote as ucap. By 
construction, indicators of the rate of capacity 
utilisation are good proxies for uk. Whether ul 
fluctuates significantly over the cycle is not clear 
since the labour input series used for the 
commonly agreed methodology already contains 
fluctuations in average hours worked per 
employees. In case there are residual fluctuations 
in the degree of labour utilisation they are likely 
to be correlated with the rate of capacity 
utilisation of capital. Thus, it is reasonable to 
assume that 
εχ += ukul    (6) 
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where ε  captures random factors. Under the 
assumption that the relative change in the 
indicator of capacity utilisation derived from 
surveys (ucap) is equal to the relative change of 
uk, tfp can be approximated as: 
υααχ +⋅−++= ucaptfpttfp ))1((  (7) 
Estimating tfpt becomes a standard unobserved-
component problem, where a measured times 
series tfp is broken down into a cycle and a trend 
component and some information is available on 
the cyclical component. 
AII.2. MODELLING TIME-VARYING TAX 
ELASTICITIES 
This annex provides the technical details of the 
time varying tax-to-GDP elasticities discussed in 
Section II.2.2.2.  
AII.2.1. The model 
The starting point is the following error-
correction model that explicitly distinguishes 
between short-term and long-term tax elasticities 
to GDP and allows for year-to-year changes:  
ttZi t
YdiDitYdtTd ελββα +−∑ +++= 1lnln0ln (8) 
where T denotes tax burden and Y nominal GDP. 
Z represents the error correction term and is 
obtained estimating the following equation: 
tZtRj jt
YtT +∑++= θα lnln  (9) 
where the long-run elasticity of taxes with 
respect to nominal GDP is exogenously set equal 
to 1 (1). tR  stands for a time trend which a priori 
                                                          
(1) This choice can be defended on the ground that except 
for discretionary shifts in the size of government, the 
ratio between taxes and GDP should remain constant in 
the long run. A long-run elasticity higher (lower) than 
one would have the rather unintuitive implication that the 
tax ratio would consistently keep on increasing 
(decreasing) as a share of GDP. There may be arguments 
such as those underlying the Wagner's law suggesting 
that the size of government in the total economy tends to 
increase. However, it is difficult to determine a priori 
is not linked to the intrinsic features of the tax 
system but is expected to capture policy 
decisions to change the size of government. Time 
breaks in the trend capture such shifts. 
iD  in equation (9) stands for a series of slope 
dummies linked to variables that may determine 
variations in the 'normal' short-term tax-to-GDP 
elasticity represented by 0β . The determinants 
included in the baseline specification of our 
model are: the share of consumption, the share of 
wages in GDP, property and equity prices. We 
choose these four variables for the baseline for 
the following reason. The first two are expected 
to capture the main composition effects, i.e. of 
aggregate demand and the primary distribution of 
income. As regards the asset price variables there 
is a strong presumption that they may have a 
significant impact on taxes and hence on fiscal 
policy making, especially boom-bust cycles of 
asset prices. The data for the two asset price 
variables were provided by the Bank of 
International Settlements (see Borio et al., 1994). 
Depending on the country, additional variables 
were added that are also expected to affect total 
taxes but which may be rather country specific, 
such as oil prices or real exchange rates. 
The slope dummies take the value -1, 0 and -1 to 
capture three different stylised states of the 
determinants: 1 and -1 are supposed to denote 
significant deviations of tax determinants from 
their 'normal' configuration indicated by the 
value 0. The exact definition of the three states 
for each of the variables concerned is described 
in Table II.AII.1. 
The use of slope dummies, instead of the 
untransformed variables to capture composition 
effects serves two purposes. Firstly, the use of 
slope dummies facilitates the interpretation of the 
results in the sense that the time varying tax-to-
GDP elasticity is simply given by the sum of 0β , 
the individual iβ 's and the error correction term. 
Secondly, slope dummies turned out to give 
statistically more robust results compared to 
                                                                                
whether such a trend is the result of automatic 
mechanisms or the reflection of discretionary fiscal 
policy decisions. In view of this 'indeterminacy' the long-
run elasticity for total taxes is set equal to one. 
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specifications where the untransformed variables 
are used. The use of slope-dummies also comes 
at a price: the link between total taxes and their 
potential determinants is not continuous. Rather, 
it reveals the average impact of a given 
explanatory variable. This caveat is acceptable as 
the purpose of the exercise is to identify the 
source of observed variations in total taxes with 
respect to GDP. 
As is evident from equation (8), changes in tax 
revenues with respect to GDP may come from 
different channels. The first channel is via 
changes in nominal GDP and refers to the rate of 
economic growth. The second channel is via the 
set of other variables captured by the slope 
dummies Di which are expected to measure 
changes in the composition of GDP growth. The 
third and last channel works via the error-
correction term which pushed tax revenues back 
to the equilibrium level with an annual rate equal 
toλ , independently of the rate and the 
composition of growth.  
The simulated time-varying elasticity and its 
drivers of a given year t are obtained by dividing 
the fitted values of equation (8) by the relative 















  (10) 
An important issue with estimating tax 
elasticities is the impact of discretionary 
measures. Tax revenue data typically includes 
the effect of both changes in the economic 
environment and the impact of deliberate policy 
decisions on the side of national fiscal 
authorities. Conceptually, tax elasticities should 
solely gauge the effect of the first and abstract 
from the latter. Possible ways to circumvent the 
problem are (i) to derive tax elasticities on the 
basis of institutional information, especially the 
tax code, or (ii) to simply assign a specific value, 
for instance 1 for the elasticity of indirect taxes 
to private consumption (see for instance 
Girouard and Andre, 2005). Another possibility, 
which however stands or falls with the 
availability of data, is to remove the estimated 
effects of discretionary measures on tax revenues 
(see for instance Wolswijk, 2007). Since the 
impact of discretionary measures is not available 
over a long period for all Member States, this 
route can not be followed for our purposes, 
namely to find a method for all Member States. 
Our models were implemented with 'raw' tax 
Table II.AII.1:









dlog(GDP) < 75% 
quantile
dlog(X)-dlog(GDP) > 75% 
quantile
real effective exchange 
rate, oil prices dlog(X) < 25% quantile
25% quantile < dlog(X) 
< 75% quantile dlog(X) > 75% quantile
trade balance d(X/GDP)< 25% quantile
25% quantile < 
d(X/GDP) < 75% 
quantile
d(X/GDP) > 75% quantile
inflation X - HP(X) < 25% quantile*
25% quantile <X-HP(X) 
< 75% quantile* X - HP(X) > 75% quantile*
 nominal GDP growth d(dlog(X)) < 25% quantile
25% quantile < 
d(dlog(X)) < 75% 
quantile
d(dlog(X))> 75% quantile
Notes:  * HP(X) stands for the cyclical component of X obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.                                    
Source: Commission services.





The slope dummies take the value 1, 0, -1 depending on whether the change of the corresponding variable  in the upper 
quartile, the two intermediate quartiles or the lower quartile respectively.
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revenue data keeping in mind that this could 
affect the quality of our estimates. 
AII.2.2. Estimation results 
The error correction specification given by 
equation (8) and (9) is estimated for each country 
individually. The estimation results are reported 
in Table A.II.2. The upper part refers to the 
equilibrium relationship, the lower part to the 
short-term adjustment mechanism. 
The size of the coefficient of the first trend 
component in the long-term relationship varies 
considerably across countries but is consistently 
positive. The positive sign reflects the rise in the 
taxes-to-GDP ratio in the 1970s and 1980s 
which, in that period, went along with an 
expansion of the government sector. In a number 
of cases, especially those that saw a strong 
increase in the size of government in the early 
part of our sample, a break in the trend was 
included to capture either a levelling off or a 
reversal of the upward trend in the later period. 
The coefficient of the error-correction term, 
which measures the strength of the adjustment 
towards the long-term equilibrium, has the 
expected negative sign and is usually significant. 
As regards the short-term elasticity with respect 
to GDP, the estimated (
0βˆ ) coefficients are 
mostly in the expected vicinity of 1. This means 
that for a 'normal' configuration of the other 
variables (when the slope-dummies take the 
value zero) total taxes are broadly proportional to 
GDP. Notable exceptions are Spain and Sweden, 
where the estimate is at around 1.3, prima facie 
indicating measurable degrees of progression in 
the tax code.  
Our main interest lies in the estimated 
coefficients of the slope-dummies (
iβˆ ), which are 
expected to capture the short-term variations of 
the tax elasticity with respect to GDP. 
Table II.AII.2:
Total current taxes - Detailed estimation results of error correction models
BE DK DE IE EL ES FR IT NL AT PT FI SE UK
trend 1 0.023 0.010 0.001 0.017 0.018 0.034 0.017 0.021 0.005 0.006 0.020 0.015 0.010 0.000
trend 2 -0.021 -0.008 -0.030 -0.032 -0.015 -0.025 -0.021 -0.022 -0.018
break 1982 1990 none 1989 none 1991 1985 1995 1993 none none 1995 1991 none
-0.13 -0.32 -0.47 -0.17 -0.24 -0.52 -0.27 -0.46 -0.19 -0.24 -0.24 -0.37 -0.13 -0.14
*** ** *** ** *** * ** *
1.21 1.06 1.16 0.99 0.93 1.37 1.11 1.13 1.04 1.16 1.18 1.11 1.35 1.03
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
0.02 -0.09 0.29 0.09 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.12 -0.07 0.04 0.10 -0.05 0.05
** ***
-0.14 0.00 -0.04 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.17 0.17
* ** * **
0.21 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.13
* ** *** *** *
0.02 0.10 na na na 0.01 0.09
0.21 na na na 0.01
***
0.13 0.00 0.02 na 0.09 0.03 na na -0.04 0.19
** ***








-0.16 -0.23 -0.07 -0.17 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.14 -0.07 -0.37 -0.01 -0.08 -0.22 -0.06
** *** ** *** *** **
-0.13
*
1972 1972 1976 1972 1972 1972 1972 1972 1972 1973 1972 1972 1972 1972
2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005















Wage share in GDP





Prices of residential 
housing






Trade balance in % 
of GDP
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Unsurprisingly, results differ significantly across 
the fourteen countries considered. Shifts in the 
consumption-to-GDP ratio, which would 
typically impact on the VAT content of GDP, 
turn out to have the expected positive sign and to 
be statistically significant in one country: in 
Germany the effect of a large increase is 
estimated to add on average 0.3 to the standard 
elasticity. With the exception of Denmark, where 
the coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant, the impact of consumption in GDP 
turns out to be rather small and statistically 
weak. The counter-intuitive result for Denmark 
needs further investigation. 
• Shifts in the labour share in total income turn 
out to be important in a large number of 
countries. In particular, in eight out of the 
fourteen Member States included in the 
sample the coefficients of either the 
contemporaneous or the lagged dummy 
variable or both have the expected positive 
sign and are statistically significant. 
• The other two slope-dummies included in the 
baseline specification capture asset price 
movements, specifically movements in 
housing and equity prices. The corresponding 
estimation results do not confirm the 
sometimes strong a priori view according to 
which asset prices are a direct driver of 
temporary revenue windfalls. Among the 
eleven countries for which asset price data 
are available, there are only three cases where 
the slope-dummies capturing asset price 
movements turn out statistically significant. 
In Denmark large swings of prices for 
residential housing are estimated to 
increase/decrease the elasticity by on average 
0.2. A similar impact is estimated for Sweden 
for what concerns equity prices. A smaller 
but still statistically significant effect is 
recorded in the case of Spain. The main 
impact of asset prices on tax revenues can be 
expected to work via the wealth effect and 
hence should be captured by the coefficient 
related to the share of private consumption 
expenditure in GDP. A measurable direct 
impact is likely to come to light only when 
capital gains are realised or when there is a 
boom or slump of real estate transactions 
which in some countries are subject to fees.  
• Beyond the baseline specification there is one 
variable which yields statistically significant 
results for many countries, namely the slope-
dummy capturing the acceleration or 
deceleration of real GDP. The size of the 
estimated impact varies markedly from 
country to country but has consistently a 
negative sign. Conceptually, the 
acceleration/deceleration is expected to allow 
for the fact that some tax bases react with a 
lag to cyclical development. This is 
particularly true for corporate profits, which 
due to the leeway foreseen by national tax 
codes can be carried forward (in some cases 
also backward) with a considerable degree of 
discretion.  
• Other variables for which there is a 
sufficiently convincing a priori about a 
potential impact on the tax elasticity to GDP 
such as the trade balance, inflation, the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) or the price 
of oil turn out to play a role only in a very 
limited number of cases. An appreciation of 
the REER seems to have a significant effect 
in Italy suggesting that the loss of 
competitiveness goes along with a higher tax 
content of economic growth as consumers 
may have switched to domestic consumption. 
In the case of France, a deterioration of the 
trade balance seems to give rise to a higher 
tax content of GDP growth as VAT-exempt 
exports decline relative to imports. 
AII.3. RECORDING OF TAXES AND SOCIAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN ESA95 ACCOUNTS 
Most government revenue consists in taxes and 
social contributions (91% of total government 
revenue on average in the EU amounting to 
41.2% of GDP (1)). The way taxes and social 
                                                          
(1) Data are for 2006. They include taxes levied by the 
general government on behalf of EU institutions (on 
average 0.3% of GDP); including notably a fraction of 
VAT receipts, which do not appear as government 
revenue and are recorded as if enterprises paid them 
directly to the EU budget. Data also include imputed 
social contributions. The estimation and recording of 
imputed social contributions (on average 0.9% of GDP in 
the EU) appear as revenue and expenditure in the 
government accounts without any impact on the 
government balance. Other government revenues include 
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contributions are recorded in ESA95 is therefore 
critical to explain the evolution of the 
surplus/deficit of the general government and to 
ensure comparability of figures across EU 
Member States. An understanding of the 
recording of taxes in practice is also crucial when 
analysing tax elasticities and other tax-related 
indicators. 
The recording of taxes and social contributions 
in ESA95 follows two basic principles. First, in 
ESA95, transactions are recorded on an accrual 
basis i.e. ‘when economic value is created, 
transformed or extinguished, or when claims 
arise, are transformed or are cancelled’ (1); this 
is not necessarily at the time of any effective 
cash flow. In the specific case of taxes and social 
contributions, ESA95 specifies that they should 
be booked ‘when activities, transactions or other 
events occur which create the liability to pay 
taxes’ (2). For example, social contributions are, 
in principle, recorded as social security revenue 
in the period during which the related work is 
done; VAT and excises are generally recorded at 
the time of the underlying transaction (the import 
or the sale of VAT-able goods and services); it 
may happen that the effective cash payments 
occurs somewhat later on. The accrual principle 
may be more difficult to apply for some other 
taxes, notably income taxes, and a number of 
pragmatic accounting techniques need to be 
implemented. In the case of income taxes, it is 
frequent that the final tax is only determined in a 
later accounting period than in which the income 
accrues (e.g. in year 2008 for income earned in 
2007); this occurs notably when the tax is 
progressive, there are a number of tax deductions 
or tax credits, or simply because the tax rate has 
not yet been decided by the Parliament at the 
time the taxable income is earned. For many 
countries, in the case of corporate taxes, it may 
even be unrealistic to estimate and book taxes on 
                                                                                
notably dividends paid by public enterprises, interest on 
deposits, rents of land, rentals of buildings, revenue from 
sales, fees, licences, etc.  
(1) ESA95, Council Regulation (EC) N° 2223/96; OJ L 310, 
30.11.1996, p.1 (Regulation as last amended by 
Regulation (EC) N° 1392/2007 of European Council and 
Parliament; OJ L 324, 10.12.2007, p.1), paragraph 1.57. 
(2) ESA95, paragraphs 4.26 and 4.82 for taxes. For social 
contributions, paragraph 4.96 uses a similar language: ‘at 
the time when the work that gives rise to the liability to 
pay the contributions is carried out’. 
the basis of profits earned during the year; in 
other countries, enterprises pay their income tax 
in instalments on the basis of their own estimate 
of taxable profits. ESA95 thus provides 
flexibility as regards the events that creates the 
liability, either when income is earned or when 
the tax to be paid is determined. Withholding 
taxes – also called pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) 
taxes –, may be recorded in the periods in which 
they are effectively paid, since the lag between 
the taxable event and the effective payment is 
usually very small. Those taxes often include a 
final settlement in a subsequent year; thus a part 
of the tax is recorded in the period in which that 
settlement takes place.  
Since the accrual basis often implies recording 
revenue before its actual collection, there is a 
need to deal with unpaid taxes. Thus, a second 
principle is that, taxes and social contributions 
due but unlikely to be paid – because of 
bankruptcy of the taxpayer, inefficiency of the 
tax agency, or any other reason – should not 
benefit the government deficit/surplus (3). This 
principle is fully compatible with accrual 
recording since the difference between accrual 
and cash bases is fundamentally on the time of 
recording of taxes, and not on the amounts to be 
recorded. Amounts recorded according to these 
two accounting bases may differ on each specific 
period, but should converge in the medium-term. 
Moreover, this principle aims at measuring the 
tax burden on the basis of amounts actually paid 
by economic agents and not on ‘virtual’ taxes. 
These two principles ensure comparability of 
deficit and tax burden figures across countries in 
spite of the differences in the tax structure of 
Member States, (4) in the basic data available to 
statisticians and in the efficiency of tax agencies.  
The recording of taxes in practice depends 
heavily on the data sources that are available to 
statisticians. There are two main sources of 
information on taxes. If the data sources are cash 
receipts, taxes can be booked either on a pure 
cash basis (i.e. amounts effectively collected are 
recorded as revenue at the time of their 
                                                          
(3) See Regulations (EC) No 2516/2000 (OJ L 290, 
17.11.2000, p.1) and 995/2001 (OJ L 139, 23.5.2001, 
p. 3). 
(4) For detailed information on the structure of tax systems 
in Europe, see Eurostat (2007). 
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collection) or on a time-adjusted cash basis. The 
time-adjustment consists in recording as 
government revenue the amounts effectively 
collected, but imputing them at the time of the 
underlying taxable transactions. This is usually 
done taking into account the average lag between 
the taxable activity and the effective payment. 
Many Member States apply this technique for 
taxes that are paid several times in each year, in 
particular when the lag between the taxable event 
and the effective payment is relatively short and 
does not exceed a few months.  
For example, in several countries, VAT received 
in the first weeks of year t is allocated to the 
accounts of year t-1. Recording techniques based 
on cash data – with or without time-lags – have 
the advantage of not requiring any specific 
adjustment for unpaid taxes.  
If the data sources are the amounts evidenced by 
assessments of the tax authorities or declarations 
by taxpayers as amounts due, there is a need to 
correct these amounts for taxes that will never be 
collected. Taxes can be registered on a net basis, 
i.e. adjusted by a coefficient that reflects the 
proportion of taxes that will never be collected; 
those coefficients are estimated on the basis of 
past experience and of current expectations. 
Alternatively, amounts assessed as due are fully 
recorded as government revenue, but the 
discrepancy between the amount assessed and 
the actual cash receipts is treated as a capital 
transfer (i.e. as expenditure) in favour of the 
defaulting taxpayers (1). Table II.AII.3 
summarizes for the main categories of taxes and 
the corresponding recording methods used in the 
EU Member States.  
                                                          
(1) Technically, the capital transfers representing taxes and 
social contributions assessed but unlikely to be collected 
are recorded in category D995. D.995 appears in 
government accounts as expenditure; when calculating 
the tax burden D.995 is deducted from tax and social 
contribution revenue. 
European Commission 









EE cash (1m lag)      
excise duties: 
cash (1m lag)    
others: cash
IE
EL cash (2 m lag), 
taxes on products: 
cash (1 m lag)    



















Source : European Commission, based on questionnaires transmitted by national statistical offices to Eurostat, according to Regulation (EC) N°2516/2000.
Actual social 
contributions (D61)
ass./decl. + coeff. + cap. trans. ass./decl.  cash (1m lag) except for final settlement of personal income tax cash (6m lag) 
cash
cash (time adjusted, 1 m lag)
cash (time adjusted, the lag depends on each specific tax)
Cash (adjusted for one 
month); amounts unlikely 
cash (1 m lag). 
ass./decl. + cap. trans.
ass./decl. + coeff.
cash (time adjusted, the lag depends 
on each specific tax) cash cash (1m lag)
cash (1m lag)
cash (1m lag) cashVAT and fuel duties: cash (2m lag), other: cash
ass./decl. + coeff. + cap. 
trans.
cash (time adjusted)
cash (1m lag) cash 
cash (the time-adjustment the lag depends on the tax)
cash (1m lag)
cash  complemented with "realistic balances" on taxes pending effective collection. From september 2008 Malta will change to time-adjusted cash (the lag will 
depends on each specific tax)
cash (1m lag)
cash (time adjusted, the lag depends 
cash (1m lag)





cash (generally 1m) cash (1m lag)
cash (time adjusted, the lag for the 
time-adjustment depends on each 
specific tax)
cash; except 
withhold tax on 
wages: cash (1 m 
lag)
cash
cash except for some part of personal income tax: cash (time adjusted)
FR
LT
excises: cash (1m 
lag)     other : 
cash




Note : This table distinguishes techniques for recording taxes and social contributions on the basis of data sources: cash data (“cash”) or assessments and declarations
("ass./decl"). When cash receipts are used, the table indicates whether there is any time adjustment and the respective lag is indicated ("1m lag" stands for an average lag of 1
month). When assessment and declarations are used ("ass./decl"), the table indicates how amounts unlikely to be ever collected are estimated and handled: uncollectible taxes
are estimated through coefficients ("coeff.") and netted from revenue, or identified as capital transfers ("cap. trans.") booked as expenditure. Some countries may use a mix of
the last two options: they estimate the amount of taxes not to be collected through coefficients, book all taxes due as revenue and record uncollectible taxes as capital transfer
("coeff.+ cap. trans."). 
Accounting treatment of taxes in ESA95
ass./decl. + coeff. + cap. 
trans. 
cash (time adjusted, 2 m lag) ass./decl. + coeff. + cap. trans.
ass./decl. + coeff. + cap. trans. (for local government non-receivable amounts are netted from tax revenue) 
cash
ass./decl. + cap. trans.
cash (1m lag), except self 
employed: cash
ass./decl. + coeff.
Indirect taxes (D2) Direct taxes (D5)
cash (time adjusted, the lag depends on each specific tax)
corporate personal
Capital taxes (D91)
ass./decl. + cap. trans. ass./decl. + coeff. + cap. trans. property taxes: cash cash
cash ( m lag) for pension 
funds, data from profit and 
loss account
cash (1 m lag)
ass./decl. + coeff. + cap. trans.
cash (time adjusted, the lag depends on each specific tax)
cash (time adjusted, the lag for the 
time-adjustment depends on each 
specific tax)




cash (time adjusted, the lag depends on each specific tax)
cash cash (1m lag)
cash (time-adjusted)
cash (1 m lag)
cash (1 m lag) final 
settlement in year t+1 
allocated to year t
ass/decl.
cash (time-adjusted, the lag depends on each specific tax)
cash (1 m lag) final 
settlement in yeat 
t+1 allocated to year 
t
Part III 








How can fiscal policy support the 
macroeconomic goal of sustained long-run 
economic growth, in addition to the commonly 
accepted role of sustainable fiscal positions? This 
question has emerged in recent years as a new 
focal point for EU policy makers and is often 
captured under the heading of 'improving the 
quality of public finances' (QPF). In contrast to 
past discussions on the short-term impact of 
fiscal policy on aggregate demand, the emphasis 
has shifted to its role in supporting an economy's 
growth potential. This shift largely reflects the 
need to prepare Europe's economies for a dual 
challenge: their ageing populations, which will 
put additional demands on public finances and 
globalisation which raises international 
competition, increases factor mobility and 
potentially heightens exposure to external 
shocks.  
The important role that fiscal policy should play 
in this respect has already been recognised by the 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs and the 
revised Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The 
former stresses the intertwining between fiscal 
policies and structural reforms and suggest 
several fiscal policy avenues to support growth. 
They include a stronger focus on growth-
enhancing public spending categories and tax 
structures and mechanisms for greater 
effectiveness. At the same time, the revised SGP 
underlines the importance of different 
dimensions of QPF for effective implementation 
of the EU's fiscal surveillance framework. 
While individual links between fiscal policy and 
economic growth had already been identified in 
the past, a systematic and comprehensive 
approach had been missing. Therefore, Part III 
provides a multi-dimensional framework of QPF 
which sets out six key channels through which 
fiscal policy impacts economic growth. In 
addition to the linchpin of sound fiscal positions 
and sustainable debt levels, they also include the 
size of governments, the composition and 
efficiency of public expenditure, the structure 
and efficiency of revenue systems, fiscal 
governance and those public finances policies 
that affect the functioning of markets and the 
overall business environment. 
Even though the links between the different 
dimensions of QPF and growth, on the one hand, 
and between various QPF dimensions, on the 
other, are very complex and not yet always fully 
understood, a number of empirical regularities 
have emerged. Part III summarises these 
empirical findings and conducts preliminary 
analyses for the EU Member States. These can 
be summarised as follows. 
The size of governments tends to matter for 
economic growth, especially if large public 
sectors are combined with short-comings in other 
dimensions of QPF. It is clear that the size of the 
public sector reflects past and current political 
choices that go beyond the macroeconomic goal 
of sustained economic growth. In particular, 
income distribution and social cohesion 
considerations also play a role, and some 
countries have been quite successful in achieving 
both objectives simultaneously. However, on 
average, empirical studies find that when 
governments become too large they tend to 
hamper long-run growth as they often go hand in 
hand with higher tax burdens and inefficient 
public administrations. This is particularly the 
case if expenditure is largely debt-financed and 
crowds out private investment. Thus, overall 
there is a need to consider many factors 
simultaneously, such as other policy objectives 
and the types, financing and efficiency of 
expenditures, in an assessment of the costs and 
benefits of large governments.  
Sound and sustainable fiscal positions are 
preconditions for growth over the medium and 
long run. The EU's fiscal framework draws on 
this link which is also confirmed by empirical 
work in Part III. The estimates substantiate 
earlier findings of a negative relation between 
public debt and growth, but the issue of 
endogeneity of debt and deficits to growth 
conditions should not be overlooked. When 
looking in more detail at the channels through 
which fiscal policies influence economic growth 
by using a growth-accounting approach, the 
evidence tends to suggest that in countries with 
poor fiscal performance, private investment is 
less of a driver of growth. This indicates a 
possible crowding-out effect.  
While both the size of the public sector and the 
debt/deficit can impair growth, an important 
conditioning factor is the composition and 
efficiency of public expenditure. Both theoretical 
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and empirical research indicates that growth can 
be supported when public expenditure is oriented 
towards investment. This can be particularly 
relevant for investment in human capital 
(through education and health spending), 
technical progress (R&D spending) and public 
infrastructure. However, evidence also suggests 
that the link between the amount of spending in 
these areas and economic growth is not 
automatic, but depends largely on the ability to 
achieve the envisaged outcomes (e.g. higher 
education attainment, more private investment in 
R&D) and overcoming existing market failures 
without creating new distortions. Thus, high 
efficiency and effectiveness of public spending 
are key to maximising the potential of 
government outlays and creating fiscal space for 
other demands (e.g. from ageing populations).  
Moreover, the structure and efficiency of revenue 
systems can be a factor for long-run growth. 
Since the tax structure affects labour supply and 
demand, incentives for investment, risk taking 
and human capital formation, it can hamper 
growth potential by creating various distortions. 
In addition to lowering the overall tax burden, 
which would have to go hand in hand with 
expenditure reforms, adapting tax structures in a 
revenue-neutral manner is a further important 
policy option. Such efficiency-enhancing tax 
reforms should also make tax systems more 
transparent and link them better to benefit 
systems, as discussed in detail in Part IV.  
Good fiscal governance can facilitate structural 
reforms and is beneficial for all dimensions of 
public finances. Fiscal governance represents the 
institutional side of fiscal policy as it comprises 
the set of rules and procedures that determine 
how public budgets are prepared, executed and 
monitored. The importance of fiscal governance 
has been confirmed in empirical studies, 
including studies conducted by the European 
Commission, which have found that EU Member 
States with strong fiscal rules, medium-term 
budgetary frameworks and independent 
budgetary institutions, have exhibited stronger 
budgetary positions and have been more 
successful in fiscal consolidations.  
Non-budgetary items also form part of QPF, 
although in an indirect way, since public finance 
policies can impact the functioning of markets 
and the business environment. Well-functioning 
product, services and factor markets and low 
administrative burdens are usually conducive to 
higher growth potential. The empirical results in 
Part III suggest that total factor productivity and 
the skilled labour contribution to GDP growth 
are the greatest beneficiaries of economies with 
lower regulatory burdens. These two growth 
components, in turn, have played a prominent 
role for growth over the past two decades. 
The empirical findings discussed in Part III, are 
not always clear-cut and need to be assessed 
against the background of a number of caveats. 
First, there is the thorny issue of potential 
simultaneity of economic growth and QPF. 
Second, in addition to economic growth other 
macroeconomic goals of economic policy, such 
as employment and social cohesion, are also 
relevant. And third, the question of how QPF 
impacts on economic growth is complicated by 
the probably long and variable time lags between 
the implementation of policies and their effects.  
Nevertheless, even if the many QPF dimensions 
and their interactions make identifying the links 
between public finances and growth a complex 
task, they also offer policy makers a broad set of 
policy options that take account of country-
specific objectives. For example, a rather large 
public sector can only remain compatible with 
strong growth prospects if accompanied by 
sustainable budgetary positions and debt levels, 
efficient public administrations, spending and 
revenue systems that are also supported by 
strong fiscal institutions that limit incentives to 
weaken performance in these areas. Moreover, 
preliminary empirical findings indicate that QPF 
dimensions impact the various sources of GDP 
growth differently and therefore call for different 
growth strategies. For instance, as might be 
expected, countries with high education 
attainment and flexible labour markets appear to 
benefit from a higher-skilled labour contribution 
to growth while countries with relatively low 
public debt (and therefore a low crowding-out 
effect on private investment) tend to benefit 
more from capital investment. A better 
understanding of the links between QPF and the 
sources of growth is particularly relevant when 
considering policy recommendations aimed at 
removing the main barriers to higher growth 




Improving the quality of public finances (QPF) 
has emerged as a new focus for European policy 
makers. In particular, QPF has as entered as a 
new aspect into the revised Stability and Growth 
Pact from 2005 and the Lisbon Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs. The latter assigns public 
finances to support the goals of stronger, lasting 
economic growth and more and better jobs in an 
environment of more closely integrated markets 
and greater global competition (1). A linchpin of 
this strategy remains ensuring sound fiscal 
positions and safeguarding the long-term 
sustainability of public finances in light of the 
adverse demographic developments that most 
European countries are facing. But sound 
budgets are no longer enough. They need to be 
accompanied by new ways of economising on 
the delivery of public services and, at the same 
time, creating conditions supportive of long-term 
growth, competitiveness and a better resilience 
of economies to shocks.  
While the necessity to improve the QPF with a 
view to supporting economic long-term growth 
had already emerged as a new policy priority in 
2000, the policy focus has shifted over time. 
Table III.1.1 documents this shift in emphasis by 
quoting from European and ECOFIN Council 
statements on this matter. In the early years, the 
emphasis was clearly on the need to ensure the 
long-term sustainability of public finances. This 
was eventually also reflected in the revision of 
the Stability and Growth Pact which allows for 
country-specific medium-term budgetary 
objectives, stresses the need to reach these 
objectives by setting an adjustment benchmark of 
annually 0.5% per year and explicitly accounts 
for pension reforms. Since then several Member 
States have launched or adopted pension system 
                                                          
(1) See Integrated Guideline No. 3 of the Lisbon Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs (2005):  "To promote a growth- and 
employment-orientated and efficient allocation of 
resources, Member States should, without prejudice to 
guidelines on economic stability and sustainability, re-
direct the composition of public expenditure towards 
growth-enhancing categories in line with the Lisbon 
strategy, adapt tax structures to strengthen growth 
potential, ensure that mechanisms are in place to assess 
the relationship between public spending and the 
achievement of policy objectives, and ensure the overall 
coherence of reform packages." For more information on 
the Lisbon strategy see the Commission's Web site 
http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/index_en.htm. 
reforms, but nevertheless many remain at high 
risk (see Section I.4) (2). At the same time, the 
corrective arm of the revised Pact explicitly 
mentions QPF as part of 'other relevant factors' 
when the Commission reports on excessive 
deficits (Table III.1.1). Moreover, the Council 
report underpinning the revised SGP emphasised 
the role of fiscal governance, another aspect of 
QPF. Later the focus widened to also include 
other aspects, in particular restructuring 
expenditure towards growth-enhancing areas, 
since the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs 
explicitly calls for more investment in research 
and development. Raising the efficiency of 
spending and remodelling tax systems have 
surfaced more recently as prominent policy 
areas.  
For the euro area, the demands for improving the 
QPF are even more pertinent. Particular burden 
lies on fiscal policy to help stabilise idiosyncratic 
demand shocks and prepare conditions which 
facilitate the adjustment to supply shocks since 
national monetary exchange rate polices are not 
available as an adjustment tool. Moreover, EMU 
fiscal policy makers also need to consider the 
externalities of their actions for the monetary 
union, stressing the importance of sustainable 
public finances. 
In support of the new policy priorities, a host of 
analytical and empirical work on QPF has 
already been carried out in the European Union. 
The Economic Policy Committee − Working 
Group on QPF, which was formed in 2004, 
served as a key exchange on cross-country 
experiences. At the same time, the European 
Commission conducted its own analytical work 
in a number of QPF areas, in part to support the 
Working Group. Both focused initially on the 
link between the composition of public 
expenditure and growth (e.g. European 
Commission 2003, 2004 and Deroose and 
Kastrop 2008). More recently, many efforts in 
the Working Group and the literature have been 
made to assess the efficiency of public spending 
                                                          
(2) On the technical side, the focus on sustainability resulted 
in the preparation by the Commission services of the 
report on The long-term sustainability of public finances 
in the European Union (2006), which is scheduled to be 
updated in 2009. See European Commission (2006b). 
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to identify room for savings of public resources 
(e.g. Afonso et al. 2003, 2006, Afonso and 
St. Aubyn 2006a,b, Sutherland et al. 2007, 
Verhoeven et al. 2007, and see for an overview 
Mandl et al. 2008). At the same time, the role of 
fiscal governance has been studied in support of 
sound fiscal positions and expenditure efficiency 
(e.g. European Commission 2006a, 2007a, von 
Hagen et al. 2005, Curristine et al. 2007, 
Joumard et al. 2004). On the revenue side, an 
extensive literature on the linkages between tax 
systems and growth exists (see Part IV) but it has 
rarely been associated with the term QPF. 
However, a conceptual framework that captures 
the various dimensions of QPF and their impacts 
on growth remains a key gap. Therefore, this part 
of the Public finances in EMU report presents a 
definition and a multi-dimensional approach on 
QPF (Section III.2). The framework aims at 
bringing together the many different pieces of 
QPF that have so far mostly been studied in 
isolation. Specifically, it reviews the findings of 
earlier studies on issues such as the size of the 
public sector, composition and efficiency of 
expenditure, the structure of tax systems, fiscal 
institutions and sustainability and reviews how 
EU Member States fare in those aspects 
(Section III.3). Moreover, it attempts to lay out 
the possible links of QPF to growth from a 
supply-side approach of growth accounting and 
provides some preliminary findings 
(Section IIII.4). This approach could also serve 
as a basis for additional analysis going forward.  
Date Statements/ Key issues
Lisbon, 
March 2000
The European Council called for using the "opportunity provided by growth (…) to pursue fiscal consolidation more actively and 
to improve the quality and sustainability of public finances" and requested the Council and the Commission to present a report 
by Spring 2001 on the contributions of public finance to growth and employment.
Santa Maria de Feira, 
June 2000
The European Council encouraged Member States to "review the quality and performance of public administration with a 
view to the definition of a European system of benchmarking and best practices."
Nice, 
December 2000
At the European Council, the focus was on modernising social protection with a view to examine the sustainability and quality 
of pension systems. It also called for promoting the quality in all social policy areas. 
Stockholm, 
March 2001
The European Council reiterated the need to study the quality and sustainability of pensions.
Barcelona, 
March 2002
The European Council endorsed a Key Issues Paper, which defined quality of public finances as "achieving the appropriate 
structure of government revenues and expenditures to ensure sound and sustainable public finances while raising the potential 
growth of Union economies. In this light, tax and spending reforms must aim at creating the conditions to foster employment and 
investment, while adhering to the medium-term objective of a budgetary position close-to-balance-or-in-surplus." It also called to 
improve the quality of public finance with a view to adequately fund the health care system and raise the transparency and quality 
of public administration. 
Brussels, 
July 2005
The European Council endorsed amendments to two regulations (1466/97 and 1467/97) that underpin the Stability and Growth 
Pact and which, among other revisions, take better account of the quality of public finances (QPF). The amendments affect the 
role of the QPF in three ways. First, as part of the preventive arm of the Pact Member States' Stability and Convergence 
Programmes should present a detailed and quantitative assessment of budgetary and economic policy measures, including on 
QPF and budgetary rules. Second, as part of the corrective arm, QPF was explicitly mentioned as a part of "other relevant 
factors" (mentioned in Article 104(3) of the Treaty) when the Commission reports on an excessive deficit. And third, the 
amendments allow that structural reforms, including the introduction of a multi-pillar pension system, are taken into account 
under the preventive and corrective arm.
Brussels, 
March 2006
The European Council underlined "the need to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending and taxes in 
order to enhance the quality of public finances and foster growth and employment enhancing activities, in line with the priorities 




The ECOFIN Council stressed that the revised SGP underlines the important role that national fiscal rules and institutions can 
play in attaining sound budgetary positions and respecting the provisions of the Treaty and that national institutions could play a 
more prominent role in budgetary surveillance. Coupled with appropriate structural reforms, national fiscal rules and institutions 
can also contribute to improving the efficiency of public expenditure.
Brussels, 
March 2007
The European Council reiterated the need to further consolidate public budgets and safeguard the long-term sustainability of 
public finances. Moreover, it stated that "the quality of public finances needs to be improved by raising efficiency and 
effectiveness of spending, by restructuring public expenditure in support of measures that promote productivity and innovation 




The ECOFIN Council confirmed the importance of national fiscal rules and institutions. Also, it "(...) underlined that the 
modernisation of public administrations can play an important role in enhancing competitiveness, delivering better services, 
achieving better value for money and ensuring the control of government expenditure." (...) It invited the EPC and the 
Commission to step up their efforts to improve the analysis, methodology and the measurement of the QPF, including the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditures and revenue structures, as well as of major public sector reforms. And it re-
iterated that Member States step up efforts in the provision of COFOG, level II data.
Table III.1.1:
Key European and ECOFIN Council statements on the role of quality of public finances, 2000-2007
Note: Unless indicated otherwise, the references are to European Council statements.
Sources:  Presidency and ECOFIN Council conclusions (http://europa.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm).
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2.1. DEFINING THE QUALITY OF PUBLIC 
FINANCES 
Quality of public finances (QPF) is a concept 
with many dimensions. It encompasses all 
arrangements and operations of fiscal policy that 
support the macroeconomic goals of fiscal 
policy, in particular long-term economic growth. 
This objective has been set out in the Lisbon 
Strategy, in particular in Integrated Guideline 
No. 3 (see Section III.1). QPF comprises policies 
that not only ensure sound budgetary positions 
and long-term sustainability but also facilitate 
stabilising the economy and adjusting to demand 
and supply shocks. To achieve these outcomes, 
public resources need to be used in an efficient 
and effective way. At the same time, 
governments should operate expenditure and 
revenue policies in a way that creates incentives 
for an efficient functioning of labour, goods and 
services markets.  
Conceptualising QPF as a multi-dimensional 
framework is needed to reflect the complex 
relationships to growth. A one-dimensional 
approach, for example focusing solely on the 
level of expenditure items that raise productivity, 
would overlook that such spending may be 
financed through a higher and distortionary tax 
burden. A multi-dimensional perspective helps 
overcoming this 'omitted variables problem'. At 
the same time, it is clear that for an empirical 
analysis it is extremely difficult to account for all 
these interlinkages due to data availability, an 
incomplete understanding of the transmission 
mechanisms and reversed causality. Thus, a 
simplification of some dimensions is called for. 
Even though the framework explicitly uses 
growth as the ultimate benchmark to assess the 
quality of public finances, it should not be 
overlooked that large parts of fiscal policies have 
other objectives. In particular social spending, 
which accounts for about 55% of public 
spending in the EU, has primarily redistribution, 
insurance and consumption smoothing motives. 
Similarly, many revenue policies, such as a 
progressive income tax, are geared toward 
redistribution of income or the allocation of 
resources toward specific sectors. This 
framework does not explicitly aim to capture 
how well public finances perform in achieving 
those other objectives. Nevertheless, to some 
extent it includes some of these aspects 
indirectly. For example, an efficient use of social 
expenditure geared toward better social cohesion 
will help avoid an unnecessary tax burden on the 
economy or crowding out of investment-related 
public spending and thereby indirectly also serve 
the growth objective even, if in that case, the 
latter is not the primary objective. 
2.2. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE 
MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF QUALITY OF 
PUBLIC FINANCES 
The different dimensions of quality of public 
finances in a growth-oriented framework are 
summarised in Graph III.2.1. It indicates that the 
impact on growth can run through (i) the size of 
the government, (ii) the level and sustainability 
of fiscal positions, (iii) the composition and 
efficiency of expenditure and (iv) the structure 
and efficiency of revenue systems. At the same 
time, the set-up of fiscal rules, institutions and 
procedures ((v) fiscal governance) can affect all 
of the above four dimensions (1). Moreover, 
there are many ways in which public finances 
can impact the functioning of markets and the 
overall business environment, which can 
therefore be viewed to be a sixth, though 
indirect, dimension of QPF. 
A good starting point to structure the channels 
through which public finances affect growth is a 
neoclassical production function framework (see 
Section III.4 and in particular Box III.4.1 for 
more details) (2). Output growth is herein 
determined by changes in the stocks and 
utilisation of capital and labour and total factor 
productivity. The various aspects of QPF that 
impact long-run growth can be analysed in terms 
of shifts to a new steady state. Thus, we do not 
explicitly distinguish between the neoclassical 
endogenous growth theory (in which fiscal 
growth theory (in which fiscal policy can only 
                                                          
(1) While not using the label 'quality of public finances', for 
example the European Central Bank (2001) employs a 
similar classification on the links between fiscal policies 
and economic growth. 
(2) This approach closely follows Gerson (1998).  
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affect the level of output) and the new policy can 
also impact the growth rates). The six 
dimensions of QPF can have a direct or indirect 
bearing on each of the components of the 
production function. Through which channels 
they are linked to growth is briefly surveyed 
below, followed by a more detailed discussion on 
each QPF dimension in Section III.3. The 
discussion draws on findings in the literature and 
assesses data for the EU Member States and 
sample of non-EU OECD countries. A deeper 
empirical analysis starting from a growth-
decomposition exercise is then conducted in 
Section III.4. It builds on comprehensive earlier 
work, including by the Commission services on 
growth-accounting (1). The six dimensions of 
QPF can be summarised as follows:  
1. The size of the government: While a large 
government sector can contribute to short-term 
stabilisation of an economy in times of demand 
shocks, the long-run link to growth is not clear 
cut. Since the level of public expenditure is 
mirrored in the tax burden, it can create 
disincentives for capital accumulation and labour 
utilisation as well as their productivity. 
                                                          
(1) See for example Koszerek et al. (2007), van Ark and 
Inklaar (2005) and Mourre (forthcoming). 
Empirically, there appears to be an upper 
threshold when governments become a drag on 
the economy. Nevertheless, some countries with 
large governments have been able to overcome 
many of the impediments that often go hand-in-
hand with sizable public sectors, for example by 
structuring revenue systems and public spending 
in ways that raise productivity (see these 
dimensions below). 
2. The size and sustainability of the fiscal 
position: Sound and predictable public finances 
support long-term growth by ensuring long-term 
sustainability. This allows to efficiently allocate 
resources for saving and investment without 
potentially distorting such decisions through the 
expectation that governments will raise taxes in 
the future to finance current deficits or even 
impose an inflation tax.  
3. The composition and efficiency of public 
expenditure: The composition of public 
spending matters for growth, with expenditure on 
public investment, R&D and education typically 
found to be particularly productivity-enhancing. 
As ageing is putting upward pressure on future 
public spending with the attending risk of 
crowding out growth-enhancing budgetary items, 
the efficient use of public resources has received 
Graph III.2.1: The quality of public finances - A multi-dimensional framework
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increasing attention. Empirical analysis, which 
largely focused on education and health 
spending, has shown great room for efficiency 
improvements.  
4. The structure and efficiency of revenue and 
tax systems: The structure of revenues is directly 
linked to the adjustment capacity of an economy 
and long-term growth through its impact on the 
allocation of labour and capital. In terms of 
adjustment capacity, it has been argued that the 
higher the labour tax wedge, the less elastic is the 
labour supply and the higher the volatility that 
results from supply shocks. In terms of long-term 
growth, theoretical considerations, supported by 
simulations, indicate that a higher share of 
indirect taxes in the overall revenue structure can 
be associated with faster growth depending on 
certain conditions, such as wage indexation and 
minimum wage agreements (details are provided 
in Part IV). Moreover, simple and transparent tax 
systems reduce compliance and administrative 
costs and thereby also create growth-supportive 
environments. 
5. The governance of public finances: The 
governance aspect cuts through all of the above 
dimensions of QPF and thereby provides an 
indirect channel to growth. For example, good 
fiscal governance (numerical fiscal rules, 
medium-term budgetary frameworks, 
independent fiscal institutions) has been found to 
contribute to greater fiscal discipline and help 
ensure sustainability. It could possibly also 
support the shift to growth-enhancing spending 
areas. Similarly, budgetary procedures which use 
performance information are viewed to increase 
efficiency by shifting the focus away from input-
oriented management of resources to more 
results orientation. 
6. Public finance policies impacting on market 
functioning and business environment: 
Structural reforms, in combination with a strong 
regulatory and legal framework, ensure the 
smooth functioning of labour, product and 
services markets and thereby affect all elements 
of a production function. In addition to the 
above-mentioned role of public expenditure for 
education and health, public finances also play a 
particular role through their impact on wage 
setting (e.g. public sector wages and minimum 
income schemes), labour market participation 
(e.g. tax and benefits systems), and factor 
mobility (e.g. benefits systems), and, more 
generally, the business environment (e.g. through 
the provision of a functioning judicial system 
and public infrastructure). 




This section reviews the links between each of 
the six dimensions of quality of public finances 
(QPF) and growth, highlights some of the 
interlinkages and summarises empirical findings 
found in the literature with a particular focus on 
recent developments in the EU Member States.  
3.1. THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 
3.1.1. Why do governments differ in size? 
Economic theory provides two main strands of 
arguments why the size of public sectors can be 
expected to differ over time and across 
countries (1). The first line of arguments builds 
on Wagner's Law, according to which the 
government's share in GDP increases more than 
proportionally in GDP. As nations get wealthier, 
the demand for public goods expands while at 
the same time the ability to raise revenues rises. 
Examples for the driving forces behind a greater 
demand for public goods are a greater 
urbanisation of countries and ageing of 
populations. A supply-side explanation has been 
added known as 'Baumol's disease'. It argues that 
the government share rises because public sector 
wages increase more strongly than public sector 
productivity while the demand for public 
services is relatively price-inelastic (2). 
The second strand of arguments is of a political 
economy nature. To get re-elected, fiscal policy, 
in particular expenditure policy, tends to be time 
inconsistent and biased toward higher deficits 
and bigger public sectors. This tendency is 
stronger, the larger the number of parties forming 
the government, the higher the frequency of 
elections and in case of proportional rather than 
majority-based election systems (e.g. Persson 
and Tabellini, 1999, 2002). Another political 
economy argument bases the size of 
governments on rent-seeking agents who support 
larger public sectors with the objective of 
                                                          
(1) See for example Holsey and Borcherding (1997) and 
Peacock and Scott (2000) for an overview of the 
literature. 
(2) Baumol's (1967) distinguished more generally the 
productivity growth in services and manufacturing but 
his model has then been transferred to public services. 
benefiting from a redistribution of income (see 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
Aside from these arguments, the size of the 
public sector ultimately reflects political choices. 
How much of public goods to provide (e.g. 
public infrastructure, environmental protection, 
defence, law and order) and how to address 
market failures and externalities depends on 
country-specific circumstances that are partly a 
reflection of policies (e.g. competition 
regulations) and objectives (e.g. income 
distribution) and partly exogenous (e.g. 
geopolitical situation or socio-cultural features). 
A classical case are different social models with 
those providing more generous insurance also 
contributing to a more equitable income 
distribution but at the price of a higher tax 
burden on the economy. But even when a choice 
is made to provide a public service, such as 
education, it does not necessarily mean that it has 
to be 'produced' by the public sector itself but it 
could be merely financed with public funds (e.g. 
education grants) and offered by private service 
providers.  
A simple graphical inspection of recent data for 
the EU Member States and a few non-EU 
comparators reveals only a weak link between 
the size of the public sector and income. Graph 
III.3.1 indicates that, while varying widely, the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio is only weakly 
correlated with per capita GDP when assessing 
the averages of the past five years for the EU 
Member States and seven non-EU industrial 
countries (3). The correlation is somewhat 
stronger when the non-EU comparators are 
excluded from the sample, since they exhibit an 
above average income but a below average size 
of government.  
                                                          
(3) The non-EU countries which are included in this chapter 
as comparators are Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. 
Since not all of those countries are included in the 
Eurostat (Ameco) database going back to 1980, the data 
shown in charts including non-EU comparators have 
been taken from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics. The expenditure-to-GDP ratios are on average 
about one percentage point lower than the corresponding 
figures from the Eurostat (Ameco) database. 
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Graph III.3.1: Size of government and income for EU Member 
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Note: Data are averages for 2003-07 excluding Luxembourg.
Source:  IMF International Financial Statistics.
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Developments over time substantiate the 
diversity across countries (1). Only six of the 24 
countries considered (excluding the transition-
country recently acceded Member States) exhibit 
an upward trend while most follow a hump-
shape curve with a peak in the first half of the 
1990s. Expenditure reforms, fiscal consolidations 
and the benefits of euro-area membership, with 
lower inflation and interest rates, have since 
brought down somewhat the expenditure-to-GDP 
ratios in 17 of the 24 countries. But nevertheless, 
the public sectors continued to be bigger in 2003-
07 than in 1980-84 in more than half of the 
economies (Table III.3.1). At the same time, 
public sectors in old EU Member States have 
remained significantly larger than those in the 
non-EU comparators, with the differences in size 
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Table III.3.1:
Between 35 and 45 % of 
GDP
Above 45% of GDP
Level 
(2003-2007)
Changes in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio between 1980-1985 and 
2003-2007
Increase Decrease
Below 35% of GDP
 
                                                          
(1) For a detailed study on how public expenditure has 
evolved in industrial countries over the past century see 
Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000). 
Econometric studies confirm the mixed evidence 
on Wagner's Law. They tend to find a positive 
relation between the public expenditure-to-GDP 
ratio and per capita income only for some 
countries and certain time periods (Table 
III.3.2) (2). Typically when low and high-income 
countries are included in a panel analysis, a 
significant link is established. However, for 
OECD countries the empirical backing for 
Wagner's Law is weak, particularly since the 
1970s (e.g. Arpaia and Turrini, 2008). 
Table III.3.2:
Authors Country coverage Sample period
Confirmation of 
Wagner's Law?




Only for contries 
with below median 
income and fast 
ageing populations
Akitoby et al. (2004) 51 developing countries 1970-2002 Yes





Kolluri et al. (2000) G7 1960-1993 Yes
Bohl (1996) G7 countries 1952-1995 Only for Canada and the U.K.
Payne and Ewing 
(1996)
22 industrial and 
developing 
countries
1950-1994 Only for 6 of the 22 countries
Empirical evidence for Wagner's Law: a summary of findings
 
3.1.2. What are the implications for 
economic growth? 
The theoretical literature argues that the long-
term link between the size of government and 
economic growth is hump-shaped. When the 
government sector is very small, long-term 
growth could be increased by raising 
productivity of capital and labour through the 
provision of public goods. The marginal increase 
is positive but decreasing with the size of the 
public sector and becomes negative when the 
distortion that additional taxes create turn the 
productivity gains for the economy around. 
Where the turning point lies, remains a key 
question and depends on structural factors, such 
as the development stage of the economy, the 
composition of expenditure and tax structures 
chosen to fund public spending. 
                                                          
(2) Some of the earlier empirical work, which tended to 
support Wagner's Law, was later found to have been 
biased since the variables were non-stationary. 
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For many non-transition countries in- and outside 
the EU, larger public sectors have been 
associated with below average real GDP growth 
rates. Graph III.3.3 depicts this bottom-line by 
grouping non-transition economies in the EU and 
the seven non-EU comparators by growth and 
size of the public sector, while not accounting for 
any other factors. During 1980-2007, high-
growth countries (i.e. the upper quartile of the 
sample) had significantly smaller governments 
than those that grew less rapidly. Countries with 
the lowest real GDP growth rates (i.e. the lowest 
quartile) were also those with the highest 
expenditure-to-GDP ratios. This finding is robust 
for the three decades since 1980 as well as the 
entire sample period.  



























Note:  Data for EU and non-EU industrial countries, excluding transition 
economies. High-growth countries comprise the upper quartile and low-
growth countries the lower quartile.
Source:  IMF International Financial Statistics.   
Most empirical studies that explicitly consider 
also other variables than just the public sector 
size confirm an association of larger 
governments with significantly lower real GDP 
growth rates (1)(2). Out of the nine studies 
                                                          
(1) However, in a seminal paper Easterly and Robelo (1993) 
using a cross-section data set for the period 1970-1988 
for 100 developing and industrial countries find that the 
link between fiscal variables (other than public 
investment in transportation and communication) and 
budget deficits is statistically fragile. For example, the 
authors find a significant negative relation between the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio and real per capita GDP 
growth in their base regression but when they add other 
explanatory variables (monetisation and trade openness 
of the economy) the effect is no longer significant. 
(2) Bjørnskov et al. (2007) make an attempt to link 
government size and life satisfaction, which could be 
viewed as a measure for welfare. In a study for 
74 countries the authors find that life satisfaction 
decreases with higher government consumption. 
surveyed in Table III.3 for industrial countries 
(all prepared relatively recently between 1997 
and 2008), eight find a significantly negative 
relation to growth. This is in line also with earlier 
papers. Nevertheless, the empirical studies are 
not without problems. In particular, the question 
of causality is an issue since higher growth can 
facilitate reducing the government sector. 
Moreover, the cross-country evidence overlooks 
that some individual countries have succeeded in 
maintaining rather high growth rates despite 
relatively large public sectors since they also 
faired strongly on other dimensions of QPF (e.g. 
fiscal positions and sustainability, efficiency of 
spending and fiscal governance).  
In addition to the link to long-term growth, the 
size of government also matters for the automatic 
stabilisation of shocks. When a negative demand 
shocks occurs and nominal spending is left 
unchanged, the expenditure-to-GDP ratio will 
automatically rise providing a positive 
counterbalancing effect to the shock. 
Consequently, many studies have pointed to a 
trade-off between the stabilisation benefits of 
larger governments and the negative implications 
for long-term growth (e.g. Martinez-Mongay and 
Sekkat 2003, Brunila et al. 2003). However, 
under certain circumstances this trade-off can 
largely be resolved. Buti et al. (2003) present a 
model in which taxation not only affects 
aggregate demand but also aggregate supply 
(higher taxation steepens the supply curve and 
the underlying Phillips-curve, i.e. it deteriorates 
the inflation-unemployment trade-off). In such a 
setting, a larger government sector helps stabilise 
output in case of demand shocks but would 
destabilises output in case of supply shocks, if 
the government size exceeds a certain threshold. 
The authors find that the maximum stabilising 
size of government is lower for small open 
economies. Their models suggests a threshold of 
about 35% of GDP for small open economies 
and somewhat higher or about 40% of GDP for 
large open economies. Thus, Buti et al. suggest 
that reducing the government size with the aim to 
eliminate distortions and encourage long-run 
growth, is not necessarily detrimental for the 
functioning of automatic stabilisers. The multi-
                                                                                
However, this negative link decreases with higher overall 
government effectiveness. 
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dimensional framework of QPF presented here 
argues in the same vein. Larger public sectors do 
not necessarily have to impinge on the growth 
potential, if distortions are kept low through, for 
example efficient expenditure and tax structures 
or flexible market structures.  
3.2. FISCAL DEFICITS AND SUSTAINABILITY 
Sound fiscal positions, over the medium and long 
term, are a precondition for macroeconomic 
stability and sustainable economic growth. The 
EU fiscal framework is built on this premise with 
the added perspective that irresponsible fiscal 
policies would interfere with centralised 
monetary policy-making and spill over to other 
members of the monetary union and create costs 
for them (1).  
The main transmission channels from large 
deficits and high debt to growth can be 
summarised as follows (2). In all channels, public 
                                                          
(1) For an overview of the motivation and functioning of the 
EU fiscal framework see for example European 
Commission (2008a) and contributions in Brunila et al. 
(2003). 
(2) Tanzi and Chalk (2002) distinguish six channels for the 
links between high public debt and growth in the EU. 
The presentation here, while broadly following their 
arguments, condenses them to three. 
debt impinges on savings and investment 
decisions. First, large public debt may raise the 
real interest rate and thereby crowd out private 
investment. Second, if economic agents view the 
current fiscal policy to be unsustainable, they 
would increase their savings to protect against 
future tax increases. Similarly, investment may 
be discouraged if future returns are expected to 
be taxed at higher rate. This could in part also 
lead to capital flight. The same applies in case 
great fluctuations in fiscal policies complicate 
long-term decision-making by private agents. 
And third, ill-designed consolidation efforts to 
reduce deficits and debt, for example through 
cuts in public investment, may negatively impact 
long-run growth. A similar effect can be 
expected from distortionary attempts to reduce 
the interest costs of public debt, for example 
through special tax concessions for public debt 
holders.  
Authors Country coverage Sample period Effect on growth Measure for size of public sector Other explanatory variables Estimation method
Afonso and Furceri (2008) 28 OECD and EU countries 1990-2004 Significantly negative
Public revenues, 
public expenditure
Initial GDP per capita, investment share, initial human 
capital, population growth rate, openness, output 
volatility, expenditure volatility, several time dummies
Panel fixed effects
European Commission 
(2006) OECD countries 1975-2000 Significantly negative Public consumption
Initial per capita GDP, share of indirect taxation, 




Mehrez (2004) 18 OECD countries 1970-2001 Significantly negative
Public revenues, 
public consumption 
GDP per capita, budget balance, direct taxes, other 





Romero de Avila and 
Strauch (2003) EU-15 1960-2001 Significantly negative Public expenditure
Other control variables only used in estimations that 
also split public spending by economic function Panel regression
Dar and Khalkhali (2002) 19 OECD countries 1971-1999 Significantly negative Public expenditure Growth rates of real gross fixed capital formation, real exports, labour
Swamy-Mehta random 
coefficients approach
Bassanini, Scarpetta and 
Henning (2001) 21 OECD countries 1971-1988 Significantly negative Public revenues
Lagged real GDP, physical capital accumulation, 
human capital stock, population growth, ratio of direct 
to indirect taxes, trade openness
Panel regression
Heitger (2001) 21 OECD countries 1960-2000 Significantly negative Public expenditure Total investment, growth of labour force, secondary enrolment rate, GDP relative to the U.S. GLS
Foelster and Henrekson 
(1999) 23 OECD countries 1970-1995 Significantly negative
Public revenues, 
public expenditure Initial GDP, demographic variables
Panel regression, 
weighted least squares, 
2SLS for first 
differences
Agell, Lindh and Ohlsson 




public expenditure Initial GDP, demographic variables Cross-section OLS
Table III.3.3:
Empirical findings on the link between government size and growth: a survey of recent studies
Notes:  IV = Instrumental variables method; 2SLS = two-stage least squares method. The results by Bassanini et al. (2001) are also presented in OECD (2000).  
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Note: Data for EU and non-EU industrial countries, excluding transition economies. 
High-growth countries comprise the upper quartile and low-growth countries the 
lower quartile.
Sources:  Commission services and IMF International Financial Statistics.  
Empirical evidence broadly supports the negative 
link between fiscal deficits and public debt and 
growth. In many growth regressions, for 
industrial and/or developing countries, these 
fiscal performance variables have been identified 
as negative contributors to growth (e.g. Tanzi 
and Chalk, 2002, Pattillo et al., 2004, Easterly 
and Rebelo 1993). But one needs to caution 
again of the problem of reversed causality (i.e. 
higher economic growth also helping to bring 
down the debt-to-GDP ratio). This problem is 
also inherent when illustrating the simple bi-
variate relation of public debt and growth in 
Graph III.3.3. The data for EU Member States 
and the non-EU comparators illustrate that high-
growth countries had significantly lower public 
debt-to-GDP ratios than those that grew below 
average (1). Moreover, high-debt EU Member 
States were also those with rather large public 
sectors (Graph III.3.4).  
Going forward, some EU Member States are in a 
precarious situation. They are at high risk that 
their public finances become unsustainable given 
their current debt levels and fiscal positions and 
in view of projected costs from pension and 
long-term care systems (see Section II.4). This 
could consequently also have negative 
implications for their long-term growth 
prospects, in particular in view of already large, 
and potentially rising, public sectors.  
                                                          
(1) The findings illustrated in Graph III.3.4 remain broadly 
unchanged if one excludes Luxembourg (which has a 
very low debt level) and the new Member States Cyprus 
and Malta from the sample. 























Note: Data are averages for  2003-07 for EU Member States and non-EU industrial 
countries.



























There is also some evidence that fiscal policy 
variability is associated with lower growth. In 
particular, Fatas and Mihov (2003) find that for a 
set of 91 countries higher volatility of 
discretionary government spending significantly 
increased output variability which in turn 
lowered growth (2). The latter link is however 
not significant for OECD countries. In a recent 
study, Afonso and Furceri (2008) show that not 
only discretionary changes in expenditure matter 
but also cyclical ones. They find that in EU 
countries a higher volatility of the cyclical 
component of public expenditure has worsened 
the growth performance (3).  
3.3. THE COMPOSITION AND EFFICIENCY OF 
EXPENDITURE 
In recent years, European policy makers have 
stressed that shifting expenditure toward 'growth-
enhancing' areas and becoming more efficient in 
the use of public resources are key avenues for 
supporting growth. The Lisbon Strategy for 
                                                          
(2) A problem in such studies is the potential reversed 
causality between output volatility and expenditure 
volatility. Fatas and Mihov (2003) attempt to account for 
this by measuring discretionary government spending 
variability as the variance of the residuals derived from a 
regression which explains real government spending in 
terms of real GDP, various control variables and 
deterministic components such as time trends.  
(3) For a wide sample of industrial and developing countries 
from 1960-2005, Herrera (2007) finds a positive relation 
between fiscal policy volatility (measured as the 
variation coefficient of public expenditure growth) and 
real GDP volatility. He associates the latter with lower 
growth. A caveat of the broad sample is that it also 
includes crisis countries. 
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Growth and Jobs, specifically Integrated 
Guideline No. 3 (see Section III.1), makes 
explicit reference to both objectives. In 
particular, the role of expenditure composition 
has been studied in great detail and country 
experiences have been analysed to draw policy 
lessons (1). Given this wealth of earlier work, 
only a brief summary is provided below, with a 
focus on efficiency of expenditure, which has 
moved to the centre of attention more recently. 
3.3.1. Composition of expenditure 
While theory offers a framework to identify 
'growth-enhancing' types of expenditure, in 
practice this assessment is difficult to make. In 
theory, public expenditure that provides public 
goods and addresses market failures and 
externalities can be growth-enhancing. In 
practice, this could apply to, for example, 
creating public infrastructure, giving liquidity-
constrained households and small and medium-
size enterprises access to credit to invest in 
human and physical capital or creating a social 
safety net where the market fails to provide for it. 
All these types of expenditure can raise labour 
and capital productivity. More generally, public 
investment is associated with a higher marginal 
productivity than public consumption and 
therefore more likely to be 'growth enhancing'. 
However, these examples also highlight that the 
underlying identification problems of 
expenditure as 'productive' is intrinsically linked 
to the existence of public goods, the type of 
market failure and externality and the ability of 
public spending to resolve it without creating 
greater distortions (Gerson, 1998).  
Against the backdrop of such methodological 
difficulties, empirical studies have nevertheless 
identified certain types of expenditure that have 
been associated with higher growth. Government 
expenditure has thereby either been broken down 
by economic or functional classifications (or, in 
some cases, a combination of the two).  
Using the economic classification, the results for 
public investment have been mixed. Gerson 
(1998), who reviews some of the empirical 
                                                          
(1) See for example European Commission (2003, 2004) and 
the papers in Deroose and Kastrop (2008). 
studies, reports that a positive link between total 
public investment and growth is only found in 
some cases. More recent studies are also 
inconclusive. For example, Romero de Avila and 
Strauch (2003) estimate public investment to 
have a positive effect on growth in the EU, while 
Afonso and Furceri (2008) do not find public 
investment to be significant in explaining growth 
in the EU and OECD. By contrast, public 
transfers and consumption are typically 
estimated to negatively impact growth. There are 
two possible explanations for these findings. 
First, the share of public investment in the EU is 
rather small at about 3% of GDP which limits its 
potential impact on long-run growth. On the 
other hand, public consumption is large at 21%. 
Thus, empirical studies which include both 
variables in growth regressions may pick up the 
negative impact of the size of governments rather 
than the composition. And second, it appears that 
well-targeted public expenditure, rather than 
overall public investment, is growth enhancing. 
This follows from studies that combine the 
economic classification with the functional 
classification, and show that investment in 
certain areas, in particular transportation and 
communication, appears to be more 
systematically matched with higher growth (see 
Gerson, 1998).  
Graph III.3.5: Public investment and economic growth in the 
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Note:  EU-17 comprise the EU-15 and Cyprus and Malta. Data are averages for 
1995-2007, excluding New Zealand.
Source:  Commission services.
 
Graph III.3.5 shows data for the EU and the non-
EU comparators for 1995-2007 indicating a weak 
positive bi-variate correlation between overall 
public investment and growth − however, 
without taking any other factors into account. 
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Using a functional classification, the types of 
public expenditure that have been found to raise 
growth vary strongly with the data sample. Some 
studies find only education, R&D and public 
infrastructure spending to be growth enhancing, 
others also include spending on health, public 
order and safety, and environment protection 
(European Commission, 2003, 2004). For 
illustrative purposes, we use a tight definition in 
Graph III.3.6 (R&D, public transportation and 
education spending). In that case, the share in 
total public primary spending ranges from less 
than 13% in Germany (of those countries with 
complete data) to more than 24% in Latvia (if a 
wider definition is used, it can be up to 45 % of 
total public outlays, see European Commission, 
2004). It is striking that particularly most 
transition economies are allocating a rather high 
share of public resources to these productive 
purposes, which may partly reflect their 
catching-up needs and the support from the 
cohesion policy programmes.  
Overall, empirical evidence seems to support the 
hypothesis that certain types of public 
expenditure can support while others may deter 
economic growth. The latter tends to be 
particularly the case when spending is not well 
targeted and its financing creates negative 
externalities (through high debt levels or 
distortionary taxes). Thus, a reallocation of 
public resources alone cannot be a sufficient 
strategy to improve the QPF but it needs to be 
supplemented by a more efficient use of public 
resources, which would also allow lowering the 
size of the public sector and create fiscal space 
for new demands. 
3.3.2. Efficiency and effectiveness of 
expenditure 
Assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public spending is a focal point when analysing 
the QPF as it establishes the link between the 
input of public resources and the output 
(efficiency) and outcomes (effectiveness) that 
they create. Empirically, however, this analysis 
faces many challenges. 
Approaches to measuring expenditure 
efficiency (1) 
The first challenge lies in the data requirements, 
which are summarised in Graph III.3.7. The 
amount of public funds used for the various 
policy objectives (e.g. education, health or R&D 
spending) needs to be identified. While these 
data may be available to individual governments, 
they are often not publicly accessible and 
comparable across countries. The publication of 
the COFOG data by the EU-27 has been a major 
step forward in that respect but the breakdown 
into ten functional groups has still not proved to 
be sufficient for more detailed analysis (2). Due 
to these data shortcomings, but also to neglect 
                                                          
(1) See also Section II.1.4 on how to capture public sector 
efficiency and productivity in national accounts. 
(2) For example, COFOG-I does not include data on R&D 
or public infrastructure spending. However going 
forward, this information would be part of COFOG-II. 
















































Note: 2005 or latest date available. For BE, BG, CY, EL, HU, IT, LU no data is available on public transportation spending and for  IT also no data on R&D spending.. 
Sources:  Commission services, Eurostat and OECD.
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differences in factor prices, studies often focus 
on 'technical' inputs instead (e.g. the number of 
teachers, doctors, nurses and researchers). 
Similarly, decisions need to be made on choosing 
relevant output variables, such as educational 
attainments, the number of graduates, number of 
cured patients, life expectancy, or number of 
patents. And finally, these outputs should be 
closely linked with the ultimate policy objectives 
or outcomes, such as a higher labour 
productivity, higher quality of life or faster 
technical progress (1). In the 'production process' 
the outputs and outcomes are also affected by 
environmental factors (e.g. parents' education 
attainmental impact that of their children and 
dietary habits affect health policy outcomes), 
which may or may not be within the realm of 
policy makers.  
Graph III.3.7: The concepts of efficiency and effectiveness
Funding (€)
Environmental factors (e.g. socio-economic background, 










Two types of statistical methods to estimate 
efficiency, non-parametric and parametric, can 
be distinguished (see Box III.3.1 for more 
details). Both methods measure (in)efficiency as 
the distance to a production possibility 
(efficiency) frontier. In particular, output 
efficiency measures by how much the output can 
be increased at a given input level and input 
efficiency measures by how much the input can 
be reduced for a given output level (Box III.3.1). 
The differences between the two statistical 
methods to estimate efficiency lie in the 
assumptions about the shape of the efficiency 
frontier and the treatment of environmental 
                                                          
(1) Since outcomes are particularly hard to determine, 
empirical studies often focus on efficiency rather than 
effectiveness measures. Thus, in the rest of this section, 
we will only use the term efficiency, but it should be 
clear that higher effectiveness is the ultimate objective. 
variables. The short-comings of both methods 
call for robustness tests, e.g. by applying both 
approaches. 
Non-parametric approaches (e.g. the DEA) 
create the form of the production possibility 
frontier by constructing an envelope around the 
observed combinations of inputs and outputs. 
However, the shape is very much dependent on 
the size of the sample and possible outliers.  
Moreover, two data points are by definition 
always efficient (the one with the lowest input 
and the one with the highest output). To account 
for environmental influences, the efficiency 
scores that are being derived through non-
parametric approaches, can be corrected. This is 
typically done through censored regression 
techniques (Tobit) or bootstrap methods.  
Parametric approaches require an ex ante 
definition of the functional form (e.g. a Cobb-
Douglas type function) but can directly include 
exogenous factors in the estimations. 
Inefficiency is derived by decomposing the 
residual into a random error and an inefficiency 
term − a calculation that requires a number of 
assumptions and a large number of observations. 
Education spending 
Given the role that education attainment can play 
to enhance growth, it is important to understand 
whether public resources on education are used 
in an efficient way (2). Just raising the level of 
public education spending does not seem to be 
enough, even though it is typically found to be 
growth-enhancing (see Section III.3.3.1), since 
the empirical link between education spending 
and student performance is rather weak (see for 
an overview Verhoeven et al., 2007 and 
Greenwald et al. 1996, Hanushek and Kimko, 
2000, and Hanushek, 2002). This is also reflected 
in Graph III.3.8 where no correlation can be 
detected between the amount of public 
expenditure on primary and secondary education 
(during 2000-2004) and education attainment as  
                                                          
(2) See Hanushek and Woessmann (2007) and Abu-Ghaida 
(2007) on the link between education skills and growth. 
European Commission 




Box III.3.1: Approaches to estimate efficiency
The decision of using non-parametric or parametric approaches in empirical studies on expenditure
efficiency, is strongly linked to the underlying data set. For cross-country comparisons at a
macroeconomic level, non-parametric approaches have been particularly popular (e.g., Afonso and St.
Aubyn 2006a, 2006b, Hauner 2007, Sutherland et al. 2007, Verhoeven et al. 2007). For micro-level data
(e.g. school level) or cross-section data, also parametric approaches have been used (e.g., Pereira and
Moreira 2007, Sutherland et al. 2007 and Kempkes and Pohl 2007). Both approaches have different
features which are briefly reviewed below. Common to both methods are the problems of identifying
appropriate indicators (as described in the text) and determining the appropriate lag structures to capture
that policy measures may impact outputs and outcomes with a considerable delay. In practice, period
averages are frequently used which also solves the problem of cyclicality. 
Non-parametric approaches 
They construct an envelope around the observed combinations of inputs and outputs. The Free Disposable
Hull (FDH) approach does this in a step-wise way; the Data Envelope Approach (DEA) (1) in a
continuous way, which assumes convexity (see graph below). FDH and DEA use linear programming
methods to estimate the frontier allowing for multiple inputs and outputs. Thereby, each country's
efficiency is calculated relative to that of its peers. Efficiency is measured as the distance between a
country point and the efficiency frontier, defined as a linear combination of best practice observations (2).
Efficient countries have scores of one, inefficient ones have scores between zero and less than one. For
example, an input efficiency score of 0.6 would indicate that the same output could be produced with only
60% of the inputs. By definition, the countries (or other decision-making units) with the lowest input and























Input inefficiency = 
x2/(x1+x2)
1 2xx
Data envelope analysis (DEA)
 
Non-parametric approaches have several caveats (3). First, estimates are very sensitive to measurement
error, outliers and sample size. Since each observation can determine a segment of the efficiency frontier,
outliers will affect the efficiency score for all its peers. In the same vein, when a relevant observation
which represents best practices has been omitted from the sample, it may lead to an overall
overestimation of efficiency. Second, the number of inputs and outputs that can be used is limited. A too
                                                          
(1) The DEA originates on work by Debreu (1951), Koopmanns (1951) and Farrell (1957) and was extended by
Charnes et al. (1978) and Faere et al. (1994). 
(2) For an analytical description of the linear programming problem see for e.g Afonso et al. (2006) or Hauner (2007).
(3) Drawbacks of non-parametric and parametric approaches are summarised for example in Sutherland et al. (2007)
and Cincera et al. (2008). The former also offer options on how to overcome some of the caveats.  
(Continued on the next page) 
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measured by the latest PISA scores for EU and 
OECD countries (1). Thus, a more efficient use 
of public resources on education has become a 
key objective of policy makers, in particular with 
the aim to raise educational attainment rather 
than to economise on education spending. 
Graph III.3.8: Public expenditure on primary and secondary 
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Note: Excludes Greece since OECD public expenditure on primary and secondary 
edcuation exceed the COFOG figure of overall public expenditure on education.























Efficiency estimates show large room for 
improvements in most countries. Focusing on 
                                                          
(1) The Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) is an internationally standardised assessment in 
the domains of reading, mathematical and scientific 
literacy.  
output efficiency, a recent OECD study 
(Sutherland et al., 2007) for over 6.000 schools 
finds that the median school in the OECD could 
improve learning outcomes by 22% by using the 
same amount of resources (in the case of the 
study these comprise teacher-student-ratio, and 
computer availability) (2). Afonso and St. Aubyn 
(2006a), using country-level data, find somewhat 
smaller margins for improvement of on average 
13%. Both studies are correcting their estimates 
for environmental factors (3). The efficiency 
estimates and country rankings are rather 
sensitive to the estimation method, the definition 
of the input and output variables (4) and the 
countries included in the study. Nevertheless, 
across various studies a pattern emerges which is 
                                                          
(2) When these estimates of technical efficiency are 
translated into cost efficiency estimates, the room for 
improvement shrinks to 5%. This is largely due to the 
use of country-level rather than school-level data for the 
cost efficiency estimates and the lower number of 
observations and degree of variation. 
(3) Cross-country studies for industrial economies that use 
an FDH or DEA approach without such correction 
include Clements (2002), Herrera (2007), Herrera and 
Pang (2005), Mattina (2007), Mattina and Gunnarsson 
(2007) and Kuhry et al. (2004). 
(4) Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006a) use the teacher-student 
ratio and hours taught per year as input, the average 
PISA scores as output, and per capita GDP and parent 
attainment as environmental variables. 
Box (continued) 
great number would result in the programming exercise delivering too many efficient linear
combinations, possibly resulting in all countries being efficient. And third, DEA analysis does not take
into account environmental factors. For example, education outcomes are also a function of income or
parent attainment. To account for this, DEA scores are in a second step being regressed on a set of
explanatory variables, most of which can be influenced by policy makers only over the long run. This is
typically done through censored regression techniques (Tobit) or bootstrap methods. The efficiency
scores are then corrected for the impact of exogenous factors. For example, the efficiency score of a
country with an above average income and parent attainment would be revised downwards. 
Parametric approaches 
They estimate a stochastic efficiency frontier assuming a specific functional form (e.g., a Cobb-Douglas
type function). When compared to the DEA, the frontier will be fit through the cloud of data points rather
than enveloping it (see graph above). Using further assumptions, the residual is then decomposed into two
components: a random error term and an inefficiency term. While parametric approaches rely on strong
assumptions and require a large number of observations, they also have several advantages. They
explicitly deal with statistical noise and incorporate environmental variables directly in the efficiency
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summarised in Table III.3.4. Ireland, Finland and 
Japan are consistently in the most efficient group 
of countries largely because they achieve far 
above average PISA scores. On the other hand, 
Portugal and Slovakia are considered to be 
relatively efficient despite their below average 
PISA scores because their use of resources has 
been rather economical (1). Poland combines 
both aspects: a slightly above average PISA 
score with below average use of resources. 
Most efficient quartile Middle two quartiles Least efficient quartile
FI, IE, JP, PL, PT, SK
BE, CZ, ES, FR, IT, HU, 
NL, SE, UK, AU, CA, NZ, 
CH
DE, DK, EL, LU, NO, US
Notes:  The classification is based on estimates of technical and cost efficiency, 
which are corrected for environmental variables, in Afonso and St. Aubyn 
(2006a), Sutherland et al. (2007) and Verhoeven et al. (2007). The quartiles are 
determined by the average rank across a number of specifications in these three 
papers.
Table III.3.4:
Estimates for education spending efficiency
 
Analysing ways to achieve these efficiency gains 
lies beyond the scope of this paper, but the role 
of institutional factors should be mentioned. The 
OECD has created institutional indicators of the 
primary and secondary education sectors based 
on a questionnaire to its Member States (see 
Gonand et al., 2007). They include (i) the ability 
to prioritise and allocate resources, (ii) the type 
of management at the local level (outcome-
focused, managerial autonomy) and (iii) service 
provision through benchmarking and user choice. 
For four of the countries (FI, JP, PT, SK) that 
have been identified above to be among the most 
efficient these indicators are available. Three of 
them (FI, JP, PT) are, according to the self-
reported information, exceptionally strong in 
matching public education resources to specific 
needs. The other institutional strengths and 
weaknesses differ however. Outcome-focused 
management and managerial autonomy is 
particularly strong Slovakia, and benchmarking 
and user choice in Portugal.  
                                                          
(1) It should be noted that the econometric studies use 
technical (e.g. student-teacher ratios) rather than 
monetary input variables. Moreover, it should be recalled 
that the countries with the highest output and the lowest 
input are automatically considered to be efficient when 
using non-parametric techniques. 
Health spending 
A second focus of empirical studies on public 
spending efficiency has been the health sector. 
The link to growth is twofold. First, fiscally 
sustainable health care systems avoid that 
additional pressures are created on public 
budgets that would expand the overall 
government size and/or crowd out other 
spending. And second, a healthier population can 
impact positively on labour input and 
productivity. At the same time, health care 
systems, by providing insurance against the risk 
of illness, allow to smooth consumption and help 
prevent poverty. Public health expenditure in the 
EU exceeds education expenditure and averaged 
6.5% of GDP in 2005, ranging from 3.0% in 
Cyprus to 7.1% in the United Kingdom.  
Most efficient quartile Middle two quartiles Least efficient quartile
CZ, ES, PO, PT DE, DE, FI, FR, IT, JP, LU, HU, SE, UK AU, CA, CH, US
Notes:  The classification is based on estimates of technical and cost efficiency, 
which are corrected for environmental variables, in Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006b) 
and Verhoeven et al. (2007). The quartiles are determined by the average rank in 
both studies. Countries are only included if covered by both studies.
Table III.3.5:
Estimates for health spending efficiency
 
However, capturing efficiency of health spending 
is very difficult. Empirical work has proceeded 
in the same vein as for estimates on education 
spending efficiency (see summary findings of 
two studies in Table III.3.5) (2). But while the 
PISA scores have been broadly accepted as 
useful outcome indicators, there is less consensus 
on health outcomes. Variables typically include 
life expectancy or infant mortality, but it has 
been argued that better indicators would be 
quality-adjusted life years or number of 
avoidable deaths (which are available only for 
few countries) (3). The World Health 
Organization's (WHO) work in this regard, 
                                                          
(2) Cross-country studies for industrial economies that use 
an FDH or DEA approach without such correction 
include Herrera and Pang (2005), Lugaresi et al. (2007), 
Räty and Luoma (2005), Mattina (2007), Mattina and 
Gunnarsson (2007) and Pommer et al. (2004). 
(3) Ways to advance the analysis on health care sector 
efficiency are discussed in Häkkinen and Joumard 
(2007). They offer three options: system level analysis, 
disease level analysis and sub-sector level analysis (e.g., 
ambulatory care and pharmaceuticals). To assess the link 
between the QPF and growth, the first option seems 
preferable but it faces the problems discussed in the text. 
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where countries were ranked according to the 
efficiency of their health care systems, based on 
stochastic frontier estimates, has not been 
updated or revised since its publication in 2000 
as it was met with strong criticism. 
Efficiency of public spending for other 
functions 
Research on efficiency of other areas of public 
spending has been scarce. A recent study on the 
efficiency of public R&D spending (Cincera et 
al. 2008) conducts parametric and non-
parametric (corrected for exogenous factors) 
estimations using private expenditure on R&D as 
an output variable, arguing that the public R&D 
spending is effective if it spurs private R&D. The 
authors find that non-EU industrial countries 
(Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Switzerland and the US) outperform 
the EU (1). Using the COFOG classification, 
Eugène (2007) estimates the efficiency of public 
spending on public order and safety and the 
provision of general public services. He finds 
Austria, Denmark and Finland to be most 
efficient for the former and Denmark, Finland 
and the United Kingdom to be most efficient for 
the latter. However, these results can only be 
indicative since his estimates are based on the 
FDH analysis without correcting for exogenous 
factors. And finally, studies have attempted to 
measure the efficiency of social spending not 
from the economic growth perspective but linked 
to the objectives of poverty reduction, income 
redistribution and insurance provision. Work 
includes those by Afonso et al. (2008) and the 
European Commission (2008b) While the former 
find the Nordic countries among the most 
efficient using a DEA approach, the latter work 
critics the simplification of such an approach and 
suggest a wider use of indicators. 
3.4. STRUCTURE AND EFFICIENCY OF 
REVENUE SYSTEMS 
The link between taxation and growth is very 
complex. While theory and empirical studies 
provide some broad lessons on which tax 
                                                          
(1) See also Mandl et al. (2008) for an overview on issues 
when assessing R&D spending efficiency. 
structures are typically associated with higher 
growth, the devil is in the detail (2). For example, 
the ability of certain tax structures to enhance 
growth depends on the specific economic 
structures (e.g. the labour participation rate and 
share of shadow economy), institutional features 
(e.g. efficiency of tax administrations) and the 
interaction between specific taxes, tax 
expenditures and benefit systems. Thus, 
reforming tax systems with a view to supporting 
growth needs to take these country-specific 
circumstances carefully into account. Moreover, 
there is a complex link between the overall tax 
burden and economic activity, as already 
described in Section III.2, which depends on the 
type and efficiency of public expenditure that is 
being financed through public revenues. 
An assessment is further complicated by trade-
offs between the growth and other objectives. 
Tax systems' primary objective is to raise the 
necessary funds for public goods and services 
while at the same time reallocating income (e.g. 
through a progressive income tax), addressing 
externalities (e.g. through environmental taxes) 
or aiming to support a specific allocation of 
resources (e.g. as part of housing or industrial 
policy). Thus, a discussion of growth-enhancing 
tax structures has to either take these objectives 
as given or point to potential trade-offs and 
assess options to optimise them.  
Focusing only on the growth objective, the 
literature on revenue structures offers a broad set 
of findings, but they remain nevertheless 
debated (3). In particular the choice of indicators 
is critical. For example, it is often difficult to 
find comparable marginal effective tax rates 
across time and countries, and results seem to 
vary with the development stage of 
                                                          
(2) Clearly, this brief section here can only provide a rather 
simplified summary of a few key issues on the 
relationship between revenue structures and revenue 
system efficiency and growth. For more details on one 
specific aspect, the shift from labour taxation to 
consumption taxation, see Part IV. 
(3) The ongoing OECD's project on 'Tax and economic 
growth' is analysing in detail the links between tax 
policies and growth and aims to identify tax policy 
priorities related to growth. A mapping of the different 
types of taxes and drivers of growth can be found in 
Heady (2007).  
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economies (1). Nevertheless, a main set of issues 
can be summarised as follows. 
A shift from labour to consumption taxation can 
enhance growth. As discussed in much detail in 
Part IV of this report, indirect taxation has a 
wider tax base than labour taxation. It also taxes 
accumulated wealth and profit incomes. Thus, a 
revenue-neutral shift could reduce the tax rate on 
labour with positive implications for labour 
supply and demand. This hypothesis finds 
support in growth regressions and model 
simulations which identify a positive link 
between tax shift and growth (European 
Commission, 2006c, and findings presented in 
Part IV, OECD, 2007a, Gray et al., 2007, Gracia-
Escribano and Mehrez, 2004, Bleaney et al., 
2000). 
A commonly used indicator to measure 
disincentives from labour taxation is the tax 
wedge. It captures the difference between what 
workers receive and what firms pay. A higher 
marginal tax wedge may discourage labour. In 
the EU, (2) this labour tax wedge is significantly 
higher than in non-EU comparator countries 
(Graph III.3.9). In particular countries with large 
public sectors tend to tax labour income highly, 
which could be problematic for growth. 
However, in five EU Member States (Ireland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands) tax 
reforms have helped to lower the marginal tax 
wedge by more than 5 percentage points between 
2000 and 2007. Only in Greece has it surged (by 
more than 9 percentage points) in parallel to the 
expansion of its public sector.  
                                                          
(1) For example, Lee and Gordon (2005) find for a sample 
of OECD and developing countries that a higher 
corporate tax rates reduces growth. However, when 
including a dummy for OECD countries the coefficient 
drops to nearly zero. See for example Valenduc (2008) 
for a discussion on indicators to assess the quality of 
revenue systems. 
(2) However, these numbers do not include most transition-
economy recently acceded Member States who have, on 
average, a tax wedge below that of the old Member 
States. 


































Note: Tax wedge is defined as marginal personal income tax and social security 
contribution rates on gross labour income for an average income earner. No data are 
available for BG, CY, EE, LT, LV, MT, RO, SI. Averages are unweighted.





But the size and duration of growth effects from 
a tax shift from labour to consumption taxation 
vary strongly with structural factors. The 
simulation in Part IV for the euro area highlights 
a tax shift of 1% of GDP could increase 
employment by 0.25% and real GDP by about 
0.2% in the long run. Most positive effects arise 
in the first three years and depend strongly on 
how much the increase in indirect taxation 
results in higher consumer prices and a real 
reduction of transfer payments and wages. 
Moreover, institutional factors, such as wage-
bargaining setups and minimum wages interact 
with tax policy in many ways and will affect the 
outcome of tax shifting policies (European 
Commission, 2006c, Valenduc, 2007).  
Across EU Member States, the revenue structure 
varies strongly and only a slight shift toward 
indirect taxation has emerged (3). The reliance on 
direct taxation and social securities contributions 
in total public revenues ranges from less than 
50% in Bulgaria to 72% in Belgium. On average, 
countries with larger public sectors tend to raise 
more resources through these two channels 
(Graph III.3.10). At the same time, revenue 
system structures have been fairly stable over 
time with changes reflecting largely cyclical 
fluctuations (Graph III.3.11). 
                                                          
(3) For more details on the revenue trends in the EU see 
Part IV of this report. See also Carone et al. (2007), 
Eurostat (2007) and OECD (2007c). 
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Graph III.3.11: Share of direct taxation and social security 










T ransition-economy recently acceeded Member States
Note: Unweighted averages.
Source:  Commission services.
 
In addition to the share of direct and indirect 
taxes, also the composition of direct taxes 
themselves matters for growth. Higher rates of 
income tax are found to have less of an impact 
on growth than higher corporate tax rates and 
social security contributions by employers (see 
for example, OECD 2007a,b, European 
Commission 2006c, Widmalm, 2001, Padovano 
and Galli, 2001, 2002). This results from a rather 
low elasticity of primary labour supply to tax 
changes. However, secondary income earners 
(i.e. additional members of a household that 
enter the labour market or adjust their hours 
worked) are found to be much more responsive. 
Thus, the overall effect depends on the degree of 
labour market participation and the setup of 
benefits systems. That growth is more strongly 
linked to corporate tax rates and employers' 
contributions has been attributed to the direct 
impact on costs and competitiveness. However, it 
should be noted that there is typically a clear 
trade-off, at least in the short run, between the 
economic growth and equity objectives as 
regards the choice on the structure of direct 
taxation.  
Moreover, many other specific revenue system 
features need to be considered. For example, 
human capital formation could be negatively 
impacted by the progressivity of income taxation 
as it reduces the return on education (see OECD 
2007b). At the same time however, it ensures a 
more even income distribution. Savings and 
investment decisions are affected by the taxation 
of capital income, profits and wealth, including 
the concrete design choices such as deductability 
or special treatments. For example, R&D 
expenditure and FDI are responsive to tax 
incentives. 
And lastly, the administrative efficiency, 
simplicity, transparency and stability of revenue 
systems can support growth (1). An efficient tax 
administration allows keeping the administrative 
burden on taxpayers and the public sector 
low (2). Together with a simple and transparent 
tax code it can also ensure high tax compliance. 
Thus, an improvement in administrative 
efficiency could either translate into additional 
revenues or in a reduction of tax rates (3). At the 
same time, transparent and stable tax systems 
facilitate long-term savings and investment 
decisions, which may stimulate growth. 
                                                          
(1) See for example Heady (2007). 
(2) Ratios of administrative costs to revenue collections have 
been collected by the OECD (2007d) but they are not 
well suited for cross-country comparisons given the 
range of factors that impact on them (e.g. differences in 
tax rates and structures and collection of social security 
contributions). 
(3) Institutional and organisational arrangements for tax 
administrations vary across countries but the 'taxpayer 
segment model' where services and enforcement 
functions are organised around segments of taxpayers 
(e.g. large, small/medium business, employees) rather 
than functions (e.g. registration, accounting, collection, 
audit) has become more popular (see OECD 2007d). 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2008 
 
148 










CZ BG PL IT SK H
U PT E



















Time to comply with tax payments (hours per month)
Note: Time to prepare, file and pay (or withhold) corporate income tax, value added or 
sales tax and labour taxes, including payroll taxes and social contributions based on a 
case study company. No data available for CY and MT. Averages are unweighted.





In the EU much remains to be done to reduce 
administrative burdens and compliance costs. For 
instance, indicators on the time needed to comply 
with tax payments show large differences across 
countries reflecting also the different 
complexities of tax systems (see Graph III.3.12). 
Countries with rather simple tax systems, 
including those with flat taxes (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania) (1) fair rather well, while 
others impose a much higher time burden for 
complying with tax payments on enterprises. 
3.5. FISCAL GOVERNANCE 
Fiscal governance is a key building block to 
ensuring high quality of public finances (2). It 
has been widely recognised that sound fiscal 
governance (including fiscal rules, fiscal 
institutions, budgetary procedures and medium-
term frameworks) can address the deficit bias, 
the common pool problem associated with 
specific spending items financed out of the 
general budget and contribute to fiscal 
sustainability (3) This is achieved by providing 
                                                          
(1) Surprisingly, despite the major tax reform in Slovakia in 
2004, including the introduction of a flat tax, the 'time to 
comply' indicator is still very high. 
(2) Fiscal governance is understood here as comprising all 
rules, regulations and procedures that impact on how the 
budgets and its components are being prepared, 
approved, carried out and monitored. The terms fiscal 
governance and fiscal frameworks are used 
interchangeably in this section. 
(3) See e.g. European Commission (2006a and 2007a), von 
Hagen and Harden (1994), Poterba and von Hagen 
constraints on or disincentives for time-
inconsistent behaviour of policy makers. 
The EU's fiscal framework explicitly accounts 
for this experience. In addition to the supra-
national deficit and debt rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), the Council Report of March 
2005 on the SGP reform explicitly recognised 
the important role that national fiscal rules and 
institutions can play in achieving sound 
budgetary positions. It called on Member States 
to "ensure that national procedures in the 
budgetary areas enable them to meet their 
obligations." Most recently (9 October 2007), the 
ECOFIN Council confirmed this view and also 
acknowledged that national rules-based multi-
annual fiscal frameworks could help to adhere to 
medium-term budgetary plans. 
But budgetary outcomes and fiscal sustainability 
are not the only dimensions impacted by fiscal 
governance. Budgetary procedures, in particular, 
a greater focus on outputs an outcomes rather 
than inputs (e.g. performance-based budgeting) 
can help to improve the efficiency of public 
expenditure. At the same time, by determining a 
rule for overall expenditure, they would allow to 
better focus policy discussions on spending 
priorities. 
The different aspects of fiscal governance, their 
links to QPF and EU performance are briefly 
discussed below.  
3.5.1. Fiscal rules 
National numerical rules have become 
increasingly important across the EU and 
underpinned progress in fiscal consolidation. 
Work by the European Commission (2006a) 
showed that since 1990 more and more Member 
States have adopted fiscal rules, extended the 
rules' coverage or strengthened their features (4). 
Graph III.3.13 summarises this development 
over the past ten years based on an index that 
captures five features of fiscal rules: the statutory 
base, the nature of body in charge of monitoring 
                                                                                
(1999), Strauch and von Hagen (2000) and Hallerberg 
(2004).  
(4) See also Moulin and Wierts (2006) and Ayuso et al. 
(2007). For an example on how fiscal rules are operated 
in Sweden see Fischer (2005). 
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and enforcing the rule, enforcement mechanisms 
and media visibility of the rule (1). In all but one 
Member State the strength and coverage has 
improved unless it had already been very strong 
in the mid-1990s. 
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Note: The index measures the coverage and strength of national numerical fiscal rules taking into
account five criteria. It is standardised to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one 
over the whole sample period. No data are available for BG, CY, IE, MT and RO. EU averages 
are unweighted.





Moreover, the European Commission (2006a) 
showed that stronger fiscal rules were linked to 
better budgetary performance (Table III.3.6). At 
the same time, rules that focused on the 
expenditure side were associated with lower 
primary expenditure-to-GDP ratios. This impact 
of fiscal rules is also visualised in Graph III.3.14. 
Countries with a high average fiscal rules index 
faired significantly better as regards budgetary 
positions and reduction in expenditure-to-GDP 
and debt ratios than those with the weakest fiscal 
rules. 
                                                          
(1) These five elements closely follow the one identified by 




Dependent variable: cyclically 
adjusted primary balance (CAPB)
Output gap 0.09 (1.4)
Constant -0.90 (-2.0)**
Lagged CAPB 0.63 (15.8)***
Lagged debt/GDP ratio 0.02 (3.1)***
Fiscal rule index 0.25 (2.1)**
Dummy 1992 0.63 (2.0)**
Dummy 1999 -0.53 (-2.9)***
N. obs. 260
R sq. within 0.59
R sq. between 0.94
R sq. overall 0.81
Influence of fiscal rules on the primary cylically adjusted balance, EU-25, 
1990-2005
Notes : Estimations method: fixed effects, instrumental variables regression. The output 
gap is instrumented with its own lag and a lagged indicator of foreign output gap. The 
foreign output gap indicator is the export-weighted output gap of the 3 major export 
markets of each market. All fiscal variables are expressed as shares on potential output.  
“t” values are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Coefficients for country fixed effects are not reported.
Source : European Commission (2006a).  














(change 2007 vs. 1995)
(%
)
Strong fiscal rules (upper quartile)
Medium-strong fiscal rules (middle quartiles)
Weak fiscal rules (lower quartile)
Note: Based on the Commission's fiscal rules index. Strong-rule countries comprise 
those in the upper quartile of the index, medium-strong-rule countries are in the 
middle two quartiles and weak-rule countries are in the lower quartile.
Source: Commission services.  
The link between numerical fiscal rule and 
stabilisation of output is however less clear cut. 
It has frequently been argued that rules-based 
frameworks could prevent flexible discretionary 
fiscal policy responses in times of shocks (see 
e.g. Anderson and Minarik, 2006). But in 
practice, fiscal policy has often moved with the 
cycle, with pro-cyclicality in industrial countries 
having been mostly a phenomenon of good 
economic times (2). While there are no 
econometric studies yet on the link between 
cyclicality of fiscal policy and numerical fiscal 
rules, country experiences point to certain types 
of fiscal rules and specific design features being 
                                                          
(2) See for example Balassone and Kumar (2007), Manasse 
(2006), Alesina and Tabellini (2005).  
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potentially helpful in limiting pro-cyclicality. In 
particular, expenditure rules (especially when 
nominal expenditure is capped), revenue rules 
(which define the use of windfall revenues) and 
budget balance rules (specified in cyclically 
adjusted terms or applicable over a whole 
business cycle) are supportive. Desirable design-
features of fiscal rules include good coordination 
among the various levels of government, multi-
annual horizons, strong political commitment 
and strong monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms, for example through an 
independent institution. The different degrees of 
cyclicality in fiscal policies across EU Member 
States may be partly linked to these different 
designs and strengths of fiscal frameworks. 
3.5.2. Medium-term budgetary frameworks 
A success factor for reducing the deficit bias is a 
multi-annual orientation of fiscal policy. A 
longer term horizon can either be enshrined in 
numerical fiscal rules or, more generally, in 
medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBF). 
They make budget plans more transparent, which 
should facilitate medium-term decision making 
by private agents and, at the same time, lower the 
likelihood of political expenditure cycles. 
Moreover, MTBFs allow shifting the focus 
during the medium-term horizon away from the 
expenditure envelope as a whole toward the 
allocation of resources between and within 
Ministries. 
For most EU Member States, the stability and 
convergence programmes (SCP) are not the only 
MTBFs but they are typically supplemented by 
specific national setups. The European 
Commission (2007a) reviewed these MTBFs and 
identified the following key features. Most 
MTBFs have 3-4 year horizons, are revised on an 
annual rolling basis and the majority covers the 
general government sector. But the degree of 
political commitment is weak in many countries 
where budget plans under the MTBFs have only 
an indicative character, are not linked to annual 
budgets and no enforcement mechanism is in 
place. Based on this features, the European 
Commission constructed an index that measures 
the quality of MTBFs (Graph III.3.15), which 
shows a similar dispersion as the fiscal rules 
index. But not all countries with strong fiscal 
rules necessarily also have a strong medium-
orientation even though there is positive 
correlation across both aspects of fiscal 
governance. 
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Note: Excludes BG, CY, EL and RO. MBTF index is calculated based on five criteria 
and ranges from zero to two (see European Commission 2007a for more details). On 
the fiscal rules index, see Graph III.3.14. 





















Not surprisingly, countries with stronger MTBFs 
are also those that have had greater success in 
adhering to them. During 1998-2006, those EU-
15 countries that scored better on the MTBF 
index were also less likely to overrun their 
expenditure plans over the medium term. The 
econometric findings of European Commission 
(2006a), which are summarised in Table III.3.7, 
also show the factors that support sticking to 
medium-term budgetary plans. They include a 
lower ambition for the planned adjustments, a 
larger public sector size at the starting point and 
the delegation of fiscal policy to a strong 
Minister of Finance (in contrast to countries 
where fiscal policy is defined in a contract 
among the diverse ruling parties). 
Explanatory variables Coefficient t-stat
Constant 0.1 (***) 4.6
Planned change primary-expenditure ratio -1.0 (**) -2.3
Initial level prim expenditure ratio -0.2 (***) -3.8
Dummy contract (0) delegation (1) -0.2 (***) -3.4
Real GDP growth surprises -0.1 -0.9
Total index medium-term budgetary 
frameworks or SCP -0.6 (**) -2.5
Dummy t+2 0.1 (***) 3.8
Dummy t+3 0.2 (***) 3.5
N. Obs.
R. Sq
Source : European Commission (2007a).
Table III.3.7:
Notes: Estimation method: fixed-effect OLS with robust standard errors. *, **, and *** 
denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level. 
282
0.48
Dependent variable: difference between the observed and planned increase 
in real primary expenditure EU-15, 1990-2006
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3.5.3. Fiscal agencies 
Independent fiscal agencies are a third 
institutional mechanism to improve budgetary 
performance and foster medium-term orientation. 
Experience shows that governments often tend to 
be overly optimistic in the macroeconomic 
assumptions that underpin their budgets (see 
Jonung and Larch, 2004, Mühleisen et al., 2005, 
Strauch et al., 2004). For that reason, the 
forecasting function could be delegated to 
independent fiscal agencies ('fiscal councils') 
which at the same time could monitor and assess 
fiscal performance (1). In practice, the 
forecasting record of these institutions has been 
free of the bias that policy makers frequently 
exhibit (Jonung and Larch, 2006). In the EU, 
many Member States have independent fiscal 
institutions that serve as advisors and monitor 
fiscal performance. In most cases, national 
central banks also play this role. But only two 
Member States (Belgium and the Netherlands) 
rely on independent fiscal institutions to provide 
the macro forecasts for the budget and medium-
term budgetary plans (Table III.3.8). 
Table III.3.8:
Key features of independent fiscal agencies in the EU, 2005
Preparation of macro forecasts for 
budget
Preparation of non-binding macro 
forecasts
BE, NL AT, DE, DK, FR, IT, SE, UK
Monitoring of budget performance No independent fiscal agency
BE, DE, DK, EE, ES, FR, HU, IT, 
NL, PT, SE
CY, CZ, IE, LV, LT, LU, MT, PO, SL, 
SK
Source: Based on European Commission (2006a).
Note: National fiscal agencies are defined as independent bodies, other than the central 
bank, government or parliament, that prepare macroeconomic forecasts for the budget, 
monitor fiscal performance and/or advise the government on fiscal policy matters. The 
table does not include information for BG and RO. In the NL, macro forecasts by the 
Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) are not legally binding but in 
practice the CPB provides the macro forecasts for the budget. In the UK, the government 
also frequently follows the National Audit Office's (NAO) macro assumptions for the 
budget. 
 
                                                          
(1) The literature also makes a case that fiscal policy 
implementation could be delegated to independent 
institutions, similar to monetary policy (Debrun et al. 
2007) but in practice there is not much support for this 
proposal given that fiscal policy reflects political choices 
and social preferences. 
3.5.4. Budgetary procedures 
While the above aspects of fiscal frameworks are 
mostly geared toward more fiscal discipline, 
specific setups of budgetary procedures can also 
contribute to greater spending efficiency (2). In 
particular, a greater results-orientation can create 
stronger incentives for raising public sector 
performance. The concept of performance-based 
budgeting has therefore gained popularity in and 
outside the EU. When fully implemented it 
would relate budgetary appropriations to 
performance, but only some countries, and just 
for few sectors (mainly education and tertiary 
education) go that far given many practical 
problems (see Box III.3.2 for an overview on the 
various concepts and their use in EU Member 
States). Given these difficulties it seems that 
performance-based budgeting, while being a 
supportive instrument, can in itself not be a 
panacea for assuring good fiscal performance or 
high public spending efficiency.  
3.6. MARKET EFFICIENCY AND BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENT 
Public finances, through budgetary and non-
budgetary items, can also impact the functioning 
of markets and the business environment. While 
this can therefore be viewed as another 
dimension of QPF, there are very strong overlaps 
with the above-mentioned dimensions and public 
policy in general. Moreover, since assessing the 
links between structural reforms and growth 
would go far beyond the scope of this paper and 
is better dealt with under the Lisbon Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs (3) only the key channels from 
public finances to growth are summarised below.  
                                                          
(2) The discussion of fiscal governance elements here cannot 
be comprehensive. Other elements of importance, mostly 
to overall budgetary performance include budgetary 
transparency, top-down budgeting techniques and 
centralisation of the budget process and during execution 
(see Blöndal 2003). 
(3) See the European Commission's (2007c) progress report 
on the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs. For OECD 
countries, OECD (2008) contains an assessment of 
reforms as part of the 'Going for Growth' initiative. 
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Note: Unweighted EU average.
Source:  Commission services based on COFOG data.
 
In addition to the structure of tax and benefit 
systems and the provision of a public 
infrastructure, the efficiency of public 
administrations can be a factor for growth. The 
first two aspects have already been discussed in 
Parts III.3.3 and III.3.4. Moreover, Part IV 
provides detailed analysis on the role of revenue 
systems and also stresses the need to account for 
the interlinkages with benefit systems. In 
particular, the flexicurity concept, which 
involves labour market flexibility, 
unemployment benefits, active labour market 
policies and training and life-long learning is an 
approach to support growth and employment. 
The role of public expenditure efficiency was 
also highlighted with the examples of 
educational and health spending but an additional 
point can be made about the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public administrations. Spending 
on general administrations in the EU is not 
negligible at 6.5% of GDP (or 14 % of total 
public spending), varying from 2.7% of GDP in 
Estonia to 9.4% of GDP in Hungary 
(Graph 3.16). A number of countries have 
therefore embarked on public administration 
reforms (for an overview see European 
Commission, 2008c). They often involve 
establishing a closer link between the use of 
resources and results (Box III.3.2), changing 
management practices and relying more on 
information technologies (e-government) with 
the aim to raise public sector productivity and 
citizen's satisfaction.  











































Note: Index ranging from 1 to 7 based on exective opinion survey on "public spending 
in your country is wasteful (=1), provides necessary goods and services not provided 
by the market(=7)." 





In a number of EU Member States the room of 
improvement in public administration efficiency 
is large. This results from a range of indicators, 
of which only three are described below. First, 
the World Bank Doing Business indicator can be 
viewed as a proxy for the quality of business 
regulation and the effectiveness of its 
enforcement. The index includes aspects directly 
affected by public administrations such as ease 
of dealing with licenses, opening and closing 
businesses, enforcing contracts, registering 
property, paying taxes, trading across borders (1). 
Five EU Member States (Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) rank 
in the top 10% of the world (178 countries). 
Second, the World Bank Governance Indicator 
captures four public administration areas, namely 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law (both including enforcement) and 
control of corruption. In terms of government 
effectiveness, which has been assessed based on 
surveys among business executives, experts and 
citizens, the EU comes out somewhat below the 
non-EU comparators, largely because 
shortcomings are seen for many of the recently 
acceded Member States as well as Greece and 
Italy. And finally, the World Economic Forum's 
index on the 'wastefulness' of government 
spending, based on survey among managers, 
comes to a very similar result. 
                                                          
(1) Other elements of the indicators, which are only 
indirectly linked to QPF are protecting investors, trading 
across borders, employing workers and getting credit. 
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Box III.3.2: Performance-based budgeting - A summary of EU Member States 
experiences
Performance-based budgeting (PBB) aims to increase the quality of public finances by strengthening the 
link between the allocation of budget resources and their outputs and outcomes. This is achieved by 
shifting budgeting and management away from input control towards a greater focus on results. The 
literature does not offer a single definition of PBB, but following the OECD (2007e) one can distinguish 
three levels, depending on the strength of the link between performance and funding: (i) presentational, 
(ii) performance-informed (PI) budgeting and (iii) direct/formula performance budgeting (see also 
Bouckaert and Halligan, 2006).  
Country experiences show that implementing a performance-based approach to budgeting, which is 
often part of larger public administration reform efforts, can be cumbersome. Problems include 
overcoming the often stiff resistance against organisational changes, the timely availability of 
performance data and, more generally, the measurability of performance (e.g. Curristine, 2005) as well 
as difficulties in avoiding to create distorted incentives (e.g. an over-emphasis on objectives that can be 
easily quantified (Smith, 1995)). This explains why just a few countries have established pure PPB and 
typically only for a few selected areas (mostly health and higher education). Instead, most countries 
apply some form of 'performance-informed budgeting' where decision-makers take performance data 
into consideration but no automatic link budget allocations exists.  
The comparison on how EU Member States use PI below is based on the 2007 updated OECD/World 
Bank Budget Practices and Procedures Database. While the database shows how the countries 
institutionalise their approach, it can provide only a rough indication to which extent a culture of 
performance is  embedded in national organisations. The main results are summarised in Graphs 1-4.  
PI is used in all 20 EU Member States included in the database except Belgium and the Czech Republic 
(Graph 1). Member States use a mix of evaluation reports, performance measures, performance targets 
and/or benchmarking to assess the government's non-financial performance but only few use all of them. 
In particular, benchmarking is not yet very wide spread. Most countries use a combination of output and 
outcome measures as performance measures and/or targets, reflecting, on the one hand, the difficulty to 
identify measurable outcomes in all sectors and, on the other hand, the attempt to avoid that using output 
indicators alone could shift the attention away from the actual desired policy outcomes. These practices 
are in line with the guidelines developed by the OECD (2007f) on Designing and developing budget 
systems that use performance information.  
The formal responsibility of setting performance targets is given either to the relevant minister or the 
Cabinet as a whole in most Member States (Graph 2). Only Austria and Denmark make the 
administrative head of the relevant ministry formally responsible for the target setting, even though in 
practice this is the case in many other Member States as well. In several countries, the Minister of 
Finance is involved in setting performance targets informally, either alone or in cooperation with the 
relevant minister. In the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer share 
the responsibility of setting targets in practice. In most countries the relevant minister is responsible for 
achieving the targets, with the exception of the Prime Minister in Poland and the Director General in 
Denmark. In Finland both the relevant minister and the head of the agency are responsible for achieving 
the target, as the ministry and the agency are partners in a performance agreement. 
The authorities that most frequently use PI are the Central Budget Authority, the Minister of Finance or 
the responsible minister (Graph 3). They take advantage of the available PI during the budgetary 
decision-making process. Within the national parliaments the use of PI is less frequent, with only 
Finland and France and, to a lesser degree, Slovakia and Sweden regularly taking PI into account in the 
budget and sectoral committees. 
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When asked on how much of the budget is linked to performance targets, EU countries display vary 
diverse practices. Some include performance targets for all expenditures (FR, SK, SE), while others use 
no performance target in the budget documentation at all (AT, DK, LU, PL, SI). The differences are just 
as big when it comes to performance goals (e.g. FI and NL have goals covering all expenditure items, 
together with SK and SE). 
Graph 1: Types of performance information produced to assess 


























Notes: 20 EU Member States included (no data for BG, EE, CY, LT, LV, MT and RO). 
FI also uses analysis of personnel in their assessment.
Source:  OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Database 2007.

























Notes:  20 EU Member States included (no data for BG, EE, CY, LT, LV, MT and RO). 
Frequency ranges from 1 = Almost never (0-20%) to 5 = Almost always (81-100%).
Source:  OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Database 2007.


































Notes: 20 EU Member States included (no data for BG, EE, CY, LT, LV, MT and RO). 
Frequency ranges from 1 = Almost never (0-20%) to 5 = Almost always (81-100%). The 
chief executive refers to either the President or Prime Minister.
Source: OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Database 2007.



































Notes: 20 EU Member States included (no data for BG, EE, CY, LT, LV, MT and RO). 
More than one response possible, i.e. the responsibility is shared.
Source: OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Database 2007.
The review on consequences, penalties or costs incurred when missing performance targets confirms the 
loose link between PI and funding (Graph 4). In general, across the 20 Member States considered on that 
matter, a budget reduction would rarely happen (in around one quarter of the cases a missed target leads 
to budget cuts). Other forms for disciplinary mechanisms, like pay reduction or consequences for future 
career opportunities for the responsible person(s) and elimination of the program, are also rarely being 
applied. Closer scrutiny in form of more intense monitoring is the most common consequence, used in 
close to 50% of the instances where targets are missed. 
Given the difficulty of linking performance measures directly to budget appropriation, the use of more 
comprehensive evaluation mechanisms are key when assessing programmes or sectors. Evaluation 
reports may even be a tool to determine the linkages between activities or programmes and outcomes 
(OECD, 2005). Throughout the EU Member States, the line ministries conduct or authorise most types 
of evaluations. The involvement of the legislature in initiating evaluations is rarer and limited to a few 
countries (LU, NL, PL, FI, EL and FR).  
To sum up, EU Member States differ greatly in their use of PI, even though many countries have 
initiated reforms over the last years (OECD, 2007e). This partly reflects different country-specific needs, 
as highlighted by the OECD Guidelines, but also different degrees of progress in tackling the practical 
problems of PBB. Countries which have institutionalised PBB to the strongest degree in the EU include 
NL, FI, FR, SK and DK, but even in these countries the actual approach is rather that of 'performance-








Public finances can impact growth through a 
number of channels. Even though not all of them 
are yet well understood and interlinkages are not 
always clear-cut, a number of broad conclusions 
can be drawn based on findings in the literature 
and the review of data for the EU Member States 
and non-EU comparators.  
First, sound overall public finances, i.e. strong 
and sustainable budgetary positions and debt 
levels remain the linchpin of fiscal policy-
making conducive to economic growth but they 
need to be accompanied by improving other 
aspects of QPF. 
Second, when public administrations become too 
large they tend, in general, to hinder economic 
growth in particular if they are associated with 
high tax burdens on labour and capital and 
inefficient use of public resources. Problems are 
compounded by large deficits and debt. On the 
other hand, when governments excel in these 
other dimensions of QPF, large public sectors 
can go hand in hand with strong growth 
performances.  
Third, whether certain types of public 
expenditure (such as public investment or 
spending on education and health) are growth-
enhancing largely depends on their ability to 
address market failures and provide public 
goods. Thus, it is rather the outcomes (such as a 
public infrastructure or educational attainment) 
than the level of inputs that matter for growth. 
Fourth, in light of rising pressures on public 
finances and the importance of spending 
outcomes for growth, a key focus for policy 
makers should be on raising the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public spending.  
Fifth, revenue structures that limit distortions and 
disincentives (e.g. indirect taxes on consumption 
rather than direct taxes on labour and capital) are 
typically associated with higher growth. 
However, when deciding on tax structures there 
are clear trade-offs between the growth and other 
objectives (such as income distribution and 
fairness), which need to be fully taken into 
account. 
And finally, achieving results on all of the above 
fronts of QPF can be facilitated by strong fiscal 
governance frameworks. They can contribute not 
only to better budgetary performance and thereby 
fiscal sustainability but also to a more medium-
term orientation with better focus on budgetary 
priorities and greater efficiency and 
effectiveness.  
The multi-dimensional concept of QPF gives 
fiscal policy makers a wide range of policy 
options in support of economic growth. The 
many policy levers of QPF allow choosing 
various policy mixes which can explicitly 
account also for other country-specific 
objectives. But it is clear that choices need to be 
made. For example, a rather large public sector 
can only remain compatible with strong growth 
prospects if accompanied by sustainable 
budgetary positions and debt levels, efficient 
public administrations, spending and revenue 
systems that are supported by strong fiscal 
institutions.  




The existing literature on fiscal policy and 
growth, rooted in endogenous growth models, 
has explored the role played by governments' 
investment in shaping growth (and innovation) 
potential (see Gemmell and Kneller, 2001 and 
Afonso et al., 2005 for a review of the main 
arguments). To date however, existing 
knowledge about the influence of public finances 
on macroeconomic performance is rather 
dispersed. As shown in Section III.3, a growing 
body of empirical evidence has considered the 
impact of public expenditure on items such as 
health, education, infrastructures, as well as 
administrative burden or taxation structure. A 
general analysis encompassing these various 
aspects into one analytical framework is still 
missing, however. In particular, still little is 
known regarding the mechanisms through which 
quality of public finances (QPF) may influence 
growth in the long run. 
This section provides descriptive evidence on the 
link between QPF and economic growth. First, 
long-run GDP per capita growth in the EU and 
non-EU OECD countries is linked to the 
different dimensions of QPF. Second, the 
question regarding the link between QPF and 
growth is investigated by identifying components 
of growth and relating them to the different 
dimensions of QPF through a growth-accounting 
approach. Finally, some tentative conclusions are 
drawn from the evidence presented and avenues 
for future empirical research are indicated. 
4.1. QUALITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES AND 
GROWTH IN THE LONG RUN 
4.1.1. Does the quality of public finances 
matter for long-run growth? 
Table III.4.1 provides the average values of 
indicators representing the different dimensions 
of QPF as described in Section III.3 for two 
different groups of countries: the high GDP-per-
capita growth countries and the low GDP-per-
capita growth countries, where the mean growth 
rate of the overall sample represents the 
reference value. The periods covered are 1980-
1989 and 1990-2005; besides the EU15 countries 
a number of non-EU industrialised countries are 
also included (Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, 
Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and 
the United States). The table does not consider 
the dimension efficiency of expenditure 
described in Section III.3 as only very short time 
series were available for the corresponding 
variables. Since limited information is available 
for the recently acceded Member States (RAMS) 
before 1990, indicators for the EU27, i.e. EU15 + 
RAMS are reported in Columns (5) and (6) only 
for the period 1990-2005. All variables in Table 
III.4.1 are expressed in weighted average terms, 
using the value of the GDP per capita in 
purchasing power standard (PPS) terms as 
weight. Differences in mean values across 
country groups that are statistically significant 
are reported in bold (1). 
The figures in Table III.4.1 highlight marked 
differences in growth performance which 
appears to have become more pronounced since 
the early the 1990s. These figures suggest that 
high-growth countries have tended to display 
lower public expenditure as percentage of GDP, 
lower public debt, lower public deficit and 
variability of public deficit, a lower (higher) 
weight of (indirect) direct taxation, a lower 
labour tax wedge and more flexible markets. 
This evidence tends to support existing findings 
in the growth and macroeconomic policy 
literature as discussed in Section III.3. 
The difference between high and low-growth 
countries concerning government debt is not the 
one expected, however, for the period 1980-
1990. This can mostly be attributed to Italy, 
Ireland, the UK and Japan, which experienced 
relatively high growth rates during this period 
while displaying relatively high debt levels. 
During the period 1990-2005, however, this 
situation   was   reversed   and   countries   with  
                                                          
(1) The statistical significance level has been calculated 
performing a Wald-test with the significance level set to 
5%, where the null hypothesis is that the difference 
between mean values is equal to zero. Table III.4.1 was 
also constructed using unweighted figures and yielded 
results very similar to the ones displayed here. 
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relatively high growth rates of GDP per capita 
tended to have relatively low public debt. 
Interestingly, the widening difference in growth 
performances between high and low-growth 
countries was also accompanied by a growing 
divergence in terms of QPF. During the 1980s, 
only the indicators concerning public 
consumption, public investment and labour 
market regulation were significantly different 
between the two groups. During the 1990-2005 
period, however, all indicators of QPF also 
displayed significant differences as growth 
divergence widened. 
The last two columns of Table III.4.1 provide the 
(weighted) mean values of the QPF variables for 
the low and high-growth country groups by 
considering only the EU27 countries. These two 
groups are defined according to the same 
reference growth rate as for the columns 1-4. In 
addition to the aforementioned variables, the EU 
sample also includes two indicators of fiscal 
governance as described in Section III.3. The 
differences in the mean values for these 
indicators do not appear to be significant 
between high and low-growth countries, 
however. The same applies to the average value 
of the fiscal deficit which, despite its lower value 
for the high-growth country groups, remains 
rather close to the corresponding value for the 
low-growth country group. Excluding fiscal 
governance and the government deficit, the high-
growth countries displayed better performance in 
terms of the other dimensions of QPF as for the 
sample group including EU15 and other non-EU 
OECD countries. 
4.1.2. Public policy spending versus policy 
outcome: a closer look at health and 
education  
The simultaneity between growth performance 
and QPF does not necessarily imply a one-way 
causal relationship. Better growth performance 
may itself improve QPF as, for instance, high-
growth countries have better chances to reduce 
their debt ratio including a reduction of their 
expenditure ratios, or may also find it easier, for 
instance, to implement tax or market reforms. 
Table III.4.1:
Growth and the quality of public finances: selected indicators for the EU and OECD countries
low growth high growth low growth high growth low growth high growth
Average GDP per capita growth rate 2.3% 3.3% 1.6% 3.3% 1.6% 3.0%
1. The size of the government
Government expenditure 41.0% 40.1% 40.8% 37.8% 48.6% 42.1%
2. Fiscal deficit and sustainabillity
Size of deficit -3.8% -3.9% -3.1% -0.1% -3.2% -3.0%
Variability of deficit -1.1% -1.0% -1.1% -0.4% -1.5% -0.9%
Public debt 50.6% 63.2% 73.8% 57.3% 65.0% 49.8%
3.Composition of expenditure
Consumption 27.9% 25.7% 26.8% 21.4% 26.5% 23.5%
Investment 2.7% 3.9% 2.9% 3.7% 2.4% 3.5%
4. Structure of revenues
Tax wedge on labour 35.5% 32.1% 34.7% 29.6% 44.8% 39.6%
Indirect taxes 9.7% 9.4% 10.0% 11.9% 13.1% 12.2%
Direct taxes 12.7% 12.5% 12.9% 10.2% 12.9% 10.1%
5. Fiscal governance
Overall fiscal rules index 0.0 0.0
Expenditure fiscal rules index 0.1 -0.1
6. Business environment (Fraser index)
Regulation 5.5 5.5 6.1 6.4 5.6 5.6
Credit regulation 7.3 7.4 7.7 8.0 7.7 8.4
Labour market regulation 4.3 5.3 5.1 5.4 5.0 5.6
Business regulation 6.3 6.8 6.4 7.0
Source : European Commission (Ameco and Eurostat), OECD and Fraser Institute (available at: http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/).
All countries, 1980-1989 All countries, 1990-2005 EU27 countries, 1990-2005
Notes:  Weighted (GDP in purchasing power standard) average reported. All variables are measured as percentage of GDP except the tax wedge, fiscal 
governance variables and the business environment variables. The tax wedge percentage includes employers' social security contributions. Business environment 
variables reflect structural rigidities in labour and capital markets and business environment and are taken from the Fraser database, a high value of the Fraser 
index indicating a high flexibility in each of the market considered under item 6. The variability of the deficit is measured by the ratio of the standard deviation of 
the deficit (or surplus) divided by the average value of the same variable for each country. Non-EU countries includes AU, CA, IS, JP, KO, NO, CH, NZ, US. 
Figures in bold denote statistically significant differences in variables (weighted) means across country groups
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Broadly speaking, the arrows of causality 
between QPF and economic growth may point in 
both directions, see Graph III.2. Additionaly, 
public policies do not necessarily have economic 
growth as the primary goal. Taking the 
traditional Musgravian classification for 
instance, public authorities have three main 
goals: (i) macroeconomic stabilisation, (ii) 
income redistribution, and (iii) resource 
allocation. These policies may or may not have 
implications for economic growth and/or may 
not be designed primarily to influence economic 
growth. Despite the above caveats, in most cases, 
however, better public policies are generally 
conducive to higher growth performance. For 
instance, a rise in skill levels as a result of an 
improved education system is likely to foster 
economic growth through higher labour 
productivity levels. Similarly, improvements in 
health care systems may generate positive 
spillovers on economic activity through healthier 
workers and reduce costs of medical care. 
Furthermore, the changes in public policies are 
implemented gradually and the influence of such 
policies on economic growth, if any, also usually 
takes relatively long time to materialise. For 
instance, public spending in education or reforms 
of education systems can enhance the job 
prospects of future workers only after several 
cohorts of students have experienced these 
reforms. The above arguments also suggest that 
using only indicators on the composition of 
expenditure is likely to miss the true effect of 
public policies on growth if no account is taken 
of the outcome of these policies.  
Graph III.4.1: Public spending in health and GDP per 
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Sources:  Commission services and OECD.
 
Graphs III.4.1 and III.4.2 provide illustrations of 
these points by considering the special case of 
public spending in health and comparing the 
experience of a sample of countries for which 
data are available for the same period in both 
terms of policy and outcome indicators. 
Graph III.4.2: Change in mortality rate and GDP per 
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Sources: Commission services and OECD.  
 
Graph III.4.1 plots the average value of the 
percentage of public spending in GDP for a 
sample of EU countries against the average 
growth performance of these countries during the 
period 1980-2005. The relationship between the 
two variables appears to be rather weak and 
rather counter-intuitive. However, Graph III.4.2 
shows that when considering the link between 
growth performance and an outcome indicator 
related to health such as the change in the 
mortality rate during the same period, then a 
negative relationship, in line with prior 
expectation, tends to emerge. These descriptive 
results are only illustrative, however; in 
particular a more detailed analysis should take 
into account the role played by the level of 
development of a country and possibly reverse 
causality issues (see for instance Bhargava et al., 
2001 and Weil, 2007). 
A similar pattern emerges for education policy in 
Graphs III.4.3 and III.4.4. Graph III.4.3 plots the 
growth performance against the share of public 
spending in education as percentage of GDP 
including also non-EU OECD countries. Here 
again, no clear relationship emerges concerning 
the link between public spending and growth 
performance. Graph III.4.4 displays however a 
positive  relationship   between   growth   and  an 
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Graph III.4.3: Public spending in education and GDP 
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Sources : Commission services and OECD.
 
outcome of education policy such as the growth 
of average years of higher schooling in the total 
population during the period 1980-2000 (1), 
(Ireland appears as an outlier given its 
exceptional growth rate during the period). 
Overall, these results concerning two specific 
public policies, namely, education and health, 
tend to highlight the importance of efficiency of 
public spending. Analysing the link between 
public finances and growth thus requires 
considering the outcome of such policies and, 
more specifically, the link between the policies 
put in place (here spending in public health and 
education systems) and their respective 
objectives. 
This conclusion raises the issue of how 
efficiency is measured (as discussed in 
Section III.3) and including the availability of 
indicators reflecting the efficiency of public 
spending. In particular, the use of inappropriate 
data may blur the usefulness of studies on the 
efficiency of public spending as researchers have 
often to rely on input indicators (such as, in the 
case of health care, number of hospital beds) in 
order to measure public spending performance 
(see in particular Afonso et al., 2005). Besides 
this data issue, the efficiency of public spending 
crucially depends on the environment within 
which this spending takes place. For instance, 
when considering health care, social conditions, 
sanitation, housing, and environmental factors 
                                                          
(1) This variable is taken from the Barro and Lee database, 
(see Barro and Lee, 1996 and Barro, 2003 for a 
description). This database can be accessed at: 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. The 
end year for this dataset is 2000 in most cases. 
(such as air pollution) to name a few, strongly 
influence the outcomes of health policy so that 
the efficiency of this policy can hardly be gauged 
without considering these other factors as well 
(see Pestieau, 2007). Ideally, therefore, a proper 
understanding of QPF would allow explaining 
the relationship depicted in Graphs III.4.1 to 
III.4.4 and in particular the reasons why the same 
relationship cannot be found when considering 
the influence of the level of public spending on 
its desired outcome. 
Graph III.4.4: Changes in secondary and higher 
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Note : Higher education attainment is the absolute change in average years in 
tertiary education of the working age population.
Sources : Commission services and Barro and Lee (1996) database.
 
4.2. OPENING THE BLACK-BOX: QUALITY OF 
PUBLIC FINANCES AND THE 
COMPONENTS OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
As outlined in Section III.2 and III.3, QPF covers 
many dimensions, some of which are easily 
quantifiable (e.g. public debt and deficit, tax 
burden), while others are of a more qualitative 
nature. Different items of public finances also 
impact GDP growth via different channels. For 
instance, taxation on labour can be expected to 
affect primarily labour participation and 
employment (and unemployment) and the 
acquisition of skills. Government deficit and debt 
and its financing in capital markets should 
primarily affect private capital investment via 
crowding-out effects. Also, public investment in 
infrastructure can foster growth via increased 
trade (both intra-national and international) and, 
possibly, increased productivity through 
specialisation and resources re-allocations across 
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sectors of activity. As evidenced earlier, EU 
countries are characterised by very different 
situations with regards to their QPF given their 
different institutional settings, policy priorities 
and public investment efforts and starting debt 
level, which all are unlikely to give rise to 
uniform impact of public finances on growth 
outcome. It is therefore unlikely that QPF should 
affect GDP growth in the same way in all 
countries. Given the differences in QPF across 
countries and the various channels through which 
these can impact on growth performance, a 
possible angle of analysis is to first identify the 
sources of growth and then, in turn, try to link 
each of these growth components with the QPF 
variables most likely to influence them. 
4.2.1. The sources of economic growth in EU 
countries  
Economic growth can present different patterns.  
Existing evidence suggests that in some countries 
labour skills, innovation and technological 
progress (via ICT diffusion for instance) were 
the main factors behind recent GDP growth 
evolutions (for instance, the Netherlands, 
Finland, Sweden). In other countries such as 
Spain, by contrast, increased labour market 
participation was the dominant factor (see for 
instance, van Ark and Inklaar, 2005). A way to 
identify the sources of economic growth is 
therefore to decompose GDP growth rate into its 
main components using a growth-accounting 
approach. Graph III.4.5 provides the results of a 
growth decomposition taken from the EU 
KLEMS database (1). 
The components considered in this exercise are: 
medium and high-skilled labour, which are taken 
together, low-skilled labour, capital and total 
factor productivity. Graph III.4.5 shows that, on 
average, during the period 1990-2004, EU 
countries, Japan and the US differed widely 
regarding their growth patterns. As evidenced 
earlier, this period is also characterised by 
widening growth dispersion across countries. For 
instance, the sources of growth for fast growing, 
                                                          
(1) The set of countries considered in the growth-accounting 
exercise is limited to some EU countries, Japan and the 
US given that data was available for these countries only. 
See EU KLEMS (2005) http://www.euklems.net/ for 
more details. 
catching-up countries such as Hungary, Slovenia 
or Poland appear to be very different. In the 
cases of Hungary and Poland, total factor 
productivity emerges as the main engine of 
growth, while in the case of Slovenia, capital 
services tended to drive most of the recent 
growth experience. Employment, including both 
low and high/medium-skilled workers, emerges 
as an important source of growth in Spain, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and the US. Overall, the 
dominant sources of growth appear to be capital 
services, explaining around half of the GDP 
growth during the period considered, while total 
factor productivity explains a quarter and 
employment, mainly medium and high-skilled, 
explains the remaining quarter. 




























Note:  See Box III.4.1 and Koszerek et al. (2007) for definitions
Sources : Commission services and EU KLEMS database (www.EUKLEMS.net).
 
4.2.2. The quality of public finances and the 
sources of economic growth 
The question arises whether the differences in 
sources of growth can be linked to differences in 
QPF. This issue was considered in Fischer 
(1993) who suggested that most macroeconomic 
policy variables would likely influence growth 
through capital accumulation and productivity 
changes. Indeed a number of authors have made 
use of investment functions (rather than GDP 
growth equations) in order to analyse the 
influence of public policy on economic 
outcomes, see for instance Barro, 1991). Other 
authors have also considered the role played by 
tax and public policies, including fiscal policies, 
on employment changes (see for instance, Gray 
et al., 2007). A simple way to apply this 
approach to the issue of the link between QPF 
and growth is to investigate whether a 
(significant) relationship exists between the 
sources of countries' economic growth derived 
from growth accounting and the components of 
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QPF identified in Section III.3. Such 
investigation can be undertaken through 
discriminant analysis, where countries' 
characteristics regarding their public finances are 
analysed according to the sources of their GDP 
growth (1). The question addressed is whether the 
QPF variables can help characterise the 
countries' growth performance assuming that no 
information on growth performance is available 
ex ante. One can then compare the hypothetical 
grouping that is obtained by using only the QPF 
variables with the `true´ one, i.e. the one 
obtained by using  the  GDP  growth  values. 
                                                          
(1) Annex III provides technical details on discriminant 
analysis. 
Such a comparison between hypothetical and 
true groupings of countries carried out by 
calculating canonical correlation coefficients is 
reported in the last row of Table III.4.2.  
The figures reported in the preceding rows of 
Table III.4.2 are the canonical loadings 
representing the weights of each QPF variable 
used in order to differentiate countries between 
growth groups. Here the absolute value of the 
coefficient obtained provides information which, 
to some extent, can be interpreted as an 
indication of the significance of an equivalent 
regression estimate (see Manly, 1986). These 
groups are defined by their GDP growth in the 
first column and the GDP growth components in 
 
Box III.4.1: Growth-accounting analysis
Growth accounting is an approach that identifies the components of GDP growth from the supply side 
by using a production function, typically of the Cobb-Douglas type. The contributions of each factor in 
the production process are calculated based on a set of assumptions, most importantly constant returns to 
scale and perfect competition. The production inputs include (i) labour (which can be further 
decomposed into highly-skilled, medium-skilled and low-skilled labour), (ii) capital (which can also be 
decomposed into ICT and non-ICT capital) and (iii) total factor productivity (TFP) which is the residual 
term and represents all non-observed elements, mainly technological progress. The Cobb-Douglas 
production function can be written as follows:  
LK vv LAKY =  
Where Y stands for real output of a given country, K is an index of capital services, L is an index of 
labour services while A stands for all other factors. The standard accounting decomposition of total 
output growth into the contribution of each input and the multi-factor productivity is: 
ALvKvY LK lnlnlnln ∆+∆+∆=∆  
The contributions of capital and labour (which, as indicated above, could be further decomposed) are the 
product of capital productivity ( Kv ) and labour productivity ( Lv ) and the changes in input factors. The 
last term A∆ln represent the Solow residual or total factor productivity term.  
Growth components for twelve old and four recently acceded Member States, the US, Japan and Canada 
have been calculated as part of the EU KLEMS project. KLEMS stands for 'capital', 'labour', 'energy', 
'material' and 'services'. The main aim of the  EU KLEMS project is to create a database on measures of 
economic growth, productivity, employment creation, capital formation and technological change at the 
industry level for all EU Member States from 1970 onwards. For a description of the project, the 
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the remaining columns (1). According to the 
results in the first column, for instance, the share 
of public investment (with a positive sign) and 
the share of public consumption and the ratio of 
public debt over GDP (with a negative sign) 
appear to play a particularly significant role in 
discriminating between high and low-growth 
countries. The canonical correlation coefficients 
reported in the last row of the table provide 
information on the variance between groups, i.e. 
the extent to which countries are correctly 
classified into growth groups following the 
values of their QPF variables. This coefficient 
appears to be especially high for the capital 
component of growth suggesting that the QPF 
indicators allow classifying countries rather 
accurately according to their effect on capital 
accumulation. 
Overall, the signs of the variables in Table III.4.2 
correspond to the expectations discussed in 
Section III.3. Countries with high debt, low 
public deficit, high public consumption, high 
direct taxes over GDP and a high tax wedge on 
labour tend to display lower growth 
                                                          
(1) The contribution of low-skilled labour to GDP growth is 
not considered here as this component was never the 
most important one for GDP growth during the period 
and for the countries considered. 
performances. Countries with high public 
investment and flexible markets tend to have 
higher GDP growth rates.  
The results concerning the growth components in 
columns (2) to (4) provide indications broadly in 
line with those on overall growth. In particular, 
the analysis concerning the contribution of 
capital accumulation to GDP growth suggests a 
high correlation of this variable with the QPF 
variables. A noticeable exception concerns the 
link between TFP and overall market flexibility 
shown in Column (3). This relationship turns out 
to be negative meaning that more flexible market 
economies have also tended to experience a 
lower contribution of TFP to overall GDP 
growth. Existing evidence tends to suggest that 
the relationship between TFP and market 
flexibility is not clear cut. For instance, Aghion 
et al. (2006) find that the relationship between 
innovation, a main driver for TFP growth, and 
competition follows and inverted-U shaped 
relationship. In a recent paper also Roeger et al. 
(2008) show that the effect of lowering mark-
ups, which goes along with greater market 
flexibility (though greater competition and firms' 
entry) depends on the sector that is being 
considered. The evidence provided by these 
authors suggests that a greater flexibility in 
intermediate-product sectors of activity has a 
Table III.4.2:
The sources of growth and the quality of public finances, 1990-2004
GDP growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High vs low GDP 
growth
High vs low capital 
contribution to GDP 
growth
High vs low TFP* 
contribution to GDP 
growth
High vs low-skilled 
labour contribution to 
GDP growth
Primary budget balance 0.018 0.076 -0.057 0.135
Debt -0.332 -0.283 -0.075 -0.366
Public consumption -0.422 -0.234 0.295 -0.233
Public investment 0.561 0.448 0.066 -0.104
Direct tax -0.325 -0.127 -0.025 0.054
Indirect tax -0.110 -0.284 0.543 0.040
Tax wedge -0.293 -0.264 0.188 -0.255
Market flexibility 0.029 0.020 -0.173 0.120
Canonical correlation 0.760 0.910 0.760 0.740
Notes:  Results of canonical discriminant analysis, see Annex III for a description of the methodology used. The definition of variables is the same as for Table 
III.4.1. Countries covered: AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, HU, IT, JP, LU, NL, PL, SE, UK, US. 
Growth components
Source:  Data on GDP growth and its components based on the EU KLEMS (www.EUKLEMS.net) database and Commission services.
Results of discriminant analyisis: canonical loadings
* TFP: total factor productivity
Part III 
The quality of public finances and growth: a conceptual framework 
 
163 
negative impact on TFP while in final-product 
sectors it has a positive impact. Such result could 
be explained by the fact that mark-ups cover 
fixed costs while less regulation could 
discourage innovation and lower TFP. 
4.2.3. Public finances, policy outcomes and 
the sources of economic growth 
The results of the discriminant analysis suggest 
that the characteristics of countries with regard to 
QPF can be used to make inference about their 
growth performance and also to the sources of 
growth. The latter appears particularly true for 
the contribution of capital to growth. Given that 
capital accumulation was also one the main 
driver of growth in the sample of countries 
considered, a closer investigation of the link 
between QPF and the contribution of capital 
investment to growth seems particularly relevant. 
Graph III.4.6 illustrates this by showing the 
evolution of the contribution of capital to growth 
during the period 1990-2004 for high and low- 
debt countries (1). In general, countries with a 
low government debt-to-GDP ratio also had a 
significantly higher contribution of capital to 
growth, suggesting a crowding-out effect of 
public debt on private investment. 
Graph III.4.6: Contribution of capital to GDP growth: 
































Sources:  Comission services and EU KLEMS (www.EUKLEMS.net).  
The above result tends to be in line with existing 
empirical evidence regarding the effect of fiscal 
policy on growth. For instance, Alesina et al. 
(2002) show, using a panel of OECD countries, 
                                                          
(1) Annual figures are smoothed using a three-year moving 
average. The five countries with the lowest debt are 
grouped together into the low-debt group. The remaining 
countries are grouped into the high-debt countries. 
that a reduction of the size of government 
(measured by total spending and total taxation 
over GDP) increases the private accumulation of 
capital. Graph III.4.7 repeats the same exercise 
grouping countries according to the degree of 
flexibility of their markets (including capital, 
labour and product markets) and using the 
indicator from the Fraser database already used 
in Table III.4.1. A higher value indicates more 
flexibility. Differences appear to be less 
pronounced in terms of contribution of capital to 
GDP growth between the two groups of 
countries although on average, countries with the 
most flexible markets also experienced a higher 
contribution of capital to GDP growth during the 
whole period. This result indeed corresponds to 
the one obtained through discriminant analysis is 
reported in Table III.4.2 suggesting that, in 
fostering the contribution of capital investment to 
growth, market flexibility does play a positive 
albeit relatively minor role. 
Graph III.4.7: Contribution of capital to GDP growth: most 



































Sources:  Commission services and EU KLEMS (www.EUKLEMS.net).
Regarding the contribution of skilled labour to 
growth, the investigation includes both a policy 
input variable, namely public expenditure on 
education and a policy outcome variable, 
namely, the level of education attainment.  Graph 
III.4.6 shows the evolution of the contribution of 
skilled labour to GDP growth splitting countries 
according to the level of their public spending in 
education. No significant differences emerge 
between the groups of countries. In particular, 
the negative evolution of the contribution of 
skilled labour during the early 1990s is due to the 
experience of countries with high public 
education spending such as Finland (which 
suffered a strong recession in the early 1990s) 
and also, to some extent, Denmark. Overall 
though, the evolutions for the two groups are 
relatively similar on average. 
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Graph III.4.8: Contribution of skilled labour to GDP growth: 



























Low public education spending
High public education spending
Sources:  Commission services and EU KLEMS (www.EUKLEMS.net).  
Graph III.4.9 shows instead the evolution of the 
contribution of skilled labour to growth in 
relation to the level of secondary and higher 
education attainment. The data indicate that 
countries with better educated workforces also 
benefited from a larger contribution of skilled 
labour to growth.  
Graph III.4.9: Contribution of skilled labour to GDP 



































Sources : Commission services and EU KLEMS (www.EUKLEMS.net).
 
More generally, the outcome of public policy 
depends crucially on the spending level and their 
efficiency but also on other factors. In particular, 
concerning education, the functioning of labour 
markets is likely to play a conditioning role. 
Education policies (through high public spending 
in education) may have little impact on 
workforce qualification if labour market settings 
are not the appropriate ones through, for 
instance, insufficient labour skills' matching or 
the existence of burdensome labour regulations, 
in particular concerning (highly educated) young 
workers. Rigid or badly performing labour 
markets may hinder education and training 
policies and, by the same token, deter a higher 
contribution of skilled labour to economic 
growth. These conjectures are to some extent 
supported by Graph III.4.10 which plots the 
evolution of the contribution of skilled labour to 
growth, grouping countries according to the 
degree of flexibility of their labour market 
(using, as before, the indicators on labour market 
flexibility of the Fraser database). The data 
indicate that countries with a more rigid labour 
market have also benefited less from the 
contribution of skilled labour to GDP growth. 
This result needs to be qualified in light of the 
existing literature, however. For instance, Agell 
and Lommerud (1997) suggest that rigid labour 
markets may give rise to higher incentives for 
human capital investment. Other authors have 
suggested instead that rigid markets may prevent 
that those skills can effectively be used in high-
tech/high growth potential production activities 
due to the higher labour costs see Saint-Paul, 
2002). 
Graph III.4.10: Contribution of skilled labour to 


































Least flexible labour markets
Most flexible labour markets
Sources:  Commission services and EU KLEMS (www.EUKLEMS.net).
 
Finally, Graph III.4.11 considers the influence of 
market rigidities on TFP. Here the evolutions 
appear to be much more volatile than for the 
other growth components as mentioned before. 
This is not surprising given that TFP is in fact a 
residual of the production function as described 
in Box III.4.1. Despite a higher volatility, the 
countries with the most flexible markets appear 
to be the ones benefiting more from TFP 
changes. This result suggests that the overall 
negative relationship between market rigidities 
and TFP found earlier when considering average 
figures may possibly hide different underlying 
dynamics given the high volatility of the TFP 
component. More generally, further caution is in 
order due to the cyclicality of the growth 
components considered in Graph III.4.6 to Graph 
III.4.11.  
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Graph III.4.11: Contribution of total factor productivity 
































Sources:  Commission services and EU KLEMS (www.EUKLEMS.net).  
This is particularly salient in the case of the 
contribution of TFP but also applies to the other 
growth components. The issue can be tackled by 
considering countries' individual series over  
longer time spans in order to remove the 
influence of the business cycle which, in some 
cases, may blur the overall relationship between 
QPF and growth components. 
4.3. SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Since the 1980s, growth performances differed 
across EU and non-EU OECD countries and 
were accompanied by significant divergences in 
terms of QPF. Generally speaking, countries with 
high debt, high deficit, high public consumption, 
high direct taxes over GDP and high tax wedge 
on labour tend to display worse growth 
performances. Countries with high public 
investment and flexible markets tend also to have 
higher GDP growth rates. When considering in 
more detail the channels through which QPF can 
affect GDP growth, the evidence provided here 
shows that high public debt tends to be 
associated with lower private capital investment 
impact on growth while high education 
attainment together with flexible labour markets 
tend to foster the contribution of skilled labour to 
GDP growth. 
While the above result tends to suggest a positive 
relationship between the QPF indicators and 
growth performance, a number of qualifications 
are in order. First, the simultaneity between good 
growth performance and good QPF does not 
necessarily imply a one-way causal relationship. 
Due account must be taken of possible 
endogeneity, especially when analysing these 
issues using regression analysis. Second, the 
design of most public policies is usually not 
made with the immediate aim of boosting 
growth, at least in the short to medium run. 
These policies cover long time periods so that 
their influence on economic growth, if any, also 
usually takes relatively long to materialize. 
Third, indicators on public policies considered 
alone are likely to miss the true effect of public 
investment on real economic activity. Analysing 
the link between public finances and growth 
requires considering the outcome of such policies 
and, more specifically, the link between the 
policies, their respective objectives and the 
environment within which these policies take 
place. Given that QPF is a wide-ranging concept, 
future research would need to provide a 
comprehensive view on the link between QPF 
and growth. Existing macroeconomic studies 
testing the link between QPF and growth 
typically omit the components of growth. Future 
research should also aim to better identify these 
components in order to get a clearer view on the 
transmission channels of QPF on economic 
performance.  
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Discriminant analysis is a statistical method used 
to describe differences between a number of 
individuals (e.g. firms, consumers or countries) 
and to allocate observations to pre-defined 
groups. It allows to measure the extent to which 
the characteristics of the individuals can explain 
their membership to a group defined according to 
a given criteria. In Part III a canonical 
discriminant analysis is undertaken in order to 
predict the membership of countries to groups 
with different growth patterns. The 
discriminating criteria are indicators gauging 
QPF of the countries, which are used in order to 
group countries. This grouping is then compared 
with the one obtained on the basis of their 
growth performance. The same method is 
applied by using, alternatively, each growth 
component rather than the overall growth rate 
(see Box III.4.1 and Table III.4.2). This method 
thus tests whether the groups of countries 
defined according to their growth performance 
are comparable to the ones obtained when using 
QPF variables and hence whether the 
characteristics described by the indicators of 
QPF can systematically be linked to growth 
performance and the sources of growth. 
Assuming that there are n variables X describing 
the characteristics of QPF, the objective is to use 
this set of n variables to group countries in order 
to maximise the between-group variance and to 
minimise the within-group variance such that this 
grouping matches the best possible way the 
grouping observed when using the growth 
variables instead. Assume a linear combination 
of the X variables such that: 
Z = a1X1 + … + anXn  
countries can be grouped using Z if the mean 
value changes significantly between country 
growth groups. The coefficients a1-an indicate 
the weight of each variable in the groups 
constructed which are, to some extent, equivalent 
to the coefficients (and their significance) 
estimated in multiple regression analysis. A F-
ratio test can be performed such that the ratio of 
between and within groups variances is as large 
as possible. Several linear combinations (or 
canonical discriminant functions) of the X 
variables can be envisaged for grouping 
countries which ends up being an eigenvalue 
problem based on within- and between-sample 
matrices of sums of squares  In the present case, 
however, only one canonical discriminant 
function can be estimated given that, for each of 
the growth variables (GDP growth and the 
contribution of TFP, capital and skilled labour to 
GDP growth) only two groups are considered, 
high and low GDP growth, where the five 
countries with the highest GDP growth belong to 
the high-growth group (see Manly, 1986). This 
analysis is thus performed four times, once for 
the overall GDP growth and, alternatively, for 
the contribution of capital, TFP and skilled 
labour to GDP growth. Table III.4.2 provides the 
results of these four alternative canonical 
discriminant analyses. 
Furthermore, a so-called canonical correlation R 
can be computed to measure the association 
between the groups formed by the dependent 
variables and the given discriminant function. 
When R is zero, there is no relation between the 
groups and the function. When R is large, there is 
a high correlation between the discriminant 
function and the groups such that in this latter 
case, the discriminant (i.e. QPF) variables can be 
considered as good predictors of the growth 
performance (and the sources of growth) of the 
countries considered. 
Part IV 







While there is considerable variation across EU 
Member States, the EU is a high tax economy on 
the whole. In particular, high tax levels on labour 
have contributed to unsatisfactory employment 
and growth in the EU in recent years. At the 
same time, competition for mobile tax bases and 
mobile factors of production is placing additional 
constraints on government policy. Against this 
background, the revenue side of government 
budgets warrants increased attention and policy 
makers are becoming increasingly interested in 
the potential of efficiency-enhancing tax reforms. 
Based on the theory of optimal taxation and 
insights from the tax competition literature, and 
also practical and administrative considerations, 
the following aspects of efficiency-enhancing tax 
reforms in the EU can be identified: (i) 
broadening of tax bases and reduction of rates at 
the same time, (ii) use of different tax 
instruments for taxing different tax bases, (iii) 
optimal re-adjustment of the tax burden between 
different groups of workers, (iv) better 
integration of tax and benefit systems, (v) 
simplification of tax systems and (vi) shift of the 
tax burden from labour to other tax bases. 
Given the importance of the high levels of tax 
burden on labour in the EU, the discussion in 
both the policy and the academic arena focuses 
on how it can be reduced. Such a reduction 
requires alternative tax bases. Ideally, the new 
tax base should be wide – so that a low tax rate 
can be imposed and distortions minimised – and 
stable – so as to ensure certainty in revenue 
collection. 
A much discussed policy proposal suggests a 
reduction in labour income taxation or social 
security contributions financed by an increase in 
VAT. This part of the report identifies and 
discusses several channels through which a shift 
from labour taxation to increased VAT can effect 
employment and growth. 
First, VAT has a larger tax base than labour 
income tax. The VAT is a consumption tax that, 
given an accommodating policy by the central 
bank, will be passed onto an increase in 
consumer prices. This reduces the real value of 
inherited wealth and of labour and profit incomes 
individuals receive. Thus, the VAT as is 
currently applied in the EU is actually a tax on 
labour income, pure economic profits and wealth 
(in terms of the equivalent stream of future 
consumption). The reform is therefore a classic 
tax reform aimed at rate cut cum base 
broadening. To raise the same tax revenue, rates 
can be reduced and the negative effects on labour 
market outcomes lessened.  
Second, an increase in VAT results in a 
reduction in the real value of unemployment 
benefits due to the increase in prices. Employed 
workers are typically more than compensated for 
the price increases by a reduction in labour taxes. 
Thus, the difference in income between wage 
earners and the inactive population increases. 
This increases the income gap between the 
employed and the unemployed, which results in 
increased individual and collective labour supply 
incentives. The increase in consumer prices also 
results in reduced real value of transfer 
payments. This makes it possible to further 
reduce the tax rate on labour with additional 
positive effects on employment. Both effects are 
however conditional on the value of benefits and 
transfers not being adjusted for the increase in 
prices. 
Third, nominal rigidities generate additional – 
although typically temporary – positive 
employment effects of the tax shift. The effects 
can be expected to be more pronounced in an 
open economy due to the improvement in 
competitiveness. For this reason, tax shifts such 
as from direct labour taxation to VAT are 
sometimes termed fiscal devaluations. 
The effects of nominal rigidities also depend on 
specific institutional conditions, e.g. whether 
employer paid payroll-taxes are reduced, or 
whether taxes payable to employees' are cut. 
Similarly, if institutional features, such as a 
binding minimum wage are part of the economy, 
the shift can have more pronounced and long-
lasting effects on the labour market, conditional 
on the minimum wage not being adjusted for the 
increase in prices due to the tax shift. 
Depending on the strength of these channels, the 
effect of the tax shift on employment and growth 
may be more or less substantial. A number of 
more problematic aspects of a shift from labour 
taxation to VAT need also to be taken into 
account: 
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• A tax shift from taxation on labour to VAT 
can help to recover international 
competitiveness in a difficult macroeconomic 
situation in the short run. However, it is not a 
solution for the problems underlying 
persistently weak growth and 
competitiveness typically associated with 
badly functioning product and labour 
markets.  
• The short-run effects are often perceived to 
have an element of a beggar-thy-neighbour 
policy as the gain in competitiveness comes 
at the expense of the trading partners. 
• The potential inflationary effects can prompt 
reactions from central banks. 
• There are obvious limits to the amount of tax 
shifting, and some mix of direct and indirect 
taxes is likely to be optimal. 
• There will be major announcement effects 
that potentially work against the effectiveness 
of the reform. 
• Given the capacity of VAT to raise additional 
revenues, policy makers may be tempted not 
to engage in revenue-neutral tax reforms, but 
to use VAT increases to augment fiscal 
revenues instead of addressing politically 
difficult expenditure cuts. 
Increased reliance on VAT to finance 
government expenditures frequently gives rise to 
concerns about equity. While several arguments 
can be brought forward in favour of a potentially 
positive distributive effect of the tax shift from 
labour taxation, in particular from social security 
contributions to VAT, recent studies support the 
traditional regressive view of the VAT. VAT 
regimes in Europe are characterised by 
substantial exemptions and the application of 
reduced rates, typically motivated by equity 
concerns. However, such differentiated regimes 
are inefficient for redistributive objectives and 
other instruments are generally better suited. 
There is a strong case for a uniform VAT, 
complemented by some elements of corrective 
taxation, e.g. for environmental taxes or taxes on 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco products. 
The tax shift from labour taxation to 
consumption taxation is evaluated quantitatively 
using DG ECFIN's QUEST III model. The 
simulation results show that a tax shift 
undertaken in the whole of the euro area can 
have positive although modest effects on 
employment and growth. The simulations 
suggest that such a reduction of labour taxation 
by 1% of GDP, financed by an increase in VAT, 
will increase real GDP by about 0.1% in the first 
year and by about 0.2% in the long run. 
Employment is estimated to increase by 0.14% in 
the first year and by 0.25% in the long run. 
Interestingly, the simulations show that, at least 
in the long run, the positive effects on 
employment and growth of countries acting 
alone are smaller compared to the case of a 
coordinated policy shift. At the same time, the 
beggar-thy-neighbour aspect of an unilateral tax 
shift appears to be rather limited, both in the case 
of a small and a large country implementing it. A 
sensitivity analysis reveals larger positive effects 
if labour supply is assumed to be more elastic, if 
transfer payments (i.e. unemployment benefits, 
pensions, social assistance) are not indexed, or if 
the price-elasticity of international demand is 
assumed to be higher than the benchmark 
assumptions. However, even under such 
modified assumptions the positive effects remain 
fairly small. 
The quantitative results indicate that shifting the 
tax burden from labour to VAT can be a 
potentially useful but also limited instrument for 
governments to react to short-run country-
specific shocks or to achieve long-run 
improvement of the structural conditions for 
increasing employment and growth in the EU. 
Further analytical work on taxation could focus 
on other tax reforms and the contribution of tax 
system efficiency to economic growth and 
employment in general. As discussed in Part III, 
to maximise the benefits of improving taxation 
systems, tax reforms should be an element in a 
broader reform strategy. An effective strategy to 
revitalise EU economies needs to rely on a 
comprehensive approach, using a wide set of 
policy instruments and emphasizing a resolute 
implementation of structural reforms in line with 
the Lisbon Strategy. 





For a given expenditure path, the sustainability 
of public finances depends on the level of 
government revenues, of which taxes typically 
represent the largest part by far. However, taxes 
are more than the budgetary counterpart of 
expenditure. They also have important 
implications in terms of the allocation of 
economic resources. High levels of taxation are 
often regarded as an important reason for low 
employment levels and unsatisfactory economic 
performance in the EU (1). High taxes can 
discourage labour supply and reduce incentives 
for investment and human capital formation (2). 
Accordingly, some policy analysts recommend a 
substantial reduction in tax levels to revitalise 
European economies. However, reducing 
taxation implies lower revenues, which requires 
cuts in spending. At the same time, ageing 
populations will put further stress on public 
spending. In many countries, this will require 
either higher fiscal revenues or decisive 
expenditure cuts (3). 
On the other hand, some EU Member States have 
been able to combine elevated levels of taxation 
with a strong economic performance and low 
unemployment. This indicates that the 
determination of the optimal aggregate level of 
taxation is not straightforward. As discussed in 
Part III, it depends on all dimensions of QPF that 
determine the marginal benefits of public 
expenditure and the marginal costs of revenues. 
From a tax policy perspective, this highlights in 
particular the importance of the optimal structure 
of the tax system for a given level of revenues. 
This implies that much can be gained from tax 
reforms that improve the structure of the tax 
system. Such reforms need to address issues 
                                                          
(1) See for example Prescott (2004). 
(2) Part III of this report notes that, on average, empirical 
studies find that when governments become too large 
they tend to hamper long-run growth, as high 
expenditure levels go hand in hand with higher tax 
burdens and inefficient public administrations.  
(3) These pressures and the existing scope for reforms has 
recently been analysed quantitatively by the European 
Policy Committee and the European Commission (2006). 
related to the optimal tax composition, but also 
the details of the tax schedule (in particular 
regarding tax progressivity) and the interaction 
of taxes with the benefit system. Moreover, since 
the expenditure side is unaffected by revenue-
neutral tax reforms, such reforms are easier to 
implement politically, compared to measures that 
aim to reduce the overall level of expenditures 
and taxation. 
The perceived shortcomings of European tax 
systems on the one hand, and the consideration 
of optimal tax systems on the other, lead to the 
question of how to design appropriate tax 
reforms that can increase efficiency and boost 
employment and growth. A particular challenge 
for European tax policy has been the heavy tax 
burden on labour, which has created widespread 
concern that this burden is detrimental to 
employment and growth in Europe. For reducing 
the tax wedge on labour EU Member States have 
to look for robust alternative tax bases. Ideally, 
the new tax base should be wide – so that a low 
tax rate can be imposed and distortions 
minimised – and stable – so as to ensure 
certainty in revenue collection. Several tax 
shifting options are possible, ranging from a shift 
from low-income to high-income workers, a shift 
from labour to capital, an increasing use of 
environmental taxes, or greater reliance on 
immovable property or consumption as a tax 
base. All these options present advantages and 
disadvantages, as well as practical constraints. 
Therefore, in practice, shifts have so far been 
relatively limited. 
This chapter discusses the economics behind 
some revenue neutral tax reforms and considers 
their potential to improve employment and 
growth in Europe. The analysis is set in the 
context of recent tax reforms in some Member 
States and the ongoing discussion in others. The 
chapter is structured as follows. It first provides a 
summary of current tax structures in the EU. It 
then discusses the challenges and the need for 
policy action in the light of unsatisfactory 
economic and social performance in some 
Member States, with a focus on the tax burden 
on labour. Based on this assessment, elements of 
improved tax systems are discussed and reforms 
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towards such systems are considered. Given the 
ongoing policy debate, a particular focus is on 
revenue neutral tax reforms that reduce the tax 
burden   on   labour.   Several policy proposals, 
notably in France and Germany, have suggested 
a reduction of the taxation of labour, typically in 
the form of reduced employer-paid payroll taxes 
or social security contributions, financed by an 
increase in consumption taxation in the form of 
an increase of VAT rates. The chapter discusses 
the economics of such a tax shift and analyses 
which factors will influence the effects of such 
reforms on employment and growth. The 
conceptual analysis is complemented with a 
quantitative assessment of the potential effects of 
a revenue-neutral tax reform that considers a 
shift from labour taxation to consumption 
taxation. Using DG ECFIN's DSGE model 
QUEST III a euro-area wide tax shift in the order 
of 1% of GDP is simulated. 
 
1.2. THE STRUCTURE OF TAXATION IN THE 
EU (1) 
1.2.1. The level of taxation 
Tax levels – measured by total tax burden as a 
percentage of GDP (2) – are high in the European 
Union. The tax rates of some Member States are 
amongst the highest of developed nations, 
although there are important differences across 
countries (Graph IV.1.1). These high tax levels 
were gradually built up since 1970 (Graph 
IV.1.2). The 1970s were a period of rapid growth 
of public expenditures, reflected by strong 
increases in tax levels. The growth of the total 
tax burden slowed down in the 1980s before 
growing again more strongly in the 1990s. The 
total tax-to-GDP ratio in the EU peaked at the 
turn of the century before starting to decrease. 
                                                          
(1) Sections IV.1.2.–1.4. draw on Carone et al. (2007). 
(2) Despite its simplicity – or rather because of it – the total 
tax-to-GDP ratio remains a rough indicator that carries 
interesting summary information but also suffers from 
deficiencies. The indicator cannot be seen in isolation of 
the level of public expenditures and of the use of other 
alternative means of government intervention such as 
regulation. Moreover, total tax revenues convey very 
little information on the impact – in terms of distortions 
and in terms of redistribution – of tax systems. 



















Note: Japan refers to 1995 and 2005.
Sources : Commission services and OECD.
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The latest data however, show a renewed pick-up 
of the overall tax burden. Short-term changes in 
the ratio of taxes to GDP need to be interpreted 
with care, as direct taxes in particular are 
strongly pro-cyclical. Overall, the tax ratio is by 
now at about the same level as ten yeas ago.  
Taxation trends mainly follow the financing 
needs stemming from government expenditure 
decisions. The many years of increasing tax 
burdens in most Member States, reflect increases 
in public expenditures. More recently, overall 
levels of expenditure have started to be reduced 
in an effort to consolidate public finances. 
However, driven by various factors, such as 
ageing populations, high demand elasticity of 
public services, low productivity growth in the 
public sector compared to the private sector, 
changing life and work patterns, spending 
pressures are likely to remain high. This implies 
that Member States need to pursue more 
efficiency in public spending. On the other hand, 
Member States also need to increasingly look to 
the revenue side for efficiency-enhancing 
reforms that can boost employment and growth. 
These issues are also discussed in the multi-
dimensional presented in Part III of this report. 
While the general trends in taxation across the 
EU are important, the differences in individual 
country developments also provide interesting 
case studies that can teach useful lessons. Several 
cases stand out. First, some countries have been 
particularly successful to stabilise their total tax-
to-GDP ratio either from the 1970s – this is the 
case of Ireland and United Kingdom (although 
with signs of increase for the latter) – at levels 
around 35%, or from the 1980s – such as 
Germany (at about 40%), Belgium, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands (all at about 45%). Second, 
the level of taxes in the economy dramatically 
increased – by some 10 pp – in Finland, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain in the 1980s and 1990s, 
although starting from comparatively low levels. 
The same 'catch-up' effect occurred in Cyprus 
and Malta over the last decade. Third, some of 
the recently acceded Member States experienced 
in the period 1995-2006 important decreases in 
their total tax burdens. This is the case of the 
Slovak Republic (10.9 pp), Estonia (6.7 pp), 
Hungary (4.4 pp), Poland (3.3 pp) and Latvia (3 
pp). The bulk of these changes occurred in the 
second half of the 1990s.  
Finally, about half of the Member States 
experienced a decrease in their tax-to-GDP ratio 
between 2000 and 2006. This decrease was 
especially marked in Germany, Greece, Finland, 
Slovakia, and Sweden. In 2006, the GDP-
weighted average for the EU-27 was at 39.9%, 
ranging from 28.6% in Romania to 49.1% in 
Denmark. 
Graph IV.1.2:  Evolution of total taxes (incl. social security 





















































Source:  Commission services.
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1.2.2. Tax composition 
Most tax systems in the world rely on three 
pillars: direct income taxes, indirect taxes on 
consumption and social security contributions. 
The EU does not differ in that respect, although 
it generally relies proportionally more on indirect 
consumption taxes (because of its developed 
VAT system) and on social security 
contributions than other developed economies. 
Graph IV.1.3 reports the development of direct 
and indirect taxes and social security 
contributions in the EU. The ratio of indirect 
taxes to GDP steadily increased until 1999 
before levelling off in the most recent years (but 
the share of indirect taxes in the total has 
increased over the last decade). This increase is 
due to developments in VAT collection that 
represented about 5% of GDP in 1970 to reach 
over 7% in 1999, partly explained by the creation 
of VAT systems in Portugal (1986), Spain 
(1986), Greece (1987) and Finland (1995). At 
13.9% of GDP and 34.9% of total taxes, indirect 
taxes are the main source of tax revenues in the 
European Union in 2006, followed by direct 
taxes at 13.5% of GDP (or 33.8% of total taxes). 
There also seems to be a trend in recent years 
towards more reliance on indirect taxes, as 
exemplified most recently by the German 
decision to increase its VAT rate by three pp in 
2007, see also Box IV.1.1 for a discussion of this 
recent reform in Germany. 
Social security contributions constitute a third 
important source of government revenues. EU 
Member States increasingly relied on social 
security contributions until the mid-1990s, but 
changed in 1996-1998 when the need to decrease 
labour costs translated into a decline in social 
security contributions. However, measures were 
mostly targeted or of limited scope so that little if 
any marked reduction in EU averages is visible 
since the turn of the century. Short-term 
movements in the tax composition need to be 
interpreted with care: direct taxes are particularly 
volatile and largely influenced by the business 
cycle, given the progressivity of the income tax 
and the cyclical movements of corporate profits. 
 





















































Direct taxes (European average, ESA 79) Direct taxes (EU-27, ESA 95)
Indirect Taxes (European average, ESA 79) Indirect Taxes (EU-27, ESA 95)
SSC (European average, ESA 79) SSC (EU-27, ESA 95)
Sources : European Commission and Eurostat (2000). 
Note: The European average is a function of the size of the European Community / EU in the respective years. 
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Table IV.1.1 provides additional information 
about the importance of the various components 
of direct and indirect taxation and social security 
contributions in the EU. Employer-paid social 
security contributions are substantially more 
important than employee-paid. While VAT is the 
single most important component of indirect 
taxation, the data indicate that other components 
such as excise taxes also play a considerable 
quantitative role. 
The structure of taxation varies widely across EU 
Member States, as can be seen from Graphs 
IV.1.4-6. The share of indirect taxes in total 
taxation varies from about 30% in Belgium, in 
the Czech Republic and in Germany to over 55% 
in Bulgaria. Direct taxes take on less than 20% of 
total taxes collected in Bulgaria but reach over 
61% in Denmark. Finally, social security 
contributions represent only about 2.1% of the 
total in Denmark, but over 40% of the total in 
Germany, in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. 
The tax structure can also be classified in relation 
to the economic function, such as consumption, 
or factor of production, i.e. capital and labour (1). 
Taxes on consumption carry a relatively similar 
weight across Member States (Graph IV.1.9), 
while there is much more variation across 
Member States in the taxation of labour and 
capital (Graph IV.1.7 and Graph IV.1.8).  
 
 
                                                          
(1) The data on direct taxation, indirect taxation and social 
security contributions as well as the data on taxes on 
labour, capital and consumption are compiled from 
European Commission (2008d), see in particular 'Annex 
C: Methodology and explanatory notes', where the 
underlying methodology is explained in detail. 
 
 
Box IV.1.1: Shifting taxes from labour to consumption. The case of Germany
Germany increased its VAT by 3 pp in 2007. The government had planned to use about one third of the
additional tax revenues (about € 6.5 billion out of estimated € 20 billion in additional tax revenue) for
reducing contributions to the unemployment insurance scheme. The remaining revenue increases were to
be used for budget consolidation. Owing to improved labour market conditions, the contribution rates to
the unemployment insurance scheme could be cut even more strongly, in total by 2.3 percentage points,
from 6.5% to 4.2% (rather than the planned cut of about 1 percentage point). In fact, the contribution rate
has been lowered again in 2008 to 3.3%. On the other hand, other social security contributions were
increased in 2007 (pension contribution by 0.4 percentage points and sickness insurance contribution by
0.5 percentage points on average). 
The effects of the tax reform are difficult to evaluate. Economic performance was relatively strong in 
2006 and 2007. Of course, there was some shift in activity from the first quarter of 2007 to the final 
quarter of 2006 due to the announcement effect of the reform. Retail sales increased at the end of 2006 
and fell substantially at the beginning of 2007. While Germany experienced a strong labour market 
performance in 2007, employment growth was already strong in 2006. Thus, it is difficult to attribute the 
improved labour market performance in Germany to the reform. It can rather be seen as a result of 
several years of substantial wage restraint, important labour market reforms enacted at the beginning of 
2005 and cyclical factors. The shift occurred at a time when Germany was already regaining 
competitiveness after a painful adjustment period. Given the high relevance of these other factors, it is 
difficult to assess the additional effect of the tax shift. Moreover, given the concomitant increase in 
revenues for the purpose of budget consolidation, the shift effect cannot be easily disentangled from the 
level effect. On the other hand, the economy appears to have managed to stay on a solid expansion path 
following the reform. An extensive account of the German tax shifting policy that also includes an 
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This reflects the higher degree of tax 
harmonisation in important consumption taxes 
such as the VAT and motor fuel excises in the 
EU. Taxes on labour vary from slightly above 
10% of GDP in Romania, Bulgaria, Ireland and 
Malta to over 29% in Sweden in 2006. Overall 
EU Member States still largely rely on taxes on 
labour but they differ as to whether those taxes 
are payable by employees or employers. On 
average, in 2006 about 43% of taxes on 
employed workers are paid by employers but the 
share varies from 2.5% in Denmark to around 
60% in a range of countries. Tax revenues from 
taxes on capital also vary largely among Member 
States, ranging from below 3% of GDP in 
Lithuania to over 11% in the UK and Italy in 
2006. On average, recently acceded Member 
States receive a lower fraction of their revenues 
from taxes on capital.  
In terms of trends over the period considered, tax 
revenue from consumption has remained fairly 
stable across EU Member States. In response to 
the need to put in place more employment-
friendly tax systems, one noticeable trend has 
been the decrease in labour taxation in a number 
of countries over the last decade. However, 
measures have tended to be either narrowly 
targeted or of limited scope so that little if any 
reduction in the EU’s average taxation on labour 




Total taxes (including SSC) 39.6 40.3 40.5 40.5 41.0 40.7 39.8 39.2 39.1 39.0 39.3 39.9 39.9 0.4
Indirect taxes 13.3 13.4 13.6 14.0 14.3 14.0 13.7 13.6 13.6 13.7 13.8 13.9 13.7 0.6
VAT 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.8 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9 7.0 6.9 0.4
Excise duties & consumption taxes 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 3.0 -0.3
Other product taxes incl. import duties 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.6 0.2
Other taxes on production 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 0.3
Direct taxes 12.4 12.8 13.2 13.6 13.8 14.0 13.6 13.0 12.8 12.7 13.0 13.5 13.2 1.1
Personal income taxes 9.2 9.3 9.2 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.7 9.4 9.3 8.9 9.0 9.2 9.4 0.0
Corporate income tax 2.0 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.0 2.5 0.9
Other 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.1
Social security contributions 13.8 14.1 13.8 13.0 13.0 12.8 12.7 12.6 12.8 12.7 12.6 12.6 13.1 -1.3
Employer SSC 7.5 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.4 -0.3
Employees SSC 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.2 -0.9
Self employed SSC 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 -0.2
Note:  GDP-weighted averages. Totals may be affected by rounding. SSC: social security contributions.
EU-27 (weighted average): Total taxes (incl. social security contributions) and tax structure, % of GDP, 1995-2006
pp change 
1995-20062000 20011995 1996 1997
Average 
1995-2006
Source: Commission services. 
2002 2003 2004 20051998 1999
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As for revenues from capital taxation, they have 
shown some tendency to increase during the last 
decade, although the tax rates on corporate 
income have been reduced in many countries. 
This is due to the interplay of various causes 
such as base broadening – through measures 
modifying the tax code or an increase in the 
number of companies – and cyclical factors.  
The evolution of tax revenues from labour and 
capital taxation should also be interpreted in the 
context of a rising share of capital income and a 
falling share of labour income in total income.  
Last but not least, it should be kept in mind that 
depending on how quantities adjust to the 
structure of taxation the actual incidence of 
taxation can differ from its classification in 
relation to economic function or factor of 
production. 
1.3. CHALLENGES FOR TAX POLICY 
1.3.1. Increased economic integration 
Over recent years we have witnessed an ongoing 
process of rapid economic integration. This 
development has made tax bases more mobile. 
Greater tax base mobility holds in particular for 
capital, but also for other tax bases. This 
development also affects indirect taxation, at 
least within the EU, in the form of cross-border 
shopping. This development is creating new 
challenges for tax policy as the increased 
mobility of capital and of some categories of 
workers (mainly highly skilled) fosters tax 
competition for these tax bases. Attracting these 
mobile tax bases is not only important for 
government revenues, but also for the rents they 
can generate for the immobile factors, such as 
immobile unskilled workers.  
The increased difficulty to collect taxes from 
mobile tax bases, has fuelled fears of erosion of 
the overall revenues, of an undesired shift of the 
tax burden from mobile to immobile factors of 
production, mainly labour (particularly unskilled 
workers), and of a reduced ability to contribute 
to the achievement of income redistribution 
objectives. Governments have become more 
aware of this increasing policy restriction. 
However, the view that globalisation has 
dramatically altered the composition of 
government revenues and reduced its capacity to 
finance the welfare state is so far not fully 
supported by empirical analysis. On the one 
hand, there is evidence that global competition 
for attracting multinationals and profit shifting 
by multinational companies is a relevant problem 
in practice. Huizinga and Laeven (2007), for 
instance, find that international profit shifting has 
lead to a substantial redistribution of national 
corporate tax revenues in the EU. 
On the other hand, according to available 
aggregate figures, taxation has not been shifted 
massively from capital to labour. While there has 
been a strong and ongoing EU-wide decline in 
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statutory corporate income tax rates and, in 
several countries, a decline of top personal 
income tax rates or the introduction of flat tax 
rate systems, revenues from capital taxation, 
including corporate taxation, have not been 
eroded so far (compare Graph IV.1.7). Several 
explanations have been put forward for this 
finding. First, the share of mobile activities in 
total taxes is still relatively small. Second, 
globalisation may also have increased 
profitability and hence tax revenues, for any 
given tax rate. Fourth, increased incorporation 
incentives due to reduced corporate taxes may 
have resulted in increased tax revenues from 
corporate income but reduced revenues from 
personal income taxation (see de Mooij and 
Nicodème, 2007). Fourth, extensive work 
already done and policy initiatives undertaken at 
both OECD and EU level (in particular the code 
of conduct on business taxation adopted in 1997) 
may have – at least partly – prevented harmful 
tax practices.  
1.3.2. High tax burden on labour 
Over the last two decades European economic 
performance has been lagging behind that of 
other developed economies. A key aspect of this 
unsatisfactory performance are the labour market 
outcomes in several Member States, in the form 
of high unemployment rates, low participation 
rates and low numbers of hours worked. Such 
outcomes constitute a loss of human capital, 
create social tensions and make it difficult to 
finance European welfare states. In response to 
this challenge, the EU, as part of its Strategy for 
Growth and Jobs, has set ambitious targets to 
improve the labour market performance. The 
high tax burden on labour is frequently cited as a 
main reason for these negative labour market 
outcomes. Such a view directly implies that the 
reduction of the tax burden on labour should be a 
top priority for tax policy. 
The tax burden on labour is composed of several 
elements. First, employers have to pay payroll 
taxes and/or employers' social security 
contributions. Second, employees have to pay 
social security contributions and labour income 
taxes on their wage income received. The 
distinction between contributions payable by 
employers and employees is mainly institutional. 
However, with nominal rigidities, it can affect 
labour market outcomes, particularly in the short 
run, and taking into account such features as 
binding minimum wages, also in the long term. 
One should also stress that social security 
contributions (whether paid by the employer or 
employee) give right to individual benefits. 
Therefore, only to the extent to which the link 
between contributions   and   benefits   in   such   
social insurance schemes is not actuarially fair, 
the contributions actually constitute a tax (1). 
Finally, labour income is subject to the personal 
income tax. These different taxes and social 
security contributions constitute the different 
components of labour taxation, and they can be 
summed up to give the aggregate tax wedge due 
to labour taxes, see Graph IV.1.10 for an 
overview of the aggregate tax wedge in the EU 
and selected non-OECD countries. 
Such measured tax wedges on labour remain 
high in most EU countries, reaching over 50% on 
average, and even substantially higher levels in 
several Member States. The lion's share (about 
45%) of the total tax wedge is accounted for by 
employers' social security contributions, while 
the remaining is made up of personal income 
taxes (about 30%) and employees' social security 
contributions (about 25%). This situation 
contrasts with that of non-EU OECD countries, 
where the total tax wedge is substantially lower 
on average than in the EU. 
However, considering only labour taxes for the 
tax wedge on labour is incomplete. Consumption 
taxes reduce the value of wages for the worker 
and should therefore also be regarded as part of 
the tax wedge on labour. Moreover, as already 
highlighted, other taxes can be considered 
implicit forms of labour taxation to the extent the 
                                                          
(1) An insurance scheme is called actuarially fair, if the 
insurance premium is equivalent to the expected costs of 
the insured contingency. In public health insurance 
schemes high income earners pay higher premiums, even 
if their risk is the same, or potentially lower than that of 
low income earners. In pension schemes, if the internal 
rate of return of the scheme is significantly different 
from the long-term rate of return of a low-risk financial 
investment, the scheme is not actuarially fair. 
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incidence falls on labour, no matter how such 
taxes are classified. The classic example is that 
of capital income taxation in a small open 
economy. If capital is fully mobile across 
borders, the tax will be fully shifted onto labour. 
Finally it should be noted that the high tax 
burden on labour is the prime reason for high 
levels of undeclared work that can be observed in 
many European countries. See for example 
Schneider and Enste (2000), which document the 
increase in the size of the shadow economy from 
1960-1995. 
1.4. RECENT REFORM EXPERIENCES AND 
POLICY DEBATE 
Over recent years, many Member States have 
already carried out reforms of their tax systems. 
These reforms have been driven by several 
interrelated factors. The growing awareness that 
an excessive tax burden on labour and its 
interaction with the benefit systems lowers work 
incentives, especially for those with low earnings 
potential, has caused Member States to attempt 
moving towards more employment-friendly 
labour taxation. However, in doing this, they 
have also faced the difficulty of finding 
alternative tax bases to finance their 
expenditures.  
Second, Member States have endeavoured to 
rationalise and simplify their tax systems, almost 
always by broadening the tax base in order to 
reduce the tax rates. This potentially brings 
economic benefits but also raises the question of 
a possible trade-off between efficiency and 
equity.  
The reforms enacted by Member States have 
tried to pay particular attention to reducing taxes 
on labour for low-skilled workers and making 
work pay. The reductions in personal income 
taxes and social security contributions have often 
been accompanied by increases in tax 
allowances. In 2006, the GDP-weighted personal 
income taxes in the EU-27 were at 9.2% of GDP, 
the same level as 1995. In the same period, social 
security contributions paid by employers 
decreased from 7.5% to 7.2% of GDP and those 
paid by employees declined from 4.7% to 3.9% 
of GDP.  
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Box IV.1.2: Taxes and labour market outcomes
Taxation is a source of distortion in the labour market. The impact of taxes on wages and employment 
depends on technology, the workers' preferences for consumption and leisure and labour market 
institutions, most notably the institutional design of the wage bargaining process and unemployment 
benefits. The effects of taxes on labour market outcomes have been extensively studied. See Pissarides 
(1998) and Bovenberg (2006) for useful summaries, and Nickell (2006) and Arpaia and Carone (2004) 
for empirical evidence. 
Taxes and social security contributions drive a wedge between the cost for the employer and the net 
compensation received by the employee. From a theoretical perspective, different predictions have been 
derived depending on the specific assumptions regarding the functioning of the labour market, e.g. 
whether the labour market is a neoclassical one, or collective bargaining dominates or whether search 
and matching frictions are modelled or not. At the individual level taxes can increase or decrease labour 
supply, depending on which of the income and substitution effect dominates. Empirical evidence tends 
to find a negative impact of labour taxes on labour supply, albeit with different magnitudes for different 
groups of workers. In particular, the effect seems largest for the second member of the household and for 
single parents. In parallel to the disincentive effects of taxes on labour supply, taxes and social security 
contributions, to the extent they are reflected in higher labour costs, will also decrease labour demand for 
any given state of technology, thereby reducing employment and output levels. 
Empirically, several questions arise regarding the relationship between taxes and labour market 
outcomes. First, what are the short-run and long-run effects of the total level of labour taxation on labour 
market outcomes? Second, do different components of the tax wedge on labour, i.e. social security 
contributions, labour income taxation, and consumption taxation, affect labour market outcomes 
differently? Third, do the answers to these questions depend on the configuration of existing labour 
market institutions in a given country? 
The first question, whether the total tax wedge has a long-run effect on real labour cost, is debated in the 
literature. Classic studies such as OECD (1990) only find significant short-run effects of taxes on real 
labour costs, but no long-run effects. Similar results have been obtained more recently by Arpaia and 
Carone (2004). These findings are in line with the insight that, from a theory perspective, the size of the 
tax wedge will typically not have a long-run equilibrium effects on real wages in models of collective 
bargaining, if the effective replacement rate remains unchanged (see Layard et al., 1991). Other multi-
country studies, such as Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Nickell et al. (2003) have found significant 
long-run effects of the tax wedge on labour cost. The former authors find that an increase in the tax 
wedge of 10 pp increases real labour costs by 5%, whereas the latter authors find an increase of 3.6%. 
Nickell (2006) reviews the evidence on the effects of taxes on aggregate employment. He concludes that 
an increase of 10 pp of the tax wedge reduces aggregate labour input between 1% and 3% in the long-
run. However, for specific groups, such as younger or older workers, single parents or second earners, 
effects are likely to be more pronounced. These group-specific effects depend on the differential impact 
taxes, or, more exactly the entire tax-benefit system has on the extensive margin, i.e. whether individuals 
decide to work or not to work at all, and on the intensive margin (how many hours) individuals actually 
work. 
The existing evidence on the second question, whether the different elements of the tax wedge, i.e. 
payroll taxes, labour income taxes and consumption taxes are shifted onto labour to a different degree is 
surveyed by Nickell (2006). He concludes that there is no evidence of difference between these different 
elements of the tax wedge, in line with what should be expected from a theoretical perspective. 
The third question, i.e. the rigidity of labour markets and the role of labour market institutions is also 
addressed by Daveri and Tabellini (2000). They claim that the interaction with other labour market 
institutions is the key to the real effects of the tax wedge on labour market outcomes. The effects tend to 
be bigger in less flexible labour market configurations. This conclusion is also supported by Nickell  
(Continued on the next page) 
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The total decline in tax revenues from personal 
income taxes and social security contributions 
corresponds therefore to about slightly more than 
1% of GDP (compare the overview of the change 
in importance of different components of labour 
taxation in the EU Member States between 1995 
and 2006 as displayed in Graph IV.1.11) (1). 
There has also been a trend towards 
modernisation and simplification by reducing 
marginal tax rates and widening tax bases in 
most Member States. This is a positive and 
important development in terms of efficiency of 
the tax systems, given well-known problems of 
using 'tax expenditures' (i.e. tax exemptions or 
deductions for specific spending categories), 
related to lack of transparency and efficiency. 
There is considerable room for further reducing 
administrative burdens in the various fields of 
taxation. This is particularly evident from cross-
country comparisons, such as the World Bank 
indicator of administrative tax burden presented 
in Part III.3. There is also a lot of room to 
simplify and clarify tax codes, especially on 
labour taxation of cross-border workers, 
repayment and refund of cross-border VAT and 
corporate taxation of companies doing business 
on a pan-European basis. Moreover, personal 
income tax systems are increasingly perceived by 
the public as too complicated resulting in high 
compliance costs. Given this background, the flat 
tax system (defined here as a single rate on 
personal income) has attracted a lot of attention 
over the last few years, having been discussed in 
many Member States and implemented in five 
recently acceded Member States (Estonia, 
Lithuania,  Latvia,  Slovakia  and Romania). 
However, neither the assumed benefits nor the 
pitfalls of flat taxes are as clear as claimed by 
their proponents and opponents respectively. 
                                                          
(1) Tax revenues are of course a broad estimate that does 
neither control for the economic cycle, nor for the share 
of wages in the economy. 
Clearly, the design of flat tax systems affects 
their impact and flat taxes may have strong and 
diverse implications in terms of efficiency and 
redistribution (2). 
Against this background, governments and 
international institutions are acutely aware of the 
need for further improvements of their tax 
system and are looking for advice on how to 
proceed. 
The UK government has commissioned Nobel 
Laureate Sir James Mirrlees with the so-called 
Mirrlees Report that is to be published in 2008. 
The report will bring together contributions from 
leading tax policy scholars and will summarise 
the current knowledge on optimal tax systems 
with a view to the further development of tax 
policy in the UK. It is set in the explicit tradition 
of the 1978 Meade Report, a landmark in the 
study of tax design that has been very influential 
for theoretical thinking and policy reforms way 
beyond the UK. Interestingly, one of the main 
recommendations the Meade Report made 
already 30 years ago was a shift towards 
expenditure taxes, which maintains its relevance 
against the current debate on increasingly relying 
on consumption taxes. 
In France, the Prime Minister commissioned Eric 
Besson to assess how to finance the French 
welfare state in the changing international 
environment. The Besson Report's (completed in 
November 2007) central suggestion is the 
introduction of a 'social VAT', comprising a 
substantial shift in the structure of tax revenues. 
It foresees a reduction in employer paid social 
security contributions financed by a rise in VAT 
rates (see Besson, 2007).  
 
                                                          
(2) Flat tax regimes are discussed in detail in Keen et al., 
2006. 
Box (continued) 
(2006). Thus, those European countries that are particularly characterised by rigid labour markets are 
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In addition to country-specific reform proposals, 
the ongoing debate has received substantial 
contributions from academics (see, among 
others, Bovenberg, 2006). It is also fed by 
international organisations. The OECD is also 
exploring the potential of efficiency-enhancing 
tax reforms, in particular in the context of its 
project on 'Tax and economic growth' (see 
OECD, 2007a). The European Commission has 
also already considered the potential for revenue-
neutral tax shifting from labour to consumption   
(see European Commission, 2006c and Roeger 
and in 't Veld, 2006). 
 
Graph IV.1.11: Change in the share of tax revenues (%  of GDP) from components of 
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2.1. ELEMENTS OF EFFICIENCY-ENHANCING 
TAX REFORMS 
An optimal tax system should achieve several 
objectives. First, it should be efficient. An 
efficient tax-benefit system moves the economy 
towards a desired distribution of income and 
raises the necessary public funds for spending on 
publicly provided goods with minimal distortions 
(1). Second, an optimal tax system should be 
simple and transparent. Third, it should minimise 
incentives and opportunities for tax avoidance, 
evasion and fraud. Finally, it should have low 
administrative demands and low compliance 
costs. Starting from these general considerations, 
the main elements for raising the efficiency of 
EU tax systems include: 
• broadening the tax bases and reducing rates at 
the same time, 
• using more sophisticated tax instruments, 
• readjusting the tax burden between different 
groups of workers, 
•  better integrating tax and benefit systems,  
• simplifying the tax system, and 
• shifting the tax burden from labour towards 
other tax bases. 
These elements are further explained below. 
Broadening the tax bases 
The idea of base broadening cum rate reduction 
has firm foundations in economic theory. Tax-
induced distortions grow more strongly in the 
rate than in the base. This recommendation has 
already been put into practice in the field of 
capital taxation, where statutory corporate tax 
                                                          
(1) This is in fact the key question in the literature on 
optimal taxation. How can the government maximise the 
welfare of its citizens subject to the requirement of 
raising a given amount of tax revenue and subject to 
technical and informational constraints. 
rates have been substantially reduced over recent 
years, but changes in the calculation of the tax 
base, such as changes in depreciation rules, have 
resulted in a broadening of the tax base. 
Similarly, regarding personal income taxation, 
reducing the scope for exemptions and 
deductions and tax credits allows reducing 
income tax rates. The potential for base 
broadening is also at the heart of a tax shift from 
labour taxation to the VAT. A central question in 
such base broadening attempts is, whether, and, 
by how much, the tax base can be actually 
expanded, since this will determine the extent to 
which rates – and accordingly distortions – can 
be reduced. 
Sophisticated instruments for better targeted 
tax policies 
Countries have become increasingly aware that 
different tax bases are mobile to a different 
degree. By applying a more sophisticated set of 
tax instruments, countries can better withstand 
international competition and defend their 
revenues. For example, the Nordic systems of 
dual income taxation distinguish between capital 
and labour income. This allows to tax capital and 
labour income at different rates. While capital 
income is taxed at a constant and rather modest 
rate, a strongly progressive rate is applied to 
labour income. This takes into account the 
different degrees of mobility of these tax bases. 
Similarly, in the field of corporate taxation, 
countries appear to increasingly target book 
profits and real investments of multinational 
firms using different instruments in their 
corporate tax code, e.g. on the one hand statutory 
rates to attract book profits and, on the other 
hand, tax accounting regulations, in particular 
depreciation allowances, to target real 
investments (see Devereux et al., 2008). 
Readjusting the tax burden between different 
groups of workers 
Several groups of workers, such as low-income 
workers, older or younger workers, single 
parents, or second-income earners, are often 
more severely affected by high tax rates than the 
average or high-income workers. In this case, 
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reducing the tax burden on these specific groups, 
financed by an increase in the tax burden of other 
workers, can improve labour market outcomes. 
In fact, the readjustment of the tax burden 
between different types of workers, typically in 
conjunction with the optimal design of transfer 
schemes such as in-work and out-of-work-
benefits have rightly received much attention 
(see for example Saez, 2002 and Immervoll et 
al., 2007). The design of optimal tax schemes 
across workers needs to take the effects of taxes 
on the extensive margin, i.e. whether individuals 
decide to take up work or not, and the intensive 
margin, i.e. how many hours an active individual 
is actually working, into account. 
Several Member States have already enacted tax 
reforms aiming at optimising the tax structure 
across workers. Of course, this policy is 
constrained by the incentives of those groups 
whose burden is increased. This regards their 
labour supply decisions, increasing international 
mobility of skilled workers and the possibility 
(especially for the self-employed) of income 
shifting by formally converting labour income 
into capital income. This puts a limit on top 
marginal personal income tax rates. 
Better integration of revenue and benefit 
systems 
Closely related to the optimal design of the tax 
schedule across workers is the issue of optimal 
benefit systems. There is an increasing 
awareness that taxation and benefit policies are 
intricately linked and that a comprehensive 
approach is required to address problems of 
unemployment and inactivity traps for specific 
groups of workers. These are, in particular, low-
skilled workers, single parents, older workers 
and second wage earners. 
Simplifying the tax system 
Simplifying the tax system makes the system 
more transparent, which reduces administrative 
and compliance costs. Clear and uniform rules 
also reduce the power of lobbying and vested 
interests which may render further reform 
unfeasible. Finally, simplification typically goes 
hand in hand with base broadening as loopholes 
and exemptions are being closed. 
Shifting the tax burden from labour towards 
other tax bases  
Shifting the tax burden from labour to other tax 
bases is the main idea behind tax-shifting 
policies. This arises naturally from the 
observation of the excessive tax burden on 
labour. The challenge consists in finding 
alternative tax bases that are sufficiently broad, 
robust and stable to generate the desired 
revenues. Several options can be considered: 
a) Shifting burden to capital 
The possibility of shifting the tax burden from 
labour to capital has often been presented as an 
attractive political proposition: to the extent that 
globalisation shifts the tax burden the other way 
round some corrective measures would seem 
desirable. Two major constraints, however, have 
prevented this from materialising to any great 
extent. First, the capital tax base is smaller than 
the labour tax base and a much higher tax rate on 
capital would therefore be required for the shift 
to be revenue neutral, which would probably lead 
to distortions. Second and more important, 
capital is much more mobile than labour, and 
consequently, it is much more difficult to 
effectively tax it in the absence of international 
coordination. In fact, as mentioned above, some 
countries, starting with the Scandinavian 
countries in the early 1990s, have instead 
introduced a dual income tax system that 
generally taxes individuals’ capital income at 
low and proportional tax rates while keeping 
higher and progressive tax rates on labour 
income. One of the objectives of this has been to 
reduce the incentives for capital exports and tax 
avoidance and evasion. 
b) Shifting burden on polluting activities 
Environmental taxes are traditionally an 
important tool for applying taxation that 
discourages the consumption of goods with 
negative externalities or 'bads'. Many ideas have 
been launched recently, especially as the debate 
on the need to act against global warming has 
become prominent. For example, car taxation can 
be based to some extent on emission levels. 
Some proposals have also been made to 
modulate property taxes with the degree of 
insulation of the dwelling or to tax products 
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based on the pollution created by their 
manufacturing process. However, it seems that 
despite some noteworthy exceptions, putting 
these principles into practice has proved hard in 
most Member States and environmental taxes are 
not widely applied. Moreover, the self-defeating 
nature of successful environmental taxes, i.e. the 
intended reduction of the tax base, poses some 
challenge for maintaining high revenue levels. 
Nevertheless, energy and transport taxes can be 
regarded as important sources of tax revenue in 
the future. 
c) Shifting the burden to other tax bases 
There are several other alternatives to potentially 
shift the tax burden on. Property taxation is one 
particularly suitable alternative that could 
generate substantial additional revenues. It has 
the additional benefit that the distortions 
associated with these taxes are rather low, as the 
supply of property tends to be inelastic and tax 
evasion difficult. Taxes on property are also less 
problematic from an equity perspective. Finally, 
they are particularly suited for financing local 
governments, since in this case the owners of 
local property will largely benefit from local 
services and public goods. Another alternative 
tax base that could increasingly be relied on is 
bequests. Finally, a shift to consumption taxes is 
also a possibility and is discussed in the next 
sections in more detail. 
2.2. SHIFTING FROM INCOME TO 
CONSUMPTION TAXATION 
Indirect taxation is often regarded as 
synonymous to consumption taxation and direct 
taxation as synonymous to income taxation. 
However, it appears to be useful to define direct 
and indirect taxation along the lines of Atkinson 
(1977), who argues that "…the essential aspect 
of distinction (is) the fact that direct taxes may 
be adjusted to the individual characteristics of 
the taxpayer, whereas indirect taxes are levied on 
transactions irrespective of the circumstance of 
buyer and seller". Following this definition, it is 
evident that consumption taxation is not 
necessarily equivalent to indirect taxation. In 
particular, it is perfectly feasible to tax 
individuals according to their consumption, by 
considering their (yearly) income corrected for 
their net savings of that year. Note that this 
personal consumption tax base can also be 
subjected to a progressive schedule. Thus, in 
general, there is no one-to-one correspondence 
when talking about a shift from direct to indirect 
taxation and, alternatively, talking about a shift 
from (labour) income taxation to consumption 
taxation. However, given the current policy 
debate, the advantages and challenges of a 
potential transition to a system of personalised 
consumption taxation are not discussed in more 
detail here. Given that, as long as there is no 
direct consumption taxation, the typical shift 
from income to consumption taxation takes the 
form of the shift from direct income taxation to 
indirect consumption taxation (VAT) the focus 
of the analysis is instead on such a shift. 
In the light of this differentiation, and before 
considering the potential advantages of different 
tax-shifting possibilities, it is useful to start by 
asking, why direct and indirect taxes coexist in 
practice. The answer to this question appears 
straightforward in the case of specific excise 
taxes that can be ascribed a role as potentially 
efficiency-enhancing taxation of certain goods or 
activities that inflict negative external or 
otherwise socially undesirable effects, e.g. 
tobacco, alcohol or motor fuels. However, in the 
case of a general consumption tax this question is 
more difficult to answer. As has been discussed 
by Boadway et al. (1994), the answer can be 
found in the problems of tax evasion and 
compliance costs. If some income escapes the 
income tax system, this income can still be taxed 
by commodity taxation. Such arguments imply 
that in general, some mix of direct and indirect 
taxes will typically be optimal, even if the tax 
base of direct and indirect taxes were the same. 
A desirable tax shift from direct to indirect 
taxation adjusts the direct indirect tax mix 
towards the optimum. 
Shifting from direct taxation to indirect taxation 
is a very general proposal. Given that direct taxes 
comprise labour and capital income taxes, as 
well as corporate taxes, and that indirect taxes 
comprise not only VAT, but also tariffs, and 
specific excise taxes such as on motor fuels, 
tobacco, alcoholic beverages and others, tax 
shifting can mean different things in practice. 
The policy discussion has often been dominated 
by the shift from income taxation to consumption 
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taxation in the form of a reduction of personal 
income taxes financed by an increase in VAT or 
a general sales tax, as the most important type of 
indirect tax (1). There are usually two potential 
advantages that are brought forward for such a 
shift. The first is the increased incentives for 
investment, as capital income is not subject to 
indirect taxation. The second is the reduction in 
progressivity of the tax system, given the 
progressive nature of the typical income tax 
scheme. Such reduction in progressivity may 
result in increased employment and generates 
increased incentives for human capital 
formation (2). 
2.2.1. Tax shifting from labour taxation to VAT 
Given the concerns about the negative effects of 
high levels of labour taxation in the EU, policy 
makers have become particularly interested in 
tax reforms that focus more narrowly on the shift 
of the tax burden from labour to consumption. 
Such recommendations typically suggest 
reductions in payroll taxation or social security 
contributions financed by an increase in the 
VAT.  
A balanced-budget shift from labour taxation to 
VAT affects economic activity through the 
following channels: 
• The proposed shift broadens the tax base, 
which allows lower rates to obtain the same 
amount of revenues. The VAT is a 
consumption tax that, given an 
accommodating policy by the central bank, 
will be passed onto an increase in consumer 
prices. This reduces the real value of 
inherited wealth and of labour and profit 
incomes individuals receive. Additional 
capital income, however, that individuals 
may generate by saving out of the mentioned 
income streams, is not additionally taxed. 
Thus, the VAT as is currently applied in the 
EU is actually a tax on labour income, pure 
economic profits and wealth (in terms of the 
equivalent stream of future consumption) 
                                                          
(1) Dahlby (2003) provides a discussion in favour of such a 
shift for the case of Canada. 
(2) See also Section IV.2.2.2 on the effects of tax 
progressivity on labour market outcomes. 
(3).The size of these additional tax bases is 
central to the determination of whether 
substantially lower rates can be applied, and 
whether the tax burden on labour can 
effectively be reduced as a consequence of 
revenue-neutral tax shifting, with positive 
effects on employment and growth. In fact, 
the proposed tax shift from labour to VAT is 
a classic tax reform aiming at rate cut cum 
base broadening. 
• An increase in VAT that is pushed forward to 
consumer prices implies a reduction of the 
real value of transfer payments to the 
unemployed. Employed workers are typically 
more than compensated for the price 
increases by a reduction in labour taxes. 
Thus, the difference in income between wage 
earners and the inactive population increases. 
In basically all theoretical models of the 
labour market, whether labour supply is 
individual or collective, this will result in an 
increase of labour supply. Trade unions will 
take the reduced outside option into account. 
Similarly, individual workers' reservation 
wages are reduced, which increases the 
probability of taking up a job. These changes 
will result in higher equilibrium employment. 
Clearly, what is decisive is the question 
whether, and how, unemployment benefits 
are adjusted. If they are indexed so that the 
level of support remains constant in real 
terms and the replacement rate will change 
only marginally to the extent that the 
reduction in labour taxation exceeds the 
increase of consumer prices, there is little 
effect on labour supply. If benefits are 
adjusted to a lesser extent, there will be an 
additional positive long-run effect on 
employment. 
• Similarly, an increase in VAT implies 
reduced financing needs for transfer 
payments, since these are smaller in real 
                                                          
(3) Another way to see that capital is actually exempt from 
the VAT is to look at the supply side of the economy. 
Firms can immediately deduct fully their spending on 
capital investment goods from their tax liability, so that 
the VAT does not levy an additional tax burden on the 
investment. As a consequence, the other income types, 
labour incomes and pure economic profits, carry the 
burden of the VAT.  
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terms. The reduction of transfers in real terms 
would allow a further reduction of the tax 
rate on labour, with additional positive effects 
on employment. This regards both the 
transfer payments to the active population, 
and the inactive population, in particular 
transfers to the old, or child and family 
benefits. As in the case of unemployment 
benefits, this result is conditional on the 
degree of indexation of transfers. Only if 
transfers are not fully adjusted for the 
increase in prices will a further reduction of 
the tax on labour be possible with the 
corresponding employment gains. How, and, 
to what extent, benefits are adjusted, clearly 
depends on the institutional setting and on the 
political conditions. 
• A tax shift away from labour taxation results 
in a reduction in real labour costs in the 
presence of nominal rigidities. Depending on 
the institutional details of the shift, the effect 
will work through labour demand, labour 
supply, or both. For example, consider the 
case in which social security contributions 
are in equal measure paid by employers and 
employees. If a reform cuts social security 
contributions across the board, the reduction 
in employers' contributions will immediately 
affect labour costs and thus labour demand, 
whereas the effects of the reduction in the 
employees' contributions will work their 
effect on labour supply. The effect can be 
expected to be more pronounced in an open 
economy, since the reduction in real labour 
costs improves the international 
competitiveness of domestic firms. Because 
of its international dimension, tax shifts such 
as the shift from social security contributions 
to VAT are sometimes termed fiscal 
devaluations (1). As nominal wages are 
adjusted to changing labour market 
conditions, the effect on real labour cost, and 
hence employment and growth, will typically 
be temporary. The size of the effect will 
depend on the degree of nominal rigidity and 
trade openness of the economy. A country 
that is more integrated internationally is 
                                                          
(1) Note that the increase in VAT itself does not improve 
international competitiveness, since  VAT is 
internationally neutral. 
likely to experience a larger effect from the 
improvement of its competitive position. 
A fiscal devaluation can help to increase 
labour demand and recover international 
competitiveness in a difficult macroeconomic 
situation. However, it is not a solution for the 
problems underlying persistently weak 
growth and competitiveness. These are 
typically associated with badly functioning 
goods and factor markets, and particularly 
inflexible labour markets that do not allow 
the economy to smoothly adjust to aggregate 
and sector shocks, but also other structural 
features such as the innovative capacity of the 
economy, the speed of technology adoption, 
the qualification of the workforce and the 
capacity of firms to reorganise themselves in 
a rapidly changing competitive environment.  
Moreover, the boost in activity and 
employment from a fiscal devaluation 
contains elements of a beggar-thy-neighbour 
policy, as the improvement in the country's 
competitiveness comes at the expense of its 
trading partners. 
At the same time, the increase in activity 
induced by the fiscal devaluation will have 
some positive demand effects on the trading 
partners. The direction and the magnitude of 
the net effect on trading partners are thus 
empirical issues that need close investigation. 
These issues are analysed in detail in the 
simulations in Section IV.3. 
• Institutional features may cause the tax shift 
to have more pronounced, and potentially 
long-lasting effects on labour market 
outcomes. For example, the employment 
effects of a tax shift that reduces employer-
paid social security contributions or payroll 
taxes will be more pronounced in case of a 
binding minimum wage (see Cahuc, 2002). In 
such a case, the increase in labour demand 
results entirely in an increase in equilibrium 
employment and is not absorbed by a 
potentially inelastic labour supply curve. This 
result is conditional on the minimum wage 
not adjusted for the increase in prices due to 
the tax shift. This illustrates the importance 
of institutional settings in determining the 
potential effects of tax shifts, which is very 
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much in line with the empirical literature on 
the effects of tax wedges on labour markets 
outcomes.  
• A reduction in labour taxation with a 
simultaneous, revenue-neutral increase in 
consumption taxation can result in potential 
behavioural effects, stemming from different 
perceptions of economically equivalent taxes. 
According to standard economic theory, in a 
simple static setting with an endogenous 
labour supply decision, an income tax can be 
replaced by an equivalent consumption tax. 
Recently, behavioural economists have 
challenged this view claiming that income 
taxes result in more negative incentives 
effects compared to consumption taxes, 
although both taxes result in the same 
household budget constraint (see e.g. 
Blumkin et al., 2007). These authors provide 
experimental evidence on this claim. 
However, it is not clear whether this evidence 
is also relevant in the real world, in particular 
since the empirical evidence on the 
composition of the tax wedge, as discussed 
by Nickell (2006), seems to contradict the 
claim (1). Therefore, it seems too early to 
base policy advice on these preliminary 
findings and more research is needed on the 
issue. However, it is worth mentioning that 
such behavioural effects would strengthen the 
case for tax shifting from labour to 
consumption taxes. 
• The extent to which the tax shift makes it 
possible to reduce the tax on labour will also 
determine the extent to which previously 
undeclared work may move to the official 
sector. This will generate additional tax 
revenues, which can be used for additional 
tax reductions with additional positive 
employment effects. 
2.2.2. More targeted tax  shifting 
The above considerations relate to a simple 
linear reduction in labour taxation (across the 
board) financed by a linearly increased VAT, 
without considering the impact on specific 
groups. As noted by many observers, e.g. 
                                                          
(1) Compare also Box IV.1.2 on this. 
Bovenberg (2006), policy changes may have 
little impact on a representative individual but 
could significantly affect incentives and 
behaviour of specific groups, such as older 
workers, retired workers considering part-time 
work, low-skilled workers, or second earners in a 
household, and single parents. In many countries 
the adverse incentives of high levels of labour 
taxation bear particularly strongly on these 
groups. It can thus be important to look at the 
effects for such groups more specifically. This 
carries on to the design of tax reforms, since 
concentrating the reduction of labour taxes on 
particular groups would require a smaller 
increase in the VAT to achieve revenue 
neutrality. In turn, this is part of the lively debate 
on how to target these disadvantaged groups 
better and how to integrate tax and benefit 
systems with the aim of avoiding inactivity and 
unemployment traps among these groups. 
More generally, an important aspect of the tax 
reforms is the question how they change the 
progressivity of the tax system. Changes in the 
tax progressivity will have very different effects 
on labour market outcomes depending on how 
the labour market is working. In the case of a 
competitive labour market tax progression will 
tend to reduce labour supply. In a collective 
wage bargaining framework (and similarly in 
search and matching frameworks) tax 
progression can induce wage moderation and 
tends to result in higher employment levels (see, 
among others, Koskela and Vilmunen, 1996). 
2.2.3. Further caveats to tax shifting 
A tax shift from labour taxation to VAT involves 
also problematic aspects. It has already been 
stressed that it is an inadequate substitute for 
structural reforms. Similarly, the potential 
beggar-thy-neighbour aspects have also been 
pointed out. Besides these points, there are 
further problems that need to be kept in mind. 
First, substantial tax shifting has short-term 
inflationary effects. In an environment of 
inflationary pressure this could be a reason for 
concern and prompt action from central banks, 
with potential negative consequences for 
economic activity. Second, there are limits to the 
amount of tax shifting. As pointed out before, a 
mix of direct and indirect taxation is likely to be 
optimal since both taxes are likely to be subject 
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to evasion. Third, there are limits to both the 
possible reduction of the various components of 
labour taxation and to the maximum increase in 
VAT. Fourth, a major tax reform will take time 
to move from the stage of design to that of 
implementation, which makes it a rather 
inflexible instrument. Fifth, and related to the 
previous point, the shift is likely to have 
announcement effects that are potentially 
working against the effectiveness of the reform. 
A substantial increase in VAT will cause 
consumers to purchase durable goods earlier. 
This will result in additional economic activity 
before the reform and reduced activity 
afterwards. Particularly this latter effect may be 
detrimental in a context of fragile economic 
prospects. Finally, care must be taken that the 
reforms of the tax revenue structure do not result 
in simple revenue increasing exercises. Given the 
capacity of a VAT rise to generate additional 
revenues, policy makers may be tempted to use it 
as an instrument to increase revenues instead of 
addressing politically difficult expenditure cuts. 
2.2.4. Equity aspects 
Since indirect taxes cannot be adjusted at 
individual level there are concerns that tax 
reforms that assign a greater role to indirect taxes 
are potentially regressive and thus be in conflict 
with distributional objectives. However, in the 
case of a tax shift from payroll tax or social 
security contributions to VAT, there are several 
arguments qualifying the objections raised from 
an equity perspective. First, as noted by Dahlby 
(2003), taxing individuals' consumption may be 
appealing from a normative perspective, since 
individuals' consumption levels describe rather 
well their standards of living. Second, indirect 
taxation of consumption does not rely on a yearly 
assessment, but taxes lifetime consumption 
instead. Third, if labour taxation is just a linear 
tax itself, which is often the case for social 
security contributions, then, if the labour tax is 
reduced linearly and the consumption tax 
increased linearly, the total distributional effect 
should be neutral. In fact, many social security 
contributions only apply up to a certain wage 
limit and are therefore regressive in nature. In 
this case, the shift towards a consumption tax 
could actually be progressive. Fourth, as long as 
direct taxation continues to exist, this can still be 
used for keeping the progressivity of the tax 
system. Fifth, distributional objectives are 
largely achieved via the expenditure side of the 
budget. This regards direct social benefits, but 
also publicly provided goods, such as security, 
health services, education, recreation and 
infrastructure, which are typically provided to all 
citizens regardless of their contribution to the 
government's budget. Sixth, VAT also taxes 
accumulated wealth and profit income that are 
typically owned by, or accrue to, richer 
households. This is likely to have a redistributive 
effect. Finally, if the tax reform is successful in 
enhancing efficiency and growth, also the poorer 
parts of the population can potentially profit 
from the reform in the long run through higher 
employment and income levels. Despite these 
arguments, some recent studies (1) strengthen the 
classic regressive view of indirect consumption 
taxes and also indicate that revenue-neutral 
budget shifts from labour taxation to VAT tend 
to be regressive. 
Finally, there is a distributional question 
regarding intergenerational equity. Since an 
increase in VAT taxes existing wealth, the older 
generation that has accumulated wealth, is made 
worse off. The younger generation, however, is 
less affected by this effect, but benefits from the 
reduction of the tax on labour. This effect is even 
stronger in the case of a tax shift from a general 
income tax to VAT, because in this case also the 
tax on capital income, which would affect the 
young who are engaging in saving, is reduced. 
2.2.5. Tax competition and tax shifting 
The competition for mobile tax bases places 
restrictions on national tax policy. Given that tax 
competition is relevant for direct as well as for 
indirect taxation, the extent of the competition 
and its implications for a tax shift need to be 
considered. As regards indirect taxation, the 
empirical evidence indicates that tax competition 
for cross-border shoppers is a real problem in 
practice. Theory suggests that countries trade off 
the marginal tax revenues from additional cross-
border shoppers associated with a reduction of 
their own tax rate with the foregone revenues on 
their existing tax base, namely the revenues 
derived from the consumption of their home 
                                                          
(1) For a review see OECD (2007h). 
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population (see Kanbur and Keen, 1993, Nielsen, 
2001 and Ohsawa, 1999). This approach predicts 
that the tax rates of neighbouring countries will 
react positively to each other. Moreover, smaller 
countries will, ceteris paribus, set lower tax rates, 
because their existing tax base is smaller. 
Similarly, countries that have many neighbours 
should have, ceteris paribus, lower tax rates than 
countries with fewer neighbours, because they 
can attract more cross-border shoppers by 
reducing their tax rates. Using European data, 
Egger et al. (2005) find strong evidence for these 
predicted effects. More recently, using the 
reduction of Danish taxes on alcoholic beverages 
in 2002 as a natural experiment, Asplund et al. 
(2007) found striking evidence how Swedish 
consumers reacted to the neighbouring country's 
tax policy change. Finally, using data from the 
US, Devereux et al. (2007) show that, in the US, 
individual states react to each other's tax policies 
regarding indirect taxes. In summary, there is 
evidence that competition for cross-border 
shoppers is a relevant problem from a policy 
making perspective. 
Given the existence of tax competition, excise 
rates are typically set below the level that would 
be chosen in the absence of tax competition. A 
coordinated increase in indirect taxes has 
therefore the potential to make all countries 
better of. A full harmonisation, however, could 
make worse off those countries that are currently 
profiting from cross-border shopping. As shown 
by Kanbur and Keen (1993) minimum tax levels 
can make all countries better off. This theoretical 
prediction is well in line with the harmonisation 
process in the EU, which has set minimum rates 
for indirect taxes such as the VAT and excise 
duties on motor fuels, although the fact that the 
minimum levels are binding for few Member 
States may be taken as evidence that these 
minimum levels are not very effective at 
reducing competition. 
For the analysis of the merits of direct relative to 
indirect taxation and a potential shift from one to 
the other, it is of interest to consider whether 
international pressures on national tax policies 
will be increasing more in the field of direct or 
indirect taxation, since this will determine the 
future constraints for policy making and affect 
the scope for tax shifting. It seems reasonable to 
assume that the ease of cross-border shopping 
will increase further, but not as dramatically as it 
has been in the context of the completion of the 
internal market and the expansion of the 
Schengen agreement over recent years. On the 
other hand, the mobility of workers across 
borders is likely to increase substantially in the 
future. This reasoning provides an additional 
argument in favour of countries to rely more 
strongly on consumption taxation, in particularly 









Box IV.2.1: The VAT - A European success showing signs of age
The European VAT has proved to be a lasting success but a 'face-lift' appears needed to address new
challenges. Currently, the US is the only OECD country that does not rely on a VAT-type system to raise
tax revenue. VAT has a number of practical advantages which have made its success possible, such as its
administrative advantages, its 'self-enforcing' nature, and related to that, its substantial capacity to raise
revenue. However, given that the VAT systems of some Member States have already been in place for
about 40 years, many observers have noted that they fall short of some more recently introduced VAT
systems, such as the New Zealand VAT scheme, for example. Moreover, the completion of the Internal
Market has put new challenges on the proper design of European VAT systems. In particular, the current
VAT regulations are quite susceptible to fraud. Given the nature of the typical fraud schemes, the
problem is unlikely to be resolved by increased monitoring and investigating activities by the tax
authorities. Rather, it calls for a more systematic solution that requires reconsidering the treatment of
cross-border transactions within the Internal Market (1).  
The current European VAT regimes do not apply a uniform rate to all goods and services. Rather there
are substantial exemptions for particular goods and services, for which reduced or even zero rates apply.
There are basically two economic arguments that can justify differentiated indirect tax rates. First,
Pigouvian taxes or subsidies can correct externalities. Goods and services that exert negative (positive)
externalities should be taxed at higher (lower) rates. Excises on alcoholic beverages or energy may be
considered example of such correcting indirect taxes. Second, recent research by Kleven (2004),
discussed also in Sørensen (2007), has identified a case in which differential taxation may be desirable.
Kleven departs from the traditional goods-services market production by including a third sector: the
household production of services, covering activities that can be carried out by households. Examples are
house cleaning, child care, car-washing, do-it-yourself activities and (arguably) restaurants. He shows that
a high tax on these activities, which are complements to leisure, are not an efficient way to stimulate
labour supply because they tend to encourage substitution of home production for market production. He
derives a tax rule that recommends putting a low tax rate on activities that can be produced in both the
household sector and the market sector. Several labour-intensive services for which some Member States
would like to have reduced VAT rates do share the feature that their consumption reduces or saves
household time. 
On the other hand, there are strong theoretical and practical arguments for a uniform indirect tax rate: 
In the policy debate, exemptions and reduced rates are often advocated for equity reasons. However, 
differentiated rates of indirect taxes are inefficient instruments for redistribution. Generally, the 
more alternative instruments the government has for redistribution, the less it should rely on 
differentiated commodity taxation to pursue distributional objectives. More particularly, under the 
condition of weak-separability of leisure and consumption, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) have shown 
that a government that applies a non-linear income tax optimally should not use differentiated 
commodity taxes for redistribution. More recently, Kaplow (2006) has proven that this result even 
holds, if the income tax is not chosen optimally. He also demonstrates that any proportional 
reduction in differential commodity taxation results in a Pareto improvement. These theoretical 
considerations are mirrored by simulation studies, such as the recent work by Boeters et al. (2006) 
                                                          
(1) The question how to modify the European VAT system to make it less susceptible is an important one. Several
potential responses to this problem have been put forward. Given the complexity and the number of suggestions,
this issue cannot be addressed here. For a discussion, see Keen and Smith (2007).  
(Continued on the next page) 
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for Germany or Ruiz and Trannoy (2006) for France. These authors find substantial welfare gains 
from the elimination of reduced VAT rates. 
• Uniform VAT is easier to administrate and less prone to fraud (by re-labelling goods). 
• There is no need to change the relative rates when tastes or technologies are changing.  
• Uniform VAT rates better prevent wasteful lobbyism. 
Thus, even though there may be a theoretical case for non-uniform commodity taxation, it seems 
desirable to maintain neutrality as the general norm. This is because governments are likely not to have 
full information on the adequate parameters to fine-tune their taxes and non-uniform taxes are subject to 
lobbyism. Hence, as noted by Sørensen (2007), the burden of the proof should always be carried by 
those who argue for deviations from uniformity. As a consequence of these arguments, the tax base of 
the VAT in Europe should be substantially broadened, given the substantial scope of exemptions and 
reduced rates in the current systems. More recently introduced VAT systems, such as the New Zeeland 
regime, come close to a full coverage of all consumption expenditures. Finally, widening the VAT base 
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3.1. THE QUEST III MODEL 
The preceding analysis has described the various 
factors that can be expected to influence how a 
revenue neutral shift from labour taxation to 
VAT will affect the economy, and, in particular, 
employment and growth. However, for sound 
policy recommendations one also needs to assess 
quantitatively what the likely effects of such a 
tax reform would be. Given the limited 
availability of data and empirical evidence on 
past experience with tax shifting from labour to 
consumption, simulation methods represent the 
key technique to assess the potential effects of 
such tax shifting reforms. Several simulation 
studies have already been carried out to assess 
tax shifting from labour to consumption, 
typically at the level of individual Member 
States. These include, among others, Feil et al. 
(2006) for Germany and various analyses for 
France reported in Besson (2007). Some country-
level studies also match income and consumption 
data at the micro level and apply micro-
simulation methods. See for example Fuest and 
Peichl (2008) who consider the implications of a 
shift from labour taxation to VAT for several 
Member States. While these micro studies 
provide more detailed results on the 
distributional impact of tax shifting from labour 
taxation to VAT, they are typically static by 
nature and do not address the dynamic 
macroeconomic effects on employment and 
growth that are the focus of this section. EU-
wide assessments have been carried out by the 
Commission in the past with the earlier 
QUEST II model (see Roeger and in 't Veld, 
2006, and European Commission, 2006c). 
This section provides a quantitative assessment 
of a shift from labour taxation to consumption 
taxation using the QUEST III model. The global 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model is employed in DG ECFIN for 
quantitative policy analysis. It belongs to the new 
class of micro-founded DSGE models that are 
now widely used in economic policy 
institutions (1). Equations in these models are 
explicitly derived from intertemporal 
optimisation under technological, institutional 
and budgetary constraints and the model 
incorporates nominal, real and financial frictions 
in order to fit the data (Ratto et al., 2006, 2008). 
The QUEST III model employs the product 
variety framework proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977). The economies are populated by 
households, final and intermediate goods 
producing firms, a monetary and a fiscal 
authority. In the final and intermediate sector 
firms produce differentiated goods that are 
imperfect substitutes for goods produced abroad. 
Final-good producers use a composite of 
domestic and imported intermediate goods and 
three types of labour (low-, medium-, and high-
skilled). There are two types of households. The 
first group of households is liquidity-constrained 
and consumes its entire income in each period. 
These households only receive labour and 
transfer income. The second group consists of 
households that are not liquidity-constrained and 
are active in the financial markets. They own the 
capital stock and receive capital and profit 
income besides their labour income. 
3.2. SIMULATING A TAX SHIFT FROM LABOUR 
TO CONSUMPTION 
Within the framework of the QUEST III model 
different tax-shifting scenarios from labour to 
consumption taxation can be considered. The tax 
experiments that are presented in this chapter 
represent a 1% of GDP reduction in wage taxes 
financed by an increase in consumption taxes. 
There are three baseline scenarios: 
1. The first scenario investigates the effect of 
joint tax-shift from wages to consumption for the 
entire euro area. 
                                                          
(1) See for example the International Monetary Fund's 
Global Economy Model (Bayoumi et al., 2004) and the 
European Central Bank's New Area-Wide Model 
(Christoffel et al., 2008). 
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2. The second scenario examines the effect of a 
tax shift in a large euro-area Member State 
(Germany). This scenario is interesting since it 
allows looking at potential spillover effects 
within EMU. 
3. The third scenario considers the effects of a 
unilateral tax shift by a small euro-area Member 
State (Ireland) (1). 
All these scenarios are based on the two-sector 
(tradable vs. non-tradable), four-region version 
of QUEST III (one euro-area (EA) economy, rest 
of euro area (RoEA), the US and the rest of the 
world (RoW)). Furthermore, the three scenarios 
use the benchmark assumption of benefit and 
transfer indexation to consumer prices, i.e. 
benefit and transfer recipients are compensated 
for the increase in consumption taxes. In order to 
guarantee that the tax shift is roughly budgetary 
neutral in the long run, labour taxes adjust to 
stabilise the government debt around its long-run 
target, which is assumed to be a stable debt-to-
GDP ratio at a level of 60 % of GDP. As 
transfers and benefits are raised to compensate 
their recipients for the consumption tax increase, 
labour taxes have to increase to offset the 
increase in expenditure. Hence, the reduction in 
labour taxes is smaller in the medium/long run 
than in the short run. 
The baseline scenarios are complemented by 
several sensitivity analyses that either change the 
magnitude of some key parameters or change the 
benchmark assumption regarding the adjustment 
of transfers. Several parameters play a decisive 
role. First, the labour-supply elasticity is 
important for the magnitude of the labour supply 
response to a tax shift. There is some uncertainty 
about the magnitude of this response. Most micro 
studies estimate values below 0.5, even going as 
low as 0.2. In order to provide a cautious 
                                                          
(1) It should be noted that Germany and Ireland are 
represented in this exercise in a stylised manner. The 
model uses region specific estimated parameters for the 
euro area and the US, as well as calibrated parameters for 
the rest of the world. There are no country specific 
behavioural estimates for Germany and Ireland, but the 
estimates obtained for the euro area are imposed. These 
countries are distinguished from the RoEA only by using 
country-specific information on their size, their degree of 
openness, their bilateral trade linkages as well as their 
employment, tradable sector and government shares. 
estimate for the output and employment effects 
we have opted for a value of 0.25. Similarly, the 
international price elasticities for tradables could 
be important determinants for the domestic 
effects, since they affect the competitiveness 
gains. Unfortunately, there is little consensus in 
the trade literature on the magnitude of the price 
elasticity of tradables. The estimates range from 
1 to values above 10. The standard model setting 
assumes an elasticity of 2 for tradables. This 
seems to be consistent with estimated price 
elasticities from aggregate trade data.  
The effects of a switch from labour to 
consumption taxation will depend crucially on 
how other income earners are compensated for 
the increase in consumption taxes. Besides wage 
income, there are five other types of income for 
households: unemployment benefits, transfers, 
profit income and interest from domestic 
government and foreign bonds. The benchmark 
case considers the case in which the first two 
types of income (benefits and transfers) are 
indexed to consumer prices and are thus 
compensated for the increase in consumption 
taxes. This is the default assumption in the model 
simulations. However, profit income and interest 
income earners are not compensated and are de 
facto paying for the reform. While the 
benchmark assumption of full indexation may be 
regarded to reflect political pressures or explicit 
legal indexation schemes, it has the additional 
conceptual advantage that it allows to isolate the 
effects of the reform that originate in the 
difference in the tax bases of labour and 
consumption taxes. The additional effects that 
arise if transfers are not indexed are considered 
in an additional sensitivity analysis. 
3.2.1. Mechanics of the model simulations: 
domestic effects 
The model predicts that a permanent shift of 
taxes from wages to consumption has positive 
employment and GDP effects. The size of the 
effects depends on the specific underlying 
assumptions, such as the size of the key 
parameters, but also on the specific policy that is 
being considered. Whether a country acts in 
isolation or whether a joint shift is considered 
makes a substantial difference.  
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These findings are in line with theoretical 
arguments presented in Section IV.2. The 
different economic effects of tax shifting in 
isolation or jointly and the relevance of country 
size are discussed in detail in the scenarios 
presented in section IV.3.3.  
The effects of the tax shift on the domestic 
economy can be described as follows. The 
reduction in labour taxes lowers wage costs and 
reduces prices. It is assumed that the central bank 
targets 'core' inflation and does not respond to 
the increase in consumer prices due to the tax 
increase. Instead, lower prices allow the central 
bank to reduce nominal interest rates. Lower 
interest rates lead to an expected appreciation of 
the nominal exchange rate. It should be noted, 
however, that the induced monetary effects are 
not quantitatively important for the observed real 
effects. The gain in competitiveness that results 
from the labour tax reduction boosts exports. But 
the increase in domestic demand, in particular in 
consumption, also raises imports and the net 
outcome of these two opposing effects is 
typically a small worsening of the trade balance 
in the simulations. 
The reduction in labour tax leads to an increase 
in employment and in output. The budgetary 
impact is more complex as there are many 
channels affecting the budget both directly and 
indirectly. As the reform consists of changes in 
tax rates, there is a direct impact on the budget, 
but the shift is constructed to be ex ante 
budgetary neutral on the baseline. The budget is 
further indirectly affected as the reform is 
accompanied by the adjustment of benefit and 
transfer payments, which are driven by 
indexation and the macroeconomic impact of the 
reform. The ex post labour tax reduction is 
considerably smaller in the long run.  
Layard et al. (1991) have raised doubts against a 
tax shift from wages to consumption based on 
the empirical observation that real wages will 
only fall temporarily after a tax shock. They 
regard this as evidence that taxation of labour 
does not have permanent labour market effects. It 
is interesting to notice that the QUEST 
simulation results exactly generate this pattern of 
the real wage response. Nevertheless there is a 
permanently positive employment effect. This 
can be explained when we take into account 
various dynamic adjustment mechanisms. The 
basic intuition behind this result is the fact that a 
temporary increase in employment leads to an 
increase in the capital stock in the medium term 
until the pre-existing capital labour ratio is re-
established (1). However, once the initial capital- 
labour ratio is re-established, the marginal 
product of labour returns to its initial level and, 
therefore, the real wages firms are willing to pay 
return to baseline at a higher level of 
employment and capital. 
In a stylised fashion the dynamics of wages, 
investment and employment can be described as 
follows. The initial impact of a tax shift is a 
reduction of real wage costs (not necessarily of 
the real consumption wage), this leads to an 
increase in employment that is accompanied by 
an increase in investment in the medium term. 
Both the increase in employment plus the 
improved supply conditions (a larger capital 
stock) lead to an increase in real wages. The 
process comes to an end when the pre-reform 
capital labour ratio is re-established, since this is 
the capital-labour-ratio which is consistent with 
an unchanged user cost of capital, which, as 
explained in detail in Box IV.3.1, is consistent 
with the long-run capital market equilibrium. 
There exists a one to one relationship between 
the capital-labour-ratio and the real producer 
wage (i.e. the wage a firm is willing to pay). 
Thus a return of the capital-labour-ratio to its 
initial condition is associated with a return of real 
wages to their initial level. 
There are also important distributional effects of 
the tax shift, since shifting taxes from labour to 
consumption affects consumption possibilities 
for different income groups differently. The 
QUEST model does not distinguish households 
by their position in the income distribution but 
only allows looking at functional income groups. 
By distinguishing between liquidity-constrained 
households and households with free access to 
capital markets one can at least indirectly trace 
the distributional effects. 
                                                          
(1) This is a direct implication from the marginal 
productivity condition for capital (for any constant 
returns to scale production function), which requires a 
long run constant capital labour ratio when real capital 
costs are not changed. 
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Box IV.3.1: The mechanics of the tax shift in the QUEST III model
This box explains the basic mechanisms at work when one considers a tax shift from labour to 
consumption in the QUEST III model. The focus is on capital formation and employment. 
Capital formation: 
The first question addressed concerns the effect of a VAT on capital formation both in the long run 
(steady state) and in the short run. Investment is determined by firms, equating the marginal product of 
capital (MPK) to the rental rate (or user cost (UCC)) of capital 
(1) UCCMPK =  
The user cost of capital must be equal to the real rate of interest on a safe asset ( r ), the rate of 
depreciation (δ ) and possibly a risk premium (risk) 
(2) riskrUCC ++= δ  (1)  
Equation (1) and (2) determine a demand schedule for capital as a function of the real interest rate. The 
supply of capital is determined by savings decisions of private households. In standard DSGE models 
savings is determined by intertemporally optimising households with a discount rate equal to ρ . 
Households equate the marginal utility of current consumption (





) and the relative price of  consumption today versus consumption tomorrow, 
which is the (gross) real interest rate (1+r) multiplied with the ratio of value added tax factor ( ttv+1 ) 
and (

















 (3)    
This condition determines a savings (intertemporal consumption) schedule. Households shift 
consumption into future periods when the real interest rate is high and when they expect value added 
taxes to be lower in the future compared to current rates. In the steady state this condition fixes the real 
interest rate at the rate of time preference, irrespective of the level of the consumption tax. This shows 
that in the long run (steady state) value added taxes do not distort capital formation. It is important to 
notice that this condition also holds for the open economy. Increasing consumption taxes for capital 
owners does not lead to an outflow of capital. However, in the short run the tax shift can affect 
consumption and savings. An increase in value added taxes lowers real consumption from all sources of 
income, while a reduction of labour taxes increases consumption. A priori, the short-run effect of a tax 
shift on savings cannot be determined. In QUEST III the effect of the tax shift on savings seems to be 
negative in the
                                                          
(1) For ease of exposition corporate taxes and depreciation allowances are ignored. 
(2) The real interest rate is defined as nominal interest rate minus the expected consumer price inflation net of value
added taxes. 
(3) This is a simplified representation of consumption and only describes consumption of non liquidity constrained
households. The QUESTIII model a fraction of households is liquidity constrained and only consumes out of
current wage and transfer income. This has additional implications for short run adjustment which are described in
the simulation section.    
(Continued on the next page) 
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The effects on the various household types are as 
follows. Liquidity-constrained households, 
which receive labour income and do not possess 
wealth, are positively affected. Non-liquidity-
constrained households are subject to opposing 
effects. As recipients of wage income, they are 
profiting from the shift. On the other hand, as 
owners of financial wealth and recipients of 
profit income, they are negatively affected. 
Whether the latter negative effect dominates the 
former positive effects depends on the share of 
these households. If there are very few of them, 
the negative effects are strong for each 
household. In that case, they each own a larger 
share of the capital stock so that their capital and 
interest income represents a greater proportion of 
their total income. In the baseline assumptions 
used in the simulations of 40% liquidity-
constrained households and 60% non-liquidity-
constrained households, the total effect on the 
non-liquidity constrained households is slightly 
positive. 
3.2.2. Mechanics of the model simulations: 
international spillover effects 
As discussed, a tax shift carried out unilaterally 
by an single country can have spillover effects on 
Box (continued) 
short run and consequently the tax reform is accompanied by a temporary increase in the real interest 
rate, which slightly reduces investment initially.  
Employment: 
The source of the positive employment (GDP) effect is due to the shift in taxation from wages to income 
from financial wealth. To understand the labour supply effect of the tax shift consider the following 















where σ denotes the elasticity of labour supply (L) and ω a preference parameter that indicates the 
preference for leisure. Labour supply (as a share of population of working age) depends positively on the 
real net consumption wage ( rCW ) and negatively on household wealth (which is proportional to private 
consumption (C)). Or, alternatively, this relationship can be rewritten to show that wages respond 






























a positive labour supply response can be expected from a change in tax policy. It is important to notice 
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its trading partners. The simulations suggest a 
rather small international spillover effect of a tax 
shift carried out in isolation by a single country. 
Theoretically, the international spillover effect is 
not determined a priori. It depends on a number 
of factors, in particular the relative size of 
demand and price effects generated in the 
country where the reform is undertaken. It is 
conceivable that, with a low price elasticity 
between domestic and foreign goods (countries 
specialise in the production of tradables), the 
positive demand effect generated by a tax shift 
dominates the price effect. However, as the price 
elasticity of internationally traded goods 
increases it is more likely that competitiveness 
effects generate negative spillovers. However, 
the simulations imply that even for relatively low 
international price elasticities the 
competitiveness effect seems to dominate. For 
example, if Germany undertakes a tax shift, the 
model suggests that this leads to a decline in real 
wage costs for German firms and a reduction of 
export prices. This in turn leads to a fall of real 
wages in the RoEA in the order of magnitude of 
one third of the decline in real wages in 
Germany. This has effects on consumption of 
liquidity constrained households which reduces 
demand for domestic goods and imports. 
However, the fall of real wages stabilises 
employment and GDP in the RoEA. Therefore, 
because of strong cost and demand spillovers, the 
trade balance in the RoEA is rather unaffected.  
3.3. SIMULATION SCENARIOS 
3.3.1. Scenario 1: co-ordinated tax shift in 
the euro area 
The first simulation scenario considers a co-
ordinated tax shift throughout the euro area in 
which all euro-area Member States reduce labour 
taxation and increase their consumption taxes at 
the same time. A revenue-neutral tax shift in the 
order of magnitude of 1% of GDP can be 
generated with a labour tax reduction of 1.3 pp in 
the long run, financed by an increase in VAT of 
1.5 pp (1). Such a tax shift generates a positive 
                                                          
(1) The absolute change of value added taxes exceeds the 
absolute change of labour taxes because of compensatory 
payments to benefit and transfer recipients. Given our 
employment and GDP effect in the short and the 
long run (compare Table IV.3.1). Compared to 
baseline, employment increases in the first year 
by about 0.14% and rises to 0.25% in the long 
run. Real GDP increase is slightly lower, at 
0.09% and 0.23% respectively. The smaller GDP 
effect is explained by a slower adjustment of 
capital to its new equilibrium level, because the 
reform is biased towards an increase of 
employment. The main mechanism is a decline 
in real wage costs of about half a percent in the 
first three years. As discussed above, the tax 
reform does not lead to a permanent reduction of 
real wage costs. Adjustment in the capital stock 
and a higher demand for labour bring real wage 
costs back to their pre-reform levels. There is 
however, a permanent gain in real consumption 
wages of about 0.7%. 
Since this tax reform shifts the burden of taxation 
from wages to capital income earners it has 
important distributional effects (in consumption 
terms). As shown in the Table IV.3.1, real wage 
income rises because net consumption wage and 
employment increase. Real consumption income 
from capital and financial wealth rises initially 
because of an increase in the real interest rate, 
but it falls below baseline over the medium term 
and recovers slightly in the long run because of 
wealth accumulation effects. This has 
implications for consumption and is reflected by 
a stronger increase of real consumption from 
current net wages and transfers of the liquidity-
constrained households, compared to households 
that consume out of labour and capital income. 
Consumption of non-liquidity-constrained 
households rises over time but the increase does 
not reach the same level as the consumption 
increase of wage earners. The difference is 
explained by the fact that the tax reform shifts 
the burden of taxation on consumption out of 
capital income.  
                                                                                
baseline levels of labour taxes (including social security 
contributions) of 38% and value added taxes of 17%, 
these relative changes fulfil condition (5) in Box IV.3.1., 
required for lowering the tax wedge. 
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The decline of wage costs does not improve 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the RoW outside the 
euro area because it goes along with a nominal 
appreciation that is driven by the increase of the 
Table IV.3.1:
Simulation of a euro-area wide tax shift
Germany
1 2 3 4 5 10 20
GDP 0.09 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23
Employment 0.14 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.25
Consumption 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22
- Consumption LC 0.45 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.47 0.48
- Consumption NLC 0.01 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.10
Investment -0.18 -0.12 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.13
Exports 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.16
Imports 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.11
Real wage costs -0.41 -0.54 -0.47 -0.38 -0.31 -0.13 -0.06
Net real consumption wage 0.67 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.65 0.67
Real consumption interest income 2.63 -0.29 -1.09 -1.17 -1.13 -1.02 -1.04
Consumer price level 1.13 0.87 0.66 0.49 0.36 0.01 -0.19
Terms of trade 0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07
Dollar exchange rate -0.22 -0.38 -0.58 -0.74 -0.87 -1.20  -1.36
Nominal interest rates -0.13 -0.20 -0.18 -0.14 -0.11 -0.03 -0.01
Real interest rates 0.18 0.04 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Inflation -0.28 -0.24 -0.19 -0.15 -0.12 -0.04 -0.01
Tax rate labour -1.47 -1.41 -1.38 -1.36 -1.35 -1.30 -1.28
Tax rate consumption 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53
Bilateral trade balance vs. EA 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Trade balance -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Rest of euro area
1 2 3 4 5 10 20
GDP 0.09 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24
Employment 0.15 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.26
Consumption 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24
- Consumption LC 0.46 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.42 0.49 0.51
- Consumption NLC 0.03 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.12
Investment -0.15 -0.08 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.16
Exports -0.01 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15
Imports 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.10
Real wage costs -0.40 -0.53 -0.46 -0.38 -0.31 -0.13 -0.05
Net real consumption wage 0.68 0.43 0.45 0.51 0.56 0.68 0.71
Real consumption interest income 2.55 -0.33 -1.12 -1.20 -1.15 -1.02 -1.04
Consumer price level 1.13 0.88 0.67 0.50 0.37 0.02 -0.19
Terms of trade 0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08
Dollar exchange rate -0.22 -0.38 -0.58 -0.74 -0.87 -1.20 -1.36
Nominal interest rates -0.13 -0.20 -0.18 -0.14 -0.11 -0.03 -0.01
Real interest rates 0.17 0.03 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01
Inflation -0.28 -0.24 -0.19 -0.15 -0.12 -0.04 -0.01
Tax rate labour -1.47 -1.42 -1.39 -1.37 -1.36 -1.31 -1.29
Tax rate consumption 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53
Bilateral trade balance vs. DE -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Trade balance -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Notes: 
Percent(age points) deviation from baseline.
LC: Liquidity-constrained households. NLC: Non-liquidity constrained households.
Inflation is defined as core inflation, i.e. excluding VAT.
Source:  Commission services.
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real interest rate, triggered by a rise in domestic 
demand, especially from consumption of 
liquidity-constrained households. The wage and 
exchange rate effect compensate each other and 
leave the terms of trade virtually unchanged.  
3.3.2. Scenario 2: an isolated tax shift in a 
large country (Germany) 
If only a single large country (Germany) 
undertakes the reform, the outcome for this 
country could be different. Germany could 
benefit by making competitiveness gains relative 
to its RoEA neighbours and could loose because 
of demand effects in the rest of the euro area. 
The total output effects in the RoEA are 
negligable because there is a strong real wage 
response in RoEA, which stabilises employment 
(and GDP). However, the initial gain in 
competitiveness does not lead to stronger output 
expansion in Germany compared to the joint tax 
reform case. Germany does not gain a permanent 
cost advantage over its RoEA neighbours, 
because real wages adjust upwards in Germany 
with rising employment, and real wages in RoEA 
fall. 
The simulation results suggest that the output 
gains, in the case Germany goes ahead 
unilaterally, are slightly higher in the short run 
but the long-run output effects are lower. In the 
first year, German GDP grows by 0.11% relative 
to baseline if moving unilaterally compared to 
0.09% if the shift is coordinated throughout the 
euro area. However, already after two years the 
effect on GDP growth is larger in the coordinated 
case. In the long run German GDP increases 
0.2% if acting on its own, whereas the increase is 
0.23% in case of the coordinated shift, see Table 
IV3.2. The effects on RoEA GDP and 
employment are negligible.   
3.3.3. Scenario 3: isolated tax shift in a small 
country (Ireland) 
Ireland, which here serves as a prototype small 
open economy with a high trade share and a high 
degree of substitutability between domestic and 
foreign tradables, constitutes another interesting 
example for a country that could possibly benefit 
extensively from tax shifting policies via 
potential competitiveness effects. Surprisingly 
this is not the case, see Table IV.3.3. The 
competitiveness gains accrue to Irish workers in 
the form of higher net wages and a stronger 
increase in domestic demand. Higher 
substitutability between domestic and foreign 
tradables limits movements in the terms of trade 
and it is the adjustment of real wages which 
generates the international price equalisation. 
Because of a faster real wage response, the 
employment gains, especially in the tradable 
sector, are smaller and there is less of an 
expansionary (investment) effect. Another 
important reason for a smaller real effect of the 
tax reform if conducted in a small country is a 
less accommodative monetary policy because 
consumer prices in the monetary union decline 








Simulation of a tax shift by Germany only
Germany
1 2 3 4 5 10 20
GDP 0.11 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Employment 0.14 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.22
Consumption 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.17
- Consumption LC 0.61 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.45
- Consumption NLC 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05
Investment -0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.10
Exports 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.12
Imports  0.08 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02
Real wage costs -0.19 -0.25 -0.21 -0.17 -0.14 -0.08 -0.05
Net real consumption wage 0.89 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.63
Real consumption interest income -0.01 -0.69 -0.98 -1.06 -1.08 -1.09 -1.16
Consumer price level 1.26 1.18 1.12 1.07 1.03 0.94 0.89
Terms of trade -0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11
Dollar exchange rate -0.05 -0.09 -0.13 -0.17 -0.20 -0.27 -0.29
Nominal interest rates -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
Real interest rates 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Inflation -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00
Tax rate labour -1.48 -1.44 -1.40 -1.38 -1.36 -1.30 -1.25
Tax rate consumption 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53
Bilateral trade balance vs. EA -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Trade balance -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
Rest of euro area
1 2 3 4 5 10 20
GDP -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
Employment -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Consumption -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01
- Consumption LC -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.00
- Consumption NLC 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Investment -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00
Exports 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Imports -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05
Real wage costs -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.00
Net real consumption wage -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.01
Real consumption interest income 0.83 0.12 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.04
Consumer price level -0.04 -0.09 -0.14 -0.17 -0.20 -0.27 -0.29
Terms of trade 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Dollar exchange rate -0.05 -0.09 -0.13 -0.17 -0.20 -0.27 -0.29
Nominal interest rates -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00
Real interest rates 0.03 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
Inflation -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00
Tax rate labour 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00
Tax rate consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bilateral trade balance vs. DE 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
Trade balance 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00
Notes: 
Percent(age points) deviation from baseline.




Inflation is defined as core inflation, i.e. excluding VAT.
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Simulation of a tax shift by Ireland only
Ireland
1 2 3 4 5 10 20
GDP 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19
Employment 0.14 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.21
Consumption 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.15
- Consumption LC 0.66 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.49 0.42
- Consumption NLC 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.03
Investment 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08
Exports 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
Imports 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00
Real wage costs -0.11 -0.15 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04
Net real consumption wage 0.95 0.84 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.68 0.58
Real consumption interest income -0.98 -0.97 -1.05 -1.10 -1.13 -1.18 -1.27
Consumer price level 1.32 1.30 1.28 1.27 1.27 1.25 1.23
Terms of trade -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
Dollar exchange rate -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
Nominal interest rates -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
Real interest rates 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Inflation -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
Tax rate labour -1.49 -1.44 -1.41 -1.39 -1.37 -1.30 -1.24
Tax rate consumption 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55 1.55
Bilateral trade balance vs. EA -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01
Trade balance -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.00
Rest of euro area
1 2 3 4 5 10 20
GDP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Employment -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Consumption -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
- Consumption LC -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
- Consumption NLC -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Investment -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Exports 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Imports -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Real wage costs -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Net real consumption wage -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Real consumption interest income 0.05 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Consumer price level -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
Terms of trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dollar exchange rate -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
Nominal interest rates -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
Real interest rates 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
Inflation -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Tax rate labour 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tax rate consumption 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bilateral trade balance vs. IR 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Trade balance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: 
LC: Liquidity-constrained households. NLC: Non-liquidity constrained households.
Inflation is defined as core inflation, i.e. excluding VAT.
Source:  Commission services.
Years after reform
Years after reform
Percent(age points) deviation from baseline.
Part IV 
The efficiency of tax systems 
 
203 
3.3.4. Sensitivity analysis 
Though the output and employment effects of the 
simulated tax shifts from labour to consumption 
taxation are positive, they are relatively modest 
in size. The assumptions that were chosen for the 
baseline calibration were of a cautious nature 
along three dimensions. First, compared to the 
Commission's own estimates based on 
macroeconomic time series, a low labour supply 
elasticity of 0.25 was adopted, which is more in 
line with the microeconomic evidence. This 
restricts the labour supply response. Second, the 
price elasticity of tradables is at the lower end of 
the spectrum of available estimates. This may 
restrict positive international competitiveness 
effects. Finally, it was assumed that transfer and 
benefit recipients are fully compensated by this 
reform. This restricts incentive effects associated 
with the reform and it inflicts budgetary costs. 
Table IV.3.4 provides results from sensitivity 
analyses with alternative assumptions for the 
case of a unilateral tax shift by Germany.  
The scenarios confirm the theoretical intuition 
that higher labour supply elasticity increases the 
multiplier effect of a tax reform considerably. 
The mirror image of higher labour supply 
elasticity is a stronger and more persistent 
decline in real wages (a smaller increase in real 
net consumption wages). This boosts the long 
run real effects by generating a more positive 
investment climate. In the case without 
compensation of transfer and benefit recipients, 
real wages will fall more because a higher 
reduction of labour taxes is possible for any 
given increase in VAT. Notice that this is not 
reflected in a stronger increase of net wages 
because there is an additional effect from non-
compensation, namely a decline in wage pressure 
because the fall in real transfer income reduces 
the reservation wage. Higher trade elasticities 
can also boost the domestic employment and 
output effects, however the gains remain modest. 
As discussed in the case of Ireland, the 
competitiveness gains are largely captured by 
workers in the form of a smaller decline of gross 




















Employment GDP Real wages
Real net 
consumption wage
(after 20 years) (after 20 years) (after 3 years)  (after 3 years)
Base case (Shift by DE) 0.22 0.20 -0.21 0.72
Higher labour supply elasticity (= 0.5) 0.58 0.53 -0.48 0.42
No compensation of transfer recipients 0.43 0.47 -0.43 0.63
Higher price elasticity of traded goods (= 5.0) 0.25 0.24 -0.20 0.78
Note: Percent(age points) deviation from baseline.
Source:  Commission services.
Table IV.3.4:





High tax burden on labour and increasing 
economic integration imply substantial 
challenges for public finances in general and, 
more specifically, for tax policy. Revenue-
neutral tax reforms that shift the tax burden from 
labour to other tax bases are an important 
element that can help to improve labour market 
outcomes and foster growth. For such a strategy 
to be successful, alternative tax bases have to be 
considered. These tax bases have to be broad and 
stable, and should not ultimately shift the burden 
to labour again. 
A proposal that has received much attention is a 
tax shift from labour to consumption, typically in 
the form of a reduction of payroll taxes or social 
security contributions financed by an increase in 
VAT. Such a tax shift can have positive effects 
on employment. The size of the effect will 
depend on various factors. First, given that VAT 
falls on labour income as well, the long-run 
effects will depend on the extent to which 
accumulated wealth and profit income that are 
also taxed by the VAT can increase the tax base. 
This enlargement of the tax base allows a 
reduction in the tax rate, with positive effects on 
labour supply. Second, the effect of the tax shift 
on the level of unemployment benefits will be 
another important factor. If these levels fall in 
real terms, there will be stronger incentives to 
take up work. Moreover, if transfers are lower in 
real terms, the financing requirements of the 
government are reduced, which can allow a 
reduction in rates. Whether these effects will be 
short-lived, or even exist in the longer run, 
depends on the institutional details that 
determine the adjustment of benefits. If benefits 
are not fully adjusted automatically, there may be 
rising political pressure to maintain the real level 
of benefits. 
Given the existence of nominal rigidities in the 
labour market, there will be a reduction in labour 
costs that can have substantial positive short-run 
effects on employment. The size and persistence 
of these effects will depend on the institutional 
characteristics of the economy, as well as on its 
degree of international integration. The 
international effects will be quite different, 
depending on whether the tax shift is carried out 
by a single Member State in isolation or whether 
it is a joint shift by the entire euro area. 
Tax shifting from labour to consumption often 
gives rise to concerns about equity. While a 
closer analysis suggests that distributional 
objectives need not necessarily be missed, if the 
government relies more heavily on consumption 
taxes, recent evidence supports the traditional 
regressive view of the VAT. There is also a 
question of inter-generational equity, since the 
tax shift towards consumption taxes will improve 
the situation of the younger generation at the 
expense of the older generation. 
Simulation results using the Commission's 
QUEST III model suggest that a co-ordinated 
euro-area wide tax shift of 1% of GDP has 
positive effects on employment and growth, 
although these are quantitatively limited. The 
benchmark simulation implies that such a shift, 
in large country (Germany), will increase real 
GDP by about 0.1% in the first year and by about 
0.25% in the long run. Employment increases by 
about 0.14% in the first year and by 0.25% in the 
long run. Thus, while tax shifting from labour 
income taxation to VAT can contribute to more 
employment and growth, there are also clear 
limits to what can be achieved through such 
measures. The effects are larger if labour supply 
is more elastic or if transfer payments are not 
indexed, in line with the theoretical reasoning. 
The quantitative results need to be interpreted 
with care and in the light of the corresponding 
model assumptions. It should also be stressed 
that the nature of the QUEST model does not 
allow considering more targeted tax shifts that 
use the additional revenues from higher VAT to 
target labour tax reductions of groups that face 
particularly strong disincentives to work. Such 
more sophisticated targeting of labour tax 
reductions could substantially increase the 
employment effects of the reform. Similarly, the 
model abstracts from potential positive effects 
that could arise from bringing undeclared work 
back into the official economy in response to a 
lower tax burden on labour. 
The simulations also consider the possibility of a 
unilateral tax shift of either a small or a large 
country within the euro area. The results show 
that small and large countries could profit from a 
unilateral shift. The positive effects on growth 
and employment are somewhat bigger for a large 
country compared to a small country. The 
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spillover effects that are generated by such 
unilateral shifts on the rest of the euro area, are 
typically negative, but small. This is intuitive for 
the small country acting alone, but the 
simulations reveal that also in the case of a large 
country moving alone the spillover effects are 
only slightly negative. While the large country 
gains competitiveness compared to the rest of the 
area, its expansion also creates positive demand 
effects that are beneficial to its trading partners.  
Thus, it appears that the beggar-thy-neighbour 
aspects of unilateral tax shifting policies from 
labour to consumption are rather limited. 
Considering both options, the coordinated and 
the unilateral shift, it should be stressed that the 
positive long-run effects on employment and 
growth of countries acting alone are always 
smaller compared to the case of a coordinated 
policy shift, although short-run effects are 
slightly larger when acting alone. Thus, while 
euro-area countries can gain from unilateral 
action, they can gain more from a coordinated 
policy. However, also in case of such a 
coordinated policy, the positive effects remain 
modest. 
The main conclusion from the analysis is that tax 
shifting from labour to consumption can be a 
potentially useful but also limited instrument for 
governments to react to short-run country 
specific shocks or to achieve long-run 
improvement of the structural conditions for 
increasing employment and growth in Europe. 
An effective strategy to revitalise European 
economies needs to rely on a comprehensive 
approach, using a wide set of policy instruments 
and emphasizing a resolute implementation of 











Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, the budgetary outturn was a deficit of 
0.2% of GDP compared to a surplus target of 
0.3% of GDP in the December 2006 stability 
programme update(1). The difference between 
the outturn and the target can be largely 
explained by the non-execution of a package of 
deficit-reducing one-off measures, including 
further property sales and pension fund take-
overs, for 0.4% of GDP(2). Furthermore, a 
number of unexpected deficit-increasing one-off 
measures of about 0.2% of GDP led to additional 
expenditure. Expenditure growth also turned out 
higher than planned. In particular, consumption 
and subsidies to companies, i.a. under the service 
voucher scheme to increase employment, 
exceeded the budget target. However, this 
expenditure overrun was partially compensated 
by slightly higher-than-expected revenue. The 
structural balance improved by 0.3% of GDP to -
0.3% of GDP, with one-offs reducing the deficit 
by 0.9% of GDP in 2006 and increasing it by 
0.1% of GDP in 2007. The debt-to-GDP ratio 
stood at 84.9% at the end of 2007.  
The budget for 2008 could only be agreed by the 
end of February, once a new interim Government 
had been formed, and still needs to be approved 
by the Parliament. The Government targets a 
balanced budget, in line with the update of the 
stability programme submitted in April, but 
markedly below the 0.5% of GDP surplus target 
in the December 2006 update. The budget 
includes expenditure-increasing measures for 
0.1% of GDP, mainly aiming at increasing 
households' purchasing power. They concern i.a. 
a revalorisation of the lowest pensions and an 
                                                          
(1) The 2007 update of the stability programme was 
submitted in April 2008. The programme, as well as its 




(2)  This is because the outgoing Government, which 
following the federal elections of 10 June 2007 stayed in 
office in a caretaker capacity, did not consider itself in a 
position to go ahead with these operations.  
extension of the measures to cushion the impact 
of rising heating fuel prices for the most 
vulnerable households. On the other hand, 
expenditure should be contained by the decision 
not to spend part of the health care budget, the 
agreement that the Regions and Communities 
will achieve a 0.1% of GDP surplus and the 
introduction of further measures that aim at 
improving the activation of the unemployed. The 
two main revenue-increasing measures in the 
budget are a specific tax for the energy sector 
and a plan for the reinforcement of tax fraud 
detection. The Commission services' spring 2008 
forecast foresees a headline deficit of 0.4% of 
GDP in 2008. The difference with the official 
target is mainly explained by the less benign 
macroeconomic projections in the spring forecast 
and the exclusion of a number of measures that 
were not sufficiently documented in order to be 
taken into account in the forecast(3). According 
to the Commission services' forecast, the 
structural balance improved by 0.1% of GDP in 
2008.  
For 2009, the Commission services' forecast 
expects, on a no-policy-change basis, a further 
slight deterioration of the deficit to around 0.6% 
of GDP, reflecting the further weakening 
economic environment. The April 2008 update 
of the stability programme targets a surplus of 
0.3% of GDP for 2009, but in a more optimistic 
macroeconomic scenario and without specifying 
all the measures envisaged to reach the surplus 
target. After 2009, the programme update 
foresees a further build-up of surpluses up to 
1.0% of GDP in 2011. 
The debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast to remain on a 
downward path, falling from 84.9% in 2007 to 
79.9% in 2009, which is slightly higher than 
foreseen in the stability programme (78.1%) on 
account of the higher deficits projected by the 
Commission services. By 2011, the stability 
programme foresees a debt ratio of about 71%. 
                                                          
(3) These include the above-mentioned specific tax on the 
energy sector and the collection of additional corporate 
taxes following more effective fraud detection. 
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2006 2007 2008 2009
0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6
48.8 48.7 48.7 48.6
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 13.2 12.9 13.0 13.0
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 16.5 16.4 16.4 16.5
- social contributions 15.7 15.9 16.0 16.0
48.4 48.8 49.0 49.3
  Of which: - compensation of employees 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.7
- intermediate consumption 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7
- social payments 15.5 15.6 15.8 16.0
- gross fixed capital formation 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
- interest expenditure 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.6
4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9
44.6 44.5 44.5 44.6
0.9 -0.1 0.0 0.0
-0.6 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
3.4 3.6 3.4 3.4
88.2 84.9 81.9 79.9
2.8 2.7 1.7 1.5
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.0
4.3 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.3
0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.4
88.2 84.9 81.5 78.1 74.7 71.1
2.8 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0
Notes:
Table V.1.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Belgium (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden









One-off and other temporary measures
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Belgium.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in April 2008.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
 
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Increase of the lowest pension (0.1% of GDP)       
•     Specific tax on the energy sector (0.1% of GDP) •     Agreement not to spend part of the health care budget 
      (-0.2% of GDP)
•     Measures to improve the effectiveness of the fight •     Measures to step up the activation of unemployed  
       against corporate tax fraud (0.1% of GDP)        (-0.1% of GDP)
•     Agreement with regions and communities not to spend 
       part of the transfers received from the federal government
       (-0.1% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.1.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services and Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, Budget des recettes et des dépenses: exposé général.






Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, the general government surplus in 
Bulgaria reached 3.4% of GDP, against an 
official target of 0.8% of GDP set out in the 
January 2007 convergence programme. The 
budgetary over-performance was entirely due to 
higher than expected revenues. The particularly 
buoyant revenue growth reflects favourable 
composition effects due to strong domestic 
demand and improved tax compliance and 
efficiency of tax collection. Cuts in corporate 
income tax rates in 2007 and in social 
contributions in 2006 and 2007 appear to have 
led to a considerable reduction of the grey 
economy and a more accurate reporting of profits 
and wages. However, expenditure control was 
not fully maintained. Initially envisaged savings 
of 10% of budgeted primary current expenditures 
were not implemented, pensions were increased 
by more than the statutory rate, and an additional 
spending package, mainly infrastructure 
investment, of around 2% of GDP was adopted 
in late 2007. In line with the high budgetary 
surplus general government gross debt decreased 
to 18.2% of GDP, down from 22.7% of GDP in 
2006. 
The 2008 budget was adopted by the Parliament 
on 20 December 2007. On the revenue side, a 
10% flat-rate personal income tax has been 
introduced from 1 January 2008 abolishing the 
current system of progressive tax brackets. This 
has been accompanied by the elimination or 
reduction of existing tax exemptions. Certain 
excise tax rates have been increased in line with 
the EU harmonization requirements. On the 
expenditure side, wages in the general 
government sector are projected to increase 
between 5% and 10% as of 1 July, while a 12% 
cut in public sector employment is to be 
implemented by mid-year. Pensions are planned 
to be raised by 9.5% in line with the pension 
indexation formula. The practice of freezing the 
release of part of the budget allocations until the 
end of the year, used so far to ensure flexibility 
in meeting the budgetary targets, has been 
abandoned. Instead, budget contingency reserves 
were increased by 0.5% of GDP, adding a ‘fiscal 
sustainability’ component to these reserves. The 
official target for the general government balance 
in 2008 is a surplus of 3% of GDP, set both in 
the budget law and in the update of the 
convergence programme of December 2007 (1). 
This is slightly below the Commission services’ 
spring 2008 forecast which expects the general 
government surplus to turn out at 3.2% of GDP, 
mainly reflecting a higher than initially 
envisaged budgetary outcome in 2007. 
According to the spring 2008 forecast, the 
structural balance is set to remain virtually 
unchanged at around 3% of GDP while the 
structural primary balance would decrease 
slightly as compared to 2007. Therefore, the 
fiscal stance in 2008 is projected to be broadly 
neutral.  
For 2009, the Commission services’ spring 2008 
forecast foresees the general government budget 
surplus to remain at around 3¼% of GDP. The 
projection is based on a no-policy change 
assumption. In the most recent update of the 
convergence programme the target for 2009 is 
set at 3% of GDP. The slight difference is due to 
a higher base effect in the Commission forecast 
and a more conservative assumption in the 
programme on the tax intensity of economic 
activity in 2009. In 2010, the general government 
surplus in the programme is projected to remain 
unchanged compared to 2009. 
On the back of strong nominal GDP growth and 
continued high primary fiscal surpluses, the 
Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast 
foresees the general government gross debt to 
fall to 14.1% and 10.8% of GDP in 2008 and 
2009, respectively. According to the programme, 
this decrease in public debt would be somewhat 
lower reflecting substantial debt-increasing 
stock-flow adjustments linked to an 
accumulation of net financial assets. 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 










2006 2007 2008 2009
3.0 3.4 3.2 3.2
39.4 41.2 40.9 40.9
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 19.0 17.4 17.3 17.1
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 5.4 6.5 6.6 6.7
- social contributions 8.7 8.7 8.4 8.4
36.4 37.8 37.7 37.7
  Of which: - compensation of employees 9.0 9.0 8.7 8.4
- intermediate consumption 7.9 8.0 8.0 8.0
- social payments 11.4 10.9 10.7 10.7
- gross fixed capital formation 4.2 4.9 5.5 6.0
- interest expenditure 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.8
4.4 4.4 4.1 4.0
33.2 34.1 33.9 33.9
-0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
2.5 3.1 2.9 3.2
3.9 4.1 3.8 4.0
22.7 18.2 14.1 10.8
6.3 6.2 5.8 5.6
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
4.6 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1
22.8 19.8 18.3 17.4 16.9
6.1 6.4 6.4 6.8 6.9
Notes:
Table V.2.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2010, Bulgaria (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden









One-off and other temporary measures
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Bulgaria.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 
taken from the programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
 
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Introduction of 10% flat-rate personal income tax (-¼% •     Increase of contingency reserves (½% of GDP)
       of GDP)
•     Increase in maximum and minimum insured income levels •     Indexation of pensions by 9.5% from 1 July 2007 (½% 
       for social security contribution payments (¼% of GDP)        of GDP)
•     Increase in excise rates on certain fuels, cigarettes, electricity
       and coal and removal of the excises on coffee beans
       (½% of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
Table V.2.2:
Notes:
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services and December 2007 convergence programme.
Main measures in the budget for 2008, Bulgaria
 




Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, the general government deficit stood at 
1.6% of GDP, which is significantly below the 
target of 3.4% of GDP set in the November 2007 
update of the convergence programme (1). The 
much better-than-expected outturn appears to 
mainly reflect containment of social expenditure, 
which was projected to rise by about 1% of GDP. 
Other elements of public expenditure including 
compensation of employees and intermediate 
consumption were also contained. In addition, 
growth turned out at 6.5% of GDP compared to 
4.9% of GDP, as expected in the March 2007 
convergence programme, and tax elasticities 
were better than predicted. Both revenues and 
expenditures were positively affected by a 
stronger than expected rise in employment. 
Social contributions grew more than anticipated 
and social transfers only increased marginally, as 
a percentage of GDP. 
Compared to 2006, the headline deficit declined 
by 1.1% of GDP, of which about one half is due 
to measures taken, as illustrated by the 
improvement in the structural balance, and the 
other half is thanks to stronger growth. Total 
expenditures decreased by 1.2% of GDP while 
total revenues decreased by 0.2% of GDP. 
Government debt fell from 29.4% of GDP in 
2006 to 28.7% of GDP in 2007. 
The 2008 budget was adopted on 5 December 
2007. The budget incorporates a wide range of 
revenue and expenditure measures contained in 
the stabilisation package, adopted on 19 
September 2007. In broad terms, the budget 
shifts the tax burden from direct to indirect 
taxation by lowering personal and corporate 
income taxes and raising the lower band of VAT 
rate, excise duties and energy taxes. The target 
for the 2008 budget is 1.5% of GDP based on the 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 




overall expenditure ceiling and estimated growth 
of 4.9% of GDP. The Commission services’ 
spring 2008 forecast estimates a deficit of 1.4% 
of GDP in 2008 based on the expectation of a 
positive fiscal impact from the stabilisation 
package, and the anticipation of a moderation in 
growth to 4.7% of GDP. The fiscal stance as 
determined by the structural primary balance will 
be mildly restrictive according to the 
Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast as it 
is predicted to improve from a deficit of 1.2% in 
2007 to 0.8% of GDP in 2008.  
According to the spring 2008 forecast, the 
general government balance in 2009, under the 
no-policy change assumption, is predicted to 
improve further to 1.1% of GDP based on the 
expectation of a positive fiscal impact of the 
stabilisation package of about 0.3% of GDP. The 
November 2007 convergence programme set a 
target of 2.6% of GDP. However, the Ministry of 
Finance announced in April a target of 1.2% of 
GDP for 2009 due to the much better-than-
expected outturn in 2007 and the government’s 
aim of further fiscal consolidation. The latest 
convergence programme targeted a structural 
deficit of -2.5% of GDP in 2010. 
On the basis of the Commission services’ spring 
2008 forecast, the debt ratio is expected to 
continue on a downward path to below 28% of 
GDP in 2009, due to continuing fiscal 










2006 2007 2008 2009
-2.7 -1.6 -1.4 -1.1
41.0 40.8 40.7 40.7
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 10.9 10.7 10.7 10.4
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 9.1 9.2 9.0 9.1
- social contributions 16.2 16.2 16.4 16.3
43.6 42.4 42.2 41.8
  Of which: - compensation of employees 7.8 7.5 6.8 6.5
- intermediate consumption 6.5 6.1 6.4 6.3
- social payments 12.6 12.8 12.8 12.9
- gross fixed capital formation 5.0 4.8 4.8 4.9
- interest expenditure 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1
-1.5 -0.4 -0.3 0.0
36.8 36.6 36.7 36.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-2.9 -2.3 -1.9 -1.5
-1.8 -1.2 -0.8 -0.4
29.4 28.7 28.1 27.2
6.4 6.5 4.7 5.0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-2.9 -3.4 -2.9 -2.6 -2.3
-1.8 -2.3 -1.7 -1.3 -1.1
-0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-3.1 -4.1 -3.4 -2.8 -2.5
30.1 30.4 30.3 30.2 30.0
6.4 5.9 5.0 5.1 5.3
Notes:
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Czech Republic.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 
taken from the programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)









One-off and other temporary measures
Table V.3.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Czech Republic (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
 
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     15% flat rate of personal tax (-0.6% of GDP) •     Changes to social and health insurance (-0.3% of GDP)
•     Reduction of corporate tax (-0.3% of GDP) •     Changes to government welfare benefits (-0.25% of GDP)
•     Increase to excise taxes (0.3% of GDP) •     Introduction of health charges (-0.1% of GDP)
•     Increase in lower VAT band (0.8% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.3.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services and November 2007 convergence programme.






Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
Continuing the trend from previous years, the 
general government recorded a budgetary surplus 
of 4.4% of GDP in 2007, considerably higher 
than the target of 2.8% of GDP indicated in the 
November 2006 update of the convergence 
programme. This overachievement reflects both 
that the cyclical conditions were stronger than 
assumed and the effects of a resilient labour 
market. In addition, certain volatile revenues, 
e.g. from oil and gas extraction, came out higher 
than predicted. As a result of continued large 
surpluses, the general government debt-to-GDP 
ratio was reduced further to 26% in 2007. 
Due to general elections held in November 2007, 
the adoption by parliament of the 2008 budget 
was delayed until 17 April 2008. With the 
incumbent government remaining in power, the 
tax freeze(1) is maintained and the income tax 
cuts agreed in September 2007 will take effect in 
2008 and 2009 as planned. The 2008 budget 
agreement focused mainly on enhancing the 
quality of public services, on alleviating the tight 
labour market situation by stimulating labour 
supply, and on temporarily offsetting the demand 
stimulus provided by central government 
consumption and investment growth by 
introducing a compulsory savings measure. In 
the February forecast, on which the draft budget 
bill was based, the headline surplus is estimated 
at 3.7% of GDP in 2008, representing an upward 
adjustment by ¾% of GDP vis-à-vis the target in 
the December 2007 update of the convergence 
programme(2). The Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast is slightly higher primarily due to a 
higher oil price assumption. The structural 
balance, adjusted for the one-off compensation 
                                                          
(1) The tax freeze implies that from 2002 onwards, neither 
direct nor indirect tax rates can be raised, whether 
defined in nominal or percentage terms. Subject to 
specific conditions the tax freeze leaves some, although 
limited, scope for revenue-neutral adjustments. 
(2) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal 
_policy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
payments related to the reform of the pension 
yield tax, is estimated to improve by close to ¾% 
of GDP indicating a restrictive fiscal stance.  
For 2009, the Commission services' spring 2008 
forecast projects a surplus of 2.9% of GDP. It is 
derived applying a no-policy-change assumption, 
but incorporates the agreement on the proposed 
budget bill (prior to the adoption). The projected 
surplus is marginally higher than the estimate in 
the forecast accompanying the draft budget bill, 
but more than ¾ pp higher than the target in the 
convergence programme update. Part of the 
difference stems from the fact that the 2009 
programme target is based on a medium-term 
projection determined by technical assumptions 
rather than a full-fledged forecast (see separate 
section below).  
In view of the sustained surpluses, general 
government debt is forecast, both by the 
Commission services and in the convergence 
programme, to continue being reduced, to well 
below 20% in 2009.  
Ensuring consistency of short-, medium- and 
long-term strategies 
In August 2007, the Danish government 
presented the so-called 2015-plan, which takes 
over from the previous 2010-plan. The plan aims 
at ensuring fiscal sustainability and macro-
economic stability and outlines general 
objectives towards 2015. As with the previous 
2010-plan, developments are addressed in the 
annual updates of the convergence programme. 
The plan sets specific objectives, targets and 
requirements guiding fiscal, tax and expenditure 
policies as well as structural and labour market 
policies. A second, separate but complementary 
objective of the plan is the operational target of 
ensuring structural surpluses every year until 
2015. The structure and key elements of the plan, 
interlinking policy areas over a long time-
horizon, are outlined in Table V.4.3 below.  
Part V 
Member State developments, Denmark 
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The plan sets out the medium-term objective 
(MTO) for the general government balance in 
structural terms on the basis of the projected path 
which, given the methods and assumptions 
adopted in the long-term projection, implies that 
fiscal sustainability is ensured. Sustainability is 
measured by an indicator similar to the S2 
sustainability gap indicator calculated by the 
Commission services (see Section I.4 for details). 
According to the plan, the structural policy 
measures required for fiscal sustainability 
correspond to a permanent budgetary 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009
4.8 4.4 3.9 2.9
56.1 55.1 54.8 53.7
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 17.8 17.7 17.6 17.4
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 30.0 29.6 29.6 28.9
- social contributions 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8
51.1 50.6 51.0 50.8
  Of which: - compensation of employees 16.9 16.7 16.7 16.8
- intermediate consumption 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.2
- social payments 15.3 15.0 14.7 14.8
- gross fixed capital formation 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9
- interest expenditure 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.2
6.4 5.9 5.3 4.1
49.2 48.8 48.6 47.6
0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.1
4.1 3.9 4.6 3.7
5.7 5.4 6.0 4.9
30.4 26.0 21.7 18.4
3.9 1.8 1.3 1.1
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2015
4.6 3.8 3.0 2.0 1.2 0.3
6.2 5.2 4.2 3.0 2.1 0.9
1.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.2 -0.3 0.0
2.7 3.5 3.4 2.5 2.5 ..
30.1 25.6 21.6 19.2 18.6 15.5
3.5 2.0 1.3 1.1 0.5 1.7
Notes:




Outturn and forecast (1)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Denmark (% of GDP)
Tax burden




Real GDP growth (%)
Convergence programme (4)
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme, the definition of which differs from the one applied by the Commission services.
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Government gross debt
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Denmark.
Real GDP growth (%)
General government balance
Primary balance
One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance (3)(5)
 
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Quality enhancing initiatives in the public sector 
•     Lower taxes net of higher transfers (-0.2% of GDP)       (0.1% of GDP)
•     Health care initiatives (0.1% of GDP), as in the agreement 
       on the regional budgets for 2008
•     Initiatives concerning care for children, the elderly, social 
       services etc. (0.1% of GDP) , as in the agreement on the 
       economy of the municipalities for 2008
•     Globalisation initiatives, concerning research, education,
       innovation and entrepreneurship (0.1% of GDP)
Notes:
Source : Commission services, the December 2007 convergence programme and the proposed budget bill for 2008.
Table V.4.2:
Main measures in the budget for 2008, Denmark
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
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improvement of 0.8% of GDP. By way of an 
example this requirement is assumed to be 
fulfilled partly by structural employment gains 
(+20,000 employed), and partly by unchanged 
working hours (which are presently high due to 
demographic composition effects). To achieve 
such structural gains, a Labour Market 
Commission has been asked to present concrete 
measures. In parallel, and within the constraints 
of the 2015-plan, a Tax Commission has been 
requested to consider tax reforms aimed inter 
alia at enhancing work incentives. 
As indicated in the 2007 update of the 
convergence programme, the structural balance 
is foreseen to deteriorate over the 2011-2015 
period, but to remain in surplus. This reflects the 
beginning effects of an ageing population and of 
the foreseen depletion of oil and gas resources. 
The Welfare Agreement of 2006 is estimated to 
reduce age-related expenditure by around 3½% 
of GDP. In the absence of these agreed reforms 
(taking effect from 2019), the path for the 
structural balance would have had to be 
significantly higher to ensure fiscal sustainability 
according to the methods and assumptions of the 
plan.  
Elaborating a comprehensive plan based on full-
fledged projections has proven useful in several 
regards. Firstly, it has provided a framework for 
public debate, highlighting and explaining fiscal 
sustainability challenges. Secondly, it has served 
as a tool for analysis, e.g. constituting a 
benchmark when assessing alternative policy 
proposals. A technical report has been published, 
enabling interested parties to scrutinise the 
government strategy. For instance, the Danish 
Economic Councils, who monitor economic 
policy developments, have presented similar 
projections, questioning the sustainability 
assessment presented by the government and 
have analysed the consequences of various 
assumptions underlying the government 
projections, e.g. 'healthy ageing'. The complexity 
and sensitivity to assumptions and specifications 
are to a certain extent unavoidable drawbacks. 
Whereas the projections are an asset in 
evaluating Danish policies, divergences with 
other methodologies (e.g. for calculating 
potential growth and assessing long-term 
sustainability) tend to complicate cross-country 
comparison and assessment.  
The plan is first and foremost an instrument to 
ensure strong political commitment. Its potential 
is reflected in the fact that the previous 2010-
plan remained unchanged despite the change of 
government in November 2001. Overall, the plan 
fosters accountability and consistency both 
across policy areas and over time. 
Table V.4.3:





2009 Medium-term projection 1%
2010  -  normalisation of cyclical and temporary factors 1%
2011    towards 2011, neutral cyclical conditions from 2012 1%
2012 -  new initiatives to raise employment (+0.7%) and 1%
2013    ensure unchanged working hours 3/4%
2014 -  specified, agreed or adopted policy measures, e.g. 3/4%
2015    quality reform, energy and globalisation strategies 3/4%
2016 Long-term projection
Notes:
(1) General government consumption expenditure
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and +1.5% of 
GDP)
 based on technical calculation principles aiming at a 
"neutral fiscal policies" and including effects of 
specified, agreed or adopted policy measures and 
objectives, e.g. the Welfare Agreement (implying 













































































5Short-term forecast 3/4 - 1 3/4 % of 
GDP
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Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, Germany registered a balanced budget 
position, which is a significant improvement on a 
planned deficit of 1½% of GDP foreseen in the 
end-2006 update of the stability programme. Of 
that difference, 0.4 percentage points are 
explained by a base effect, as the 2006 budget 
deficit turned out lower than expected. In 
addition, public finances benefited from a 
buoyant growth in tax revenues, as GDP growth 
exceeded late 2006 projections by more than one 
percentage point. The revenue side also benefited 
from an increase in the relative tax intensity of 
the economy, with a strong increase in personal 
income tax revenue. Government expenditure 
was slightly lower than planned, which was due 
to higher-than-expected savings in labour market 
spending. The government debt amounted to 
65% of GDP at the end of 2007.  
The 2008 federal budget was adopted by the 
Bundesrat on 20 December 2007. The official 
target of a ½% of GDP deficit was presented in 
the December 2007 update of the stability 
programme (1) and confirmed by the German 
authorities in the April 2008 fiscal notification. 
The main measures in the budget are the 
company tax reform and the reduction in the 
overall social security contribution rate. The 
company tax reform, which took effect on 1 
January 2008, is projected by the authorities to 
result in a revenue loss of about 0.3% of GDP, 
most of which owes to the reduction of the 
corporate tax rate from 25% to 15% of profits. 
As from the beginning of this year, the 
contribution rate to the unemployment insurance 
has been reduced from 4.2% to 3.3% of gross 
wages. On the other hand the contribution rate to 
the long-term care insurance 
(Pflegeversicherung) will be raised by ¼ pp as of 
July. In addition, public expenditure will be 
reinforced on childcare facilities and the fight 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.        
against long-term unemployment. Moreover, the 
unemployment benefit duration for older workers 
will be extended to 24 months, after it was 
shortened in 2006 from a maximum of 32 
months to 18 months. 
Public finances in 2008 are also affected by 
action taken well before this budget. The 2006 
public sector wage agreement for the Länder 
foresees a rise in the wage rate of just below 3% 
in 2008. In addition, the recent government wage 
agreement for employees at the federal and local 
level implies an effective wage increase of 4½% 
in 2008.  
The Commission services' spring 2008 forecast is 
in line with Germany's deficit estimate of ½% of 
GDP. The 2008 budget will be burdened by 
retroactive tax reimbursements resulting from the 
ruling of the European Court of Justice on 
taxation of foreign dividend income. With the 
structural deficit estimated to widen by 0.5% of 
GDP, the fiscal stance would be mildly 
expansionary. 
The end-2007 update of the stability programme 
targets a balanced budget for 2009. The 
programme foresees no significant new measures 
that would affect the outcome. Instead, the 
consolidation would result from the reduced need 
for social transfers in the wake of a continuously 
strong labour market. Under the assumption of 
unchanged policies, including social contribution 
rates, the Commission projects a deficit of 0.2% 
of GDP in 2009. Regarding the evolution of the 
general government balance beyond 2009, the 
programme foresees a slight surplus of ½% of 
GDP in 2010 and 2011, respectively. 
With still relatively solid GDP growth, the 
Commission services' spring 2008 forecast 
projects the debt ratio to decline by about 3½ 
percentage points from 65% of GDP in 2007 
down to 61.6% of GDP in 2009, which is in line 
with the estimates in the end-2007 update of the 
stability programme. For 2010 and 2011, the 
debt ratio is projected by the authorities to 
decline by 2 percentage points each year. 
European Commission 




2006 2007 2008 2009
-1.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.2
43.8 43.9 42.8 42.7
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.1 12.5 12.3 12.4
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 10.8 11.2 10.8 10.8
- social contributions 17.3 16.5 16.1 16.0
45.4 43.9 43.3 43.0
  Of which: - compensation of employees 7.2 6.9 6.9 6.9
- intermediate consumption 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
- social payments 18.5 17.3 16.9 16.6
- gross fixed capital formation 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6
- interest expenditure 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6
1.2 2.8 2.2 2.3
39.6 39.7 38.7 38.7
0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.1
-1.4 -0.3 -0.8 -0.8
1.3 2.5 1.8 1.8
67.6 65.0 63.1 61.6
2.9 2.5 1.8 1.5
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-1.6 0.0 -½ 0.0 ½ ½
1.2 3.0 2½ 2½ 3.0 3½
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-1.5 -0.3 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.7
67.5 65.0 63.0 61½ 59½ 57½






Real GDP growth (%)
General government balance
Primary balance
One-off and other temporary measures
Table V.5.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Germany (% of GDP)
Tax burden




Real GDP growth (%)
Stability programme (4)
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Germany.
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Company tax reform (-0.3% of GDP) •     Labour market, childcare (0.1% of GDP)
•     Social contribution rates (-0.3% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.5.2:
Main measures in the budget for 2008, Germany
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
Source: Commission services and the December 2007 update of the stability programme.





Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government surplus was 2.8% of 
GDP in 2007 in Estonia. The outcome was 
considerably better than the official target of a 
surplus of 1.2% of GDP set in the December 
2006 update of the convergence programme, 
despite reclassification of some companies and 
foundations inside the government sector having 
a negative impact on the balance of 0.4% of 
GDP. The higher surplus reflected carryover 
from a better-than-expected outcome for 2006, 
together with revenue growth in 2007 exceeding 
its target by a larger margin than expenditure 
growth. In December 2007 a supplementary 
budget was adopted, increasing planned 
expenditure by 1.1% of GDP, while attributing 
1.5% of GDP to the accumulation of financial 
assets. However, part of the expenditure 
measures foreseen by the initial and 
supplementary budgets remained 
unimplemented. The general government debt 
ratio continued to decline, even taking into 
account the impact of the reclassification noted 
above, and stood at 3.4% of GDP in end-2007. 
The 2008 budget law was passed by Parliament 
on 13 December 2007. On the revenue side, 
changes in taxation that entered into force in 
2008 – mainly a reduction of the personal and 
corporate income tax rate and an increase in 
several excise tax rates – are expected to broadly 
balance each other. On the expenditure side, the 
main increase relates to social protection, in 
particular increases in pensions due to the 
adoption of a more generous indexation rule. The 
general government surplus target for 2008 set in 
the November 2007 update of the convergence 
programme is 1.3% of GDP (1). However, a 
marked deceleration of the Estonian economy in 
the last months of 2007 and the beginning of 
2008, reflected in low tax returns in the first 
months of the year, suggests that this target 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://www.ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fisca
l_policy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm 
might not be achievable. This led the government 
to adopt a restrictive supplementary draft budget 
on 15 May 2008, reducing revenue target by 
2.2% of GDP and expenditure by 1.2% of GDP 
with a fiscal outlook now close to the one 
expected in the Commission services' spring 
forecast. Taking into account Estonia's recent 
track record of under-spending compared to 
budgeted expenditure, the Commission services 
expect a headline surplus of 0.4% of GDP in 
2008, while the structural balance is expected to 
deteriorate from 1¼% of GDP in 2007 to ½% in 
2008, implying an expansionary fiscal stance 
against the background of sharply easing cyclical 
conditions. 
For 2009, the Commission services' spring 2008 
forecast, assuming unchanged policy, projects a 
deficit of 0.8% of GDP. This reflects a 
combination of slowing tax collection as a result 
of lower and less tax-intensive growth, as well as 
increasing social expenditure and the impact of 
proposed changes to corporate income tax 
legislation (2), expected to reduce revenue in that 
year by around 0.4% of GDP. In addition, the 
personal and corporate income tax rate is to be 
reduced by 1 percentage point every year until it 
reaches 18% in 2011, with an estimated negative 
impact in 2009 of around 0.7% of GDP. The 
November 2007 update of the convergence 
programme set a headline surplus target of 1.0% 
of GDP for 2009, slightly declining subsequently 
towards the end of the programme period in 
2011. 
The Commission services' spring 2008 forecast 
expects the general government debt to GDP 
ratio to stabilise at around 3½% in 2008 and 
2009, somewhat higher than the 2-2¼% 
projected in the 2007 convergence programme 
update. The difference largely reflects the impact 
of the statistical reclassification noted above. In 
addition, the worsened outlook for public 
                                                          
(2) The proposed changes involve a switchover from the 
current taxation of profits at the time of their distribution 
to a system of advance payment credited against the final 
tax liability. However, due to some exemptions, 
implementation of the proposed change will have a 
negative effect on revenue in 2009. 
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finances is likely to result in local governments 
financing deficits by new debt issuance, whereas 
any central government deficit is likely to result 
in recourse to existing gross financial assets 
(which for the central government amounted to 
over 11% of GDP at the end of 2007).  
2006 2007 2008 2009
3.4 2.8 0.4 -0.7
36.6 36.9 36.5 35.8
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 13.3 13.5 13.5 13.4
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 7.1 7.7 7.1 6.6
- social contributions 10.3 11.0 11.1 11.0
33.0 33.7 36.1 36.5
  Of which: - compensation of employees 8.8 9.2 9.8 9.8
- intermediate consumption 6.5 6.5 6.7 7.0
- social payments 8.8 8.8 9.5 9.6
- gross fixed capital formation 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.8
- interest expenditure 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
3.5 3.0 0.5 -0.6
31.0 32.5 32.0 31.3
0.9 0.3 0.2 -0.4
1.0 1.3 0.4 0.6
1.2 1.4 0.5 0.8
4.2 3.4 3.4 3.5
11.2 7.1 2.7 4.3
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
3.6 2.6 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.8
3.7 2.7 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.8
0.7 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.8 1.2 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.2
4.0 2.7 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
11.2 7.4 5.2 6.1 6.7 7.0
Notes:
- Total expenditure (6)
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Estonia.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Convergence programme (4)
(6) General government balance reflects sectoral reclassification in the 2007 spring fiscal notification. However, this reclassification is not yet 
reflected in government total expenditure and revenue, which thus cannot be compared directly with the general government balance.
General government balance
Primary balance





Real GDP growth (%)
Table V.6.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)(6)
- Total revenue (6)
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Estonia (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Reduction of personal and corporate income tax rate from 
       22% to 21% (-0.8% of GDP) •     Increase in pensions, including due to change in 
•     Increase in personal income tax basic exemption (-0.1%       indexation (1.4% of GDP)
       of GDP) •     Increase in family benefits (0.4% of GDP)
•     Increase in excise taxes for alcohol, tobacco and fuels and •     Wage increase for domestic security services (0.3% of 
       introduction of excise tax for electricity (0.7% of GDP)       GDP)
•     Increase in social tax minimum contribution basis from •     Increase in R&D expenditure (0.2% of GDP)
       2000 to 2700 EEK (0.2% of GDP)
Notes:
Source : Commission services, November 2007 update of the convergence programme and 2007 and 2008 budget laws.
Table V.6.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
Main measures in the budget for 2008, Estonia





Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, a general government surplus of 0.3% 
of GDP was recorded and a debt-to-GDP ratio at 
25¼% was estimated. These figures compare 
with projections of 1.2% and 23.0% respectively 
contained in the December 2006 Stability 
Programme update (1). The worse than projected 
outcome for the general government balance, 
reflects both higher spending and weaker 
revenue in 2007 than planned, which more than 
offset the base effect of an upward revision of 
the 2006 surplus. Notably, revenues were 
affected by the deterioration in taxes linked with 
the housing sector towards the end of the year.  
The budget for 2008 was presented on 
5 December 2007, together with the 2007 
stability programme update for 2007-2010 (2). 
The budget and the programme were based on a 
significantly worse macroeconomic outlook than 
previously, with growth in 2008 projected to be 
particularly affected by a further decline in the 
residential construction sector. Among the 
specific revenue measures announced, the 
personal income tax package in the 2008 Budget 
was limited to indexation of the key tax 
parameters in line with wage inflation. Other 
measures included: additional tax relief for 
mortgage holders; changes to taxation of motor 
vehicles in order to better reflect CO2 emissions; 
reform of stamp duty so as to simplify and 
reduce the effective rate of duty on residential 
property transactions. On the expenditure side, 
the budget announced further increases in social 
transfer payments, funds for a new residential 
elderly care scheme and increased capital 
spending in line with the national development 
plan. 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.        
(2) Budget 2008 marked the introduction of a 'unified 
budget' whereby all expenditure and revenue decisions 
were announced simultaneously, unlike earlier years 
when many spending changes were announced before 
budget day. 
The stability programme update projected a 
deficit of 0.9% of GDP in 2008. However, 
economic and fiscal indicators since then have 
tended to point to lower growth and to a higher 
deficit.  In particular, with weak tax revenues in 
the first quarter, the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast projects a higher headline deficit, 
at 1.4% of GDP. This points to an estimated 
deterioration of the structural deficit by about 1% 
of GDP and an expansionary fiscal stance. An 
updated official projection for the general 
government balance in 2008 is not expected until 
the October 2008 EDP reporting of general 
government deficit and debt levels.  
For 2009, the Commission's spring forecast 
projects that, under no-policy change 
assumptions, the headline deficit in 2009 rises to 
1.7% of GDP (3), implying a further slight 
deterioration in the structural deficit. Using a 
slightly more optimistic growth forecast, the 
stability programme projected a lower deficit of 
1.1% of GDP which now appears achievable 
only with significant restraint in current 
spending. The higher Commission forecast 
reflects base effects from 2008 as well as 
somewhat higher projected spending growth in 
the absence of specific information on spending 
measures for 2009. The national authorities 
project that the headline deficit improves slightly 
in 2010, mainly owing to further spending 
restraint and a recovery in revenue growth.  
The government debt ratio is projected to 
increase to about 28¾% by end of 2009. The 
main drivers are the projected primary budget 
deficits, the accumulation of non-general 
government assets in the National Pensions 
Reserve Fund and a denominator effect of lower 
nominal GDP growth. 
 
                                                          
(3) The no-policy-change assumption for 2009 is made 
operational by allowing average tax rates to return 
gradually toward long-term values and adjusting social 
transfer payments by forecast inflation plus an additional 
amount to reflect the actual policy stance in recent years. 
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2006 2007 2008 2009
3.0 0.3 -1.4 -1.7
37.2 36.7 36.7 36.8
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 14.1 13.5 13.5 13.6
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 13.2 12.9 13.0 13.0
- social contributions 6.3 6.5 6.6 6.6
34.2 36.4 38.1 38.5
  Of which: - compensation of employees 9.7 9.9 10.2 10.2
- intermediate consumption 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.7
- social payments 9.3 9.7 10.3 10.5
- gross fixed capital formation 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.5
- interest expenditure 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1
4.0 1.2 -0.3 -0.6
32.6 32.0 32.1 32.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.9 0.2 -0.8 -0.9
4.0 1.2 0.2 0.2
25.1 25.4 26.9 28.8
5.7 5.3 2.3 3.2
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2.9 0.5 -0.9 -1.1 -1.0
3.9 1.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0
0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.9 0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7
25.1 25.1 25.9 27.6 28.7
5.7 4.8 3.0 3.5 4.1
Notes:
Table V.7.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Ireland (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden









One-off and other temporary measures
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Ireland.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 
taken from the programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     For personal incomes, more generous tax-exempt •     Increased social welfare payments (0.3% of GDP)
       thresholds, widening of standard rate tax bands (-0.2% •     New long-term residential care scheme (0.1% of GDP)
       of GDP) •     Other health sector spending (0.1% of GDP)
•     Reform and effective reduction in stamp duty on sale •     Security and defence (0.1% of GDP)
       of residential properties (-0.1% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.7.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services and Department of Finance Budget 2008 booklet.





Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government deficit outcome for 
2007 was 2.8% of GDP (1), which compares with 
the December 2006 (2) stability programme of 
2.2% (3). The deviation of more than ½ % of 
GDP reflects an expenditure overrun of almost 
¼% of GDP and a net one-off deficit increasing 
impact of the same amount. This net one-off 
impact is the combination of deficit-increasing 
measures of 1 percentage point and deficit-
reducing measures of ¾ of a percentage point of 
GDP. The outcome is slightly higher than the 
estimation in the December 2007 update of the 
stability programme. The debt-to-GDP ratio is 
moving downwards slowly, from an average of 
99% of GDP over the period 2001-2006 to 
around 94½% of GDP in 2007. 
The 2008 budget was adopted by the Greek 
Parliament on 20 December 2007. According to 
the Budget Law, the budgetary target for 2008 is 
a deficit of 1.6% of GDP. Deficit-reducing one-
off measures of 0.1 percentage points of GDP are 
included. On the revenue side, the budget 
includes the effects of a reform in personal-
income taxation, an increase in the excise tax on 
fuel, the new tax scheme for heating oil, the 
increase of real estate taxation, along with a 
simplification of the system, a restructuring of 
the tax administration and auditing services, and 
an increase of penalties associated to tax evasion 
and fraud. On the expenditure side, the budget 
includes the effects of an increase of the armed 
forces staff's wages, increases of public sector's 
pensions, an improvement of social benefits to 
low-income households and significant cutbacks 
in intermediate consumption. According to the 
Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast, the 
general government deficit for 2008 is projected 
to be 2% of GDP. The deviation between the 
spring 2008 forecast and the official target is 
                                                          
(1) Eurostat news release on 18 April 2008. 
(2) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/netstartsearch/ 
pdfsearch/pdf.cfm?mode=_m2 
(3) As recalculated to take into account the denominator 
effect of the upward GDP revision by 9.6%.  
explained by a slightly less favourable growth 
scenario foreseen by the Commission services' 
and a prudent assessment of the economic impact 
of measures undertaken on the revenue side, 
which imply clearly above the historical level tax 
elasticity. Moreover, the effects of the reforms 
undertaken to improve the efficiency of tax 
administration and compliance appear optimistic, 
especially when taking account of past outcomes 
of policies against tax evasion and fraud. In 
2008, total revenues are projected to increase by 
some ¼ percentage point, as higher indirect and 
property taxes would more than compensate for 
the decline in one-off revenues and personal 
income tax cuts. In parallel, expenditure is 
projected to fall by around ¾ of a percentage 
point of GDP, on the back of the non-repetition 
of sizeable temporary hikes in intermediate 
consumption and other current expenditures. 
This contraction should only be partly offset by 
social transfers' increases and by an increase of 
public sector's real wages. Overall, measured by 
the cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-offs, 
the structural balance would improve by more 
than ½% of GDP in 2008, pointing to a 
restrictive fiscal stance.  
Based on a no-policy-change assumption, the 
projection for 2009 is a deficit of around 2% of 
GDP. This compares with the targets set in the 
December 2007 update of the stability 
programme of Greece of 0.8% of GDP for 2009 
and a balanced budget for 2010, which are not 
underpinned by with corresponding measures. 
The Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast 
projects a general government debt-to-GDP ratio 
at just below 92½% in 2008, which is some 1¼ 
percentage points higher than the target shown in 
the update of the stability programme, due to a 
favourable official growth projection and, on 
account of the associated risks, on optimistic 
deficit targets. Increasing primary surpluses, 
privatisations and decelerating but robust 
nominal GDP growth contribute to a further 
reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2009, at 
around 90%. However, stock-flow adjustments 
are still high. According to the update, the debt-
to GDP-ratio is foreseen at 87¼% in 2009. 
European Commission 







2006 2007 2008 2009
-2.6 -2.8 -2.0 -2.0
39.4 40.2 40.4 40.4
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.0 12.1 12.5 12.5
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 7.9 8.0 8.2 8.2
- social contributions 13.1 13.8 14.0 14.0
42.0 43.1 42.4 42.4
  Of which: - compensation of employees 10.9 11.1 11.2 11.2
- intermediate consumption 4.7 5.1 4.5 4.5
- social payments 16.5 17.3 17.9 17.9
- gross fixed capital formation 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0
- interest expenditure 4.1 4.1 3.9 3.9
1.4 1.2 2.0 1.9
31.3 32.0 33.1 33.1
0.5 -0.2 0.1 0.0
-3.7 -3.3 -2.6 -2.3
0.4 0.8 1.4 1.6
95.3 94.5 92.4 90.2
4.2 4.0 3.4 3.3
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-2.5 -2.7 -1.6 -0.8 0.0
1.6 1.2 2.4 3.1 3.8
0.4 -0.3 0.1 - -
-3.2 -2.8 -2.0 -1.2 -0.5
95.3 93.4 91.0 87.3 82.9
4.2 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0
Notes:
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Structural balance (3)(5)
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Greece.
Government gross debt




One-off and other temporary measures
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 




Real GDP growth (%)
Table V.8.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2010, Greece (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     The excise tax on fuel (¼% of GDP) •     Wage increases of the armed forces staff and justice
•     Reform of the tax scheme for heating oil (½% of GDP)       (0.2% of GDP)
•     Simplification of the real estate tax system and the •     Increases of public sector’s pensions and extension of 
       imposition of single property tax (¼% of GDP)        social benefits to the families with 3 children instead of 4 
      (0.4% of GDP)
Notes: 
Table V.8.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services and 2008 budget law.





Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government surplus is forecast to 
have attained 2.2% of GDP in 2007, compared to 
the target of 0.7% of GDP set out in both the 
2007 Budget Law and the December 2006 
stability programme. This better result is mainly 
explained by higher-than-expected revenues in 
2007.  In structural terms (1), the surplus reached 
2.4% of GDP, compared to 2% one year earlier. 
The Budget for 2008 was adopted by Parliament 
on 26 December 2007 and projected a surplus of 
1.2% of GDP, fully in line with the 2007 update 
of the Stability Programme (2). The Budget Law 
seems to be based on an optimistic 
macroeconomic scenario. Nevertheless, 
favourable growth projections for tax revenues 
might be largely offset by a better-than-
anticipated 2007 outturn.  However, when taking 
into account the spending increase associated 
with the recently announced discretionary 
measures, this target does not appear attainable 
any more and the fiscal surplus might bottom out 
at 0.6% of GDP. In structural terms, the surplus 
would be reduced to 1.1% from 1.8% in 2007, 
implying that the fiscal stance can be considered 
as expansionary. Specifically, the announced 
fiscal package contains a tax credit of €400 to be 
granted to taxpayers (employees, self-employees 
and pensioners) during the second half of the 
current year. Total expenditure might grow by 
about 7¼%, well above the nominal GDP 
growth. Regarding central government 
expenditure, the 2008 Draft Budget Law gave 
priority to R&D spending for the fourth 
consecutive year. 
In 2009, based on the customary no-policy-
change scenario, the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast estimates general government 
finances at a close-to-balance position (in 
                                                          
(1) Calculated by the Commission services on the basis of 
the commonly agreed methodology. 
(2) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
structural terms at a surplus of 0.9% of GDP). 
These are well below the surplus targets of 1.2% 
of GDP in nominal terms and 2.0% in structural 
terms set out in the November 2007 update of the 
Stability Programme. In a worsened economic 
situation, the budgetary target for 2009 only 
appears achievable with a significant adjustment 
effort. Currently, revenues are projected to grow 
by around 4%, close to nominal GDP, reflecting 
mainly declining indirect and corporate tax 
revenue on the back of contracting housing 
market and less buoyant corporate profits. Total 
expenditure is assumed to grow above nominal 
GDP, by 5½%, mainly explained by the 
functioning of automatic stabilisers, especially 
higher unemployment benefits. The Draft Budget 
Law for 2009 is expected to be presented by the 
Spanish government to Parliament in September 
2008.  
The debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to continue 
on a decreasing path in 2007, at 36¼%, and 
2008, at 35¼% of GDP, while remaining at 
around this level in 2009. 
Immigration and public finances 
Between 1996 and 2007, the Spanish economy 
grew at an average annual rate of 3¾%. 
Employment creation attained 3¼% p.a., pushing 
the employment rate up to 66% from 48%. 
Interestingly, the female employment rate 
increased by 21½ pp, from 33¼% to the current 
54¾%. A remarkable feature of the Spanish 
economy during this period is its relative 
resilience to the slowdown in world economic 
activity in 2001, associated to the bust of the 
dotcom bubble. As shown below, demographic 
factors have been paramount to keeping up high 
potential growth during the 2000s.  
The Spanish population has grown by around 1% 
per year since 1996 (in total by 5.2 million 
inhabitants), with an accelerated growth of 1½% 
since 2001. This demographic shock can be 
attributed almost entirely to immigration, as 
natural growth has remained negligible. Indeed, 
Spain has received the highest number of 
immigrants in the euro area and the EU. Non-
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native population grew from 540,000 in 1996 to 
around 4.5 million in 2007. As a result, the 
percentage of foreigners has risen from 1.3% of 
the total population to around 10% in 2007. Most 
immigrants come from North Africa, Latin 
America and Eastern Europe and are mainly 
occupied in agriculture, tourism, construction 
and domestic services. 
Within this framework, the rest of the section 
tries to analyse the impact of the demographic 
shock on public finances, which can be affected 
through increased tax revenues and higher public 
expenditures. Additionally, a denominator effect 
associated to an enhanced GDP growth also 
needs to be taken into account. The rather scarce 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009
1.8 2.2 0.6 0.0
40.4 41.0 40.3 40.2
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.4 11.8 11.5 11.4
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 11.7 12.9 12.4 12.4
- social contributions 13.0 13.0 13.1 13.1
38.6 38.8 39.7 40.2
  Of which: - compensation of employees 10.0 10.2 10.4 10.5
- intermediate consumption 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.4
- social payments 11.5 11.6 12.1 12.5
- gross fixed capital formation 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
- interest expenditure 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5
3.4 3.8 2.2 1.6
36.5 37.1 36.4 36.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.0 2.4 1.1 0.9
3.6 3.9 2.7 2.5
39.7 36.2 35.3 35.2
3.9 3.8 2.2 1.8
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1.8 1.8 1.2 1.2 1.2
3.4 3.4 2.7 2.6 2.6
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.3 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.9
39.7 36.2 34.0 32.0 30.0
3.9 3.8 3.1 3.0 3.2
Notes:
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Structural balance (3)(5)
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Spain.
Government gross debt




One-off and other temporary measures
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in Dec 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 




Real GDP growth (%)
Table V.9.1
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2010, Spain (% of GDP) 
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Reform of direct taxes (-0.3% of GDP)
•     New allowance for child born (-0.1% of GDP) •     Public R&D (0.1% of GDP)
•     Tax brackets full deflation (-0.1% of GDP) •     Infrastructures (0.1% of GDP)
•     Income tax rebate of € 400 per taxpayer (-0.5% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.9.2:
Source : Commission services and 2008 Budget Law.
Main measures in the April fiscal package and in the budget for 2008, Spain
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Part V 
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available literature (1) provides some 
methodological avenues. However, due to the 
lack of complete statistical information, 
simplifying assumptions need to be incorporated, 
inevitably leading to some uncertainty on the 
robustness of final conclusions.  
Regarding the contribution of immigrants to 
economic activity and according to the 
methodology suggested by the Economic Bureau 
of the President (2006), GDP growth would be 
decomposed into population increase and per 
capita growth, which, in turn, can be divided into 
productivity per unit of labour, employment rate 
and a demographic factor: 
(1) ∆GDP = ∆Population + ∆(GDP/Population)        
(2) ∆(GDP/Pop) = 
∆(GDP/Empl)+∆(Empl/PWA)+∆(PWA/Pop)(2) 
 
The contribution of immigrants to each 
subcomponent is calculated by the Commission 
Services on the basis of the active population 
survey, with the exception of the weight of 
foreigners in the productivity factor, taken from 
the Bank of Spain (2007). It can be concluded 
that, without the demographic shock, Spain 
might have been much less resilient to the world 
economic slowdown in 2001. Moreover, in 2008 
and 2009, immigrants are expected to still 
contribute largely to GDP growth (Graph V.9.1). 
With respect to the impact of foreigners in tax 
revenues and public expenditures, in some cases, 
budgetary statistics, such as those of personal 
income tax, social contributions, unemployment 
benefits, pensions or integration policies, include 
a breakdown between immigrants and nationals. 
In contrast, disentangling the effects of 
immigration in other fiscal categories, such as 
indirect taxes, education and health care 
spending, requires the introduction of 
simplifying assumption. 
                                                          
(1) Dolado and Vázquez (2008); Bank of Spain (2007); 
Economic Bureau of the President (2006); Carone et al. 
(2005); and Collado et al. (2004). 
(2) Pop = Population; Empl = Employment; PWA = 
Population of working age. 
 
















































The Commission services' calculations take the 
weight of immigrants in each budgetary item 
from the results of the Economic Bureau of the 
President (2006), which presents the immigrants' 
fiscal balance for 2005 (estimated at a surplus of 
0.5% of GDP). Specifically, in 2007, according 
to table V.9.3, non-natives would have 
contributed 0.6% of GDP, representing around 
one fourth of the general government surplus. 
This positive outcome can be mainly explained 
by the immigrants' contributions to social 
security, well above their granted benefits. 
On the basis of the Commission services 2008 
spring forecast, in 2008, foreigners, although 
accounting for around two thirds of the (lower) 
general government surplus, might reduce their 
fiscal balance contribution to 0.4% of GDP. 
Indeed, given that migrants represent around 
25% of workers in the construction sector, 
compared to about 14% for the economy as 
whole, it can be expected that the adjustment of 
the housing sector will impact substantially on 
non-native labour force. In 2009, while with the 
contribution to the budget of nationals alone, 
could enter red territory, a close-to-balance 
position might still be attained when including 
the positive contribution of immigrants. 
2007 2008 2009
Revenues 2.7 2.6 2.5
Personal income tax 0.3 0.2 0.2
Social security 1.0 0.9 0.9
VAT 0.4 0.4 0.4
Others 1.1 1.0 1.0
Expenditures 2.1 2.2 2.3
Unemployment benefit 0.1 0.1 0.2
Others (Pension, healthcare, education, etc.) 2.0 2.1 2.1
Fiscal balance 0.6 0.4 0.2
Pro memoria: Total fiscal balance 2.2 0.6 0.0
Source: Commission services.







Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
For 2007, the French authorities had targeted a 
deficit of 2½% of GDP in the December 2006 
update of the stability programme, revised to 
2.4% of GDP in spring 2007, under the 
assumption of 2-2.5% GDP growth. The deficit 
outturn was 2.7% of GDP, on the back of 1.9% 
GDP growth. Compared to the target set in the 
December 2006 update of the stability 
programme, public finances benefited from 
unexpectedly strong revenue, notably in 
corporate taxes and non-fiscal revenue 
(especially property income), also thanks to a 
significant base-effect from 2006. However, in 
contrast with the announcement made in the 
2007 update of the stability programme and 
included in the Finance Act, these revenues were 
not exclusively allocated to deficit reduction but 
partially to tax cuts, including the first measures 
of the TEPA package adopted in summer. 
Slippages were recorded in social security and 
local current expenditure was more dynamic than 
initially envisaged by the authorities (1). In 
addition, the deficit was also increased by a 
revision in the national account treatment of a 
customary annual transfer from the financial 
institution Coface. 
The Budget Bill for 2008 was adopted on 18 
December 2007. It targeted a decline in the 
general government deficit to 2.3% of GDP in 
2008, after an expected 2.4% in 2007, under the 
assumption of 2-2½% GDP growth. Given the 
planned decrease in the tax ratio (notably 
reflecting the effect of the TEPA package of 
around 0.4 pp of GDP) by 0.2 pp to 43.3% of 
GDP, the authorities intend to meet this 
budgetary objective thanks to strong expenditure 
restraint, stemming notably from two measures. 
The first is the revised “0% volume increase 
expenditure rule” for the State, extended to a 
                                                          
(1) At the level of the State, although the announced 
reduction in expenditure in volume by 1% was not 
achieved (due to lower inflation than originally 
expected), the underlying nominal target for State 
expenditure was reached. 
broader category of expenditure including the 
State and now also “prélèvements sur recettes” 
(i.e. most of the transfers to local authorities and 
to the EU). It appears to be notably backed by 
cuts in public employment via replacing only 
two thirds of retired employees in 2008, although 
the impact of the latter measure appears limited 
in 2008 (0.02% of GDP). The second is a limited 
increase in the objective for healthcare 
expenditure (ONDAM) set at 2.8%, backed by 
the introduction of a new “franchise de soins” 
(minimum payment charged to patients) and a 
package of measures adopted in July 2007 (e.g. 
lower prices for certain medical examinations). 
In March, on the basis of a scenario of lower 
GDP growth in 2008, between 1.7 and 2.0%, and 
a higher deficit in 2007, the official deficit target 
was increased to 2½% of GDP. In the 
Commission services' spring 2008 forecast, the 
deficit is expected to rise to 2.9% of GDP. The 
difference with the latest official target stems 
both from (a) lower revenue, in particular non 
fiscal revenue (including dividends), partly 
because of the envisaged stronger 
macroeconomic deterioration, and also from (b) 
higher expected expenditure, notably in social 
security transfers, other current transfers and 
subsidies. With one-off measures of 0.1 pp of 
GDP, as in 2007, the structural deficit in the 
Commission' spring forecast is expected to 
deteriorate by 0.1 pp of GDP, implying a broadly 
neutral fiscal stance. 
The French authorities have set a new deficit 
target for 2009 at 2.0% of GDP, under the 
assumption of 1¾-2¼% GDP growth, while the 
November 2007 update of the stability 
programme (2) had set a deficit target of 1.7% of 
GDP for 2009 in the central scenario based on 
GDP growth of 2½%, and targeted the 
achievement of a balanced budget in 2012. 
Under the customary no-policy-change 
assumption, the Commission forecasts for 2009 a 
                                                          
(2) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.        
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further deterioration in the general government 
deficit to 3% of GDP. None of the measures 
recently announced in the context of the global 
revision of public policies (1) are included in this 
forecast. Assuming no one-off measures in 2009, 
the structural deficit implied by the Commission' 
2008 spring forecast is expected to marginally 
improve by 0.2 pp to 2.6% of GDP. 
The debt ratio in the Commission's forecast is 
expected to increase slightly to 64.4% in 2008, 
and more significantly, to 65.1%, in 2009. This 
contrasts with a decreasing debt ratio targeted by 
the French authorities, to 64.0% in 2008 and 
63.2% in 2009. The official debt forecast reflects 
lower deficit projections in both years, as well as 
higher debt-reducing stock-flow adjustment. 
The framework for public finances two years 
after the full implementation of the LOLF 
The new Constitutional Bylaw on the Finance 
Acts (Loi Organique Relative aux Lois de 
Finances – commonly called LOLF) was adopted 
on 1 August 2001. It entered into force 
progressively and was fully implemented only on 
1 January 2006. Benefiting from a strong 
political consensus, it abrogated the Ordonnance 
of 2 January 1959. While the LOLF confirmed 
the key principles of Finance Acts (unity, 
annuality, universality, specification…) and the 
leading role of the government in the budgetary 
process, it also introduced many innovations, 
among which two appear particularly important: 
First, the main purpose of the LOLF is to move 
towards "result oriented" public policies, with 
credits allocated not to categories of public 
expenditure but rather to "missions" subdivided 
into "programmes", designed to match the key 
objectives of State public services. The aim is to 
ensure a clear allocation of public resources to 
each objective and strengthen monitoring. Since 
the full implementation of the LOLF, Finance 
Acts now include objectives (projets annuels de 
performance or PAP) for each programme, 
                                                          
(1) The Révision Générale des Politiques Publiques 
(RGPP), started in July 2007, consists in an exhaustive 
audit of public missions with the aim of carrying out a 
major rationalisation of expenditure and an improvement 
in State services. The measures already announced are 
expected to be included in the 2009-2011 Finance Act. 
covering the whole range of State policies. 
Ministries issue reports (rapports annuels de 
performance or RAP) on the achievement of 
these objectives to the Parliament the year after 
the exercise (t+1) for review in the context of the 
examination of the Loi de Réglement (which 
closes the budgetary exercise in year t+1, and is 
necessarily adopted before the discussions on the 
next Finance Act).  
In this context, the definition of relevant, useful 
and measurable indicators attached to the 
objectives is one of the main challenges the 
LOLF has to face. The new budgetary 
framework set in the LOLF could in the medium 
term increase the efficiency of administrative 
organisation, and therefore entail expenditure 
reduction, if administrative structures 
progressively evolve to match "programmes" and 
"missions". In this respect, the merger between 
the Direction Générale des Impôts – taxes – and 
the Direction Générale de la Comptabilité 
Publique – public accounts – is a positive step.  
Second, the LOLF significantly enhances the role 
of the Parliament. It notably abolishes the former 
distinction between new and previously adopted 
measures (services votés / mesures nouvelles), 
which used to imply that the debate on the 
budget at the Parliament mostly concerned new 
measures while existing ones were usually not 
called into question and mechanically renewed, 
hence limiting the Parliament's role and 
responsibility. Moreover, as mentioned above, 
the LOLF also increases reporting and 
accountability to the Parliament. It introduces 
further obligations for the government to inform 
the Parliament of budgetary measures adopted 
throughout the year. In addition, public accounts 
as presented to the Parliament are now certified 
by the Cour des comptes (French Court of 
auditors), and their presentation is now closer to 
the private sector standards. 
One the main criticisms levelled against the 
LOLF, namely the absence of multi-year 
budgeting, was addressed by the RGPP: the 
implementation of a pluri-annual budget over 
three years. In December 2007, the Government 
announced that a 2009-2011 Finance Act is to be 
adopted this autumn. This would represent a 
major improvement in terms of public finance 
management and enforcement of budgetary 
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discipline, although the effectiveness of this 
framework will very much depend on whether it 
will be adopted through a formal Finance Act or 
remain at the level of an informative report. 
2006 2007 2008 2009
-2.4 -2.7 -2.9 -3.0
50.3 49.9 49.6 49.5
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 15.2 15.1 15.1 15.1
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 11.7 11.5 11.4 11.3
- social contributions 18.2 18.1 18.1 18.1
52.7 52.6 52.5 52.5
  Of which: - compensation of employees 13.0 12.9 12.8 12.7
- intermediate consumption 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.0
- social payments 17.6 17.5 17.5 17.7
- gross fixed capital formation 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.2
- interest expenditure 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.7
0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.3
43.9 43.5 43.3 43.2
0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0
-2.7 -2.7 -2.8 -2.6
-0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
63.6 64.2 64.4 65.1
2.0 1.9 1.6 1.4
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
-2.5 -2.4 -2.3 -1.7 -1.2 -0.6 0.0
0.0 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.5
0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-2.5 -2.0 -1.9 -1.4 -1.0 -0.4 0.0
64.2 64.2 64.0 63.2 61.9 60.2 57.9
2.0 2-2.5 2-2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Notes:
Budgetary developments 2006 - 2012, France (% of GDP)
- Total expenditure
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
Structural primary balance
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)




One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance (3)(5)
Outturn and forecast (1)




One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance (3)
Table V.10.1:
Source: Commission services and stability programme of France.
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Tax reform on dividends taxation (+0.1% of GDP) •     Cuts in public employment (-0.02% of GDP) 
•     Elimination of taxation on overtime (-0.2% of GDP) •     Social security: July 2007 correction and LFSS measures 
•     Suppression of the inheritance tax (-0.1% of GDP)       (-0.1% of GDP)
•     Tax shield and ISF (-0.1% of GDP) •     Reform in healthcare system organisation (-0.1% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.10.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services and French Ministry of Finance.





Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government deficit in 2007 was 
reported at 1.9% of GDP (1). This compares with 
the targeted deficit of 2.8% of GDP set in the 
December 2006 update of Italy's stability 
programme (2). The better-than-expected result is 
due to the positive base effect from the 2006 
deficit net of one-offs, which turned out 1.5 
percentage points of GDP lower than estimated. 
The corrective measures adopted for 2007 were 
effectively implemented. In particular, the 
revenue-to-GDP ratio increased substantially 
relative to 2006, by 1.2 percentage points. This 
was achieved mainly through a widening of the 
income tax bases as well as the receipt of the 
severance payment scheme flows (TFR - 
Trattamento di Fine Rapporto) that were 
diverted to the public social security institute (3). 
However, an even better outcome was within 
reach, as around 0.9% of GDP of additional 
expenditure was decided in the second half of 
2007 and partly implemented in that year. In 
2007, the structural balance (i.e. net of cyclical 
factors and excluding one-off measures) 
improved by 1 ¼ percentage points of GDP, 
broadly in line with official projections. 
After increasing in the previous two years, the 
government debt ratio fell by 2.5 percentage 
points in 2007, to 104% of GDP. The 2006 
update of the stability programme had projected 
a much smaller decline. The difference is 
explained by a higher debt-reducing contribution 
of the primary surplus and a less negative 
"snow-ball" effect. The latter was due to nominal 
GDP growth turning out higher than assumed in 
the 2006 update, while interest expenditure was 
broadly in line with projections. 
                                                          
(1) The headline deficit in 2007 was affected by 0.2% of 
GDP deficit-increasing one-offs.  
(2) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.  
(3) See European Commission (2007a) 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/public
ation_summary340_en.htm.  
The 2008 budget was adopted on 21 December 
2007. For the first time in many years, the budget 
law did not foresee a net deficit-reducing impact. 
It targeted a deficit of 2.2% of GDP, from a trend 
deficit based on unchanged legislation of 1.8% of 
GDP, with around 1% of GDP of deficit-
increasing measures due to be partly offset by 
around 0.6% of GDP of corrective measures.  
On 12 March, the official deficit projection for 
2008 was revised upwards, to 2.4% of GDP. 
Starting from the favourable base effect acquired 
with the better-than-expected 2007 deficit 
outturn, the revision reflects lower expected real 
GDP growth (0.6% as compared to 1.5% of GDP 
in the stability programme). It also incorporates 
budgetary slippages, including some less than 
0.1% of GDP deficit-increasing measures 
approved by Parliament in February 2008. 
Taking account of the budgetary measures that 
had been adopted by the time of the completion 
of the forecast and with real GDP growth at 
0.5%, the Commission spring 2008 forecast 
anticipates a general government deficit of 2.3% 
of GDP in 2008. Both the Commission and the 
official forecasts incorporate the postponement 
to 2008 of the impact of new social transfers, 
investments and cuts in the regional taxes on 
productive activities (IRAP), originally planned 
for 2007. In the Commission forecast, public 
investment is projected to rise substantially, but 
by less than in the official projections, on the 
assumption that some delays will continue to be 
experienced in its budgetary execution.  
The budgetary impact of one-offs is expected to 
reduce the 2008 deficit by 0.1% of GDP. In the 
Commission forecast, the structural balance is 
projected to worsen by more than ¼ of a 
percentage point of GDP in 2008, implying a 
mildly expansionary fiscal policy stance. In 
contrast, the 2007 stability programme update 
foresaw an improvement, but of just around ¼ of 
a percentage point of GDP.  
Based on the no-policy-change assumption and 
real GDP growth at 0.8%, the general 
government deficit is forecast to rise slightly in 
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2009, to 2.4% of GDP. The November 2007 
update of the stability programme targeted a 
deficit of 1.5% of GDP, with real GDP growing 
by 1.6%. No information on the corrective 
measures to achieve this target was provided.  
The 2009 structural balance is forecast to 
improve by ¼% of GDP, almost back to the level 
estimated for 2007. The full implementation of 
the new tighter requirements for pension 
entitlement and slowing public wages after the 
sizeable arrears paid in 2008 will contribute to 
relatively moderate current expenditure 
developments. On the other hand, the tax burden 
should decline slightly due to lower corporate 
income taxes. The 2007 stability programme 
planned a ¾ of a percentage point of GDP 
structural adjustment. 
For the subsequent years, the 2007 stability 
programme update planned the government 
balance to continue improving, to become 
balanced in 2011, but again without spelling out 
the broad measures backing the adjustment. 
In the spring 2008 forecast, the debt ratio is 
expected to decline by only 0.8% of GDP in 
2008, to 103.2% of GDP. The difference 
2006 2007 2008 2009
-3.4 -1.9 -2.3 -2.4
45.4 46.6 46.4 46.4
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 14.9 14.7 14.6 14.6
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 14.4 15.2 15.1 14.9
- social contributions 12.8 13.3 13.5 13.5
48.8 48.5 48.7 48.7
  Of which: - compensation of employees 11.0 10.7 11.0 10.9
- intermediate consumption 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.3
- social payments 17.0 17.3 17.5 17.5
- gross fixed capital formation 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
- interest expenditure 4.6 5.0 4.9 4.9
1.3 3.1 2.6 2.5
42.1 43.3 43.2 43.1
-0.4 -0.2 0.1 0.0
-2.8 -1.5 -1.9 -1.6
1.8 3.5 3.1 3.3
106.5 104.0 103.2 102.6
1.8 1.5 0.5 0.8
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-4.4 -2.4 -2.2 -1.5 -0.7 0.0
0.1 2.5 2.6 3.4 4.2 4.9
-1.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
-2.7 -2.2 -2.0 -1.3 -0.5 0.2
106.8 105.0 103.5 101.5 98.5 95.1
1.9 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Notes:
Real GDP growth (%)





One-off and other temporary measures
Structural primary balance
Real GDP growth (%)
Stability programme (4)
General government balance




(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the EDP.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Italy.
Government gross debt
Table V.11.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Italy (% of GDP)
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Corporate tax reform (0.1% of GDP) •     Higher compensation of employees (0.3% of GDP)
•     Rent deductibility (-0.1% of GDP) •     Social transfers and employment measures (0.1% of GDP)
•     Cuts to local property taxes (-0.1% of GDP) •     Savings on unspent budgetary carry-overs (-0.1% of GDP)
•     Annual extension of special tax provisions (-0.1% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.11.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure. 
Source : Commission services and Ministry of Economy and Finance.
Main measures in the budget for 2008, Italy
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compared with the 1.6 percentage points fall 
projected in the 2007 update of the stability 
programme is essentially due to the significantly 
lower real GDP growth. The primary surplus is 
forecast to contribute to the debt-to-GDP 
reduction in line with the programme 
projections, but less than in 2007. Based on 
unchanged policies, the spring 2008 forecast 
anticipates a modest reduction in the government 
debt ratio also in 2009 (0.6 percentage points). 
This compares with a 2 percentage points decline 
projected in the 2007 update that would be 
achieved essentially thanks to a significantly 
higher primary surplus. 
The spending review for expenditure control 
Measured as a share of GDP, total government 
expenditure in Italy in 2007 was 2 percentage 
points higher than in the euro area. The steady 
increase in its primary component since the euro 
adoption contrasts with the reduction recorded in 
the euro area. This is not consistent with the need 
to rapidly reduce the very high government debt, 
while avoiding further excessive increases in the 
tax burden. Furthermore, the composition of 
government expenditure has remained virtually 
unchanged, reflecting some rigidity in its 
underlying mechanisms. The high cost of the 
debt service and high pension spending take their 
toll on more productive expenditure as well as 
other social spending. Finally, there is 
widespread perception, often supported by 
evidence, that there is large scope for improving 
the quality of services provided.  
Italian policy makers, and public opinion at 
large, appear increasingly aware of the need to 
substantially improve the effectiveness and cost 
efficiency of public expenditure. A Green Book 
on Public expenditure, published in September 
2007 by the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
and the Advisory Committee for Public 
Finances, substantiates this awareness. The book 
analyses the composition and quality of public 
expenditure with a special focus on five domains 
- justice, health, tertiary education, compensation 
of employees and local governments' spending. It 
is intended to support the formulation of precise 
guidelines for reform in the context of an 
ongoing spending review, which was launched in 
April 2007 with an initial round involving five 
ministries on a voluntary basis (Education, Home 
Affairs, Justice, Infrastructure and Transport).  
Spending reviews are a regular feature of the 
budgetary process in the United Kingdom and 
some other Anglo-Saxon countries. In the UK, 
they are an integral part of a multi-annual 
budgetary approach with fiscal rules that 
constrain public spending over a three-year 
cycle. As such, they are part of a strategic 
approach to the planning of public spending, 
focusing on public sector performance and public 
management practices (1). 
The Italian spending review has more limited, 
but nonetheless challenging, ambitions. Starting 
from an examination of expenditure in the 
selected areas, it seeks to identify scope for 
efficiency gains. As stated in the Economic and 
Financial Planning Document (DPEF) of June 
2007, the spending review responds to the need 
to go beyond a purely incremental approach in 
decisions on budget allocations, which merely 
focus on 'additional' resources and neglect to 
review outstanding expenditure commitments. 
Hence, it aims at reviewing all the existing 
spending programmes within the selected 
domains. If it becomes an integral part of the 
budgetary process, the spending review will 
facilitate a results-oriented management of 
resources. The recent reclassification of the state 
budget, based on items that bear a clearer 
relation to the functions of government spending, 
is also instrumental to this effect.  
The spending review has so far resulted in a 
White Book on Education Spending and in an 
Interim Report. The former identifies the action 
required to improve schools' results and pupils' 
skills, and the necessary rationalization in order 
to finance the needed reforms. The latter presents 
broad indications for action. As the Green Book, 
these documents reveal ample scope for 
achieving savings in the examined expenditure 
items by reorganising departments, reviewing 
priorities, better assigning tasks and establishing 
criteria for the evaluation of results. However, 
the guidelines for action still need to be specified 
in detail and implemented.  
                                                          
(1) See the Commission assessment of the 2007 convergence 





Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government balance in 2007 attained 
a surplus of 3.3% of GDP, which compares with 
a target 1.6% of GDP set in the December 2006 
convergence programme of Cyprus (1). The 
better-than expected outcome reflected an 
exceptional rise in revenue, mainly due to 
particularly strong profitability in the financial 
sector and the booming real estate sector.. 
Consequently, part of the increase in tax bases 
and in the associated revenue may prove to be 
transitory. No one-off or other temporary 
measures were implemented. The general 
government debt ratio declined to around 59¾% 
of GDP in 2007 compared with 64¾% a year 
earlier.  
The 2008 budget law was approved by 
Parliament on 20 December 2007. According to 
the Budget Law, the official budgetary target for 
2008 is a surplus of ½% of GDP, on the basis of 
an estimated surplus of 1½% of GDP in 2007. 
However, as a result of the higher-than-expected 
surplus in 2007, the 2008 target has been revised 
upwards to a surplus of about 1% of GDP, in the 
context of the March 2008 EDP notification. No 
one-off measures are planned. The budget 
envisages a reduction in the excise duty levied on 
heating oil, a VAT rate cut for specific goods and 
services, and a tax reform reducing personal 
income, which would reduce revenues by around 
¼ of a percentage point of GDP. On the 
expenditure side, the main measures include the 
maintenance of a ceiling on the nominal growth 
rate of expenditure of the central government 
(3% for current expenditure and 5% of capital 
expenditure), the gradual extension of the 
retirement age in the public sector to 63 years 
and the reduction of interest expenditure by 
running down the stock of debt financed by 
deposits held in the Central Bank.  
The Commission services spring 2008 forecast 
projects a government surplus of 1¾% of GDP in 
                                                          
(1) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/netstartsearch/ 
pdfsearch/pdf.cfm?mode=_m2 
2008. The reduction in the surplus compared to 
2007 is entirely accounted for by a reduction in 
revenues of some 1½ points of GDP, as projected 
also in the stability programme, reflecting a 
partial fading out of the temporary composition 
effects, while expenditure is assumed to remain 
constant as a percentage of GDP. As a result, 
according to the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast the primary balance would decline 
from 6.5% of GDP in 2007 to 4.5% of GDP in 
2008. In structural terms, the government surplus 
is expected to worsen in 2008 by about 1½% of 
GDP to just below 2% of GDP, but to remain 
comfortably above the revised MTO of a 
balanced budget in structural terms. This decline 
in the structural surplus would imply an 
expansionary fiscal stance in good times. 
However, the government's consideration that the 
rise in revenues in 2007 is only partially 
permanent reflects a prudent budgetary approach, 
as it is not accompanied with a concomitant rise 
(as a percentage of GDP) in projected 
expenditure. 
For 2009, based on the customary no-policy-
change assumption, the Commission services 
spring 2008 forecast projects a surplus of about 
1¾% of GDP. This compares favourably with 
the target set in the December 2007 stability 
programme of a surplus of ¾% of GDP for 2009 
and 2010.  
The Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast 
project the debt-to-GDP ratio to continue its 
downward path reaching 47.3 % in 2008, down 
from 59.8 % in the previous year, reflecting debt-
reducing stock-flow adjustments associated with 
the planned reduction of deposits with the central 
bank, and to decline further to 43.2% in 2009. 
According to the 2007 stability programme, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to decline from 
60.0% in 2007 to 48.5% in 2009, before 
gradually improve further and reach 40.5 % in 
2010. The difference with the Commission 
services’ forecast is mainly explained by 
different projections of the primary balance and 
nominal GDP growth.  
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2006 2007 2008 2009
-1.2 3.3 1.7 1.8
42.4 47.2 45.6 45.7
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 17.7 20.1 18.8 18.8
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 10.8 14.0 13.7 13.7
- social contributions 7.8 8.1 7.8 7.8
43.6 43.9 43.9 43.8
  Of which: - compensation of employees 14.8 14.6 14.6 14.6
- intermediate consumption 5.6 5.1 5.3 5.4
- social payments 12.2 12.1 13.2 13.2
- gross fixed capital formation 3.0 3.1 2.9 2.9
- interest expenditure 3.3 3.2 2.9 2.7
2.1 6.5 4.6 4.6
36.6 42.5 40.6 40.6
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-0.7 3.5 1.9 2.0
2.6 6.7 4.8 4.8
64.8 59.8 47.3 43.2
4.0 4.4 3.7 3.7
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1.2 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7
2.1 4.7 3.4 2.9 2.9 2.8
0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-0.8 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
65.2 60.0 48.5 45.3 43.8 40.5
3.8 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.0
Notes:
Table V.12.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Cyprus (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden




Real GDP growth (%)
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. The Programme considers revenues in 2007 amounting 
to 1,5% of GDP as one-offs. Although transitory in nature, this amount of revenues does nto qualify as a one-off. Therefore, it is not considered 
as such by the Commission services. No other one-off or temporary measures are presented.
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Structural balance (3)(5)
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Cyprus.
Government gross debt




One-off and other temporary measures
 
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Reduction in the excise duty levied on heating oil •     Application of expenditure ceilings on current and 
       (-0.05% of GDP)        capital expenditures
•     Application of the reduced VAT rate of 5% on specific •     Gradual extension of the retirement age in the public 
       goods and services such as products of bakeries and        sector to 63 years of age
       confectioneries, entrance fees to cultural and sport •     Reduction of net interest payments by running down 
       events (-0.05% of GDP)       stock of debt financed by sinking fund deposits
•     Increase of tax-free income for individuals and 
       alignment of tax brackets (-0.05% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.12.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services and 2008 budget law.






Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
For 2007, the December 2006 convergence 
programme targeted a budget deficit of 1.3% of 
GDP, while the estimated outturn indicates a 
balanced budget position. The better outcome 
reflected higher than expected revenues - 
especially in case of direct tax revenues where 
the annual increase was 38.7% - partly offset by 
higher-than budgeted expenditure growth. A 
strong contributor to expenditure growth was a 
43% increase in the public sector compensation 
bill. The aim of the March 2007 anti-inflation 
plan to tighten fiscal policy resulted in a 
supplementary budget which introduced less 
additional expenditure than such exercises in 
preceding years. The debt to GDP ratio declined 
to 9.7% in 2007 from 10.7% in 2006. 
On 8 November 2007 the Latvian parliament 
adopted the 2008 state budget, projecting a 
surplus of 1.0% of GDP according to national 
methodology and corresponding to an ESA 
general government surplus of 0.7% of GDP, as 
reported in the November 2007 update of the 
convergence programme(1). The main fiscal 
measures in the 2008 budget include raising the 
rate of contributions payable into the funded 
pension scheme from 4% to 8%, increasing 
excise tax rates for oil and tobacco products to 
comply with agreements made upon accession to 
the EU, and raising the non-taxable minimum 
threshold and the minimum wage for natural 
persons. The budget introduced a medium-term 
budgetary framework, setting expenditure 
ceilings for public institutions for three years 
starting from 2008. The concept of a long-term 
stabilisation reserve was also established in order 
to accumulate potential surplus revenues and 
privatization receipts. 
The Commission services' 2008 spring forecast's 
projections for the general government balance 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
diverge significantly from the official targets set 
in the convergence programme, projecting a 
deficit of 1.1% of GDP for 2008. The main 
reason for this difference is that the spring 2008 
forecast projects lower GDP growth. With the 
credit-financed, domestically-driven growth 
slowing significantly, the headline budget is 
likely to come under strong pressure, as the 
programme’s revenue projections are based on 
the assumption of continuing high consumption 
growth and, accordingly, a high rate of growth of 
indirect taxes. Higher inflation than assumed in 
the budget is expected to compensate to some 
extent the impact of lower real growth; on the 
other hand, higher inflation puts pressure on the 
expenditure side, especially on pensions and 
public sector wages. Finally, the programme 
counts on substantial revenues related to 
privatization, which are surrounded by 
uncertainties. According to the Commission 
services' spring 2008 forecast, the fiscal stance in 
2008, as measured by the change in the structural 
balance, is expected to be broadly neutral. 
For 2009, under a no policy change assumption, 
the spring forecast projects a deficit of around 
2% of GDP. The deterioration from 2008 is 
mainly explained by the projected decrease in the 
revenue growth, due to lower and a less 
favourable composition of economic growth. 
However, given the possibility of economic 
stimulation measures being taken, risks are 
skewed towards a higher deficit. In contrast, the 
November 2007 convergence programme update 
has set the 2009 target for general government 
balance at a surplus of 1.0% of GDP and the 
2010 target at a surplus of 1.2% of GDP.      
The debt to GDP ratio – in line with the 
projected general government budget deficits in 
2008 and 2009 - is set to increase to 10.0% in 
2008 and to 11.2% in 2009, which would still be 
one of the lowest in the EU.  
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2006 2007 2008 2009
-0.2 0.0 -1.1 -2.1
37.7 38.0 37.2 36.4
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.8 12.8 12.4 12.1
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 8.5 9.4 9.0 8.9
- social contributions 9.0 9.5 9.0 8.9
37.9 38.0 38.2 38.5
  Of which: - compensation of employees 10.0 11.5 11.6 11.5
- intermediate consumption 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.0
- social payments 8.1 7.6 7.6 7.8
- gross fixed capital formation 4.7 5.7 5.4 5.6
- interest expenditure 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
0.3 0.5 -0.5 -1.5
30.4 31.8 30.5 30.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-1.1 -1.4 -1.3 -1.1
-0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.6
10.7 9.7 10.0 11.2
12.2 10.3 3.8 2.5
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-0.3 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.2
0.2 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-0.9 -0.5 0.4 1.1 1.7
10.6 9.4 8.3 7.2 6.4
11.9 10.5 7.5 7.0 6.8
Notes:
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Structural balance (3)(5)
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Latvia.
Government gross debt




One-off and other temporary measures
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 




Real GDP growth (%)
Table V.13.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2010, Latvia (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
 
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Social security contributions revenue: raising the rate of •     Co-financing for EU and other financial instruments
       contributions payable into the funded pension scheme        (2.4% of GDP)
       (-0.8% of GDP) •     Indexation of pensions (0.9% of GDP)
•     Personal income tax revenue: raising the non-taxable •     Increase of salaries for public sector employees (0.6% of
       minimum, relief for dependents and minimum wage and        GDP)
       salary (-0.5% of GDP) •     Completion of administrative and territorial reform (0.3% 
•     Excise tax revenue: raising the rate on oil and tobacco       of GDP)
       products (0.3% of GDP)
Notes:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services and the November 2007 convergence programme.
Table V.13.2:






Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, the general government deficit was 
1.2% of GDP, compared with a deficit target of 
0.9% of GDP set in the 2006 update of 
Lithuania's convergence programme. Revenue 
grew more strongly than expected due to higher 
GDP growth rates and improved tax collection. 
A weaker than budgeted increase in collection of 
personal and corporate income tax was more 
than offset by higher growth of VAT and excise 
tax revenues. However, although no 
supplementary budget was adopted, general 
government expenditure also increased more 
than planned. Thus, additional revenues were 
spent, mainly by increasing social payments and 
public investment, the latter partly supported by 
EU funds. The government's decision in 
November 2007 to compensate pensions 
underpaid in 1995-2002 (such compensation 
accruing in 2007) added 0.6% of GDP to the 
deficit. The gross debt ratio decreased from 
18.2% in 2006 to 17.3%, thanks to strong 
nominal GDP growth. 
The budget for 2008 was approved by parliament 
on 7 December 2007. The general government 
deficit target, confirmed in the December 2007 
update of the convergence programme (1), is 
0.5% of GDP in ESA 95 terms. Compared to the 
2007 budget, revenue is planned to increase by 
31% in nominal terms and expenditure by 28%. 
Main measures on the revenue side comprise a 
cut in the personal income tax rate from 27% to 
24%, the abolition of a temporary 3% tax on 
corporate profits and increases in excises duties 
on fuel, alcohol and tobacco. VAT revenues are 
assumed to increase strongly (by 43% compared 
to the 2007 budget), despite slower consumption 
growth, against the background of improved tax 
administration. The budgeted increase on the 
expenditure side reflects wage increases for 
public sector employees, including those for 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
teachers, and a significant rise in social transfers. 
Wage increases for teachers as voted by 
parliament in spring 2008 were significantly 
more generous than those proposed by the 
government in the budget; the additional cost 
from the spring decision is 0.2% of GDP in 2008 
and 1.0% of GDP in 2009. In 2008 the 
continuing pension reform which started in 2004 
is estimated to reduce revenue by about an 
additional 0.8% of GDP. 
In the Commission services' spring 2008 forecast 
the projected general government deficit in 2008 
is expected to widen further to 1.7% of GDP. 
Taking into account the substantial direct tax 
cuts, this reflects a markedly more cautious 
assessment of revenue prospects compared to the 
budget, given the latter's heavy reliance on 
improved tax administration leading to higher 
revenues. Planned higher spending for social 
transfers and rises in public sector salaries might 
thus not be offset by higher revenues. The above 
mentioned decision to increase teachers' wages 
more than planned in the 2008 budget adds 
significantly to expenditure in 2008 and 2009. 
There are also risks that additional expenditure 
will be planned in the run-up to the 
parliamentary elections in October 2008. Setting 
aside such risks, the effect of tax cuts and 
expenditure increases in 2008 contributes to an 
expansionary fiscal stance, with the structural 
primary balance deteriorating by about ¾% of 
GDP.  
In 2009, based on a no-policy change 
assumption, the spring 2008 forecast projects the 
general government deficit to improve slightly to 
1.5% of GDP, despite a weakening in domestic 
growth, helped by a build-up of EU funds inflow 
financing high expenditure growth. The most 
recent update of the convergence programme 
foresees the general government to achieve a 
surplus of 0.2% and 0.8% of GDP in 2009 and 
2010 respectively.  
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The spring 2008 forecast projects the general 
government debt ratio to remain low at about 
17% over the forecast period. 
Size and composition of public expenditure 
On the back of rapid GDP growth in recent 
years, Lithuania has reached or exceeded its 
fiscal targets. However, the budget has remained 
2006 2007 2008 2009
-0.5 -1.2 -1.7 -1.5
33.4 34.3 34.7 35.1
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 11.2 11.8 12.3 12.4
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 9.7 9.4 8.9 8.9
- social contributions 8.8 9.1 9.2 9.2
33.9 35.6 36.4 36.7
  Of which: - compensation of employees 10.5 10.1 10.2 10.6
- intermediate consumption 6.0 5.4 5.2 5.2
- social payments 8.6 9.3 10.7 10.8
- gross fixed capital formation 4.2 5.2 5.2 5.2
- interest expenditure 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
0.3 -0.5 -0.9 -0.8
29.7 30.3 30.4 30.4
0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0
-1.0 -1.4 -2.0 -1.3
-0.2 -0.6 -1.3 -0.6
18.2 17.3 17.0 16.8
7.7 8.8 6.1 3.7
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-0.6 -0.9 -0.5 0.2 0.8
0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.9 1.4
0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
-1.0 -1.2 -0.9 0.3 1.1
18.2 17.6 17.2 15.0 14.0
7.7 9.8 5.3 4.5 5.2
Notes:
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Lithuania.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 
taken from the programme (0.6% of GDP in 2007; deficit-increasing). 
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)









One-off and other temporary measures
Table V.14.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2010, Lithuania (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
 
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Reduction of personal income tax from 27% to 24% 
       (-0.5% of GDP) •     Increases in public sector wages (1.1% of GDP)
•     Abolition of the temporary tax on corporate income •     Higher social transfers other than in kind (0.8% of GDP)
       (-0.3% of GDP)
•     Ongoing pension reform (2nd pillar) (-0.8% of GDP)
•     Increase in excise duties on fuel, tobacco and alcohol 
       (0.3% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.14.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services, convergence programme of Lithuania and the Ministry of Finance.
Main measures in the budget for 2008, Lithuania
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in deficit and budgetary improvement has been 
mainly due to revenue surprises rather than 
expenditure restraint. Government expenditure 
has increased at a similar pace as GDP. It is 
therefore important to look at the size and 
composition of government expenditure and 
possible ways of improving its efficiency.  
After peaking in 1997 at around 50% following 
the Russian financial crisis, the ratio to GDP of 
government expenditure decreased gradually and 
stood at around 33% over the period 2003-2006. 
However, it started to increase again in 2007 as a 
consequence of strong increases in social 
transfers and public investment. 
With a spending ratio of below 40% of GDP 
over the period 2000-2007 as a whole, Lithuania 
is considered to have a relatively small 
government sector. However, despite this 
relatively small size, the share of productive 
spending such as investment and education has 
been relatively high. Investment expenditure has 
increased both as a share of total expenditure 
(from 6.0% in 2000 to 14.7% in 2007) and as a 
share of GDP (from 2.4% in 2000 to around 
5.2% in 2007). This significant acceleration over 
the recent years can mainly be attributed to an 
increase in EU-funded projects. At the same 
time, social expenditure has been gradually 
reduced relative to total spending and the 
government wage bill proportion has remained 
relatively stable; public sector wages have 
increased somewhat less than private sector 
wages in recent years.  
The composition of public spending has an 
impact on the output of the public sector and of 
the whole economy, with expenditure for 
education and R&D being particularly growth-
enhancing. However, in Lithuania expenditure 
on education has been increasing at a slower rate 
than GDP, the ratio to GDP having dropped from 
6.2% in 2002 to 5.5% in 2006. Spending on 
R&D has been increasing and reached 0.8% of 
GDP in 2006, about 80% of it financed by 
government. 
Graph V.14.1: Lithuania - General government 






`00 `01 `02 `03 `04 `05 `06 `07
GFCF Interest 
Social benefits Intermed. consumption
Compens. of employees Other expenditure
Total revenue
S o urce:  Co mmis s io n s e rvices ' s pring 2008 fo recas t.
 
In the light of the ongoing catching-up process, 
there is a continuously high need for public 
spending to improve the public administration 
capacity and the social situation, to increase 
(efficient) investment in R&D and human 
capital, as well as to contribute to an improved 
infrastructure. Several studies (Varoudakis et al, 
2007; Afonso et al., 2006) suggest that in 
Lithuania similarly to other new EU member 
states there is significant scope for enhancing the 
efficiency of various expenditure programmes. 
So as to increase the efficiency of public 
spending, prioritising growth-enhancing public 
investment and holding back projects with less 
importance for real catching-up would be a 
prudent way of managing expenditure in this 
situation. Furthermore, as the budget is formed 
based on institutional rather than programming 
principles, it currently lacks an evaluation of the 
efficiency of expenditure. A more prudent 
approach to expenditure planning would also 
help to preserve the flexibility necessary to 
manage a turn in the economic cycle than solely 
relying on over-performing revenues in periods 
of strong economic growth.  
Given the limited range of policy instruments to 
curb domestic demand, improving supply-side 
conditions will be central to achieve high and 
sustained economic growth while at the same 
time reducing economic imbalances. Public 
finances should play an important role in this, by 
re-directing public spending to growth-enhancing 
areas, easing labour market pressures through 
investment in education and by generally 






Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
General government balances for 2005 and 2006 
were recently revised upwards by 2 to 3 
percentage points of GDP with respect to the 
initial estimates (see special topic below). The 
2007 outturn was subject to the same kind of 
revision: it was revised upwards from a deficit of 
0.9% of GDP in the 2006 stability programme 
first to a surplus of 1.0% of GDP in the 2007 
stability programme and then to a surplus of 
2.9% of GDP with the April 2008 EDP 
notification. Out of the cumulative 3.8 
percentage points of GDP revision with respect 
to the initial target, 2.5 points are due to a base 
effect. The rest is due to much higher than 
expected revenues, which rose by 1.2 percentage 
points of GDP instead of decreasing by the same 
percentage as the 2007 programme projected. 
Although the expenditure ratio declined less than 
planned by the programme (by 0.5 percentage 
points of GDP instead of 1.5), the combined 
impact of these deviations with respect to the 
programme projections improved the 
government balance by an additional 1.3 
percentage points of GDP. 
The 2008 budget was adopted by Parliament on 
21 December 2007. The target for the general 
government balance was a surplus of 0.8% of 
GDP, down from an expected outcome of 1.0% 
in 2007. This objective was based on the 
assumption of a slowdown in GDP growth to 
4.5%, from an estimated 6% for 2007. The 
projected decline in the surplus in 2008 was 
chiefly due to a 6% increase in income tax 
brackets aiming at compensating for their non-
indexation since 2001 and to the replacement of 
the current system of tax reductions for 
households with children by a tax bonus. The ex 
ante cost of these measures was estimated at 
about 0.8-0.9% of GDP but their impact on the 
general government balance was supposed to be 
for the largest part offset by other factors, 
especially the still strong projected GDP growth. 
The surplus planned for 2008 has since been 
revised upwards by half a percentage point to 
1.3% of GDP in the April 2008 reporting. 
However, this figure is still chiefly based on the 
2008 budget and only partially takes into account 
the upward revision in the 2007 surplus. Based 
on the assumption of decelerating real GDP 
growth in the Commission services' spring 2008 
forecast (3.6% in 2008 compared with 4.7% in 
the autumn forecast) and taking into account the 
revision in the 2007 government balance, the 
Commission services project the surplus to 
decline to around 2.4% of GDP in 2008. This 
decrease will be due for a part to the tax cuts 
foreseen in the 2008 budget but also to the 
deceleration in growth, although the effects of 
this slowdown are likely to be felt only 
gradually, as corporate tax receipts generally 
reflect fluctuations in companies' profits with a 
significant lag. Based on these new GDP growth 
and government balance forecasts, the structural 
surplus is projected to decline only marginally in 
2008, indicating a broadly neutral fiscal policy 
stance. 
Under a no-policy change assumption, the 
Commission services forecast the budget surplus 
to broadly stabilise at about 2.3% of GDP in 
2009: growth is projected to decelerate only 
marginally with respect to 2008 and, despite the 
lagged impact of the slowdown of growth in 
2008, the rise in revenues is expected to be 
stronger than in 2008, when it will be 
significantly reduced by the tax cuts. This 
stabilisation in the headline surplus would result 
in a slight increase in the structural balance, from 
2.7% of GDP to 2.9%, signalling a continued 
broadly neutral fiscal policy stance. For 
comparison, the 2007 update of the stability 
programme projected the general government 
surplus to rise from 0.8% in 2008 to 1.0% in 
2009 and to 1.2% in 2010. As explained above, 
the latest data revision has radically modified 
this scenario. 
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The Commission services' spring 2008 forecast 
projects the general government debt ratio to rise 
from 6.9% of GDP in 2007 to 7.4% and 7.6% in 
2008 and 2009, respectively. Public debt 
dynamics in Luxembourg are totally 
disconnected from developments in the general 
government balance: from 1990 to 2007, the debt 
ratio fluctuated between 4% and 8% of GDP, 
while the recurrent surpluses recorded during 
that period would have allowed repaying it 
2006 2007 2008 2009
1.3 2.9 2.4 2.3
39.9 41.2 41.2 41.7
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.6 12.9 12.9 12.8
- current taxes on income, wealth, 13.0 13.6 13.1 13.2
- social contributions 10.8 11.1 11.5 11.8
38.6 38.2 38.8 39.4
  Of which: - compensation of employees 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.7
- intermediate consumption 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.2
- social payments 22.9 22.5 22.9 23.2
- gross fixed capital formation 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.1
- interest expenditure 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
1.5 3.1 2.6 2.5
36.3 37.5 37.4 37.8
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1.4 2.8 2.7 2.9
1.6 3.0 2.9 3.1
6.6 6.8 7.4 7.6
6.1 5.1 3.6 3.5
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0.7 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.2
0.9 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.6
6.6 6.6 7.1 7.2 7.0
6.1 6.0 4.5 5.0 4.0
(4) Submitted in October 2007
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken 
from the programme.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Luxembourg.
Notes:
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)












One-off and other temporary measures
Structural balance (3)
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenues
- Total expenditure
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Increase by 6% in personal income tax brackets in order to 
       compensate for their non-indexation since 2001-2002 •     Wage agreement in the government sector: effect 
•     Replacement of the current system of tax reduction for       quantified by STATEC at slightly less than 0.05% of GDP
       households with children by a tax bonus. Motivation:        in 2008 and 0.1% in 2009
       households with an income below the taxable minimum •     Gradual increase of public R&D expenditure from 0.25% of 
       could not benefit from the previous tax reduction system        GDP in 2006 to 0.4% in 2009. Effect in 2008 not quantified 
    Ex ante  cost of the two measures together estimated by the        by the programme
    budget and the stability programme at 0.8%-0.9% of 
    GDP.
Notes: 
Source : Commission services and 2008 Budget of Luxembourg.
Table V.15.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenues.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Main measures in the budget for 2008, Luxembourg
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completely several times. However, a reduction 
in the debt was not necessary as its very low 
level did not raise any concern. In absolute value, 
the debt increased fivefold from 1990 to 2007 
and in percentage of GDP it rose from 4.7% to 
6.9%. However, simultaneously, the social 
security system used the totality of its surpluses 
(which constituted the bulk of the general 
government surpluses since 1990) to build up 
sizeable reserves, estimated by the 2007 
programme at about 34% of GDP in 2006. 
Public finances in 2005 and 2006 revisited 
As indicated above, Luxembourg's public finance 
data were subject to a series of major revisions in 
recent years, the last one to date in the April 
2008 EDP notification. These successive 
revisions resulted in a large upward shift of the 
government balances since 2005: the 2005 deficit 
was revised by 2.2 percentage points of GDP 
from the initial estimate of 2.3% of GDP in the 
2005 stability programme to 0.1% in the 2007 
programme (1). Similarly, the government 
balance for 2006 was revised by 3.1 percentage 
points of GDP from the target set by the 2005 
programme, a deficit of 1.8% of GDP, to a 
surplus of 1.3% in the April 2008 reporting. 
The origin of these revisions is essentially a large 
overestimation of expenditure in 2005 and 2006 
in those years' programmes. While the 2005 
programme projected total government spending 
to increase by 1.4 percentage points of GDP, it 
actually decreased by 0.8 points. This fully 
explains the 2.2 percentage points of GDP 
difference between the initial estimate of the 
deficit in 2005 and the actual revised data (2). By 
contrast, the estimation of revenues was 
accurate: they rose by 0.4 percentage point of 
GDP, close to the 0.2 point increase projected in 
the 2005 programme. Like in 2005, the main 
reason for the revision of the 2006 data were 
developments in expenditure, which the 2006 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm 
(2) GDP levels were also substantially (sometimes by about 
10%) revised upwards for the whole period, which 
complicates the comparison of expenditure and revenue 
ratios over time. 
programme projected to decline by 1.2 
percentage points of GDP, while, according to 
the latest data, it actually fell by 3.2 percentage 
points. This divergence is probably due to an 
overestimation of government spending, but it 
possibly also reflects the first effects of the 
adjustment measures decided in April 2006. 
Moreover, also like in 2005, the estimation of 
revenues in 2006 was very accurate: the 2006 
programme projected them to decline by 1.7 
percentage points of GDP, while they actually 
decreased by 1.8 points. Combined with the fact 
that the 2006 programme only partially revised 
the 2005 balance (from a deficit of 2.3% of GDP 
in the 2005 programme to a deficit of 1.0% of 
GDP, compared to the revised outcome of 0.1% 
of GDP), the overestimation of expenditure by 2 
percentage points of GDP is the main reason for 
the difference between the initial estimate of the 
general government balance for 2006 (a deficit 
of 1.5% of GDP) and the latest revised outturn (a 
surplus of 1.0% of GDP).  
Based on these revised data, it now appears that 
the deficit peaked at 1.2% of GDP in 2004 and 
not at 2.3% of GDP in 2005, as previously 
estimated, and that the objective of a balanced 
budget, which the 2006 stability programme 
planned for the period 2007-2009 was already 
nearly achieved in 2005. Moreover, Luxembourg 
has always respected its MTO, which is a 
structural deficit of 0.8% of GDP, except for a 
minor deviation in 2004, when the structural 





Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, the general government deficit was 
5.5% of GDP, sharply down from 9.2% of GDP 
in 2006. It was substantially lower than the 
original deficit target of 6.8% of GDP set in the 
December 2006 update of the convergence 
programme. The overachievement of the deficit 
target by 1.3 pp of GDP is primarily explained 
by better-than-expected tax receipts and social 
security contributions of around 1½% of GDP; 
about one-third of this positive surprise was 
thanks to the better-than-expected revenue-
generating effect of a series of measures 
addressing tax evasion. In addition, interest 
expenditure were 0.3% of GDP lower than 
expected, and savings of 0.2% of GDP on other 
expenditure items were achieved compared to 
budgeted figures. However, the improvement 
could have even been larger without some 
within-the-year additional spending measures. 
This includes ¼% of GDP additional spending 
on pensions due to the obligatory adjustment to 
higher-than-expected inflation and net wages, but 
also around ½% of GDP of discretionary 
spending. The debt ratio slightly increased (from 
65.6% to 66% of GDP in 2007), with the 
privatisation revenues and EU pre-financing 
(debt reducing impact of 1% of GDP) largely 
contributing to its broad stabilisation. 
The 2008 budget adopted by Parliament on 17 
December 2007 sets a general government deficit 
target of 4.0% of GDP, in line with the envisaged 
adjustment path of the November 2007 
convergence programme(1), but 0.3% of GDP 
lower than the target set in the December 2006 
convergence programme. On the revenue side, 
the moderate changes are aimed at simplifying 
taxation and at increasing preferential tax 
measures to SMEs. On the expenditure side, the 
biggest improvement comes from the elimination 
of one-off deficit increasing measures of 0.9% of 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.  
GDP. In addition, a further slowdown in the 
increase of public wage expenditure (although by 
less than originally planned) and further cuts in 
price subsidies also contribute to the foreseen 
deficit reduction. The Commission services' 
spring forecast projects a deficit of 4% for 2008, 
fully in line with the official target(2). The 
forecast assumes that the positive base effect 
stemming from the overachievement of the 2007 
deficit target will be offset by higher pension and 
interest expenditure as well as by increased 
spending on railway subsidies. The fiscal stance 
as measured by the change in the structural 
balance remains restrictive in 2008. 
For 2009, the Commission services forecast, on 
the basis of a no-policy-change assumption, a 
deficit of 3.6% of GDP against the official target 
of 3.2% of GDP. The forecast does not take into 
account any future structural measures and 
follow-up reform steps the Hungarian 
government may approve in the coming months, 
especially in the context of the 2009 budget bill. 
Furthermore, the forecast assumes that not all the 
planned further savings in government 
consumption will be achieved, since it may be 
difficult to continue to restrain spending. It 
should also be noted that the deficit and debt 
projections do not incorporate any possible 
takeover from the debt of the state-owned 
railway company (around 1% of GDP). For 2010 
and 2011, the 2007 update of the convergence 
programme plans further reductions in the 
headline deficit by 0.5% of GDP, to 2.7% and 
2.2% of GDP, respectively. 
The Commission services' spring 2008 forecast 
projects the debt-to-GDP ratio to continue to 
moderately increase to 66.5% in 2008, before 
declining to 65.7% in 2009. According to the 
most recent update of the convergence 
programme, the general government debt ratio is 
expected to continuously decrease from 65.8% in 
2008 to 61.8% in 2011. 
                                                          
(2) The deficit target for 2008 was confirmed in the April 
2008 EDP progress report of the Hungarian authorities. 
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The reform of fiscal governance 
Since the transition process started, a strong 
deficit bias has been evident in the formulation 
of fiscal policy in Hungary. This and the 
recurrent deterioration of public finances as  
 
election years approached (1) has been largely 
                                                          
(1) In Hungary, up to present, the national and local 
elections have always been held in the same year, which 
further intensified the working of the electoral cycle. 
2006 2007 2008 2009
-9.2 -5.5 -4.0 -3.6
42.6 44.6 45.1 44.8
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 15.0 15.6 15.6 15.3
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 9.3 10.2 10.5 10.7
- social contributions 12.6 13.6 13.7 13.6
51.9 50.1 49.1 48.4
  Of which: - compensation of employees 12.2 11.4 11.2 11.3
- intermediate consumption 7.0 6.4 6.1 5.8
- social payments 15.0 15.2 15.4 15.4
- gross fixed capital formation 4.4 3.6 3.6 3.3
- interest expenditure 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.1
-5.3 -1.4 0.2 0.5
36.9 39.4 39.9 39.6
-0.3 -0.9 0.1 0.0
-9.7 -4.7 -3.7 -3.3
-5.8 -0.6 0.5 0.8
65.6 66.0 66.5 65.7
3.9 1.3 1.9 3.2
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-9.2 -6.2 -4.0 -3.2 -2.7 -2.2
-5.3 -2.2 0.1 0.6 0.8 1.1
-0.7 -1.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
-8.9 -4.8 -3.5 -2.8 -2.5 -2.3
65.6 65.4 65.8 64.4 63.3 61.8
3.9 1.7 2.8 4 4.1 4.2
Notes:
Table V.16.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
 - Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Hungary (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden




Real GDP growth (%)
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Structural balance (3)(5)
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Hungary.
Government gross debt




One-off and other temporary measures
 
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Increase in the limit on investment related spending to be •     Increase in EU funds co-financing expenditures 
       exempt from corporate taxation from 25% to 50% up to a        (0.2% of GDP), overcompensated by the reduction in
       maximum of HUF 0.5 bln (-0.05% of GDP)        motorway investment projects (-0.3% of GDP)
•     Extension of the preferential corporate tax rate (10% •     Indexation of pensions through the Swiss-indexation 
       instead of the standard 16%) for small and micro        mechanism and the implementation of the long-term 
       companies that invest and/or create jobs (-0.08% of GDP)        pension correction programme (+0.2% of GDP)
•     Merger of two different types of personal income tax •     Savings on the operational expenditures of public 
       credits (-0.12% of GDP)        administration (-0.3% of GDP)
•     Broadening of the base for social security contributions •     Cuts in public education expenditure as a result of the
       by more rigorously enforcing the insurance principle in         new financing mechanism encouraging school mergers 
       the provision of health-care services (+0.15% of GDP)        (-0.15% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.16.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services; Draft budget for 2008; 'Annual report on the budget proposal' by the State Audit Office.
Main measures in the budget for 2008, Hungary
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possible due to the weakness of fiscal 
governance (see graph below).  
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 % of GDP
Note:  1991-1995: cash flow figures, 1996-2007: ESA figures.
Source: Commission services.
 
In recent years, there have been some modest 
improvements as regards the transparency of 
budgetary developments (e.g. on-budget 
recording of quasi-fiscal activities) as well as 
steps to solidify control over line ministries' 
budgetary execution. More importantly, in 
November 2007 the Government adopted and 
submitted to Parliament a package of bills 
aiming at a wide-ranging reform of public 
finances, which is similar to a so-called Fiscal 
Responsibility Framework (1). 
The new set-up would be embedded in the 
Constitution by defining fiscal sustainability as a 
new constitutional principle. As regards the 
medium-term budgetary planning for the central 
government, it stipulates that the central 
government's gross debt may not increase faster 
than inflation and the primary balance targets 
must be consistent with the former objective. 
During the adoption of the annual budget law, 
the necessary adjustment for compliance with the 
numerical rules must be made in the 
discretionary budgetary items, which are subject 
to direct government control as opposed to 
mandatory items. These rules are foreseen to be 
backed by stringent procedural rules: regular 
reporting and review of accounting practices, the 
introduction of mandatory offsetting, and the 
establishment of a new fiscal body (Legislative 
                                                          
(1) For details see the Commission services' assessment of 
Hungary's most recent (November 2007) convergence 
programme update. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_ 
finance/publications/publication_summary11856_en.htm 
Budget Office, LBO) to provide independent 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts as well 
as fiscal impact assessments.  
The proposed reform is a coherent rule-based 
system, which would be able to greatly enhance 
fiscal governance in Hungary. The introduction 
of the planned set of numerical fiscal rules could 
be instrumental in generating a truly multi-
annual budgetary framework and improving 
budgetary control. Through the circumscription 
of mandatory and discretionary items in the 
budgetary planning, the proposed new set-up 
allows for the operation of automatic stabilisers 
to a large extent; therefore the application of the 
rules does not seem to lead to pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy. The establishment of the LBO and the 
regular publication of budgetary reports could 
increase the transparency of budgetary 
accounting and fiscal developments. The new 
fiscal office could serve as a prudential 
supervisor through the entire budgetary process 
being an institutional counterbalance to the 
Government. The risk of expenditure overruns at 
local government level could be mitigated by the 
introduction of a 'golden rule'-type of fiscal 
regime as envisaged.  
On the other hand, the proposal could be 
strengthened by designing an adequate 
mechanism for positive budgetary surprises, 
giving more autonomous profile to the new fiscal 
body and ensuring that well-defined enforcement 
mechanisms are put in place. The envisaged 
framework should be conducive to improving the 
sustainability of public finances, in particular if 
strengthened as explained above. The 
Government intends to seek a two-thirds 
majority in Parliament for the entire package, 
which is important not only because it is the 
required quorum for adoption, but also because a 
broad political consensus could be instrumental 






Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, the general government deficit is 
estimated at 1.8% of GDP, against a target of 
2.3% of GDP in the 2006 update of the 
convergence programme (1). Revenue is 
estimated to be around 3.2 percentage points of 
GDP lower than planned in the 2006 update. Of 
this, 2.4 percentage points are accounted for by a 
lower-than-anticipated absorption of EU 
structural funds. The remainder is mainly due to 
lower-than-planned revenue from direct taxes 
and social contributions. The expenditure-to-
GDP ratio in 2007 is estimated to be 3.7 
percentage points lower than targeted in the 2006 
update. Of this, 2 percentage points relate to 
lower investment spending, reflecting the lower 
EU capital transfers. An additional 1.2 
percentage points are due to lower consumption 
expenditure, whilst the remaining 0.5 percentage 
points are explained by higher one-off 
transactions (i.e. sale of land, which is 
conventionally recorded as lower expenditure). 
The general government debt is estimated at 
62.6% of GDP, substantially lower than the 
target in the programme of 66.7% of GDP. The 
deviation is mainly due to a base effect as a 
result of an upward revision of GDP for 2006. 
The 2008 Budget was approved by the Maltese 
Parliament on 2 November 2007. The main 
measures presented in the 2008 Budget include a 
reform of the personal income tax regime (more 
favourable personal income tax bands effective 
in 2008), increases in the amount of cash benefits 
granted to children as well as improved social 
entitlements given to specific social groups 
including pensioners and first-time property 
buyers. The 2008 Budget targets a general 
government deficit of 1.2% of GDP for 2008. 
According to the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast, the general government deficit for 
2008 is projected at 1.6% of GDP. The 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
Commission services' higher headline deficit 
reflects lower social contributions in line with 
the projected lower employment growth. In 
addition, the Commission's spring 2008 forecast 
projects the current expenditure-to-GDP ratio to 
fall by less than expected by the Maltese 
authorities. Specifically, the deviation concerns 
the evolution of compensation of employees by 
accounting for the increased remuneration and 
higher recruitment in certain sections of the 
public sector in the beginning of 2008. 
Furthermore, the Commission services' 
projections reflect higher expenditure as a result 
of the Maltese authorities' decision in December 
2008 to cap utility prices until mid-2008 by 
providing increased subsidies on fuel procured 
for electricity generation. The fiscal stance can 
be characterised as restrictive in 2008, as the 
Commission's spring 2008 forecast projects an 
improvement in the structural deficit of around ¾ 
of a percentage point of GDP. For 2008, the 
reliance on one-off operations, estimated at ¼% 
of GDP, is expected to be significantly lower 
than in the previous years. 
Under the no-policy-change scenario, the 
Commission services' spring 2008 forecast 
projects a decline in general government deficit 
to 1% of GDP for 2009. The 2007 stability 
programme targets a deficit-to-GDP ratio of 
0.1%. The deviation is mostly accounted for by 
the programme's assumption of a larger decline 
in the public sector wage bill. Moreover, 
consistent with the customary no-policy change 
scenario, the Commission services' spring 2008 
forecast assumes that other items of current 
expenditure, such as intermediate consumption 
and social transfers, move in line with GDP 
growth (in contrast, the stability programme 
assumes that these items fall as a share of GDP), 
whilst excluding deficit-reducing one-off 
measures. By 2010, the programme envisages 
that the general government balance turns into a 
surplus of around 1% of GDP. 
According to the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast, the debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast 
at 60.6% of GDP in 2008. For 2009, under the 
no-policy-change scenario, the general 
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government debt is projected to fall below 59% 
of GDP. The 2007 stability programme also 
projects a decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio, from 
60% of GDP in 2008 to 57.2% of GDP in 2009 
and around 53¼% by 2010. The main drivers of 
the decline in the general government debt, 
according to the programme, are a growing 
primary surplus and nominal GDP growth. 
Falling interest expenditure as a ratio of GDP 
also leads to the reduction in debt, while stock-
flow adjustments are insignificant over the 
programme period. 
The efficiency of public expenditure in Malta 
Fiscal adjustment plays a very important role in 
strengthening macroeconomic stability. 
Nevertheless, in order to last, the quality of 
budgetary adjustment should be adequate. A 
pertinent aspect of improving the quality of 
public finances is the efficiency with which 
inputs are transformed into desired social 
outcomes. Identifying and tackling inefficient 
expenditure categories could thus enhance the 
quality of fiscal consolidation. This section 
focuses on the efficiency of public healthcare 
and education spending in Malta relative to EU 
Member States. 
The literature proposes two main non-parametric 
techniques (1) to measure the efficiency of 
government expenditure: the Full Disposal Hull 
(FDH) and the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) (2). In evaluating the efficiency of public 
spending, both methodologies try to establish a 
production frontier representing efficient cross-
country input-output combinations. The degree 
of efficiency of each country is then measured as 
the radial distance of an observation from the 
frontier and a ranking is computed. The FDH and 
DEA techniques allow for the computation of 
                                                          
(1) Parametric techniques assume a specific functional form 
for the relationship between inputs and outputs and are 
based on econometric methods. Non-parametric 
techniques do not impose specific functional restrictions 
and use mathematical programming techniques. Since 
previous analyses of public spending in education and 
health have found no conclusive justification for 
assuming a specific functional form, this section is based 
on non-parametric techniques. 
(2) See Gupta, Honjo and Verhoeven (1997) for further 
elaboration on the differences between the two 
approaches. 
both input and output efficiency scores which 
indicate by how much more output could be 
increased with the same input level. 
In order to assess the efficiency of public 
spending in Malta, the FDH technique has been 
applied to both education and healthcare 
expenditure items (3). In the case of education, 
input efficiency scores are estimated using 
primary level student-teacher ratio, secondary 
level enrolment and tertiary level enrolment as 
output. Input is measured by public expenditure 
per student as a percent of per capita GDP 
corresponding to each level of education. The 
results indicate that the efficiency of primary and 
secondary education in Malta is high. This 
reflects both a relatively low spending per 
primary school student as a ratio of GDP and 
also an above-average student-teacher ratio. 
However, tertiary education in Malta displays 
less efficient outcomes. The score of 0.77 
denotes that at least the same level of output 
could be achieved with 77% of the present level 
of expenditure per student, suggesting important 
scope for improving efficiency at this level of 
education. Given the importance of tertiary 
education in the context of the goals set in the 
renewed Lisbon strategy, it would be interesting 
to assess efficiency from the output side. In other 
words, compared to the relatively more efficient 
countries, by how much could tertiary education 
output in Malta increase if spending was fully 
efficient. The output efficiency score for Malta is 
0.65 or only 65% of what it could be if spending 
was efficient. This implies that if educational 
spending was efficient, the tertiary enrolment 
rate would rise to around 90%, instead of the 
current 59%. This suggests that a more efficient 
allocation of spending in tertiary educational 
output could lead to higher attainment levels in 
Malta. 
For public healthcare expenditure, estimates for 
input efficiency scores along with the respective 
ranking are computed using life-expectancy at 
birth, infant deaths and standardised death rates  
                                                          
(3) Despite some limitations in the FDH approach, a 
comparison of efficiency estimates using the DEA 
approach generate similar trends to those suggested by 
the FDH methodology for Malta. 
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(SDR) (1) as three output measures. Input is 
measured by per capita public expenditure 
expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
terms. The results show that for the three 
indicators, input efficiency in Malta is low 
                                                          
(1) SDR is a weighted average of age-specific mortality 
rates. 
amounting to a score of less than 0.4. Put 
differently, this means that the same level of 
output could be achieved by reducing 
expenditure by three-fifths of the current level. 
This suggests ample scope for improving 
efficiency in healthcare expenditure.  
2006 2007 2008 2009
-2.5 -1.8 -1.6 -1.0
41.3 40.7 40.9 40.9
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 15.0 14.8 14.9 14.9
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 11.8 13.3 13.3 14.0
- social contributions 7.7 7.4 7.3 7.1
43.9 42.5 42.5 41.8
  Of which: - compensation of employees 13.4 13.1 12.8 12.6
- intermediate consumption 5.8 5.5 5.8 5.8
- social payments 12.5 12.4 12.7 12.7
- gross fixed capital formation 4.2 4.1 3.9 3.3
- interest expenditure 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.0
1.0 1.6 1.7 2.1
33.7 34.9 34.9 35.5
0.7 0.7 0.2 0.0
-2.9 -2.4 -1.7 -1.0
0.7 0.9 1.5 2.1
64.2 62.6 60.6 58.8
3.4 3.8 2.6 2.5
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-2.5 -1.6 -1.2 -0.1 0.9
1.0 1.7 2.0 2.9 3.8
0.7 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.1
-2.5 -2.1 -1.4 -0.5 0.1
64.7 62.9 60.0 57.2 53.3
3.2 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.4
Notes:
Table V.17.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenues
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Malta (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden









One-off and other temporary measures
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Malta.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 
taken from the programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
 
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Income tax reform (-0.5% of GDP) •     Restraint on public service wage bill (3) (-0.4% of GDP)
•     Duty on documents amendments (-0.1% of GDP) •     Increases in children & family benefits (0.2% of GDP)
•     Increases in benefits to pensioners (0.1% of GDP)
Notes:
(3) On-going measure, not specific to 2008 Budget
Table V.17.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services and 2007 stability programme and the Budget for 2008.
Main measures in the budget for 2008, Malta
 




Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, the general government balance came 
out at a surplus of 0.4% of GDP, marginally 
below the surplus of 0.5% of GDP in 2006. The 
November 2006 update of the stability 
programme had targeted a general government 
surplus of 0.2% of GDP for 2007, which was 
revised in September 2007 in the context of the 
budget preparation to a deficit of 0.4% of GDP. 
The main source of these changes in the 
budgetary estimates was the variation in the 
assessment of non-tax gas revenues, which was 
related to weather conditions. Other factors that 
explain the better budgetary outcome as 
compared to the November 2006 update of the 
stability programme include a higher local 
government balance and higher tax receipts, 
related to better-than-expected GDP growth in 
2007 (3.5%, compared to a forecast of 3% in the 
November 2006 update of the stability 
programme). These factors outweighed 
expenditure overruns that were concentrated in 
health care. The debt-to-GDP ratio fell to 45.4%, 
from 47.9% in the year before. 
The draft budget for 2008 was adopted in 
parliament on 23 November 2007. Both the draft 
budget and the November 2007 update of the 
stability programme (1) targeted a general 
government balance surplus of 0.5% of GDP for 
2008, which was based on an expected deficit of 
0.4% of GDP in 2007. The budget set out to 
introduce new taxes on packaging and aviation 
and raised several existing taxes and levies. 
Furthermore, it planned an increase in health care 
contributions. These factors are partly offset by 
additional expenditure in the fields of health care 
and education. In the Commission services' 
spring 2008 forecast, the headline balance is 
expected to turn out better in 2008 and improve 
to 1.4% of GDP. This is based on a better 
starting position carried over from 2007, higher 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
economic growth that supports tax revenues and 
gas receipts that are expected to be slightly 
higher, in response to the recent strong increase 
in global energy prices. In the Spring note on 
budgetary implementation, sent to parliament on 
23 May, the target for 2008 has been revised up 
to a surplus of 0.9% of GDP on account of 
higher tax revenues and social premiums, while 
gas receipts have remained virtually unrevised. 
The Spring note specifies increased spending on 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods and child care.  
Based on the spring forecast, the structural 
balance is projected to improve from a surplus of 
¼% of GDP in 2007 to a surplus of around 1% in 
2008, mainly on account of the envisaged 
revenue-based fiscal tightening and the expected 
increase in gas receipts. The fiscal stance as 
measured by the change in the structural balance 
is thus planned to be contractionary.  
On a no-policy-change basis, the Commission 
services' spring 2008 forecast projects the 
headline budgetary balance to improve by 0.4 % 
of GDP in 2009 to reach a surplus of around 
1¾% of GDP. The improvement compared with 
2008 is explained by an expected slight increase 
in gas receipts and the reduction of the Dutch 
contribution to the EU own resources by ½% of 
GDP. This is partly offset by lacklustre economic 
growth which is expected to lower tax 
elasticities. Planned budgetary measures for 2009 
such as the envisaged VAT increase were not 
taken on board in the forecast as final budgetary 
decisions were pending. The November 2007 
update of the stability programme set a nominal 
budgetary target of a surplus of 0.6% of GDP for 
2009, implying a marginal improvement over the 
budget target of 0.5% in 2008. After correcting 
for the better starting position in 2008, the 
difference with the spring forecast mainly lies in 
the measures that are planned for 2009. For 
2010, the stability programme update targets a 
further slight improvement in the headline 
balance, to a surplus of 0.7% of GDP. 
The government debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast to 
fall from 45.4% in 2007 to 39% in 2009. The fall 
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in the debt ratio can be mainly attributed to the 
primary surplus and the growth of nominal GDP. 
2006 2007 2008 2009
0.5 0.4 1.4 1.8
46.6 46.3 47.3 47.6
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.8 12.7 12.7 13.0
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 11.7 12.2 12.7 12.9
- social contributions 15.1 14.6 14.7 14.5
46.1 45.9 45.9 45.7
  Of which: - compensation of employees 9.4 9.3 9.4 9.4
- intermediate consumption 7.2 6.9 6.9 7.0
- social payments 11.0 10.6 10.7 10.5
- gross fixed capital formation 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.4
- interest expenditure 2.2 2.3 2.0 1.9
2.7 2.7 3.4 3.7
39.5 39.5 40.1 40.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
1.1 0.3 1.0 1.3
3.3 2.6 3.0 3.2
47.9 45.4 42.4 39.0
3.0 3.5 2.6 1.8
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
0.1 -0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
2.8 1.8 2.7 2.8 2.9
0 0 0 0.3 0
1.1 -0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8
47.9 46.8 45 43 41.2
3 2¾ 2½ 1¾ 1¾
Notes:
Table V.18.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2010, the Netherlands (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden




Real GDP growth (%)
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary 
measures taken from the programme.
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Structural balance (3)(5)
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and stability programme of the Netherlands.
Government gross debt




One-off and other temporary measures
 
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Increase in duties on tobacco, alcohol and fuels (0.1 % of
       GDP) •     Higher health care expenditures (0.1% of GDP)
•     Introduction of a tax on disposable packaging and airport •     Increase in disability benefits (0.1% of GDP)
       tax (0.1% of GDP) •     Increase in education expenditures (0.1% of GDP)
•     Increase in health care premiums (0.4% of GDP)
•     Changes to the wage and income taxes, e.g. reduction of            
       first tax bracket rate and  increasing the rate of the second 
       tax bracket (0.2% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.18.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services and 2008 Budget.






Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
At 0.5% of GDP, the general government deficit 
for 2007 turned out lower than the initial 0.9% of 
GDP targeted in the March 2007 update of the 
stability programme. The favourable outturn was 
mainly due to higher-than-expected revenue 
from wage and corporate taxes as well as capital 
yields taxes, which more than offset slightly 
higher-than-planned expenditure growth. The 
latter resulted to a large extent from stronger-
than-foreseen growth of spending on subsidies 
and a heavier interest burden. The debt-to-GDP 
ratio amounted to 59.1% in 2007, falling under 
the 60% threshold for the first time since 1992.  
The federal budget for 2008 was adopted 
(together with that for 2007) by the new 
parliament in May 2007. Revenues, on the one 
hand, will benefit from the increase in fuel duties 
introduced in mid-2007. On the other hand, the 
recently agreed rules exempting low-wage 
workers from paying unemployment insurance 
contributions will take their toll. In terms of 
expenditure, like in 2007, the budget will be 
burdened by the spending on military aircraft 
amounting to about 0.2% of GDP. Additional 
cost of about 0.1% of GDP will be incurred 
because of the introduction of two new variants 
of the childcare allowance, whereby parents will 
be allowed to opt for higher monthly payments 
but for a shorter period of time than previously. 
The continued reform of public administration is 
expected to result in savings of around 0.1% of 
GDP. Originally, the budget for 2008 targeted a 
deficit of 0.7% of GDP. Later on, in the 
November 2007 update of the stability 
programme (1), it was marginally revised down 
to 0.6% of GDP. The authorities confirmed this 
goal in their fiscal notification of 31 March 2008. 
As the central government deficit is envisaged to 
increase significantly, mainly due to slackening 
tax revenue growth, the plan hinges strongly on a 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm 
significant improvement in the budgetary 
situation of the Länder and social security funds. 
In their spring 2008 forecast, the Commission 
services foresee a marginally higher deficit of 
0.7% of GDP, since given the recent track record 
of the Länder and social security funds, it 
remains to be seen whether such a consolidation 
is realistic. The fiscal stance in 2008, as 
measured by the change in the structural balance, 
is anticipated to be mildly expansionary. 
According to the Commission services spring 
2008 forecast, the structural deficit will increase 
by ¼% of GDP, while it is estimated to be 
broadly unchanged in the most recent update of 
the stability programme (2). Austria does not take 
advantage of the better-than-expected budgetary 
outcome in 2007 to make further headway in 
terms of achieving its MTO.   
Under the no-policy-change assumption, the 
Commission services spring 2008 forecast 
foresees a general government deficit of 0.6% of 
GDP in 2009. By contrast, the most recent 
update of the stability programme targeted a 
0.2% of GDP deficit. The difference between the 
two numbers is firstly due to the fact that the 
stability programme expects GDP growth to be 
0.7 percentage point higher than the Commission 
services' spring forecast. Secondly, since the 
measures underlying the planned consolidation 
remain largely unspecified in the programme, 
under the non-policy-change assumption they 
were not incorporated in the Commission 
services' forecast. The budget for 2009 will 
benefit from the phasing-out of expenditure on 
new military equipment. However, it is likely to 
be slightly burdened by growing spending on 
unemployment benefits due to decelerating job 
creation in the face of a strongly growing labour 
force.  
For 2010, the most recent update of the stability 
programme foresees a government balance of 
0.4% of GDP, i.e. an improvement of 0.6 
percentage point. However, at the same time the 
government plans tax cuts amounting to about  
                                                          
(2) According to the Commission services' recalculation 
based on the information in the programme 
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1% of GDP in that year. The achievement of the 
planned surplus would therefore require 
significant additional saving measures, which are 
not spelled out in the stability programme.  
In its spring 2008 forecast the Commission 
services expect the debt ratio to fall to 57.8% and 
56.7% of GDP in 2008 and 2009, respectively. 
This projected improvement is by about ½ 
percentage points lower than that foreseen in the 
most recent update of the stability programme. 
  
2006 2007 2008 2009
-1.5 -0.5 -0.7 -0.6
47.6 47.5 47.0 46.8
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 14.1 14.0 13.8 13.8
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 12.9 13.4 13.3 13.2
- social contributions 16.0 15.7 15.5 15.5
49.1 48.0 47.7 47.5
  Of which: - compensation of employees 9.3 9.0 8.9 8.8
- intermediate consumption 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.2
- social payments 18.2 17.6 17.4 17.4
- gross fixed capital formation 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
- interest expenditure 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6
1.2 2.2 1.9 2.0
41.7 41.8 41.3 41.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-1.4 -1.0 -1.2 -0.9
1.3 1.7 1.5 1.7
61.8 59.1 57.7 56.8
3.3 3.4 2.2 1.8
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-1.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2 0.4
1.5 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.8
0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0
-1.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 0.1
61.7 59.9 58.4 57.0 55.4
3.3 3.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
Notes:
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Austria.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 
taken from the programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)









One-off and other temporary measures
Table V.19.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2010, Austria (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
 
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Increase in fuel duties (0.1% of GDP)     •     New childcare allowance (0.1% of GDP)
•    Public administration reform (-0.1% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.19.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services and the November 2007 update of the stability programme.






Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government balance improved to 
−2.0% of GDP in 2007 compared to the target of 
−3.4% set in the November 2006 convergence 
programme (1). Much higher real GDP growth 
(6.5%) than assumed in the programme (5.1%) 
was the main reason. High profitability of 
companies allowed for lower subsidies. A 
favourable evolution of the labour market and 
the ceiling imposed by the Hausner plan (last 
year of its operation) resulted in lower social 
transfers. In addition, higher inflation contributed 
to lower expenditure ratios for such items as 
compensation of public sector employees, which 
are budgeted in nominal terms. Government 
investment was by 0.5% of GDP lower because 
of slower absorption of EU funds. Overall, total 
expenditure was by 1.3% of GDP lower. On the 
revenue side, despite cuts, social contributions 
were by about 0.5% of GDP higher than 
projected in November 2006 thanks to a much 
higher employment and wage growth. The 
revenue from indirect taxes also turned out 
higher. These positive surprises were offset by a 
weaker performance of non-tax revenue leading 
to a revenue ratio close to the planned one. As a 
result of a lower deficit, the 2007 general 
government debt declined to 45.4% of GDP, 4½ 
percentage points lower than projected in 
November 2006. 
The 2008 budget was adopted by the previous 
Polish government on 25 September 2007. The 
new parliament elected in October 2007 slightly 
modified the budget, with wage increases in the 
public sector (mainly for teachers) offset by 
administrative expenditure cuts, resulting in an 
improvement of the central government balance 
by about 0.2% of GDP. The amended budget was 
finally adopted on 23 January 2008. The 2008 
budget includes significant revenue-decreasing 
measures: the second cut of social contributions 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
to the disability fund (the first one took place on 
1 July 2007) estimated at about 1% of GDP and a 
pro-family relief (related to the number of 
children) on the personal income tax, estimated 
at ½% of GDP. These revenue cuts are only 
partly offset by excise duty hikes for cigarettes 
(most of them required under EU tax 
harmonisation) estimated at less than 0.2% of 
GDP. The government projects that the budgeted 
changes would be neutral for the deficit ratio 
thanks to continuing favourable labour market 
conditions (steep wage and employment growth) 
additionally stimulated by the tax wedge cut. On 
the expenditure side, the 2008 budget 
reintroduces the annual indexation of pensions 
and disability benefits, which had been 
abandoned as part of the Hausner plan. The 
indexation will be extended with a link to wage 
growth (i.e. inflation plus 20% of wage growth). 
In addition, the 2008 indexation will be based on 
cumulated inflation for 2006-2007, with an 
overall budgetary cost in 2008 estimated at ½% 
of GDP. Overall, the current general government 
balance target is set by the March 2008 
convergence programme at 2.5% of GDP, the 
same as the spring 2008 Commission forecast. 
The deterioration in the structural balance points 
to a mildly expansionary fiscal stance in 2008. 
Compared to 2.6% of GDP in the spring 2008 
forecast, the 2009 deficit target in the 
convergence programme is 2.0% of GDP and 
planned to further improve to 1.5% in 2010. In 
2009, a personal income tax reform will be the 
main deficit-increasing measure (estimated at 
about 0.6% of GDP). The vast majority of tax-
payers will be covered by a low marginal rate of 
18%. This impact will be cushioned by further 
improvement in tax compliance and falling 
inactivity thanks to the lower overall tax wedge. 
One more round of hikes of indirect taxes, as 
determined by the EU harmonisation, will have a 
direct deficit-decreasing effect.  
Gross debt is projected to fall to about 44% of 
GDP in 2009. If privatisation is re-activated, as 
planned by the new government, the debt ratio 
may decline faster. 
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Public finances and the labour market: the 
case for improving the quality of public 
finances 
The overall spending on social protection 
reached about 17% of GDP in the recent years, 
significantly above the average ratio for other 
new Member States. Such situation not only 
results in high overall expenditure and fiscal 
deficits, but also produces distortions in the 
labour market. Disability benefits being replaced 
by early pensions and the farmers’ social fund 
are two examples of improperly targeted social 
benefits, impacting unfavourably on the labour 
market. 
A high inactivity rate: early pensions replace 
disability benefits 
In the 1990s, inactivity was high because of both 
lenient disability benefits (approximately 3% of 
GDP) and generous early retirement schemes 
(about 1.8% of GDP). As a result, Poland had 
one of the lowest activity rates in the EU: 62.4% 
(compared to 71.9% for the EU) in 2007. 
Although rules on the access to disability 
benefits have been reinforced recently, the 
potential savings have been offset by an 
increased use of early pensions, both in the 
general and in the farmers’ social security 
system. These trends appear to accelerate 
(Graph V.20.1). 
Graph V.20.1: Pensions and social benefits in Poland, general 
















Note: KhRUS – farmers’ social fund.
Source:  htttp://www.mpips.gov.pl/_download.php?userfiles%2FFile%
               2FAnalizy%2Fraport_2007.pdf  
Employment and social security in the 
agricultural sector 
A subsidy to the farmers’ social security fund 
(KRUS) constitutes a significant part of social 
protection expenditure budgeted at more than 
1.2% of GDP in 2007. The net benefit from 
participation in the fund is very high and the 
eligibility rules are lenient. Farmers contribute 
less than 5% of gross wage to the KRUS on 
average, while the non-agricultural worker 
contributes about 20% of its gross wage to the 
general social security fund. Moreover, owners 
of the smallest farms (below 2 hectares) do not 
have to pay contributions. To qualify for 
membership in KRUS, one has to possess at least 
1 hectare of land over a certain number of years 
of contribution. As a result, according to the 
2007 budget, only 7.7% of KRUS expenditure 
was covered by contributions and the fund was 
heavily subsidised from the central budget. 
KRUS may have slowed down farm restructuring 
during transition, resulting in the persistence of a 
number of low-productive farms of less than 2 
hectares (1). Despite many calls from different 
institutions to conduct a fundamental reform of 
KRUS, the system has remained broadly 
unchanged since 1990. The general pension 
reform establishing funded pension schemes did 
not cover the farmers’ social security system. 
The number of people insured in KRUS has 
increased in recent years, despite a decline of 
employment in agriculture (Graph V.20.2). 
These tendencies not only hamper restructuring 
of agriculture, but also increase the implicit 
liabilities weighing on future government 
balances in Poland. 
Graph V.20.2: Employment in agriculture and farmers’ social 















Employed in agriculture (lhs)
KRUS members (rhs)
Sources: Polish central statistical office (GUS), Eurostat and the farmers’ social fund (KRUS).  
                                                          
(1) See Latruffe (2006). 
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2006 2007 2008 2009
-3.8 -2.0 -2.5 -2.6
40.0 40.4 40.1 39.7
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 14.2 14.2 14.5 14.8
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 7.5 8.6 8.3 7.9
- social contributions 12.2 12.1 10.9 10.8
43.8 42.4 42.6 42.3
  Of which: - compensation of employees 9.8 9.6 9.3 8.9
- intermediate consumption 6.0 5.9 5.7 5.5
- social payments 15.2 14.4 14.1 14.0
- gross fixed capital formation 3.9 4.1 4.5 4.8
- interest expenditure 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.7
-1.1 0.6 0.2 0.1
33.8 34.8 33.6 33.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-4.0 -2.5 -2.7 -2.3
-1.3 0.1 0.0 0.3
47.6 45.2 44.5 44.1
6.2 6.5 5.3 5.0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-3.8 -2.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5
-1.1 0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.8
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-4.0 -2.4 -2.8 -1.9 -1.1
47.6 44.9 44.2 43.3 42.3
6.2 6.5 5.5 5.0 5.0
Notes:
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Poland.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in March 2008.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 
taken from the programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)









One-off and other temporary measures
Table V.20.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2010, Poland (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Social contribution cut (-1% of GDP) •     Special indexation of transfers (0.5% of GDP)
•     Income tax relief for families (-0.5% of GDP)
•     Excise duty hike (+0.2% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.20.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services.





Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, the general government deficit 
amounted to 2.6% of GDP, which compares with 
a target of 3.7% of GDP in the December 2006 
update of the stability programme. This 
overachievement benefited from the carry-over 
of a better-than-expected 2006 outcome and was 
further helped by additional revenue buoyancy. 
After peaking at 64.7% of GDP in 2006, 
government debt came down to 63.6% of GDP in 
2007, clearly below the original target of 68% of 
GDP. This better-than-expected outcome was the 
result of lower budget deficits and higher debt-
reducing stock-flow adjustments in both 2006 
and 2007; further help came from an upward 
revision of GDP data which mechanically 
lowered the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
The 2008 budget was approved by Parliament on 
23 November 2007 with a general government 
deficit target of 2.4% of GDP, which was 
confirmed in the December 2007 update of the 
stability programme (1). The deficit reduction is 
envisaged to be mainly driven by a containment 
of current primary expenditure, notably 
compensation of employees. In 2008, revenue 
will benefit from the normalisation in VAT net 
proceeds as they were temporarily lowered in 
2006 and 2007 following a reduction of the 
maximum reimbursement period. Some marginal 
revenue rise is planned to result from 
improvements in revenue. In addition, other 
government revenue is projected to increase 
somewhat as a share of GDP thanks to rising EU 
funds, in the context of the implementation of the 
new National Strategic Reference Framework (2). 
On 26 March, the deficit target was revised to 
2.2% of GDP, following the publication of the 
better-than-estimated 2007 budgetary execution. 
At the same time, the Portuguese authorities 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
(2) Concomitantly, these inflows will also imply additional 
spending, consequently mitigating considerably the 
impact of those receipts on the overall budget balance. 
announced a reduction of the VAT standard rate 
by 1 percentage point (to 20%) as of 1 July 2008. 
This tax cut is expected to reduce revenues by 
some 0.15% of GDP in 2008. However, the 
granting of concessions for the exploitation of 
dams will provide a one-off deficit-reducing 
contribution of almost 0.2% of GDP. All in all, 
for 2008, the Commission services’ spring 2008 
forecast projects a fiscal deficit of 2¼% of GDP. 
The fiscal stance is foreseen to be mildly 
restrictive, with a reduction of the structural 
balance by about ¼% of GDP. This compares 
with a more restrictive stance in the stability 
programme, which plans an improvement of ½% 
of GDP in the structural balance (3). However, in 
view of the better-than-expected outcome for 
2007 the most recent official target seems to be 
associated with a lower corrective effort. 
Under the customary no-policy-change 
assumption, the Commission services’ spring 
2008 forecast projects the general government 
deficit to increase to over 2½% of GDP in 2009. 
This upturn is expected to be driven mainly by a 
falling tax burden, reflecting still the impact of 
the reduction in the VAT standard rate as of July 
2008. In addition, unlike in previous years, tax 
revenue is assumed to evolve in line with the 
relevant tax bases. The base effect associated 
with the 2008 one-off operation should push the 
headline deficit further up. The government 
deficit target in the December 2007 update of the 
stability programme is 1.5% of GDP, against a 
backdrop of GDP growth of 2.8%. However, this 
does not take into account the impact of the cut 
in the standard VAT rate in mid 2008. According 
to the Commission forecasts, on the basis of the 
no-policy-change assumption, the fiscal stance in 
2009 would be mildly expansionary rather than 
restrictive as projected in the stability 
programme. For 2010 and 2011, the December 
2007 stability programme targets a deficit-to-
GDP ratio of 0.4% and 0.2%, respectively. 
                                                          
(3) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the 
information in the programme. 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2008 
 
258 
The Commission services’ forecast projects the 
government debt-to-GDP to rise to around 64% 
in 2008 and, on a no-policy-change basis, to 
64¼% in 2009. This increase reflects low 
nominal GDP growth in both years, a debt-
increasing stock-flow adjustment in 2008 and a 
reduction of the primary surplus in 2009. The 
December 2007 stability programme projects the 
debt-ratio to fall steadily to 64.1% in 2008 and 
62.5% in 2009. The differences between the path 
envisaged in the stability programme and the 
Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast 
reflect mainly the fact that the latter projects 
lower GDP growth and a higher budget deficit in 
2009. 
2006 2007 2008 2009
-3.9 -2.6 -2.2 -2.6
42.4 43.1 43.6 43.3
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 15.5 15.1 15.1 14.9
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 8.8 9.8 9.9 9.9
- social contributions 12.5 12.7 12.8 12.7
46.3 45.7 45.7 45.9
  Of which: - compensation of employees 13.6 12.9 12.5 12.3
- intermediate consumption 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
- social payments 15.1 15.2 15.5 15.8
- gross fixed capital formation 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4
- interest expenditure 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7
-1.1 0.2 0.6 0.1
35.9 36.8 37.1 36.8
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0
-3.2 -2.2 -1.9 -2.2
-0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6
64.7 63.6 64.1 64.3
1.3 1.9 1.7 1.6
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
-3.9 -3.0 -2.4 -1.5 -0.4 -0.2
-1.1 -0.1 0.5 1.3 2.2 2.5
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-2.8 -2.1 -1.6 -1.0 -0.3 -0.4
64.8 64.4 64.1 62.5 59.7 56.7
1.3 1.8 2.2 2.8 3.0 3.0
Notes:
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and December 2007 update of the stability programme of Portugal.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)









One-off and other temporary measures
Table V.21.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Portugal (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•    Reduction in central government employment (-0.3% of 
•    Increase in excise taxes on tobacco products       GDP)
•    Lowering of allowances for income from pensions •     Savings with redundant staff; revision of overtime pay 
      and wage supplements; reduction of health care benefits for 
      parts of the civil service (-0.3% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.21.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services, 2008 Budget and December 2007 stability programme update of Portugal.





Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, the general government recorded a 
deficit of 2.5% of GDP, compared to a target of 
2.7% of GDP set in the January 2007 
convergence programme. While the deficit target 
was undershot only slightly, both revenue- and 
expenditure- to GDP ratios were substantially 
lower than planned. On the revenue side, the 
underperformance is mainly due to lower-than- 
expected VAT receipts partly compensated by 
favourable social contributions. On the 
expenditure side, the lower level mainly stems 
from less-than-planned public investment. The 
government gross debt ratio was 13% in 2007. 
The 2008 budget was adopted by the Parliament 
on 20 December 2007. On the revenue side, the 
main measures relate to social contributions. 
Social contribution rate is being gradually 
reduced by 6 percentage points and part of the 
revenues (2% of the gross wage) is being shifted 
to a second pension pillar introduced in 2008. 
However, these reforms will be partly financed 
by some measures aimed at broadening the base 
according to which social contribution are paid. 
On the expenditure side, the budget includes a 
substantial increase in social benefits, due to a 
43% nominal increase in pensions compared to 
the level in mid-2007. While an important 
increase in public investment is also planned, the 
effect is foreseen to be partially offset by a lower 
wage bill, which in contrast to the past trend is 
planned to decrease as a share of GDP.  
The initial 2008 general government deficit 
foreseen in the December 2007 convergence 
programme (1) was 2.9% of GDP. Following a 
budget amendment adopted in March 2008, the 
target was revised downwards to 2.4% of GDP 
(as reported in the April 2008 fiscal notification). 
The lower deficit is to be realised by a planned 
cut in expenditures. The revised target is lower 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
than the 2.9% of GDP deficit projected by the 
Commission services' in the spring 2008 
forecast. The difference is mainly due to 
significantly more favourable revenue 
projections by the Romanian authorities, which 
more than compensate for their also substantially 
higher public investment plans. In addition, the 
government deficit target also assumes a much 
lower compensation of employees compared to 
the Commission forecast. 
The fiscal stance as measured by the change in 
the structural balance (cyclically-adjusted 
balance excluding one-offs and other temporary 
measures) in the Commission services' spring 
2008 forecast is mildly expansionary as the 
structural deficit is projected to deteriorate from 
3.4% of GDP in 2007 to 3.7% of GDP in 2008. 
Based on the no-policy change assumption, the 
Commission services' spring 2008 forecast 
projects the general government deficit to 
deteriorate sharply to 3.7% of GDP in 2009. This 
worsening is driven by an additional substantial 
increase in pensions (of around 30%), the full 
impact of the 6 percentage cut in social 
contributions undertaken in 2008, and an 
estimated pension reform cost (i.e. the second 
pension pillar introduced in 2008) of 0.3% of 
GDP. So far, these extra-costs are not financed 
by additional measures. The December 2007 
convergence programme foresees a general 
government deficit of 2.9% in 2009 (which does 
not include the impact of the further hike in 
pensions in 2009, although it was approved in 
June 2007) and a tightening to 2.4% of GDP in 
2010. 
Debt in 2008 and beyond 
The Commission services project the debt-to-
GDP ratio to increase by around 1¼ percentage 
points between 2008 and 2009, reaching almost 
15% of GDP in 2009. 
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2006 2007 2008 2009
-2.2 -2.5 -2.9 -3.7
33.1 34.4 35.6 36.2
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.7 12.8 13.0 12.8
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 6.1 7.0 7.9 8.7
- social contributions 10.3 10.6 10.8 10.7
35.3 36.9 38.5 39.9
  Of which: - compensation of employees 9.1 9.7 10.0 10.3
- intermediate consumption 6.4 6.1 5.8 5.5
- social payments 8.8 9.4 10.8 11.9
- gross fixed capital formation 5.1 5.5 5.8 6.1
- interest expenditure 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9
-1.4 -1.8 -2.1 -2.9
28.6 29.8 30.9 31.4
-0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.0
-2.7 -3.4 -3.7 -4.1
-1.9 -2.7 -2.9 -3.2
12.4 13.0 13.6 14.9
7.9 6.0 6.2 5.1
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-1.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.4
-1.0 -2.0 -2.1 -2.1 -1.6
-0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
-2.2 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -2.7
12.4 11.9 13.6 14.2 14.9
7.7 6.1 6.5 6.1 5.8
Notes:
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Romania.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 
taken from the programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)









One-off and other temporary measures
Table V.22.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2010, Romania (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Broadening of social contribution base (+0.7% of  GDP) •     Pension increases (+2% of GDP)
•     Social contributions shifted to second pension pillar
       (-0.2% of GDP)
•     Reduction of social contributions (-0.5% of GDP)   
Notes:
Table V.22.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services, Romanian Ministry of Finance and the December 2007 convergence programme.





Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, the general government deficit 
amounted to 0.1% of GDP, compared with a 
deficit target of 1.5% of GDP set in the stability 
programme submitted in December 2006 (1). The 
better budgetary outcome in 2007 mainly reflects 
stronger-than-expected revenue growth, which 
was only partly offset by increased expenditure 
growth. Revenue developments were supported 
by the economy's ongoing strong performance, 
with favourable employment and wage 
developments contributing to higher social 
contributions as well as to a lower adverse 
impact of the changes in direct taxation than 
estimated earlier. The general government gross 
debt-to-GDP ratio declined to around 24% in 
2007.  
The National Assembly of Slovenia adopted the 
2008 and 2009 budgets on 28th November 2007 
(2). On the revenue side, the 2008 budget is 
marked by the ongoing tax reform. In particular, 
the corporate income tax rate is being 
successively lowered from 23% in 2007 to 20% 
in 2010. Revenues are also expected to decline 
due to the payroll tax, which is being gradually 
phased out and completely abolished as from 
2009. On the expenditure side, railway 
investments amounting to 0.4% of GDP stand 
out. Overall, a general government deficit of 
0.9% of GDP in 2008 was planned in the 
November 2007 stability programme. However, 
amendments to the budget for 2008 are currently 
being prepared. The amended budget is likely to 
reflect the better-than-expected budgetary 
outturn in 2007 and changes in expected revenue 
and expenditure due to the updating of the 
government's macroeconomic projections for 
2008, including an upward revision of inflation. 
Risks include still ongoing public sector wage 
                                                          
(1) The Programme as well as its Commission assessment 
can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm  
(2) According to the Public Finance Act, the National 
Assembly of Slovenia has been adopting budgets for two 
consecutive years on a rolling basis since 2002. 
negotiations related to the government's efforts to 
reduce wage disparities in the public sector. 
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned 
factors, and anticipating that a large part of the 
better-than-expected 2007 outturn would be 
carried over into 2008, the Commission services' 
spring forecast projects a slightly lower deficit of 
0.6% of GDP for 2008. According to the 
Commission services, the fiscal stance is 
estimated to be mildly expansionary in 2008, 
with a deterioration of the structural balance by 
close to ½% of GDP.  
On the basis of a no-policy-change assumption, 
the Commission services' forecast the 
government deficit to be maintained at 0.6 % of 
GDP in 2009. The November 2007 stability 
programme also projects a general government 
deficit of 0.6% of GDP in 2009. However, the 
upcoming parliamentary elections to the National 
Assembly of Slovenia scheduled for autumn of 
2008 imply heightened uncertainty for the 2009 
budget. For 2010, the stability programme 
projects a balanced budget.  
The Commission services forecast the debt-to-
GDP ratio to continue its gradual decline to 
around 23½% of GDP in 2008 and 22½% in 
2009. 
Rigidity and expenditure efficiency of the 
Slovenian budget 
The degree of flexibility of the budget and the 
efficiency of spending are generally considered 
important aspects of the quality of public 
finances. Flexibility provides the government 
with leeway to restructure its spending in the 
short run in response to changing policy 
priorities or macroeconomic circumstances while 
efficiency is a central aim in itself.  
First, as regards flexibility, several indicators 
point to low flexibility of the budget in Slovenia. 
For instance, in the Standard and Poor’s “Fiscal 
Flexibility index”, Slovenia's index score for 
expenditure flexibility is slightly worse than the 
average of the 28 European countries sample, 
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including the EU-25 (1). Budget rigidities are 
also suggested in a recent IMF study (2), which 
highlights that the variability of total spending in 
Slovenia in 2000-2005 was much lower than in 
other countries. In particular, the variation was 
about twice as high in the EU-15 as in Slovenia, 
while the value for the 10 new Member states 
was more than three times as high as in Slovenia. 
Regarding individual expenditure categories, the 
variation is lower in Slovenia reportedly for 
social benefits and compensation of employees, 
suggesting that these expenditures are 
particularly rigid.  
Finally, it is instructive to consider the share of 
the budget representing expenditure items 
defined as rigid, insofar as they are not 
dependent upon the discretion of the authorities 
in the short-term, i.e. social benefits, subsidies, 
interest payments and compensation of 
employees. Over 1997-2006, this share was 
higher for Slovenia (67.7%) both compared with 
the unweighted average for the 13 euro area 
member countries (EA-13) (66.5%) and with the 
10 new Member States (EU-10) (64.2%). 
Moreover, the EA-13 and especially the EU-10 
have reduced this share since 2000 by more (-2.2 
pp and -3.6 pp, respectively) than Slovenia (-1.2 
pp). According to Slovenia's 2007 stability 
programme update, the share of rigid expenditure 
in the budget is actually expected to increase by 
1 pp. from 2007 until 2010. 
Second, as regards efficiency of public spending, 
various methods show that Slovenia's 
performance could be improved also in this field. 
Assessing the efficiency of public expenditure 
means setting indicators proxying for desired 
policy outcomes in certain policy areas in 
relation to public expenditure in the respective 
areas. These output-input-ratios can be compared 
either to cross-country averages or to a 
theoretical efficiency frontier benchmark 
constructed as the line in input-output space 
connecting all efficient countries in a sample (3). 
                                                          
(1) Standard and Poor’s (2007). 
(2) Mattina and Gunnarsson (2007). 
(3) That means countries whose input-output combinations 
are not “dominated” by other feasible combinations 
meaning that there are no feasible combinations that 
reach the same/higher level of output using a lower level 
of financial resources. 
According to both methods, there seems to be 
scope for improving public spending efficiency 
in Slovenia, in particular as regards health and 
primary education spending (4). Recent work by 
Commission services uses a version of the 
efficient frontier approach to compare most of 
the EU-25 countries over 2001-2005 (5). It is 
found that Slovenia ranks among the less 
efficient 50% of countries with regard to the 
health outcome indicators life expectancy at 
birth, standardised death rates and infant deaths 
per 1000 life births. According to the earlier 
mentioned IMF study, which uses a similar 
methodology, Slovenia ranks among the bottom 
30% of countries in their sample (6). The IMF's 
results imply that the same level of health 
outcomes could efficiently be produced with 
63% of the resources Slovenia is currently using 
for this purpose.  
The two above-mentioned studies also analyse 
public spending efficiency in the education 
sector. When comparing student-teacher ratios in 
primary education to related public spending, 
Slovenia ranks 42nd among 45 countries in the 
IMF sample and last among the 19 countries of 
the Commission's sample. The observed elevated 
level of public expenditure could consequently, 
at least theoretically, be reduced by at least 46% 
while maintaining the current student-teacher 
ratio for Slovenia, which is close to the average 
ratio in the sample. 
The analysis reviewed in this section shows that 
the flexibility of the Slovenian budget could be 
enhanced, which would imply greater leeway for 
fiscal policy to quickly react to shocks. At the 
same time, identifying areas with low spending 
efficiency highlighted opportunities for fiscal 
consolidation on the expenditure side, as 
expenditure in these areas could potentially be 
reduced without compromising the level of 
services provided, if measures aimed at 
                                                          
(4) A caveat applies insofar as the focus in constructing this 
efficiency measure is on quantifiable outcomes and only 
public spending is taken into account. Moreover, by its 
very nature, the method is sensitive to data quality. 
(5) Ebejer and Mandl (forthcoming).  
(6) The study is based on 1998-2003 data on a sample 
including a large number of European countries, relating 
public health spending to child mortality, maternal 
mortality and standardised death rates, respectively. 
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2006 2007 2008 2009
-1.2 -0.1 -0.6 -0.6
44.1 43.2 42.7 41.9
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 15.2 15.0 14.5 13.9
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 9.3 9.0 9.0 9.0
- social contributions 14.5 14.3 14.3 14.2
45.3 43.3 43.3 42.5
  Of which: - compensation of employees 11.4 10.9 11.1 11.2
- intermediate consumption 6.4 6.1 6.0 5.8
- social payments 15.5 14.7 14.8 14.5
- gross fixed capital formation 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6
- interest expenditure 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1
0.2 1.2 0.6 0.5
39.1 38.5 38.0 37.3
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-1.3 -0.7 -1.1 -0.7
0.1 0.6 0.1 0.4
27.2 24.1 23.4 22.5
5.7 6.1 4.2 3.8
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-1.2 -0.6 -0.9 -0.6 0.0
0.2 0.7 0.2 0.6 1.1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-1.1 -0.8 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1
27.1 25.6 24.7 23.8 22.5
5.7 5.8 4.6 4.1 4.5
Notes:
Budgetary developments 2006-2010, Slovenia (% of GDP)
Table V.23.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)












Real GDP growth (%)
Stability programme (4)
General government balance
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 
taken from the programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Slovenia.  
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•    Railway investment (0.4% of GDP)
•     Lowering the payroll tax (-0.65% of GDP) •     EU presidency (0.1% of GDP)
•     Lowering the corporate tax (-0.1% of GDP) •     Restrictive employment and implementation of agreed 
       wage policy in the public sector (up to -0.1% of GDP)
•     Streamlining of indexation of social transfers (-0.1% 
       of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
Table V.23.2:
Source : Commission services and Ministry of Finance of Slovenia .
Main measures in the budget for 2008, Slovenia
Notes:






Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government deficit dropped to 2.2% 
of GDP in 2007 which was below the official 
target of 2.9% of GDP set in the December 2006 
update of the convergence programme (1). The 
over-performance was mainly induced by higher-
than-foreseen GDP and employment growth, 
lower-than-budgeted co-financing for the EU 
funds and a larger-than-expected pre-stocking 
with cigarettes at the end of 2007, triggered by a 
hike in the excise tax on tobacco in January 2008 
and resulting in additional revenue of ½% of 
GDP compared to ¼% of GDP expected by the 
programme. The debt ratio decreased to 29.4% 
of GDP in 2007. 
The 2008 budget targeting a general government 
deficit of 2.3% of GDP was approved by 
parliament on 4 December 2007. Revenue-
increasing measures included in the 2008 budget 
such as a broadening of the corporate income tax 
base and an increase in the maximum ceiling on 
social contributions are foreseen to generate 
additional revenue of around ¼% of GDP in 
2008. The revenue shortfall induced by the 2007 
pre-stocking with cigarettes is likely to be 
broadly offset by a further hoarding of cigarettes 
motivated by another excise tax hike planned for 
the end of 2008. Moreover, a temporary opening 
up of the second pension pillar in the first half of 
2008, allowing all current participants to leave 
and new participants to join, should result in a 
one-off revenue of around 0.1% of GDP as 
savings accumulated in previous years in the 
second pillar will be transferred to the pay-as-
you-go pillar if participants decide to leave. On 
the expenditure side, farming subsidies are set to 
continue increasing substantially.  
In reaction to the February 2008 Council opinion 
on the November 2007 update of the 
convergence programme, which invited Slovakia 
exploit the strong growth conditions to 
                                                          
(1)  The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm 
strengthen the pace of structural adjustment 
towards the MTO the Ministry of Finance 
lowered the 2008 deficit target to 2% of GDP 
reflecting the improved revenue outlook. This 
target is in line with the Commission services’ 
spring 2008 forecast which foresees a mildly 
expansionary fiscal stance with the structural 
deficit deteriorating from around 2½% in 2007 to 
some 2¾% of GDP in 2008.   
According to the Commission services’ spring 
2008 forecast the headline deficit is expected to 
increase to 2.3% of GDP in 2009 (under the 
customary no-policy-change assumption).  The 
main reason for the 2009 deterioration projected 
in the spring forecast is a likely revenue shortfall 
of some ½% of GDP due to the aforementioned 
expected further substantial pre-stocking with 
cigarettes in 2008. The projection for 2009 is 
above the deficit target of 1.8% of GDP set in the 
most recent update of the convergence 
programme which foresees the headline deficit to 
fall further to 0.8% of GDP by 2010. 
According to the Commission services’ spring 
2008 forecast, the debt ratio is expected to 
remain broadly stable between 2007 and 2009.  
The role of fiscal policy in creating favourable 
conditions for sustained and rapid catching-
up 
In the years 2003-2005 some major structural 
reforms were introduced in Slovakia. The labour 
regulations were made more flexible, the social 
benefit system became less generous and more 
targeted, the tax code was simplified shifting the 
weight from income to consumption taxation and 
a second funded pension pillar was established. 
These reforms created the right incentives and 
promoted growth including through large green-
field FDI projects. At the same time, the total tax 
burden decreased from 31.7% of GDP in 2004 to 
29.6% of GDP in 2007 and it is expected to 
decrease further to 28.8% of GDP in 2009. 
The relatively lower share of resources at the 
disposal of the public sector implies a higher 
pressure for increasing the quality of public 
finances and especially the efficiency of public 
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expenditure. This holds in particular also for the 
areas of education and R&D where there is 
considerable scope for improvement. 
Although the overall employment rate increased 
from 57.0% to 59.4% between 2004 and 2006, 
young people continue to face serious problems 
on the labour market with the youth (15-24 
years) employment rate stagnating at around 
26%. Disaggregating by education levels, the 
unemployment rate for the young Slovaks with 
only pre-primary, primary and lower secondary 
education amounted to 74% in 2006 and was 
thus some 3.5 times higher than the EU27 
average. The unemployment rate for young 
having achieved upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary education was much 
lower, 21.4%, albeit still above the EU27 
average of 15.5%. Hence, the performance of the 
Slovak education sector appears insufficient in 
terms of providing an adequate skill mix at all 
education levels.   
Primary and secondary education 
According to the 2003 OECD PISA study 
assessing 15-year-olds in 41 countries, Slovak 
students’ overall results were below the OECD 
average. This was confirmed by the 2007 study 
which showed that Slovak students’ relative 
performance has further deteriorated. At the 
same time, student performances were more 
sensitive to their socio-economic background 
than in most other countries (1).  
Public expenditure on education in Slovakia 
amounted on average to 4.2% of GDP in the 
period 2000-04 and was thus almost 1 percentage 
point below both the EU27 average of 5.1% and 
the recently-acceded Member States’ (RAMS12) 
average of 5%. Moreover, the share of education 
expenditure in total Slovak public expenditure 
hovered around 10% in the years 2003-2005, 
below the RAMS10 (RAMS12 without Bulgaria 
and Romania) average of 13%.  
As a result, the public education sector in 
Slovakia seems relatively under-financed. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that higher education 
expenditure does not automatically guarantee 
                                                          
(1) OECD (2007i) 
better educational outcomes and thus higher 
employability of young labour-market entrants. 
Hence, apart from reprioritising public 
expenditure toward education, Slovakia should 
also try to improve the efficiency of public 
education spending through curriculum and 
education methodology reforms (currently under 
preparation) and the restructuring of the public 
school network.  
Tertiary education, R&D and innovation  
The availability of a relatively cheap but skilled 
labour force helped Slovakia to attract substantial 
foreign investment into its manufacturing sector 
in recent years. Similarly, the supply of 
university graduates familiar with state-of-the-art 
technologies and research can crucially affect the 
scale of R&D and innovation activities 
undertaken in Slovakia in the coming years. 
Although the share of tertiary graduates in 
science and technology among the population 
aged 20-29 increased from 0.8% in 2001 to 1% 
in 2005 and thus slightly exceeded the RAMS12 
average of 0.9%, it was still lagging behind the 
EU27 average of 1.2%.  
Apart from education spending, investment into 
R&D is also crucial in this context. Gross 
domestic expenditure on R&D in Slovakia 
amounted on average to 0.5% of GDP in the 
period 2001-2006 and was thus below both the 
RAMS12 average of 0.7% of GDP and the EU27 
averages of 1.4% of GDP. The government set 
an annual R&D investment target of 0.8% of 
GDP to be reached in 2010 but it has so far not 
planned any increases in public R&D spending.  
To conclude, Slovakia should ensure that 
sufficient resources are invested into the 
education system and R&D and innovation and 
that they are used efficiently. Otherwise, 
declining productivity growth may limit its 
potential output growth in the medium and long 
term and thus impede the catch-up process. 
Increased financing should be achieved through 
budgetary reallocation in order not to endanger 
the foreseen fiscal consolidation path. 
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2006 2007 2008 2009
-3.6 -2.2 -2.0 -2.3
33.5 34.7 34.3 33.8
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 11.3 11.4 11.2 11.0
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 6.1 6.0 6.0 5.9
- social contributions 11.9 11.9 11.7 11.6
37.2 36.9 36.3 36.1
  Of which: - compensation of employees 7.4 6.8 6.5 6.2
- intermediate consumption 5.7 4.5 4.5 4.5
- social payments 11.9 11.6 11.5 11.5
- gross fixed capital formation 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.9
- interest expenditure 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4
-2.2 -0.8 -0.6 -1.0
29.5 29.6 29.2 28.8
0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0
-3.1 -2.6 -2.8 -3.1
-1.7 -1.2 -1.5 -1.7
30.4 29.4 29.2 29.7
8.5 10.4 7.0 6.2
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
-3.7 -2.5 -2.3 -1.8 -0.8
-2.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.3 0.5
-0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
-3.1 -3.0 -3.1 -2.4 -1.2
30.4 30.6 30.8 30.5 29.5
8.3 8.8 6.8 5.8 5.0
Notes:
Table V.24.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2010, Slovakia (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden




Real GDP growth (%)
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 
taken from the programme.
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Structural balance (3)(5)
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Slovakia.
Government gross debt




One-off and other temporary measures
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Broadening of corporate tax bases (0.1% of GDP)
•     Increase in the maximum ceiling on social contributions •     Limited wage growth in the public sector (- 0.3% of GDP)
       (0.1% of GDP) •     Higher farming subsidies (0.6% of GDP)
•     Capital transfer from the second pension pillar (0.1% 
       of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.24.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source : Commission services and the 2008 budget.





Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government surplus reached 5.3% of 
GDP in 2007, more than double the surplus of 
2.8% projected in the November 2006 update of 
the Stability Programme (1) and above the MTO 
of 2% of GDP. The bulk of the difference 
(almost 2 percentage points) was accounted for 
by the central government finances, where 
higher-than-expected economic growth boosted 
tax and non-tax revenues while expenditure 
remained contained by the mid-term budgetary 
ceilings. Also, the social security sector 
accumulated a stronger surplus than expected. 
However, this is partly due to statistical revisions 
arising from the recording of reinvested property 
income of pension funds, with a positive impact 
of about 0.3 percentage points for 2007 (slightly 
less in previous years). The debt ratio declined to 
35.4% of GDP in 2007. 
The 2008 central government budget was 
adopted on 21 December 2007. It provides for a 
sharp rise in expenditure as the new government 
frontloaded expenditure increases to its first year 
in office. Expenditure is set to grow by almost 
7% in nominal terms compared with the outcome 
in 2007. The primary focus of the 2008 budget is 
on various employment measures, and on social 
and health programmes. Public investment and 
wage costs will also increase sharply. The 
original budget targets a general government 
surplus of 3.8% of GDP in 2008. However, in 
light of the higher-than-expected surplus in 2007 
and its carry-over to the next year, the most 
recent Ministry of Finance forecast from March 
2008 has revised the surplus target up to 4.5% of 
GDP. This is slightly lower than in the 
Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast of 
4.9% of GDP, mainly on account of the Ministry 
of Finance being more cautious in its assumption 
on growth of tax revenues. The stability 
programme update of November 2007 foresaw a 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm.        
decline in the structural balance in 2008 by about 
1% of GDP from the previous year. This was 
assessed by the Commission and the Council as 
implying a risk of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
stance in 2008. The recent Commission services 
spring forecast indicates that the decline in the 
structural primary balance in 2008 is likely to be 
only marginal, as well as the risk of a pro-
cyclical fiscal stance in 2008. 
The Commission services project that in line 
with slowing economic activity, the general 
government surplus would continue to moderate 
in 2009, declining by less than ½ percentage 
point from the previous year to 4½% of GDP. 
This forecast is based on a no-policy-change 
assumption, implying in particular that potential 
personal income tax cuts (other than the usual 
adjustment to income tax scales) are not included 
in the projection because their exact timing and 
size has not yet been decided by the government. 
Commission services project a general 
government surplus 1 percentage point higher 
than envisaged in the latest stability programme 
update of November 2007. The latter target 
seems outdated as it does not include the carry-
over from 2007, when the surplus was also 
almost 1 percentage point higher than expected. 
The latest Ministry of Finance forecast from 
March 2008 has revised the 2009 surplus target 
up to 4.1% of GDP. Beyond 2009, the Stability 
Programme expects the surplus to maintain a 
continuous downward trend, declining to 2½% of 
GDP in 2011, driven by adverse effects from 
ageing of the population. 
Based on Commission services’ spring forecast, 
the debt ratio will continue to decline, falling 
below 30% of GDP by 2009. The stability 
programme projections indicate that the debt 
ratio would diminish further over the programme 
period up to 2011, albeit at a somewhat slower 
pace in line with smaller general government 
surpluses. Because a significant part of the 
surpluses consists of the accumulation of assets 
to pension schemes (broadly corresponding to 
stock-flow adjustment) the decline in the debt 
ratio is smaller than what could be concluded 
from the sizeable general government surpluses. 
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2006 2007 2008 2009
4.1 5.3 4.9 4.6
52.9 52.7 52.4 52.0
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 13.6 13.1 12.9 12.6
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 17.2 17.6 17.4 17.3
- social contributions 12.3 12.1 11.9 12.0
48.8 47.4 47.5 47.4
  Of which: - compensation of employees 13.4 12.9 13.0 12.9
- intermediate consumption 9.3 9.0 9.1 9.2
- social payments 15.9 15.3 15.2 15.2
- gross fixed capital formation 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5
- interest expenditure 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3
5.5 6.8 6.3 5.9
43.6 43.3 42.8 42.4
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.2 4.9 4.8 4.9
5.6 6.4 6.2 6.1
39.2 35.4 31.9 29.1
4.9 4.4 2.8 2.6
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
3.8 4.5 3.7 3.6 2.8 2.4
5.3 6.0 5.2 5.0 4.1 3.6
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.0 4.2 3.3 3.3 2.8 2.8
39.2 35.3 32.8 30.4 29.0 27.9
5.0 4.4 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.1
Notes:
Table V.25.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Finland (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden









One-off and other temporary measures
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and stability programme of Finland.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in Nov 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the 
programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Income tax cuts by € 500 million (-0.3% of GDP) •     Various health and social welfare projects €224 million
•     Lowering tax on pension income €200 million (-0.1%       (0.1% of GDP)
       of GDP) •     Education and R&D € 106 million (0.05% of GDP)
•     Increasing energy taxes € 300 million (0.2% of GDP) •     Subsidy for employment of young and disabled € 50 
       million (0.03% of GDP)
Notes: 
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Table V.25.2:
Main measures in the budget for 2008, Finland
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.





Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
In 2007, the general government recorded an 
estimated surplus of 3.5% of GDP. This was 
significantly better than the 1.2% initially 
foreseen in the convergence programme of 
December 2006 (1). The better-than-expected 
general government balance was mainly the 
result of unexpectedly buoyant revenue growth, 
reflecting strong labour market developments 
and higher revenues from capital gains taxes. 
The significant fall in unemployment also 
contributed to lower-than-expected expenditures. 
Thanks to the surplus, government debt is 
estimated to have fallen to 40.6% of GDP in 
2007. 
The Budget for 2008 was approved by the 
Riksdag (Parliament) on 20 December 2007. It 
contains new reforms aiming at creating clearer 
incentives to work and to better include groups 
currently outside the labour market. They mainly 
take the form of a further reduction of income 
taxes for low and middle-income earners by 
means of a strengthened in-work tax credit, but 
also include lower expenditures for active labour 
market measures and unemployment as well as 
sickness insurance. The loss of revenue due to 
the abolition of the wealth tax as from 1 January 
2007 is to some extent compensated in 2008 by a 
further limitation of the tax deductibility of 
private pension fund savings. According to the 
macroeconomic scenario underpinning the spring 
budget bill presented in April 2008, the 
government forecasts a general budget surplus of 
2.9% of GDP in 2008. This is slightly higher 
than the 2.8% of GDP envisaged in the 2007 
update of the convergence programme, but still 
represents a narrowing of 0.6 percentage points 
compared with the surplus of 2007. This is close 
to the view taken in the Commission spring 
forecast, which foresees a surplus of 2.7% of 
GDP in 2008. The slight difference compared to 
                                                          
(1) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 
Commission and the Council, can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_poli
cy/sg_programmes9147_en.htm. 
the government forecast is mainly due to a 
somewhat less optimistic assumption about 
employment growth in 2008. On current policies, 
the fiscal stance is expected to be somewhat 
expansionary in 2008, as the primary structural 
surplus is expected to decrease by 0.5 percentage 
points in the Commission spring forecast. 
For 2009, the Commission services projects a 
further narrowing of the surplus to 2.3% of GDP. 
This forecast is based on a no-policy-change 
assumption and, hence, does not take into 
account announced measures that have not been 
sufficiently detailed, such as those presented in 
the spring budget bill. The latter signals the 
government's priorities for the 2009 Budget to be 
presented in the autumn. Notably, it foresees a 
third phase of the in-work tax credit to strengthen 
the incentives to work. The Commission 
services' forecast is significantly lower than the 
surplus of 3.1% of GDP indicated in the most 
recent update of the convergence programme, 
which was based on a much more optimistic 
macroeconomic scenario. It is, however, only 
slightly more pessimistic than the forecast 
underlying the spring budget law, which is built 
on a revised macroeconomic outlook. The 
remaining difference compared to the 
Commission forecast is again mainly due to the 
Commission services taking a slightly less 
optimistic view on labour market developments. 
For 2010, the convergence programme foresaw a 
general government surplus of 3.6% of GDP. In 
the spring budget bill, the forecast has been 
lowered to 3.3% of GDP, rising to 4.1% of GDP 
in 2011. 
As a result of continued high general government 
surpluses, the government debt ratio is projected 
to decline further. According to the Commission 
services' spring forecast, the debt ratio is 
expected to decrease to 35.5% and 31.9% of 
GDP in 2008 and 2009, respectively. On the 
back of continued strong surpluses and 
privatisation receipts, the convergence 
programme foresees the debt to decline towards 
20% of GDP in 2011. The government foresees 
privatisation receipts of more than 1.5% of GDP 
a year over the 2008-2011 period. 
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2006 2007 2008 2009
2.3 3.5 2.7 2.3
56.5 56.0 55.5 55.0
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 16.7 16.7 16.8 16.8
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 19.8 19.0 18.4 18.1
- social contributions 12.8 12.8 12.9 12.8
54.2 52.5 52.8 52.6
  Of which: - compensation of employees 15.3 15.1 15.2 15.3
- intermediate consumption 9.6 9.4 9.2 9.1
- social payments 16.3 15.3 15.1 15.1
- gross fixed capital formation 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2
- interest expenditure 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7
4.0 5.3 4.4 4.0
49.0 48.1 47.7 47.4
0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0
1.5 2.8 2.4 2.5
3.2 4.6 4.1 4.2
45.9 40.6 35.5 31.9
4.1 2.6 2.2 1.8
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2.5 3 2.8 3.1 3.6
4.2 4.6 4.4 4.5 4.8
0.5 0.4 0.3 0 0
1.7 2.4 2.1 2.8 3.4
47 39.7 34.8 29.8 24.5
4.2 3.2 3.2 2.5 2.2
Notes:
Table V.26.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006-2011, Sweden (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden









One-off and other temporary measures
- Total expenditure
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of Sweden.
(2) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit 
procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures 
taken from the programme.
Government gross debt
Real GDP growth (%)
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast.
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•     Taxes on labour (-0.6% of GDP) •     Labour market measures; unemploymnet and sickness 
•     Taxes on tobacco, alcohol and CO2 (0.1% of GDP)       insurance (-0.2% of GDP)
•     Other taxes on energy, environment and road traffic •     Grants to local governments (0.1% of GDP)
       (0.1% of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.26.2:
Main measures in the budget for 2008, Sweden
Source : Commission services and the November 2007 convergence programme.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.




Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects 
The general government deficit in 2007/08 (1) is 
estimated by the Commission services at 2.9% of 
GDP, up from 2.6% in 2006/07. The estimate for 
2007/08 is 0.1 percentage points less than the 
projection in the UK's convergence programme 
(CP) of November 2007 (2), reflecting lower 
current and capital expenditure. Excluding a 
deficit-neutral accounting adjustment, revenue is 
expected to reach the level envisaged in the 
November update. Lower VAT receipts and a 
drop in stamp duties from property transactions 
should be offset by higher revenues from income 
taxation and social security contributions, 
following strong revenues in January 2008 from 
tax liabilities accrued on income earned in the 
previous financial year.  
The 2007 budget had announced important, but 
intended deficit-neutral, changes in the direct 
taxation regime, which came into effect in April 
2008. On 9 October 2007, the Pre-Budget Report 
(PBR) and the 2007 Comprehensive Spending 
Review (CSR) were published. The PBR 
announced with immediate effect deficit-
increasing changes in the inheritance tax regime, 
while the 2007 CSR confirmed a significant 
slowdown in expenditure growth between 
2008/09 and 2010/11. The 2008 budget, 
presented on the 12 March 2008, included some 
small discretionary changes that are expected to 
be fiscally neutral in 2008/09, but which should 
contribute to a small improvement in the fiscal 
position in 2009/10. In 2008/09, these include an 
increase in duties on alcoholic products that will 
be offset by the deferral of a previously-
announced increase in road fuel duty. The budget 
projects a deficit of 3.2% of GDP in 2008/09, up 
by 0.3 percentage points from the convergence 
programme. The increase in the deficit is entirely 
due to a downward revision to the revenue 
                                                          
(1) The UK financial year runs from April to March.  
(2) The programme, as well as its assessment by the 




projections. In turn, the reduction in the revenue 
growth forecast in 2008/09 primarily reflects the 
UK authorities' downgrading of their outlook on 
asset and property markets. The expected 
downturn in the property market (relative to what 
had been assumed in the CP) is expected to cost 
the government 0.15% of GDP in forgone 
revenues from stamp duties and capital taxes, 
whereas lower-than-expected equity prices are 
expected to reduce receipts by an additional 
0.1% of GDP. Indirect tax revenues are also 
expected to fall short of the programme 
estimates, due to lower household spending and 
an increase in the share of expenditure on food, 
which is not subject to the standard VAT rate.  
The Commission services' spring 2008 forecast 
projects a deficit of 3.3% of GDP in 2008/09. 
This is 0.1 pp higher than in the 2008 budget, 
primarily reflecting the effect of the weaker 
economic context envisaged in the Commission's 
forecast on direct and, to a lesser extent, indirect 
tax revenues. According to the spring forecast, 
the fiscal stance in 2008/09 was expected to be 
broadly neutral, with the structural deficit 
projected to increase by 0.1% of GDP. However, 
subsequent to the cut-off date for the 
Commission services' forecast, on 13 May the 
government announced that it would be 
providing compensation to those negatively 
affected by the removal of the 10% starting rate 
on income tax (one of the measures announced in 
the March 2007 budget). The compensation is 
expected to raise the deficit ratio relative to the 
spring 2008 forecast by 0.2% of GDP.  
Under a no-policy-change assumption (pre-
dating the latest compensation package), the 
Commission services forecast the deficit in 
2009/10 to remain at around 3.3% of GDP, 0.9 
percentage points higher than in the programme. 
This is partly due to the carry-over from the 
higher deficit forecast in the preceding year 
2008/09, but it also reflects differences in 
revenue growth projections as a result of the 
weaker economic context underpinning the 
spring 2008 forecast. On the expenditure side, 
the Commission assumes that the government 
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will adhere to its non-cyclical primary 
expenditure plans announced in the budget, 
which were practically unchanged from those in 
the 2007 CSR (on which the CP was based).  
However, the Commission's higher inflation 
forecast for the third quarter of 2008 implies 
upward pressure on index-linked social benefits 
in 2009/10.  
Beyond 2009/10, the programme envisaged a 
reduction in the deficit by an average of ¼ pp per 
annum during the following three years, to a 
deficit of 1.6% of GDP in 2012/13. In the 2008 
budget, the programme's deficit projections for 
2010/11 and 2011/12 were revised slightly 
upward, by 0.2 pp and 0.1 pp respectively, 
implying an average consolidation of 0.4 pp per 
annum during the three-year period to 2012/13. 
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10
-2.6 -2.9 -3.3 -3.3
41.2 40.7 40.8 40.8
  Of which : - taxes on production and imports 12.6 12.4 12.5 12.5
- current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 16.7 16.5 16.6 16.6
- social contributions 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.5
43.9 43.6 44.2 44.1
  Of which: - compensation of employees 10.9 10.8 11.0 10.9
- intermediate consumption 11.8 11.7 11.7 11.6
- social payments 12.5 12.5 12.8 13.0
- gross fixed capital formation 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.9
- interest expenditure 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1
-0.5 -0.7 -1.1 -1.2
37.9 37.4 37.6 37.8
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-2.7 -3.0 -3.1 -2.9
-0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8
42.5 43.2 46.2 47.5
3.0 2.9 1.4 1.8
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 20011/12 2012/13
-2.6 -3.0 -2.9 -2.4 -2.1 -1.8 -1.6
-0.4 -0.8 -0.9 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-2.5 -3.0 -2.7 -2.3 -1.9 -1.6 -1.5
43.4 43.9 44.8 45.1 45.3 45.2 44.9
3.0 3.0 2.0 2¾ 2½ 2½ 2½
Notes:
(1) Commission services’ spring 2008 forecast. The UK financial year runs from April to March. The excessive deficit procedure applies to the UK on a 






Real GDP growth (%)
Government gross debt




One-off and other temporary measures
(2) Total revenues exclude UMTS receipts in line with the decision by Eurostat of 14 July 2000. Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include 
swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(3) Cyclically-adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Source: Commission services and convergence programme of the United Kingdom.
Table V.27.1:
Outturn and forecast (1)
General government balance (2)
- Total revenue
Budgetary developments 2006/07-2012/13, United Kingdom (% of GDP)
Primary balance
Tax burden
One-off and other temporary measures
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
Applicable as from 2008/09
•     Inheritance tax threshold raised (-0.1% of GDP) •     Expenditure settlements for government departments 
•     Deferral of increase in road fuel duties (-0.04% of GDP)       (increase in total expenditure by 2.1% p.a. in real terms 
•     Increase in alcohol duties (0.03% of GDP)       between 2008/09 and 2010/11 from 4.0% p.a. between 
Applicable as from 2009/10        1999/00 to 2007/08) 
•     Tax for non-domiciled UK residents (0.1% of GDP)
•     Increase in duties on alcohol and motor vehicles (0.1% 
       of GDP)
Notes:
Table V.27.2:
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
Source : Commission services, 2007 pre-budget report and 2008 budget.
Main measures in the 2007 pre-budget report and the 2008 budget, United Kingdom
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
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According to the spring 2008 forecast, the gross 
debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to increase by 4 pp 
during the forecast period, to 47½% at the end of 
2009/10, with the replacement of the Bank of 
England's loan with government financing 
expected to raise the debt ratio by 1 pp in 
2008/09.  
Efficiency challenges for the provision of 
public services 
In recent years general government expenditure 
has grown faster than revenues in relation to 
GDP, reflecting to a large extent the 
government’s objective to improve public 
services. The ratio of general government 
expenditure to GDP has risen by more than 5 
percentage points from 39% in 1999/00 to 44% 
in 2006/07. In the light of the weak current fiscal 
position there is a growing need to contain 
overall public spending. In this context, further 
advancing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
public spending will be essential so as to ensure 
value for money and release resources for key 
priorities. 
Graph V.27.1: Public sector spending by function, 1997/98, 
2001/02 and 2006/07 (% of GDP)
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
 Environment protection
 Housing and community amenities
 Recreation, culture and religion




 Education (includes training)
 Health
 Social protection
1997/98 2001/02 2006/07 
Note: Functional categories are based on the UN Classification of the Functions of Government 
(COFOG), the international standard.
Source: PESA 2007, HM Treasury.  
Since 1997/98, public sector spending on key 
public services such as health and education has 
increased substantially. With average annual real 
growth rates of 5% and 6% respectively, these 
areas have grown much faster than both total 
public spending and national income.  
Since the early 1990s the UK’s budgeting 
framework has gradually developed so as to take 
a more strategic approach to the planning of 
public spending. The UK is today at the forefront 
of applying performance-based budgeting 
techniques, including the linking of spending to 
performance targets (1). The multi-annual 
framework allows departments to plan spending 
over a longer time horizon and reduces the risk 
of growth-enhancing capital investment being 
squeezed out by short term spending. However, 
challenges still remain, including how to ensure 
better coordination between different levels of 
government and how to define measurable 
targets and outcome-focused objectives.  
To support the 2007 CSR spending plans for 
2008/09 to 2010/11 a new performance 
management framework was introduced in the 
form of 30 new cross-departmental Public Sector 
Agreements setting the government’s priority 
outcomes for the 2007 CSR period as well as a 
value for money programme. The latter, building 
on the 2004 Efficiency Programme and the 
Gershon Review approach (2), aims at at least 
3% efficiency savings per year over the CSR 
period across central and local government, 
releasing £30 billion by 2010/11 (3). It should be 
noted that the efficiency savings do not represent 
an overall fiscal tightening but a measure to 
increase the effectiveness of public expenditure. 
Departments and local authorities can thus retain 
achieved gains, re-directing them to priority 
areas within the same spending envelope.  
It is still too early to judge whether the 
introduced measures will actually lead to a real 
improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness 
of public spending. There is a risk that some of 
the declared efficiency gains could represent 
pure cost-savings, entailing lower public service 
output. Furthermore, the targets are intrinsically 
hard to evaluate (4). 
                                                          
(1) OECD (2007j). 
(2) For further information see European Commission 
(2008e). 
(3) In comparison the 2004 efficiency programme set a 
target of achieving annual efficiency gains of around 
£21bn by 2007/08. 
(4) As regards the 2004 efficiency programme, the National 
Audit Office noted in February 2007 that some good 
progress in addressing measurement issues and reaching 
the target has been made, although some projects have 
found it hard to demonstrate that quality of services has 












CZ Czech Republic 
DK  Denmark 
DE Germany 
EE Estonia  
EI  Ireland 
EL  Greece 
ES  Spain 
FR  France 




LU  Luxembourg 
HU Hungary 
MT Malta 
NL  The Netherlands 
AT  Austria 
PL Poland 




FI  Finland 
SE  Sweden 
UK  United Kingdom 
 
EA Euro area 
EU European Union 
EU-25 European Union, 25 Member States (excl. BG and RO) 
EU-27 European Union, 27 Member States 





EU-10 European Union, 10 Member States that joined the EU on 1 May 2004  
(CZ, EE, CY, LV, LH, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK) 
Non-EU countries 
AU  Australia 
CA  Canada 
CH  Switzerland 
JP   Japan 
KO South Korea 
NO Norway 
NZ  New Zeeland  
US(A)  United States  
Currencies 
EUR  euro 
ECU  European currency unit 
BGL Bulgarian lev 
CZK  Czech koruna 
DKK  Danish krone 
EEK  Estonian kroon 
GBP  Pound sterling 
LTL Lithuanian litas 
LVL Latvian lats 
HUF Hungarian forint 
RON New Rumanian leu 
SEK  Swedish krona 
SKK Slovak koruna 
CAD  Canadian dollar 
CHF  Swiss franc 
JPY  Japanese yen 
SUR  Russian rouble 
USD  US dollar 
Other 
CAPB Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
COFOG  Classification of the functions of government 
DEA  Data envelope approach 
DG ECFIN  Directorate-General Economic and Financial Affairs 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2008 
 
278 
DR Debt requirement 
DSGE Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECOFIN  Economic and Financial Council 
EFC Economic and Financial Committee 
EMU   Economic and Monetary Union 
EPC Economic Policy Committee 
EU KLEMS  European database on capital, labour, energy, material and services 
FDH  Free disposable hull 
FDI  Foreign direct investment 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GLS  Generalised least squares 
IBP Initial budgetary position 
ICT  Information and communication technologies 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
LTC Long-term budgetary cost of ageing 
MTBF  Medium-term budgetary framework 
MTO Medium-term budgetary objective 
OECD Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS  Ordinary least squares 
PBB  Performance-based budgeting 
PISA  Programme for International Student Assessment 
pp Percentage points 
PPS Purchasing power standard 
QPF Quality of public finances 
R&D Research and development 
RAMS  Recently acceded Member States 
RoEA Rest of euro area 
RoW Rest of the world 
SCPs Stability and convergence programmes 
SGP  Stability and Growth Pact 
SSC Social security contributions 
TFP  Total factor productivity 
VAT Value added tax 




Automatic stabilisers  Features of the tax and 
spending regime which react automatically to the 
economic cycle and reduce its fluctuations. As a 
result, the budget balance in percent of GDP 
tends to improve in years of high growth, and 
deteriorate during economic slowdowns. 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs)  
Annual guidelines for the economic and 
budgetary policies of the Member States. They 
are prepared by the Commission and adopted by 
the Council of Ministers responsible for 
Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN). 
Budget balance  The balance between total 
public expenditure and revenue in a specific 
year, with a positive balance indicating a surplus 
and a negative balance indicating a deficit. For 
the monitoring of Member State budgetary 
positions, the EU uses general government 
aggregates. See also structural budget balance, 
primary budget balance, and primary structural 
balance. 
Budgetary rules  Rules and procedures through 
which policy-makers decide on the size and the 
allocation of public expenditure as well as on its 
financing through taxation and borrowing. 
Budgetary sensitivity  The variation in the 
budget balance in percentage of GDP brought 
about by a change in the output gap. In the EU, it 
is estimated to be 0.5 on average. 
Candidate countries  Countries that wish to 
accede to the EU. Besides the accession 
countries, they include Croatia and Turkey. 
Close-to-balance requirement  A requirement 
contained in the 'old' Stability and Growth Pact, 
according to which Member States should, over 
the medium term, achieve an overall budget 
balance close to balance or in surplus; was 
replaced by country-specific medium-term 
budgetary objectives in the reformed Stability 
and Growth Pact. 
Code of Conduct Policy document endorsed by 
the ECOFIN Council of 11 October 2005 setting 
down the specifications on the implementation of 
the Stability and Growth Pact and the format and 
content of the stability and convergence 
programmes. 
COFOG  (Classification of the Functions of 
Government) A statistical nomenclature used to 
break down general government expenditure into 
its different functions  including general public 
services, defence, public order and safety, 
economic affairs, environmental protection, 
housing and community amenities, health, 
recreation, culture and religion, education and 
social protection. 
Composite indicator  Is formed when individual 
indicators are compiled into a single indicator, on 
the basis of an underlying model of the multi-
dimensional concept that is being measured. 
Convergence programmes  Medium-term 
budgetary and monetary strategies presented by 
Member States that have not yet adopted the 
euro. They are updated annually, according to 
the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Prior to the third phase of EMU, convergence 
programmes were issued on a voluntary basis 
and used by the Commission in its assessment of 
the progress made in preparing for the euro. See 
also stability programmes. 
Crowding-out effects  Offsetting effects on 
output due to changes in interest rates and 
exchange rates triggered by a loosening or 
tightening of fiscal policy. 
Cyclical component of budget balance  That 
part of the change in the budget balance that 
follows automatically from the cyclical 
conditions of the economy, due to the reaction of 
public revenue and expenditure to changes in the 
output gap. See automatic stabilisers, tax 
smoothing and structural budget balance. 
Cyclically-adjusted budget balance  See 
structural budget balance. 
Data envelope analysis  A statistical method to 
form a production possibility frontier by creating 
an envelope around the observed input-output 
(outcome) observations. Efficiency is than 
calculated as the distance to the frontier. 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2008 
 
280 
Defined-benefit pension scheme  A traditional 
pension scheme that defines a benefit, i.e. a 
pension, for an employee upon that employee's 
retirement is a defined benefit plan. 
Defined-contribution pension scheme A 
scheme providing for an individual account for 
each participant, and for benefits based solely on 
the amount contributed to the account, plus or 
minus income, gains, expenses and losses 
allocated to the account. 
Demand and supply shocks  Disturbances that 
affect the economy on the demand side (e.g. 
changes in private consumption or exports) or on 
the supply side (e.g. changes in commodity 
prices or technological innovations). They can 
impact on the economy either on a temporary or 
permanent basis. 
Dependency ratio  A measure of the ratio of 
people who receive government transfers, 
especially pensions, relative to those who are 
available to provide the revenue to pay for those 
transfers. 
Direct taxes  Taxes that are levied directly on 
personal or corporate incomes and property. 
Discretionary fiscal policy  Change in the 
budget balance and in its components under the 
control of government. It is usually measured as 
the residual of the change in the balance after the 
exclusion of the budgetary impact of automatic 
stabilisers. See also fiscal stance. 
Discriminant analysis  A statistical technique 
for classifying observations into predefined 
groups where the purpose is to determine the 
group to which a particular observation belongs 
based on a set of variables known as predictors. 
A discriminant function is calculated and is a 
latent variable which is created as a linear 
combination of the discriminating (independent) 
variables. This method is analogous to multiple 
regression where the coefficients of the 
discriminating variables maximize the distance 
between the means of the dependent variable of 
two different groups. 
Early-warning mechanism  Part of the 
preventive elements of the Stability and Growth 
Pact. It is activated when there is significant 
divergence from the budgetary targets set down 
in a stability or convergence programme. 
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)  
Formerly the Monetary Committee, the EFC is a 
Committee of the Council of the European Union 
set up by Article 114 of the. Its main task is to 
prepare and discuss (ECOFIN) Council decisions 
with regard to economic and financial matters. 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC)  Group of 
senior government officials whose main task is 
to prepare discussions of the (ECOFIN) Council 
on structural policies. It plays an important role 
in the preparation of the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines, and it is active on policies related to 
labour markets, methods to calculate cyclically-
adjusted budget balances and ageing populations. 
Effective tax rate  The ratio of broad categories 
of tax revenue (labour income, capital income, 
consumption) to their respective tax bases. 
Effectiveness  The same concept as efficiency 
except that it links input to outcomes rather than 
outputs. 
Efficiency  Can be defined in several ways, 
either as the ratio of outputs to inputs or as the 
distance to a production possibility frontier (see 
also Free Disposable Hull analysis, Data 
Envelope analysis, stochastic frontier analysis). 
Cost efficiency measures the link between 
monetary inputs (funds) and outputs; technical 
efficiency measures the link between technical 
inputs and outputs. Output efficiency indicates by 
how much the output can be increased for a 
given input; input efficiency indicates by how 
much the input can be reduced for a given input. 
ESA95 / ESA79  European accounting standards 
for the reporting of economic data by the 
Member States to the EU. As of 2000, ESA95 
has replaced the earlier ESA79 standard with 
regard to the comparison and analysis of national 
public finance data. 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)  A 
procedure according to which the Commission 
and the Council monitor the development of 
national budget balances and public debt in order 
to assess and/or correct the risk of an excessive 





been further clarified in the Stability and Growth 
Pact. See also stability programmes and Stability 
and Growth Pact. 
Expenditure rules  A subset of fiscal rules that 
target (a subset of) public expenditure. 
Externality  It arises in a given economic 
transaction when its participants do not fully 
internalize (through the price level in particular) 
all of the costs or the benefits derived from this 
transaction. Externalities may arise, for instance, 
for certain productive activities damaging the 
environment (e.g. pollution) or because all the 
benefits of a given change in the production 
process are not fully captured by the innovating 
firms (e.g. technological innovation).  
Fiscal consolidation  An improvement in the 
budget balance through measures of 
discretionary fiscal policy, either specified by the 
amount of the improvement or the period over 
which the improvement continues. 
Fiscal decentralisation  The transfer of 
authority and responsibility for public functions 
from the central government to intermediate and 
local governments or to the market. 
Fiscal federalism  A subfield of public finance 
that investigates the fiscal relations across levels 
of government. 
Fiscal governance  Comprises all rules, 
regulations and procedures that impact on how 
the budget and its components are being 
prepared. The terms fiscal governance and fiscal 
frameworks are used interchangeably in the 
report. 
Fiscal impulse  The estimated effect of fiscal 
policy on GDP. It is not a model-free measure 
and it is usually calculated by simulating an 
econometric model. The estimates presented in 
the present report are obtained by using the 
Commission services’ QUEST model. 
Fiscal rule  A permanent constraint on fiscal 
policy, expressed in terms of a summary 
indicator of fiscal performance, such as the 
government budget deficit, borrowing, debt, or a 
major component thereof. See also budgetary 
rule, expenditure rules. 
Fiscal stance  A measure of the effect of 
discretionary fiscal policy. In this report, it is 
defined as the change in the primary structural 
budget balance relative to the preceding period. 
When the change is positive (negative) the fiscal 
stance is said to be expansionary (restrictive). 
Free Disposable Hull analysis  A statistical 
method to form a production possibility frontier 
by creating a step-wise envelope around the 
observed input-output (outcome) observations. 
Efficiency is than calculated as the distance to 
the frontier. 
General government  As used by the EU in its 
process of budgetary surveillance under the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the excessive 
deficit procedure, the general government sector 
covers national government, regional and local 
government, as well as social security funds. 
Public enterprises are excluded, as are transfers 
to and from the EU Budget. 
Government budget constraint  A basic 
condition applying to the public finances, 
according to which total public expenditure in 
any one year must be financed by taxation, 
government borrowing, or changes in the 
monetary base. In the context of EMU, the 
ability of governments to finance spending 
through money issuance is prohibited. See also 
stock-flow adjustment, sustainability. 
Government contingent liabilities  Obligations 
for the government that are subject to the 
realization of specific uncertain and discrete 
future events. For instance, the guarantees 
granted by governments to the debt of private 
corporations bonds issued by enterprise are 
contingent liabilities, since the government 
obligation to pay depend on the non-ability of the 
original debtor to honour its own obligations. 
Government implicit liabilities  Government 
obligations that are very likely to arise in the 
future in spite of the absence of backing 
contracts or law. The government may have a 
potential future obligation as a result of 
legitimate expectations generated by past 
practice or as a result of the pressure by interest 
groups. Most implicit liabilities are contingent, 
i.e., depend upon the occurrence of uncertain 
future events. 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2008 
 
282 
Growth accounting  A technique based on a 
production function approach where total GDP 
(or national income) growth is decomposed into 
the various production factors and a non-
explained part which is the total factor 
productivity change, also often termed the Solow 
residual. 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter  A statistical 
technique used to calculate trend GDP and 
output gaps by filtering actual GDP. 
ICT  (Information and Communication 
Technologies) investment in ICT usually include 
three types of assets: computing equipment, 
communication equipment and software. 
Investments in these assets have attracted 
increasing attention during in the recent years 
due to their potential impact on productivity and 
growth development in developed economies. 
Indirect taxation  Taxes that are levied during 
the production stage, and not on the income and 
property arising from economic production 
processes. Prominent examples of indirect 
taxation are the value added tax (VAT), excise 
duties, import levies, energy and other 
environmental taxes. 
Integrated guidelines  A general policy 
instrument for coordinating EU-wide and 
Member States economic structural reforms 
embedded in the Lisbon strategy and which main 
aim is to boost economic growth and job creation 
in the EU. 
Interest burden  General government interest 
payments on public debt as a share of GDP. 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs 
Partnership between the EU and Member States 
for growth and more and better jobs. Originally 
approved in 2000, the Lisbon Strategy was 
revamped in 2005. Based on the Integrated 
Guidelines (merger of the broad economic policy 
guidelines and the employment guidelines, 
dealing with macro-economic, micro-economic 
and employment issues) for the period 2005-
2008, Member States drew up three-year national 
reform programmes at the end of 2005. They 
reported on the implementation of the national 
reform programmes for the first time in autumn 
2006. The Commission analyses and summarises 
these reports in an EU Annual Progress Report 
each year, in time for the Spring European 
Council. 
Maastricht reference values for public debt 
and deficits  Respectively, a 60 % general 
government debt-to-GDP ratio and a 3 % general 
government deficit-to-GDP ratio. These 
thresholds are defined in a protocol to the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union. See also 
Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
Maturity structure of public debt  The profile 
of total debt in terms of when it is due to be paid 
back. Interest rate changes affect the budget 
balance directly to the extent that the general 
government sector has debt with a relatively 
short maturity structure. Long maturities reduce 
the sensitivity of the budget balance to changes 
in the prevailing interest rate. See also public 
debt. 
Medium-term budgetary framework  An 
institutional fiscal device that lets policy-makers 
extend the horizon for fiscal policy making 
beyond the annual budgetary calendar (typically 
3-5 years). Targets can be adjusted under 
medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBF) 
either on an annul basis (flexible frameworks) or 
only at the end of the MTBF horizon (fixed 
frameworks).  
Medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) 
According to the reformed Stability and Growth 
Pact, stability programmes and convergence 
programmes present a medium-term objective for 
the budgetary position. It is country-specific to 
take into account the diversity of economic and 
budgetary positions and developments as well as 
of fiscal risks to the sustainability of public 
finances, and is defined in structural terms (see 
structural balance). 
Minimum benchmarks  The lowest value of the 
structural budget balance that provides a safety 
margin against the risk of breaching the 
Maastricht reference value for the deficit during 
normal cyclical fluctuations. The minimum 
benchmarks are estimated by the European 
Commission. They do not cater for other risks 
such as unexpected budgetary developments and 
interest rate shocks. They are a lower bound for 





Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)  An 
indicator combining the change in real short-term 
interest rate and in the real effective exchange 
rate to gauge the degree of easing or tightening 
of monetary policy. 
Mundell-Fleming model  Macroeconomic 
model of an open economy which embodies the 
main Keynesian hypotheses (price rigidity, 
liquidity preference). In spite of its shortcomings, 
it remains useful in short-term economic policy 
analysis. 
NAIRU  Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment. 
Non-Keynesian effects  Supply-side and 
expectations effects which reverse the sign of 
traditional Keynesian multipliers. Hence, if non-
Keynesian effects dominate, fiscal consolidation 
would be expansionary. 
Old age dependency ratio  Population aged 
over 65 as a percentage of working age 
population (usually defined as persons aged 
between 15 and 64). 
One-off and temporary measures Government 
transactions having a transitory budgetary effect 
that does not lead to a sustained change in the 
budgetary position. See also structural balance. 
Outcome indicator Measures the ultimate 
results (outcomes) of policy choices (e.g. 
education attainment, healthy life years, 
economic growth).  
Output gap  The difference between actual 
output and estimated potential output at any 
particular point in time. See also cyclical 
component of budget balance. 
Output indicator Measures the technical results 
(outputs) of policy choices (e.g. number of 
university graduates, number of patents, life 
expectancy). 
Pay-as-you-go pension system (PAYG)  
Pension system in which current pension 
expenditures are financed by the contributions of 
current employees. 
Pension fund A legal entity set up to 
accumulate, manage and administer pension 
assets. See also private pension scheme. 
Performance-based budgeting A budgeting 
technique that links budget appropriations to 
performance (outcomes, results) rather than 
focusing on input controls. In practice, 
performance-informed budgeting is more 
common which basis decisions on budgetary 
allocation on performance information without 
establishing a formal link. 
Philips-curve  Depicts the inverse relationship 
between the unemployment rate and the inflation 
rate in a given economy. 
Policy-mix  The overall stance of fiscal and 
monetary policy. The policy-mix may consist of 
various combinations of expansionary and 
restrictive policies, with a given fiscal stance 
being either supported or offset by monetary 
policy. 
Potential GDP The level of real GDP in a given 
year that is consistent with a stable rate of 
inflation. If actual output rises above its potential 
level, then constraints on capacity begin to bind 
and inflationary pressures build; if output falls 
below potential, then resources are lying idle and 
inflationary pressures abate. See also production 
function method and output gap. 
Pre-accession Economic Programmes (PEPs)  
Annual programmes submitted by candidate 
countries which set the framework for economic 
policies The PEPs consist of a review of recent 
economic developments, a detailed 
macroeconomic framework, a discussion of 
public finance issues and an outline of the 
structural reform agenda. 
Pre-accession Fiscal Surveillance Framework 
(PFSF)  Framework for budgetary surveillance 
of candidate countries in the run up to accession. 
It closely approximates the policy co-ordination 
and surveillance mechanisms at EU level. 
Primary budget balance  The budget balance 
net of interest payments on general government 
debt. 
European Commission 
Public finances in EMU - 2008 
 
284 
Primary structural budget balance  The 
structural budget balance net of interest 
payments. 
Principal components  A statistical technique 
used to reduce multidimensional data sets to 
lower dimensions for analysis. This technique 
provides a compression of a set of high 
dimensional vectors (or variables) into a set of 
lower dimensional vectors (or variables) and then 
reconstructing the original set summarizing the 
information into a limited number of values. 
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy  A fiscal stance which 
amplifies the economic cycle by increasing the 
structural primary deficit during an economic 
upturn, or by decreasing it in a downturn. A 
neutral fiscal policy keeps the cyclically-adjusted 
budget balance unchanged over the economic 
cycle but lets the automatic stabilisers work. See 
also tax-smoothing. 
Production function approach  A method to 
estimate the level of potential output of an 
economy based on available labour inputs, the 
capital stock and their level of efficiency. 
Potential output is used to estimate the output 
gap, a key input in the estimation of cyclical 
component of the budget. 
Public debt  Consolidated gross debt for the 
general government sector. It includes the total 
nominal value of all debt owed by public 
institutions in the Member State, except that part 
of the debt which is owed to other public 
institutions in the same Member State. 
Public goods  Goods and services that are 
consumed jointly by several economic agents 
and for which there is no effective pricing 
mechanism that would allow private provision 
through the market. 
Public investment  The component of total 
public expenditure through which governments 
increase and improve the stock of capital 
employed in the production of the goods and 
services they provide. 
Public-private partnerships (PPP)  
Agreements that transfer investment projects to 
the private sector that traditionally have been 
executed or financed by the public sector. To 
qualify as a PPP, the project should concern a 
public function, involve the general government 
as the principal purchaser, be financed from non-
public sources and engage a corporation outside 
the general government as the principal operator 
that provides significant inputs in the design and 
conception of the project and bears a relevant 
amount of the risk. 
Quality of public finances  Comprises all 
arrangements and operations of fiscal policy that 
support the macroeconomic goals of fiscal 
policy, in particular economic growth. 
Quasi-fiscal activities  Activities promoting 
public policy goals carried out by non-
government units. 
QUEST  The macroeconomic model of the EU 
Member States plus the US and Japan developed 
by the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs of the European Commission. 
Recently acceded Member States  Countries 
that became members of the EU in May 2004 
and include Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Two additional 
countries, Romania and Bulgaria joined in 
January 2007. 
Ricardian equivalence  Under fairly restrictive 
theoretical assumptions on the consumer’s 
behaviour (inter alia infinite horizon for decision 
making), the impact of fiscal policy does not 
depend on whether it is financed by tax increases 
or by a widening deficit. The basic reasoning 
behind this statement dates back to Ricardo and 
was revisited by Robert Barro in the 1970s. 
Securitisation  Borrowing (issuing of bonds) 
with the intention of paying interest and capital 
out of the proceeds derived from assets (use or 
sale of) or from future revenue flows. 
Sensitivity analysis  An econometric or 
statistical simulation designed to test the 
robustness of an estimated economic relationship 
or projection, given various changes in the 
underlying assumptions. 
Significant divergence  A sizeable excess of the 





stability or convergence programmes, that 
triggers the Early warning procedure of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. 
Size of the public sector  Typically measured as 
the ratio of public expenditure to nominal GDP. 
‘Snow-ball’ effect  The self-reinforcing effect of 
public debt accumulation or decumulation 
arising from a positive or negative differential 
between the interest rate paid on public debt and 
the growth rate of the national economy. See also 
government budget constraint. 
Social security contributions (SSC)  Mandatory 
contributions paid by employers and employees 
to a social insurance scheme to cover for 
pension, health care and other welfare 
provisions. 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)  Approved in 
1997 and reformed in 2005, the SGP clarifies the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the 
surveillance of Member State budgetary policies 
and the monitoring of budget deficits during the 
third phase of EMU. The SGP consists of two 
Council Regulations setting out legally binding 
provisions to be followed by the European 
Institutions and the Member States and two 
Resolutions of the European Council in 
Amsterdam (June 1997). See also Excessive 
Deficit Procedure. 
Stability programmes  Medium-term budgetary 
strategies presented by those Member States that 
have already adopted the euro. They are updated 
annually, according to the provisions of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. See also Convergence 
programmes. 
Stochastic frontier analysis  A statistical 
method to estimate a production possibility 
frontier by assuming a specific functional form, 
e.g. a Cobb-Douglas type production function. In 
contrast to the Data Envelope analysis the 
frontier will be fit through the cloud of data 
points rather than enveloping them. Efficiency is 
calculated as part of the residual with the other 
part being the error term 
Stock-flow adjustment  The stock-flow 
adjustment (also known as the debt-deficit 
adjustment) ensures consistency between the net 
borrowing (flow) and the variation in the stock of 
gross debt. It includes the accumulation of 
financial assets, changes in the value of debt 
denominated in foreign currency, and remaining 
statistical adjustments. 
Structural budget balance  The actual budget 
balance net of the cyclical component and one-
off and other temporary measures. The structural 
balance gives a measure of the underlying trend 
in the budget balance. See also primary 
structural budget balance. 
Sustainability  A combination of budget deficits 
and debt that ensure that the latter does not grow 
without bound. While conceptually intuitive, an 
agreed operational definition of sustainability has 
proven difficult to achieve. 
Tax elasticity A parameter measuring the 
relative change in tax revenues with respect to a 
relative change in GDP. The tax elasticity is an 
input to the budgetary sensitivity. 
Tax gaps  Measure used in the assessment of the 
sustainability of public finances. They measure 
the difference between the current tax ratio and 
the constant tax ratio over a given projection 
period to achieve a predetermined level of debt at 
the end of that projection period. 
Tax smoothing  The idea that tax rates should be 
kept stable in order to minimise the distortionary 
effects of taxation, while leaving it for the 
automatic stabilisers to smooth the economic 
cycle. It is also referred to as neutral 
discretionary fiscal policy. See also cyclical 
component of fiscal policy. 
Tax wedge  The deviation from equilibrium 
price/quantity as a result of a taxation, which 
results in consumers paying more, and suppliers 
receiving less. When referring to labour tax 
wedge more specifically, the tax wedge is 
usually regarded as the difference between the 
difference between the salary costs of an average 
worker to their employer and the amount of net 
income that the worker receives in return, the 
difference being represented by taxes including 
personal income taxes and compulsory social 
security contributions. 
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Total factor productivity  Represents the share 
of total output not explained by the level of 
inputs (labour, capital or primary product). It is 
generally considered as a measure of overall 
productive efficiency. 
UMTS  Third generation of technical support for 
mobile phone communications. Sale of UMTS 
licences gave rise to sizeable one-off receipts in 
2001. 
Wagner’s law  Theory according to which 
public spending – since it comprises ‘luxury 
goods’ with high elasticity to income – would 
tend to rise as a share of GDP as per-capita 
income increases. 
Welfare state  Range of policies designed to 
provide insurance against unemployment, 
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